1. S. 482 CrPC/S.528 BNSS | Supreme Court Lays Down Four-Step Test For High Courts To Quash Criminal CasesIn a significant ruling, the Supreme Court has established a four-step test for High Courts to follow when considering petitions to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) [now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, BNSS]....
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court has established a four-step test for High Courts to follow when considering petitions to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) [now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, BNSS].
The bench, comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Sandeep Mehta, outlined that the High Court should assess: (i) whether the exonerating material presented by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality; (ii) if this material conclusively rules out the accusations in the complaint; (iii) whether the prosecution has failed to or cannot justifiably refute this material; and (iv) if continuing the trial would be an abuse of the court's process. The Court held that if all four steps are satisfied, the High Court should exercise its power to quash the proceedings to serve the ends of justice and save judicial time.
This test was formulated while allowing an appeal and quashing criminal summons in a case where the complainant had alleged rape on a false promise of marriage, noting a four-year delay in filing and a lack of credible allegations.
Cause Title: PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880
The Supreme Court has emphasized that Magistrates must actively ascertain the truth of allegations before issuing summons in criminal complaints. In a judgment quashing a cheque dishonour case, the bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan held that a complainant's statement under Section 200 CrPC (Section 227 BNSS) is not a mere formality. The Magistrate has a duty to question the complainant and apply their mind to the evidence to determine if sufficient grounds exist to proceed against an accused. The Court stressed that suppressing material facts and documents while filing a complaint is an abuse of the judicial process, and criminal law cannot be set in motion on such a misleading foundation.
Cause Title: REKHA SHARAD USHIR versus SAPTASHRUNGI MAHILA NAGARI SAHKARI PATSANSTA LTD., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355
The Supreme Court has directed courts to adopt a liberal approach when deciding bail applications under Section 437(6) of the CrPC (Section 480(6) BNSS), which applies when a Magistrate's trial has not concluded within 60 days from the first date set for prosecution evidence.
The bench, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, held that this right to speedy trial should be liberally enforced in the absence of factors like the accused causing delay, tampering with evidence, or risk of absconding. The Court outlined relevant considerations, including whether the delay is attributable to the accused, the nature of evidence, the likely trial duration, and the period of custody already undergone. Applying this principle, the Court granted bail to an accused in a cryptocurrency fraud case who had been in custody for over a year, while also imposing a condition to deposit a specified amount.
Cause Title: Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh., Citation :2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223
4. Charges Framed Cannot Be Deleted Invoking S.216 CrPC/S.239 BNSS : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has clarified that once charges are formally framed against an accused in a trial, they cannot be deleted by invoking Section 216 of the CrPC (Section 239 BNSS).
The bench, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, held that the power under this provision is limited to adding or altering charges, not for deleting them mid-trial. The Court emphasized that a charge, once framed, must lead to a final outcome of either acquittal or conviction at the conclusion of the trial, and no shortcuts are permissible. The ruling came in appeals where trial courts had incorrectly deleted charges under the NDPS Act after framing them. The Supreme Court set aside these orders and directed that the trials against the accused proceed under the initially framed charges.
Cause Title: DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE VERSUS RAJ KUMAR ARORA & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434
The Supreme Court has issued a significant directive to High Courts, urging them to proactively check compliance with Section 313 of the CrPC (Section 351 BNSS) at the very outset of hearing criminal appeals. This section mandates that all incriminating evidence against an accused must be presented to them during trial to provide an opportunity for explanation.
The bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka, Pankaj Mithal, and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, observed that many appeals fail because this vital procedural step was omitted at the trial stage, a defect that becomes incurable after years have passed. The Court recommended that if High Courts detect such a lapse early, they should immediately remand the case to the trial court to cure the defect, thereby preventing potential acquittals on this technical ground and conserving judicial time. This observation was made while dismissing an appeal against an acquittal in a murder case, though the acquittal itself was upheld on other grounds.
Cause Title: Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 456
The Supreme Court has held that police officers are constitutionally bound to protect and uphold the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.
In a judgment quashing an FIR against a political leader over a social media post, a bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan emphasized that police are part of the 'State' under Article 12 and are duty-bound by Article 51A(a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals, including liberty of thought and expression. The Court strongly urged state governments to conduct massive training programs to sensitize police officers about their constitutional obligations, stating that officers must carefully scrutinize complaints about speech to ensure they do not infringe on fundamental rights. The ruling underscores that the police must not only enforce the law but also act as guardians of constitutional freedoms
Cause Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362
The Supreme Court has mandated that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted before registering an FIR for offences related to speech and expression that are punishable with imprisonment between three to seven years.
Interpreting Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), a bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan held that this step is essential to protect the fundamental right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) and to prevent the misuse of law through frivolous FIRs.
The Court clarified that for such offences, which constitute reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), police must normally obtain prior approval from a superior officer and conduct an inquiry within 14 days to ascertain if a prima facie case exists before proceeding. The ruling came while quashing an FIR against a political leader over a social media post, reinforcing judicial safeguards for expressive freedoms
Cause Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362
The Supreme Court has reiterated that High Courts cannot conduct a 'mini-trial' or inquire into the credibility of allegations when deciding petitions to quash an FIR under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS).
Setting aside a Madhya Pradesh High Court order that had quashed a dowry harassment case, a bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra held that at the quashing stage, the court's role is limited to examining whether the complaint/FIR discloses a prima facie case. It is impermissible to evaluate the reliability, genuineness, or consistency of the allegations at this preliminary stage. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had erroneously examined specific omissions in earlier complaints and held a 'mini-trial,' which overstepped the bounds of its jurisdiction under Section 482. The ruling reinstates the FIR, emphasizing that quashing power should be exercised only when no sufficient material exists to proceed against the accused.
Cause Title: MUSKAN VERSUS ISHAAN KHAN (SATANIYA) AND OTHERS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1080
The Supreme Court has directed that police must not serve notices under Section 41A of the CrPC (Section 35 of BNSS) through WhatsApp or other electronic means.
A bench of Justices MM Sundresh and Rajesh Bindal clarified that such electronic service is not a valid substitute for the formal modes of service prescribed under the criminal procedure law. The Court also directed that similar notices under Sections 160 and 175 CrPC (Sections 179 and 195 BNSS) must be issued only through the prescribed statutory modes. The ruling came during the monitoring of compliance with its earlier directions in the Satender Kumar Antil case aimed at preventing unnecessary arrests. The Court ordered all states and union territories to issue standing orders to their police forces to comply with this mandate, reiterating that electronic notices cannot circumvent the legal requirements for serving appearance notices to an accused or suspect.
Case : Satender Kumar Antil v CBI, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112
10. S. 223 CrPC/S. 243 BNSS | Supreme Court Lays Down Principles For Joint Trial In Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court has laid down key principles for conducting joint trials in criminal cases under Section 223 CrPC (Section 243 BNSS).
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan ruled that a joint trial is permissible when multiple accused are involved in offences arising from the same transaction; a separate trial should be ordered only if the acts attributed to each accused are distinct and severable. The Court emphasized that while separate trial is the general rule, the decision for a joint trial should be based on whether it would cause prejudice to the accused or lead to unnecessary delay and duplication of judicial effort. Applying these principles, the Court set aside orders directing a separate trial for an MLA in the Nuh violence case, holding that the evidence against him and his co-accused was inseparable and part of the same alleged incident. The ruling underscores that segregating a trial without legal justification violates the right to a fair trial under Article 21.
Cause Title: MAMMAN KHAN VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court clarified that the absence of a complainant in a criminal case does not automatically mandate the acquittal of the accused under Section 256 of the CrPC. The Court held that acquittal is only required if the hearing date was specifically appointed for the appearance of the accused and the accused is present. If the date was fixed for another purpose, such as for the complainant to show cause for a prior absence, the magistrate may dismiss the complaint but is not obliged to acquit the accused, especially if the accused are also not present.
Applying this principle, the Court set aside a Calcutta High Court order that had acquitted the accused after a trial court dismissed the complaint when the elderly complainant was absent due to COVID-19 illness and restrictions. The Supreme Court further noted that the trial court's dismissal itself was improper as it violated a High Court COVID-19 SOP that explicitly prohibited dismissals for default during the pandemic. Consequently, the Court revived the complaint and restored the criminal revision petition for fresh disposal
Cause Title: RANJIT SARKAR VS. RAVI GANESH BHARDWAJ AND OTHERS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 369
The Supreme Court has clarified the appropriate legal remedy for challenging a criminal chargesheet based on the stage of proceedings. It held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be used to seek the quashing of an FIR or a chargesheet only before a judicial magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. Once cognizance is taken, the proper remedy shifts to invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which corresponds to Section 482 of the CrPC. Under this provision, the High Court can quash not only the FIR or chargesheet but also the cognizance order itself, provided a strong case is made out and the order is properly challenged in the pleadings.
The Court set aside a Bombay High Court order that had dismissed a writ petition as infructuous merely because a chargesheet was filed, noting that the High Court had misapplied an earlier ruling and failed to exercise its available jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS. Consequently, the Supreme Court revived the petition for fresh consideration.
Cause Title: PRADNYA PRANJAL KULKARNI VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875
The Supreme Court has clarified a crucial procedural change between the old Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) regarding the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). Under Section 154 of the CrPC, if information discloses a cognizable offence, FIR registration is mandatory and no preliminary inquiry is allowed. However, Section 173(3) of the BNSS introduces a significant departure: for cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment between 3 and 7 years, the police officer-in-charge may, with prior permission from a superior officer, conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists before registering an FIR. This provision aims to filter out frivolous cases. The Court emphasized that this inquiry is discretionary and an exception to the general rule of mandatory registration under Section 173(1) BNSS. For offences with lower punishments (under 3 years), the officer must still assess the information to determine if it discloses a cognizable offence—a basic legal exercise that does not constitute an impermissible inquiry. The Court provided this clarification while quashing an FIR against a politician for an alleged offensive poem.
Cause Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362
The Supreme Court has cautioned High Courts against taking a mechanical approach while deciding petitions to quash an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC (Section 528 BNSS). It held that while the High Court's primary focus should be on the prima facie allegations in the FIR, in some cases, it is equally important to consider the background and context in which the case was filed. The Court must examine whether the FIR appears to be a counterblast, retaliatory measure, or an abuse of the legal process initiated with an oblique motive to harass the accused. In the instant case, the Supreme Court set aside a Punjab & Haryana High Court order that refused to quash an FIR, finding that the High Court failed to appreciate that the wife's complaint of cruelty and dowry harassment, filed just one month after an Australian court granted divorce in favor of the husband, was likely a retaliatory action against the favorable legal outcomes he had obtained. The Court emphasized that a judicial mind must look beyond the bare allegations and consider the attendant circumstances to prevent the misuse of the criminal justice system.
Cause Title: NITIN AHLUWALIA Versus STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 923
The Supreme Court has clarified that there is no absolute bar preventing a High Court from quashing an FIR by exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC (or Section 528 of the BNSS) merely because the investigation is at a nascent stage. The Court held that if the allegations in the FIR, even when taken at face value, do not disclose any prima facie offence, the High Court can and should intervene to prevent an abuse of the legal process. This power is essential to stop mechanical and frivolous FIRs. The observation came while quashing an FIR against a politician for a poem posted online, where the Court found no criminal intent (mens rea) and deemed the FIR registration a "mechanical exercise" bordering on "perversity." The Court emphasized that each case must be judged on its own facts, and the High Court's power to quash at the threshold, as outlined in the Bhajan Lal case guidelines, cannot be curtailed by a blanket embargo based on the early stage of investigation.
Cause Title – Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362
The Supreme Court has clarified that a High Court cannot rely on an investigation report while deciding a petition to quash an FIR under its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC. The Court held that the authority to call for and assess an investigation report rests exclusively with the Magistrate, not the High Court, at this stage. The High Court's extraordinary power under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly and based solely on the allegations in the FIR and undisputed facts, not on the opinions or conclusions of the investigating agency.
Citing its earlier judgment in Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi (2007), the Court emphasized that allowing the High Court to evaluate investigation reports would be inappropriate as it could prejudice the trial and deny the Magistrate an independent opportunity to evaluate the case on its merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside a Gujarat High Court order that had relied on an investigation report to refuse quashing an FIR.
Cause Title: ASHOK KUMAR JAIN VERSUS THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 516
The Supreme Court has reiterated that while considering a petition to quash an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC (Section 528 BNSS), the court cannot embark on an inquiry into the reliability, genuineness, or credibility of the allegations made in the FIR or complaint. At this preliminary stage, the court's role is limited to determining whether the allegations, if taken at face value, disclose a prima facie case justifying an investigation. It is impermissible to conduct a "mini-trial" by evaluating evidentiary inconsistencies or labeling specific allegations as an "afterthought."
The Court set aside a Madhya Pradesh High Court order that had quashed an FIR under Section 498A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, criticizing the High Court for examining the omission of certain incidents in earlier complaints. The Supreme Court held that such an approach oversteps the limited jurisdiction under Section 482, as the presence of sufficient material to proceed mandates that the investigation continue.
Cause Title: MUSKAN VERSUS ISHAAN KHAN (SATANIYA) AND OTHERS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1080
The Supreme Court has held that a victim of an offence has an absolute right to file an appeal against the acquittal of an accused under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC (Section 413 of the BNSS), irrespective of whether they are the complainant in the case or not. This right is unconditional and is not subject to any preconditions, such as obtaining special leave from the court, unlike an appeal filed by a complainant under Section 378(4) CrPC. The Court emphasized that the victim's right to appeal must be placed on par with the right of a convicted accused to appeal under Section 374 CrPC. It further clarified that in a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the payee or holder of the dishonoured cheque is a "victim" as defined in Section 2(wa) CrPC and can directly invoke this provision. The judgment expands victims' rights by ensuring they have a direct and independent avenue to challenge an acquittal, even if they were not the formal complainant in the proceedings.
Cause Title: M/s Celestium Financial v A Gnanasekaran, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666
The Supreme Court has affirmed a Karnataka High Court judgment, holding that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to ten years, the permissible 15 days of police custody must be sought and granted within the first forty days of the investigation period. This interpretation flows from Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which governs the remand and custody of an accused. The Court clarified that while the total police custody permissible is 15 days, it can be availed in parts, but all such custody must fall within the initial 40-day window of the investigation. Once this 40-day period lapses, the magistrate cannot authorize any further police custody, even if the full 15-day period has not been utilized. This ruling provides clarity on the strict temporal limits imposed by the BNSS for securing police custody in cases involving offences with a maximum punishment of ten years.
Cause Title : Hyder Ali v.State of Karnataka
The Supreme Court has held that a second private complaint filed under Section 200 CrPC after a closure report has been submitted in the first complaint, concerning the same incident, is not maintainable merely by adding a new offence. The Court clarified that the prohibition against lodging two FIRs or complaints for the same incident applies when the subsequent complaint is filed by the same complainant against the same accused, as it would amount to an impermissible "improvement" of the original facts after the investigation has commenced. An exception permitting a second complaint exists only if it presents a rival version of the incident from a different complainant (e.g., a counter-complaint by the accused).
In this case, since the complainant filed a fresh complaint over two years later, adding Section 308 IPC to the same set of facts for which the police had already filed a closure report, the Supreme Court deemed it a gross abuse of the legal process and quashed it.
Cause Title: RANIMOL & ORS. VERSUS THE STATE OF KERALA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
The Supreme Court has held that a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC from her second husband even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved by a decree of divorce. The Court clarified that a formal legal dissolution is not a mandatory precondition. If the woman and her first husband have mutually separated and ceased cohabitation, and the second husband was fully aware of her prior marital status when he married her, she cannot be denied maintenance on the sole ground that the first marriage subsists legally. The Court emphasized that the right to maintenance is a social welfare provision intended to prevent destitution and must be interpreted broadly. It noted that the second husband, having knowingly entered into the marriage, cannot later use the lack of a formal divorce decree as an excuse to evade his moral and legal duty to provide maintenance, especially when the wife is not receiving any support from her first husband. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the maintenance granted by the Family Court.
Cause Title: SMT. N. USHA RANI AND ANR. VERSUS MOODUDULA SRINIVAS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156
The Supreme Court has held that a wife's refusal to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disentitle her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. The Court clarified that the mere existence of such a decree and its non-compliance by the wife is not determinative. Instead, the court must independently examine whether the wife has "just and sufficient cause" to live apart from her husband. If the wife can demonstrate valid reasons, such as ill-treatment, neglect (as in this case, where the husband ignored her after a miscarriage), or any other reasonable cause, her refusal to return to the matrimonial home will not attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) CrPC.
The Court emphasized that Section 125 is a social welfare provision meant to prevent destitution, and a husband cannot use a restitution decree as a shield to evade his legal and moral duty to maintain his wife. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Family Court's maintenance award in favor of the wife.
Cause Title: Rina Kumari Versus Dinesh Kumar Mahto and another, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47
The Supreme Court criticized the routine and mechanical use of Section 156(3) CrPC by magistrates to order police investigations. It held that a magistrate must apply judicial mind and direct a police investigation only when the allegations are complex and require state machinery expertise. For simple allegations where the court can directly proceed to trial, the magistrate should record evidence instead of passing the buck to the police.
The Court highlighted key changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) under Section 175(3), which corresponds to Section 156(3) CrPC. The BNSS mandates three new safeguards: (1) the complainant must first apply to the Superintendent of Police upon police refusal and submit a copy of that application with an affidavit to the magistrate; (2) the magistrate has the power to conduct a preliminary inquiry; and (3) the magistrate must hear and consider the police officer's submissions on why the FIR was refused before ordering registration. These provisions ensure greater accountability and a more reasoned, judicially considered order.
Cause Title: OM PRAKASH AMBADKAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 139
The Supreme Court has clarified that the landmark Lalita Kumari judgment (2014) does not create an absolute rule that a preliminary inquiry is mandatory in every case before registering an FIR. The Court reiterated that the judgment only reaffirmed the settled legal principle that police are obligated to register an FIR when the information received prima facie discloses a cognizable offence. A preliminary inquiry is permissible only in a limited category of cases where the information does not, on the face of it, disclose a cognizable offence but requires verification. However, if the information clearly reveals a cognizable offence, such as allegations of corruption or abuse of official position, the police have no discretion to conduct a preliminary inquiry and must register the FIR immediately. The Court also refused to issue any blanket direction restraining FIR registration against a particular individual or mandating preliminary inquiries in future cases involving them, stating that such an order would amount to judicial overreach and contravene the statutory framework of the CrPC.
Cause Details: PRADEEP NIRANKARNATH SHARMA v. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 315
The Supreme Court has held that the statement of an accused recorded under Section 161 CrPC (police interrogation) cannot be used against a co-accused at the stage of deciding anticipatory bail or regular bail. This is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. The Court explained that such statements are either inculpatory (confession or admission) or exculpatory (self-serving denial). An inculpatory confession made to the police is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used at the bail stage. Even if a confession is later found admissible under Section 30 of the Evidence Act (implicating both the maker and co-accused in a joint trial), it can only be considered during the trial as a rule of prudence, not at the bail stage. An exculpatory statement has no credibility against a co-accused as it cannot be tested by cross-examination. The Court cautioned that magistrates must first ascertain whether a person giving a Section 161 statement is a witness or an accused, as reliance on such statements changes if the person is later arrayed as an accused. While the Court dismissed the bail plea in this case on other grounds, it firmly rejected the High Court's reliance on co-accused statements to deny bail.
Cause Title: P KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY VERSUS THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598
The Supreme Court has held that the prosecution can be permitted to produce documents that were referred to in the chargesheet but inadvertently omitted from being submitted to the magistrate along with it. This applies to documents gathered either before or after the investigation, provided the omission is bona fide and causes no prejudice to the accused. The Court clarified that such procedural lapses are curable and do not require invoking the provision for further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC. Relying on its earlier judgment in Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai, the Court emphasized that the inadvertent failure to forward relied-upon documents does not bar their subsequent production, as long as the accused's right to challenge their authenticity and admissibility during the trial remains intact. In this case, since the CDs were referenced in the supplementary chargesheet and their omission was inadvertent, the Court allowed their production at the trial stage.
Cause Title: Sameer Sandhir versus Central Bureau of Investigation, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 627
27. No Concept Of 'Deemed Sanction' Under Section 197 CrPC : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has clarified that there is no concept of 'deemed sanction' under Section 197 of the CrPC. This provision mandates prior sanction from the competent authority before a court can take cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by public servants in the discharge of their official duties. The Court held that the failure of the sanctioning authority to decide on a sanction request within a stipulated time period (as suggested in guidelines from judgments like Subramanian Swamy) does not automatically result in a deemed grant of sanction. Since such a provision has not been statutorily incorporated into the CrPC, the Court cannot read it into the law. Consequently, if the sanctioning authority ultimately denies sanction—even after a delay—the prosecution cannot proceed.
The Court contrasted this with the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which explicitly introduces a deemed sanction provision if the government fails to decide within 120 days. In the present case, since the competent authority had denied sanction, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the public servant for lack of valid sanction.
Cause Title: SUNEETI TOTEJA VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ANOTHER, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 249
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed a crucial safeguard for public servants under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Court held that prior government sanction for prosecution is required even when a public servant's alleged acts exceed their official authority, provided there is a "reasonable nexus" between those acts and the discharge of official duties. The bench, comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma, emphasized that a "mere excess or overreach" in performing official duty does not automatically strip a public servant of this statutory protection.
The ruling came in an appeal by police officers accused of assault and wrongful confinement, where the alleged acts occurred during the investigation of cases against the complainant. Since the actions were linked to their official roles, the Court found sanction mandatory, quashing the proceedings initiated without it. This judgment clarifies that the test for sanction hinges on the connection to duty, not the lawfulness of the act itself, thereby upholding the protective intent of Section 197 CrPC.
Cause Title: G.C. MANJUNATH & OTHERS VERSUS SEETARAM, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 399
29. If Arrest Is Made On Warrant, No Separate Grounds Of Arrest Need To Be Given : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court clarified the application of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which mandates that an arrested person be informed of the grounds for arrest. The Court held that when an arrest is made pursuant to a valid warrant, no separate communication of grounds is required. Reading the warrant to the arrestee constitutes sufficient compliance, as the warrant itself, issued after judicial scrutiny, contains the necessary grounds (e.g., the offence and reasons for arrest). The obligation to furnish separate written grounds applies only to warrantless arrests.
Cause Title: KASIREDDY UPENDER REDDY Versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628
30. Supreme Court Advises Caution While Granting Ad-Interim Anticipatory Bail
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Courts must exercise caution when granting interim protection to the accused while deciding anticipatory bail pleas.
Disapproving of the Punjab & Haryana High Court's order, the bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan held that granting an accused the liberty to join investigation while their plea is pending, and ordering their release on ad-interim bail if arrested, effectively amounts to granting final relief prematurely.
Cause Title: DEEPAK AGGARWAL VERSUS BALWAN SINGH & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 68
31. S.482 CrPC | Second Quashing Petition On Grounds Available Earlier Not Maintainable : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that a second petition for quashing an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC is not maintainable on grounds that were available to the accused but not argued in the first petition. The bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta observed that the principle of constructive res judicata applies to such petitions. The Court clarified that a subsequent petition is permissible only when there is a material change in circumstances or the availability of new grounds after the first dismissal.
In this case, the Madras High Court had allowed a second quashing petition on identical grounds that existed during the first petition (which was dismissed), which the Supreme Court found impermissible. The Court further noted that this amounted to an impermissible review of the earlier order, in violation of Section 362 CrPC. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order allowing the second petition.
The Supreme Court clarified the power of a trial court under Section 319 of the CrPC to summon a person as an additional accused. The Court held that a person who was named in the FIR but dropped by the police in the chargesheet (via a closure report) can still be summoned to face trial if evidence presented during the trial indicates their involvement.
The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan emphasized that the trial court is not bound by the police investigation or closure report; its discretionary power to summon is based solely on the evidence adduced during the trial, not on materials in the chargesheet or case diary. The Court noted that the expression "any person not being the accused" in Section 319 includes those released by the police under Section 169 CrPC. Therefore, the filing of a police closure report does not bar the summoning of an additional accused if trial evidence warrants it. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial court's summons.
Cause Title: OMI @ OMKAR RATHORE & ANR. VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR., Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 24
The Supreme Court issued a significant direction to all High Courts and trial courts, stating that bail—whether regular or anticipatory—should not be granted based solely on an undertaking by the accused to deposit a sum of money. The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan emphasized that bail must be decided strictly on the merits of the case, not on any monetary assurances. The Court disapproved of the practice where an accused obtains bail by promising to deposit money and later challenges the condition as onerous, calling it an abuse of process that undermines judicial dignity.
In this case, the appellant had been granted bail on an undertaking to deposit ₹25 lakhs in a misappropriation case but later reneged, leading the High Court to cancel his bail. The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation, imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the appellant for misleading the court, and directed its Registry to circulate the order to all High Courts to prevent such conditional bail orders in the future.
Cause Title: GAJANAN DATTATRAY GORE VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 756
The Supreme Court reiterated its mandatory guidelines from Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015), which require a complainant to file a supporting affidavit with a plea under Section 156(3) CrPC, affirming the complaint's genuineness and disclosing prior litigation. The bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah clarified that while these guidelines are mandatory and prospective, the failure to initially file the affidavit is a curable defect if rectified before the magistrate passes a substantive order directing an FIR registration.
In this case, the complainant filed the affidavit after the complaint but before the magistrate's order, curing the defect.The Court held that if the magistrate proceeds without the requisite affidavit, the order and consequential proceedings can be quashed solely for non-compliance. The appeal was allowed, quashing the FIR on other grounds, but the Court confirmed the High Court's view that the procedural lapse was curable.
Cause Title: S. N. VIJAYALAKSHMI & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758
The Supreme Court held that in cases involving cross-FIRs (where both sides file FIRs against each other), it is unfair and imprudent to quash one FIR while proceeding with the investigation of the other. The bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Manmohan emphasized that both FIRs must be investigated together comprehensively to discover the truth. The Court observed that investigating agencies must examine both sides of the dispute simultaneously, as evidence in one FIR cannot be ignored while probing the other.
Reversing the Delhi High Court's decision that had quashed the appellant's FIR, the Supreme Court revived it, directing a holistic investigation. The Court also referenced Nathi Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1990), which held that cross-cases should be tried by the same judge to ensure consistency, a logic that extends to investigations as well.
Cause Title: PUNIT BERIWALA VERSUS THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 504