75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to...
75 years into our republic, we cannot be seen to be so shaky on our fundamentals that mere recital of a poem or for that matter, any form of art or entertainment, such as, stand-up comedy, can be alleged to lead to animosity or hatred amongst different communities. Subscribing to such a view would stifle all legitimate expressions of view in the public domain which is so fundamental to a free society. (Para 42 ix) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Constitutional Law - Separation of Powers - Judicial Independence - Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 - Legislative Override - The Supreme Court reiterated that an executive or legislative action that frustrates or overturns a mandatory direction or a finding of unconstitutionality previously issued by the Court, without remedying the underlying basis for the declaration of invalidity, amounts to an impermissible legislative override and violates the basic structure doctrine, specifically the principle of judicial independence- held that the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which contains provisions identical to the previously struck-down Ordinance and sections of the Finance Act, 2017- including the minimum age requirement of fifty years, the truncated four-year tenure for members, and the mandate for the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) to recommend a panel of two names- is invalid as it constitutes a direct attempt to negate binding judicial directions and encroach upon the judicial sphere- clarified that all appointments of Members and Chairpersons whose selection or recommendation by the Search-cum-Selection Committee was completed before the commencement of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, shall be protected- Such appointments will continue to be governed by their respective parent statutes and the conditions of service as laid down in the previous binding judgments, rather than by the truncated tenure and altered service conditions introduced by the 2021 Act. [Relied on Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (2021) 7 SCC 369; S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124; Paras 84-86, 87-89, 90, 117, 118, 136-141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330
Executive Authority vs. Cabinet Policy – Relaxation of Rules – Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's finding that a valid State Policy adopted by the Cabinet cannot be rescinded by an Executive Officer on mere procedural grounds, such as a Cabinet Memorandum not being routed through the Chief Secretary - Since the Chief Secretary was the Ex-Officio Secretary of the Cabinet and Chairman of the State Level Empowered Committee that cleared the appointments, the State could not plead ignorance or disapproval of the process. [Relied on Arun Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 580; Paras 2-6] State of Assam v. Mukut Ranjan Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1204
Legal Principle (Post-46th Amendment) - Following the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, the principle of 'dominant intention' is irrelevant for levying sales tax on a works contract, as the contract is by legal fiction divisible into a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for labour and services - Held that the 'dominant intention' test for works contracts, is no longer good law - Appeals dismissed. [Larsen and Toubro Limited & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.; overruled-Rainbow Colour Lab & Anr v. State of M.P & Ors. 2014 1 SCC 708, (2000) 2 SCC 385; Paras 132, 154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188
List II in the Seventh Schedule - the event, that is inter-State movement of the goods, which does not amount to inter-State sale, falls within the legislative domain and power of the State Legislature. The State, when it imposes such tax, does not exceed its power to impose tax conferred by the State List as inter-State sale of goods is not being subjected to tax. C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661
Part III, IV - Article 21 - Forest Act, 1927, Section 29 – Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Sections 2, 3A, 3B – Zudpi Jungle/Forest in Maharashtra – Protected Forests – Sustainable Development – Encroachments – Afforestation – Non-Forestry Use – Compensatory Afforestation – Special Task Force – State Accountability – The Supreme Court, following the T.N. Godavarman judgment (1996), declared Zudpi Jungle lands in Maharashtra as forest lands under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, requiring Central Government approval for any non-forestry use under Section 2. Pre-December 12, 1996, allotments of Zudpi Jungle lands may be regularized without compensatory afforestation or Net Present Value (NPV) payments, subject to State approval under Section 2. Post-December 12, 1996, allotments require Central Government approval, strict compliance with forest laws, and punitive action against officers for illegal allotments under Sections 3A and 3B. Pre-1980 encroachments may be regularized if legally permissible; post-1980 commercial encroachments must be cleared within two years by a district-level Special Task Force. Approximately 7.76 lakh hectares of unallotted Zudpi Jungle lands to be transferred to the Forest Department within one year for afforestation. Unallotted fragmented parcels (<3 hectares, not adjoining forest areas) to be declared Protected Forests under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Sub-Divisional Magistrates to prevent future encroachments, with accountability for violations. Non-forestry use proposals require FC Act compliance and cannot be diverted to non-governmental entities. Zudpi Jungle lands may be used for compensatory afforestation only if non-forest land is unavailable, certified by the Chief Secretary, with double the area afforested per MoEF&CC guidelines. The Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to monitor land transfer and compliance. State Governments/Union Territories to investigate and recover forest lands allotted to private entities or recover afforestation costs if retention serves public interest. (Para 138) In Re: Zudpi Jungle Lands, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2025 INSC 754
Petitioner's Conduct & Waiver - Maintainability of Writ Petition - The writ petition challenging the “In-house Procedure” and the inquiry report was not entertained primarily due to the petitioner's conduct, specifically acquiescing to the uploading of incriminating evidence and participating in the inquiry without demur, only raising objections after the report was submitted - Held that Petitioner's conduct did not inspire confidence for the Court to entertain writ petition. [Para 104-106] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943
Referring to any court as a "Lower Court" or its records as "Lower Court Record" (LCR) is contrary to the ethos of the Constitution. The Supreme Court directed that Trial Court records be referred to as "Trial Court Record" (TCR), reiterating its order dated 8 February 2024 and the subsequent Registry circular dated 28 February 2024. (Para 25) Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2025 INSC 777
Rehabilitation of Rickshaw Pullers - Hand pulled Rickshaws – Held, the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws in Matheran is 'inhuman practice' and it should be stopped as it attacks human dignity - Continuing the practice of hand-pulled rickshaws 'belittles the constitutional promise of social and economic justice - To continue such human practice even after 78 years of independence and after 75 years of the Constitution being enacted and promising social and economic justice to its citizens would be betraying the promise - Directed State of Maharashtra to stop this practice in a staged manner within 6 months - Directed the State to evolve a rehabilitation scheme, using the model implemented in Kevadia, Gujarat, where e-rickshaw are given on a hire basis to underprivileged persons, including tribal women - Genuine hand cart and rickshaw pullers will be given priority in the allotment of e-rickshaws - State is also required to bear the expenses for training the allottees - That Scheme could be funded through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds and non-availability of funds would not be an acceptable excuse for non-implementation - Supreme Court stressed that the unique character of Matheran as a pedestrian hill station must be maintained. [Paras 32-49] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996
Article 12. Definition
Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section 80(2) CPC - Failure to do so bars the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, rendering the suit unsustainable and liable to dismissal - A judgement rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution or collateral proceedings - The Trial Court has a duty to address the satisfaction of Section 80 notice as a precondition for initiating a suit. [Para 13, 29, 30] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Article 12 - Whether Air Force School constitutes a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for teachers' employment disputes. Held, Air Force School is not a “State” under Article 12. The school, managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, operates as a non-profit, non-public fund entity primarily funded by student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel, not from the Consolidated Fund of India. No evidence of deep or pervasive control by the Government or Indian Air Force (IAF) over the school's administration. Ex-officio IAF officers on governing committees do not indicate statutory or governmental control. The school's operations, including staff employment, are governed by private contracts, lacking a public law element. Even if the school performs a public function (education), this alone does not bring it within Article 12. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on: St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, (Para 22-24)] Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2025 INSC 749
Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 14. Equality before law
Articles 14 and 16 – Compassionate Appointment, whether a matter of right – Held, compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of public employment and is not a vested right- The objective is to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over sudden financial crisis on humanitarian grounds. It is a concession and not a right- The mere eligibility of an applicant does not entitle them to a specific post or a higher post than what was held by the deceased- Once a dependent has applied for, accepted, and joined a post on compassionate grounds, the right to be considered for such appointment stands consummated- No further or second consideration for a higher post arises, as it would lead to "endless compassion"- The purpose of relieving the family's financial distress is served once the initial appointment is made. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 138; State of Karnataka v. V. Somyashree (2021) 12 SCC 20; State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh (1994) 6 SCC 560; Paras 11- 12] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423
Articles 14, 15, and 21 - Social Welfare Legislation – Purposive Interpretation – Held that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation intended to uphold fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution - Any interpretation that compels an aggrieved woman to pursue her remedy at an "alien workplace" of the respondent would create procedural and psychological barriers, defeating the Act's remedial intent. [Relied on Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; Paras 32-35, 72] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415
Article 14 – Contractual Employment – Termination– Educational Qualification – Purposive Interpretation – Held, insisting solely on the title of a degree without considering the actual curriculum amounts to elevating form over substance - Where a candidate possesses a postgraduate degree (M.Com.) with the required subjects (Statistics) as principal courses, and no standalone degree with the prescribed nomenclature is offered in the state, the candidate must be deemed to satisfy the eligibility criteria - Even in contractual matters, the State is bound by the obligations of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 14 - The expression “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” must be understood contextually and purposively - The termination arbitrary as the State ignored its own expert authority's recommendation confirming the appellant's eligibility based on his curriculum and work experience - Singling out one candidate for termination while others with similar qualifications were retained violates the guarantee of equal protection under Article 14 - Appeal allowed. [Relied on GRIDCO Ltd. v. Sadananda Doloi, (2011) 15 SCC 16; Paras 32-41] Laxmikant Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1174 : 2025 INSC 1385
Article 14 and 21 - Constitutional Mandate and Concluding Observations - Constitutional Mandate - Held that the directions are issued to ensure that the constitutional mandate of equality, non-discrimination, and the right to live with dignity enshrined under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, read with the provisions of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, is meaningfully implemented - emphasized that the rights guaranteed to persons with disabilities are not acts of benevolence, but expressions of the constitutional promise of equality - It is imperative that the directions are carried out with utmost earnestness, sensitivity, and expedition. [Paras 12, 13] Mission Accessibility v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1163 : 2025 INSC 1376
Article 14 - Arbitration Agreement – Unilateral Appointment Clause – Validity and Severability - Held that a clause in a public-private contract (Clause 25) which mandates unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by an ineligible authority (Managing Director) and further stipulates that "no arbitration shall be held" if such appointment fails, is void ab initio as it violates the principle of nemo judex in causa sua and is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution - the invalidity of the appointment procedure does not destroy the core agreement to arbitrate - Applying the doctrine of severability, the offending portions, including the negative covenant, must be severed, and the substantive arbitration agreement survives, thereby enabling the court to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6). [Relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) 2025 4 SCC 641; Para 12] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Articles 14 & 298 – State as Model Litigant - Held that lethargy and indifference by a public authority, where contractual obligations demand prompt responsiveness, falls short of the standards of fairness required of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298 of the Constitution – The State must act as a model litigant – fair, responsive, and transparent in its dealings – Silence or procedural evasion by senior officers is inconsistent with the constitutional trust reposed in public authorities - Public Officers are custodians of public faith, not mere administrators – A stern warning was issued to the then Managing Director of the respondent company for such neglect, cautioning that any repetition may invite adverse remarks or even personal accountability. [Relied on State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (2000) 9 SCC 94; Para 11, 15-19] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Article 14 - Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Administrative Action – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness- Held even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
Article 14 - Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 - Substantive Equality – Reasonable Accommodation – Held, the concept of 'Reasonable Accommodation' is an implied obligation under the 2019 Act and a non-negotiable facet of Substantive Equality under Article 14 of the Constitution – The duty to provide such accommodation, which involves providing additional support to vulnerable persons, applies horizontally to both State and non-State actors – The Court analysed the doctrine through the four-dimensional approach to substantive equality propounded by Sandra Fredman - Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights – The statutory prohibitions against discrimination in the 2019 Act, particularly Section 3, act as a vehicle for the indirect horizontal application of Fundamental Rights, thereby binding private institutions (like schools/employers) to the constitutional ethos of Articles 14, 15, and 21 – The obligations of equality and non-discrimination bind both State and non-State actors - The failure of the Union and State Governments to implement the mandatory provisions of the 2019 Act and its Rules (such as establishing Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, and designating Complaint Officers) amounts to 'omissive discrimination', violating the fundamental rights of transgender persons – Such inaction is liable for judicial scrutiny - Supreme Court held that transgender persons Act reduced to dead letter and inaction seems intentional. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 (NALSA); Paras 52, 125-127] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 300A - Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 - Constitutional validity of - Amendments were challenged primarily on the grounds of violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30 and 300A of the Constitution - Composition of the Central Waqf Council and State Boards allowing non-Muslim majorities, and scrutiny on discriminatory provisions such as those requiring demonstrable practice of Islam for 5 years - Supreme Court upheld the legislative competence of Parliament and found no manifest arbitrariness warranting interim relief, underscoring protections for government properties from wrongful Waqf declarations, the secular nature of Board and Council functions, and wider remedies available under the Amended Waqf Act - Supreme Court stayed this provision till the State Governments frame rules for providing a mechanism to determine the question as to whether a person has been practising Islam for 5 years or more - Without such a mechanism, the provision will lead to an 'arbitrary exercise of power - Held that objections to inclusion of non-Muslims in statutory councils did not transgress religious freedoms as the functions are secular and advisory - Held no prima facie ground for interim stay and upheld the Act's constitutionality, emphasizing the need to respect legislative intent and due process in safeguarding Waqf properties. [Paras 34, 35, 38-41, 43-54, 72-80, 111-124, 182-186] In Re the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909 : 2025 INSC 1116
Article 14 – Equality before Law - Held, the Trial Court's order to segregate the trial of an accused, solely because he is a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), is legally unsustainable and violates the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution - While Section 218 if CrPC establishes a separate trial as the general rule, joint trials are permissible exceptions, particularly when offences are part of the same transaction - In the present case, since the prosecution's own case was based on an overarching conspiracy and common evidence, a joint trial was appropriate - All accused persons are equal before law, and preferential segregation based on an individual's public position or status violates the principle of equality under Article 14 - Segregating the appellant's trial without any legal or factual necessity amounted to arbitrary classification and undermined the integrity of the criminal justice process. Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Articles 14, 19, 21 – Held, Indian legal framework on disability rights has evolved from a charity based model to a rights-based framework - this shift is guided by statutory enactments and constitutional mandates - This Act was enacted in line with India's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) - It guarantees substantive rights, including community living and protection from abuse - Judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution to reframe disability as a structural disadvantage requiring active redressal and inclusion - That failure to ensure accessibility constitutes systematic exclusion and infringes on the equal protection clause of Article 14 - Reasonable accommodation is essential for substantive equality under Article 14, but also cautioned against framing the value of a person with a disability in terms of productivity - Supreme Court expressed concerns over the denial of general category seats to persons with disabilities who score higher than the cut-off marks for the unreserved category - Directed Union Government to explain if appropriate steps have been taken to ensure that PwDs, who score higher than the general cut off, are given 'upward movement' by accommodating them in the general category - Direct consequence of not providing upward movement to the meritorious candidates applying under the category of PwD would be that even when a candidate with disability scores higher than the cutoff for unreserved category, such a candidate would invariably occupy the reserved seat thereby denying the opportunity to a lower scoring candidate with disability to make claim on the said post - this defeats the very purpose of reservation under Section 34 - Directed monitoring of the implementation of RPwD Act, 2016 to be undertaken under the name and style of a project called 'Project Ability Empowerment' and assigned the task to 8 NLUs across the country and project report shall be filed within 6 months. Reena Banerjee v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2025 INSC 1101
Articles 14, 16 - Equality before law - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - Migration to unreserved category permissible or not - Held that this depends on the presence of a specific rule or policy - In absence of an embargo in recruitment rules or employment notifications, reserved candidates who score higher than the last selected unreserved candidate are entitled to migrate to and be appointed against unreserved seats - However, if an embargo is imposed by the relevant recruitment rules, such candidates are not permitted to migrate to the general category - Distinguished present facts of the case from Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119 and held that this case does not have universal application - The general principles from Jitendra Kumar case do not apply when there is a contrary circular or rule - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22, 32] Union of India v. Sajib Roy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 881 : 2025 INSC 1084
Articles 14, 16, 21 - Regularization of Service - State as a Constitutional employer - Daily wage employees - Right to be considered for regularization - State is a constitutional employer and cannot balance budgets by exploiting those who perform basic and recurring public functions - When work is perennial, the public institution's sanctioned strength and engagement practices must reflect that reality - Long term use of temporary labels for regular labour corrodes confidence in public administration and violates the promise of equal protection - While financial constraints are relevant to public policy, they cannot override fairness, reason and duty to organize work on lawful lines – Held, outsourcing cannot be a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial - Later policy to outsource Class IV / Driver functions cannot retrospectively validate earlier arbitrary refusals or be used to deny consideration to workers on whose continuous services the establishment relied for decades - Misuse of temporary employment contracts by government institutions mirrors exploitative practices in private sector and can erode public trust - Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that in reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices - Quashed State's refusal to sanction posts as unsustainable - Directed all appellants to be regularized - Appeals allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12] Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2025 INSC 998
Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 - Army Act, 1950 - Section 12 - Indian Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch - Short Service Commission (SSC) – Recruitment Policy - Gender Discrimination - Supreme Court quashes Army policy to reserve higher number of JAG posts for men than woman – Held, once the Union of India has permitted the induction of women into JAG branch under Section 12 of Army Act, it cannot restrict the number of women candidates through policy or administrative instruction - Reserving a double number of vacancies for males through a notification dated January 18, 2023, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 - The selection criteria and process for both male and female candidates in JAG are identical, with only minor differences in physical attributes and overall process is intended to be 'gender neutral' and merit based - A combined merit list should be prepared and any recruitment policy leading to indirect discrimination is unconstitutional - Fundamental rights, particularly the Right to Equality cannot be waived, especially when marks obtained by candidates were not in the public domain - True meaning of gender equality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected - Directed Union of India and Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender that is if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected - The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which is discriminatory to women. Petition allowed. [Paras 83-98, 101, 105-108, 114] Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2025 INSC 954
Article 14, 170, 239A - Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (2014 Act) - Section 26 - Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 - Delimitation Act, 2002 - Delimitation of Constituencies - Increase in Assembly Seats - The petitioners challenged notifications issued by the Union of India which conducted a delimitation exercise for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, increasing the number of seats in its legislative assembly, while excluding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - The Petitioners sought a direction to similarly increase the number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in terms of the applicable statutory provisions - Supreme Court dismissed the Petition, holding that the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from delimitation process was not arbitrary or discriminatory - the delimitation process is a legislative and executive function, if compelled such an exercise through judicial fiat, it would likely be construed as an interference in the policy-making prerogative of the Executive - Held that the constitutional mandate under Article 170(3) of the Constitution serves as a bar on any delimitation exercise concerning the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, or any other State. [Paras 15-22, 26-29] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894 : (2025) 9 SCC 722
Article 14, 15, 38, 46 - Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property - Trial Court and High Court dismissed the suit filed by appellant (heirs of a tribal woman) citing that mother had no right in her father's property as members of Scheduled Tribe are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per section 2(2) and nothing proved by custom - This Court Held - Exclusion of female from inheritance is unreasonable and discriminatory - that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the Scheduled Tribes, it does not mean that tribal women are automatically excluded from inheritance - it needs to be seen by Court whether there exists any prevailing custom restricting the female tribal right to share in the ancestral property - In this case parties could not establish the existence of any custom which excluded women from inheritance - Customs are too like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others - Held in absence of any specific tribal custom or codified law prohibiting women's right, courts must apply “justice, equity and good conscience” - Where there is no custom prohibiting succession to women, still denying them succession is in violation of Article 14, 15 read with Articles 38 and 46, ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Held legal heirs of tribal woman entitled to share in the property, set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. ltd. v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCC 817; Para 13, 19, 20, 21] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865
Whether recruitment process was made in violation of UGC Regulations and whether selection ought to have been made through Commission as these posts were under purview of Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution – Held - UGC Regulations binding on State once adopted - Purpose of formation of Public Service commission at both Union and State level - was to have an impartial and autonomous body to select the best possible persons for government posts and to have fairness and transparency in procedure – Held - elimination of viva-voce which is vital component in overall appreciation of merit of a candidate and replacing well considered selection parameters prescribed by UGC with single MCQ based written test, establish the arbitrary nature of exercise which cannot pass the test of reasonableness - State and its instrumentalities have a duty and responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of mandate of Article 14 of Constitution - when a thing is done in haste, mala fide would be presumed - A State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden change without valid reasons will always be seen with suspicion – Held - State-respondent did not adhere to UGC Regulations and took posts out of purview of Commission without following due procedure under law, amounting to arbitrariness - no valid reason given by State for not adopting UGC Regulations and avoiding Public Service Commissions, set aside and quash entire recruitment process. Appeals allowed. [Relied Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Para 51, 52, 56] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834
Article 14 - Disputes On Consignment Excess Weight - Advancement of Technology - Whether an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight being detected in a consignment – Held, it was not possible for the railways to issue show-cause notice before imposing a penalty for excess weightage - It would be practically difficult for appellant-Railways to issue a show cause notice to the consignor or consignee and to hold a mini-trial to determine the question of excess weightage and compensatory charges - Relied on Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills Vs. Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.R. and others (1998) 5 SCC 126 - that a demand for penal freight without prior notice was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Court directed appellant-Railways to upgrade and update themselves with the advancement of technology - Suggested appellant-Railways to use mechanisms like automatic videography of loaded weight along with weight measurement at the time of off-loading, to avoid litigation. In case, any consignor or consignee disputes the liability towards charges for excess weightage, such electronically collected proof can be supplied to redress the grievances - Court made observations to sensitize the appellant-Railways and set aside order passed by High Court wherein it was held that an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight, citing it as 'obsolete and redundant'. [Paras 8, 10-13] Union of India v. Megha Technical and Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 670
Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757
Articles 14, 16, 21 - Reasonable Accommodation - Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) - MBBS Admission - Held, reasonable accommodation for PwBD candidates is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 16, and 21, not a discretionary benefit. The Supreme Court directed the allotment of an MBBS seat for the 2025-26 session at AIIMS, New Delhi, under the Scheduled Castes Persons with Benchmark Disability (SC/PwBD) quota for the appellant, who has congenital absence of multiple fingers in both hands and left foot involvement. Denial of admission was deemed "grossly illegal, arbitrary, and violative" of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, reflecting institutional bias and systemic discrimination. The Court declared the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring "both hands intact" for MBBS admission as arbitrary and directed its revision within two months, before the 2025-26 counselling session, in line with Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236. The appellant, with a NEET-UG 2024 category rank of 176, was found functionally capable by a Medical Board, with the minor challenge of wearing sterilized gloves insufficient to justify denial of admission. The Court ordered admission without requiring the appellant to reappear for NEET-UG 2025, emphasizing individualized, evidence-based assessments to ensure substantive equality and dignity for PwBD candidates. (Paras 9, 14) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2025 INSC 623 : AIR 2025 SC 2861
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Article 14 - A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute. (Para 15) Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2025 INSC 535
Article 14 and 16 - Bihar Chaukidari Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2014; Rule 5 (7) proviso (a) - Constitutional validity of - Hereditary Appointment - Allowing chaukidars to nominate dependent kin for appointment prior to retirement – Held, appointment to the public posts cannot be done on hereditary basis. The High Court's suo motu action in declaring the proviso void was upheld, as it was manifestly contrary to fundamental rights and binding precedents. The impugned proviso was deemed an archaic practice favoring a select group, undermining equality of opportunity in public employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's judgment which struck down the aforementioned proviso as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 10, 11, 32 & 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Articles 14 and 16 - West Bengal Central School Service Commission Recruitment Case (2016) - Selection Process for Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X, XI-XII) and Non-Teaching Staff (Groups C, D) - Cancellation of Entire Process - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's en bloc cancellation of the 2016 recruitment process conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (WBSSC) for 12,905 Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X), 5,712 Assistant Teachers (Classes XI-XII), 2,067 Group C, and 3,956 Group D non-teaching staff, due to systemic irregularities including OMR sheet manipulation, rank jumping, out-ofpanel appointments, and destruction of records. The Court found segregation of tainted and untainted candidates impossible due to WBSSC's failure to retain OMR sheets and discrepancies in recovered data, justifying cancellation despite some selectees' claims of innocence. Principles of natural justice were deemed satisfied by public notices, given the scale of fraud (over 6,276 illegal appointments). Pleas of delay and laches were rejected as illegalities surfaced in 2021-2022. The Court modified the High Court's relief: tainted candidates' services terminated with salary refunds at 12% interest; untainted appointees terminated without refunds; previously employed candidates allowed to rejoin prior posts with preserved seniority; disabled candidates (except one) to continue with wages until fresh selection, with age relaxation for all eligible candidates. (Para 43 – 51) State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2025 INSC 437 : AIR 2025 SC 1882
Article 14 - Though it is true that precautionary principle and polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country, it is equally true that while the right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the right to development equally claims priority under the fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is a need for sustainable development striking a golden balance between the right to development and the right to clean environment. (Para 17) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347
Article 14 - Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255
Article 14 and Article 300A - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - Constitutional Imperative - Section 3J created an "intelligible differentia"-less disparity between similarly situated landowners (NH Act vs. other acquisitions), violating equality. Retrospective rectification is essential to uphold Article 14 and Article 300A (right to property), especially as the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation Act applies post-2015. The ruling does not reopen concluded cases but extends benefits to unresolved claims, avoiding violation of the doctrine of immutability. NHAI's plea indirectly evades unequivocal directions in Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304. Granting solatium/interest is a core compensatory mechanism, not disruptive. Financial strain is untenable where NHAI has already paid thousands of claims; costs ultimately pass to project proponents and commuters (e.g., via tolls) under public-private partnerships, not justifying constitutional evasion. Appeals dismissed; authorities directed to compute and disburse solatium/interest per Tarsem Singh. No costs. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146
Article 14, 15 - Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2025 INSC 125 : AIR 2025 SC 1445
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87
Articles 14 and 16 - The Jharkhand High Court issued an advertisement on July 29, 2010, for recruitment of IV Class Employees, which omitted mention of the total number of posts, reservation ratios (reserved vs. unreserved seats), and any decision against providing reservations based on adequate representation data. - Candidates were selected and appointed through this process, but their services were later terminated due to procedural irregularities. - Aggrieved candidates challenged the termination before the Supreme Court. Whether advertisements for public employment are valid if they fail to specify the total number of posts, reservation ratios, minimum qualifications, selection procedures, and any decision to forgo reservations, thereby lacking transparency and violating constitutional mandates under Articles 14 and 16. Held, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of the selected candidates and set aside the entire 2010 recruitment exercise as illegal, unconstitutional, and a nullity in law. Advertisements inviting applications for public employment must mandatorily include: (i) the total number of seats; (ii) the ratio of reserved and unreserved seats; (iii) minimum qualifications; and (iv) procedural clarity on selection stages (e.g., written exams, interviews). Failure to do so renders the advertisement invalid due to lack of transparency. If the State opts against reservations due to quantifiable data showing adequate representation, this decision must be explicitly stated in the advertisement alongside the above details. Any appointment in violation of statutory rules or Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality in public employment) of the Constitution is void ab initio. The Court emphasized that such omissions deprive candidates of fair opportunity and equal access, undermining the constitutional scheme for public recruitment. The judgment reinforces trite law on transparent public hiring, ensuring procedural fairness and non-arbitrariness. [Relied on: Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (2014) 14 SCC 16; State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176
Article 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
Article 16 - Equal opportunity in public employment - Even as we near 80 years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for 2 public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities. (Para 13) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Article 16—Public Employment—Eligibility Criteria—Mandatory Nature - In appointments to public office under statutory schemes, eligibility criteria prescribed by law, including minimum years of experience in specified leadership roles, constitute mandatory requirements that cannot be waived or relaxed by administrative authorities. Such criteria ensure fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 16 of the Constitution. Where an appointee misrepresents experience or lacks verifiable proof of requisite qualifications, the selection process stands vitiated, warranting judicial interference notwithstanding limited scope of review in service matters absent mala fides. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201
Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.
Article 19(1)(a) & Article 136 – Held, candidate convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment - Failed to disclose this conviction in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form as mandated by Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) mandates every candidate to furnish information regarding "any disposed criminal case in which he has been convicted" - The format of the affidavit requires disclosure of conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year or more - Failure to furnish such information results in non-compliance with the Rules - The requirement to furnish information, including criminal antecedents, is in furtherance of the electorate's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India - Non-disclosure or suppression of material information deprives voters of making an informed and advised choice - By failing to disclose the conviction, the candidate furnished false and incorrect information, making the acceptance of the nomination form improper - This constitutes a breach of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 and attracts the ground under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Act of 1961 for declaring the election void - When there is non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, the question of whether the election was materially affected does not arise, as such non-disclosure amounts to undue influence - The wrongful acceptance of the nomination form of the returned candidate renders the election void and, by itself, indicates the result was materially affected - In the absence of a provision in the Rules to condone such non-compliance, adopting such a course would do violence to the Act of 1961 and the Rules of 1994 - The eligibility of a candidate is determined as on the date of submission of the nomination form; thus, the subsequent acquittal in appeal after the election was of no consequence - Petition dismissed. [Relied on Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar and others 2015 INSC 960; Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & Others 2014 INSC 384; Paras 22-25] Poonam v. Dule Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1068 : 2025 INSC 1284
Article 19(1)(g) – Issue - Whether the impugned tender condition prescribing past local supply experience is reasonable, non-arbitrary, and constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or whether it constitutes an artificial barrier excluding competent bidders and violating the doctrine of level playing field – Held, government discretion in tender conditions is subject to the tests of reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness - The principle of non-discrimination under Article 14 and the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) were applied, including the doctrine of level playing field that mandates equal opportunity to equally placed competitors - The tender condition restricting eligibility to bidders with past supply experience specifically in Chhattisgarh was held arbitrary and disproportionate to the objective of ensuring effective supply - Noted that such restriction encourages cartelization and violates constitutional provisions by closing the market to competent outside bidders without sufficient justification - The State's justification based on Maoist affected areas was rejected as untenable since the tender concerned non-security sensitive goods and localized conditions did not justify exclusion - Held tender condition requiring past supply within one state irrational, violates Article 19(1)(g) - Set aside High Court order and Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 1973 3 SCC 489; Paras 16-21] Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2025 INSC 1182
Article 19(1)(a) - Right to Information - Supreme Court examined legal framework on the right to information affirming that the right of citizens to know about candidates is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) - This right is essential for a well-informed electorate to make an intelligent decision while exercising their franchise - A fine balance must be struck between the voter's right to information and the sanctity of people's mandate - Minor procedural errors or technical objections should not be allowed to override the mandate of electorate - The will of the people expressed through the election result is sacrosanct and should be respected unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices. [Paras 8, 9] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992
Distinction between remission and release on completion - Held remission applies when the sentence is not yet complete and involves a reduction in sentence imposed - Release on completion occurs when the convict has served the full period of incarceration they were sentenced to undergo - In case of an indeterminate life sentence, remissions cannot lead to automatic release, a final order is required - For a fixed term sentence, completion of the term, especially one 'without remission' entitles release - If convict is detained beyond actual release date, it would violate Article 19(d) and 21 of Constitution of India. [Paras 8,9] Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2025 INSC 969
Article 19(1)(g) - Right to carry on Business - Article 19(1)(g) includes right to shut down a business subject to reasonable restrictions - Right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry it on. [Para 7] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286
Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 19(1)(a) - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 499, 500 – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241
Article 19, 21, 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Natural Justice - The courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions. Administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545
Article 19, 21, 32 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90
Article 20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences
Article 20(3) - Power of Magistrate to Direct a Witness to Give Voice Sample - Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) – Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 - Rule against Self-Incrimination – Held, the Magistrate has the power to order any person (not just an accused) to give a voice sample for the purpose of investigation - Reiterated that compelling a person to give a specimen handwriting, signature, finger impression, or a voice sample does not amount to 'testimonial compulsion' and thus does not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) - These samples are considered "material evidence" for comparison, not oral or documentary testimony which would, by itself, have the tendency to incriminate the accused - Held that CrPC lacked an explicit provision, whereas precedents conceded the power to the Judicial Magistrate to order a voice sample by adopting the identical principle from Kathi Kalu Case, which dealt with handwriting, signature and finger impressions - This power was conceded to the Magistrate until explicit provisions were incorporated - With the advent of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 now specifically incorporates the provision empowering the Magistrate to direct a person to provide a voice sample - Held that whether the CrPC or BNSS is applicable, the Magistrate was empowered to pass the order. [Relied on Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 8 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808); Paras 4-11] Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002 : 2025 INSC 1223
Article 20 (1) - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, retrospective application of enhanced punishment violates Article 20(1) - Amended provision of Section 6 of POCSO Act, which came into effect on August 16, 2019, could not be applied to the appellant's case since the offence was committed on May 20, 2019 - Retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty is barred by Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence - Sentence of “imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life” did not exist on the date of the incident under the unamended Section 6 - Maximum punishment then permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense - Supreme Court upheld the conviction of appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, and modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 9-12] Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2025 INSC 892
Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty
Article 21 - Applicability of Section 436-A CrPC - Article 21 vs. National Security - Supreme Court clarified that Section 436-A CrPC expressly excludes offences for which death is a prescribed punishment - the accused were charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 16 UAPA (both punishable by death), they were ineligible for bail under this specific provision - While Article 21 rights (speedy trial, liberty) are sacrosanct and apply to all prisoners, they are not absolute - In cases involving "heinous offences" that threaten national security or sovereign authority, individual liberty must be balanced against the integrity of the nation - In statutes like UAPA where a "reverse burden of proof" exists (Section 43E), prolonged incarceration is particularly "insidious." - Held that the State and Judiciary must ensure such accused are "meaningfully equipped" with legal aid and resources to reclaim their innocence, as procedural delays otherwise make liberty "hostage to clogged dockets." - Held that the High Court erred in its initial legal reasoning for granting bail, the Supreme Court declined to cancel it- Noted the "glacial pace" of the trial (15 years pending) and that the accused had not misused their liberty, influenced witnesses, or delayed the trial during the three years they were out on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 11-16, 18, 19, 21, 22] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418
Article 21 - Supreme Court allowed the appeal for regular bail to the Appellant, Mahesh Joshi, former Minister of Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Rajasthan, in a case registered by the Directorate of Enforcement under the PMLA – Held, Constitutional Courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21 where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged - Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention, especially in cases with voluminous, document-heavy material where the trial is unlikely to begin promptly - The extraordinary powers to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution, notwithstanding statutory provisions like Section, can be exercised by the Constitutional Courts (under Article 32 or Article 226) if they conclude there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time - Appellant had remained in custody for over seven months - Noted that case record is entirely documentary, involving 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC - These circumstances indicate that the commencement of the trial is not imminent and the trial itself is not likely to conclude in the near future, requiring closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations - Directed the appellant to be released on bail - Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Paras 13-18] Sh Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1166 : 2025 INSC 1377
Article 21 - Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - Section 3(1)(d) - Right of divorced Muslim woman to recover properties given at the time of marriage - Purposive Construction of Act – Issue - Whether goods given to a daughter or the bridegroom at the time of marriage could be returned to the daughter after divorce under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act) - Held that the 1986 Act must be given a purposive construction, keeping the goals of equality, dignity, and autonomy in mind, especially to secure the financial protection of a Muslim woman post-divorce, which aligns with her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Held that the High Court erred by treating the matter purely as a civil dispute and missing the 'purposive construction goalpost' - observed that Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act entitles a divorced woman to receive "all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends" - This section clears the way for a woman to set up a claim against her husband, or claim back properties given, as the case may be - directed Respondent to remit the amount directly to the wife's bank account, the non-compliance of which would attract interest at 9% per annum - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; Paras 7-10] Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1160 : 2025 INSC 1375
Article 21 - Bail - Cancellation of - Dowry Death - Annulment of Bail Order - Perversity of High Court Order - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the deceased's father and annulled the bail granted to the accused-husband by the High Court, holding that the High Court's order was perverse and unsustainable as it failed to consider material evidence and settled legal principles - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between the cancellation of bail (due to post-bail misconduct) and the annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity/perversity in the order) - Bail granted without due application of mind to relevant factors - such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, and statutory presumptions - may be annulled, even in the absence of post-bail misconduct - held that the High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence - the unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage - and the statutory presumption - Supreme Court held that he Court emphasized that dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime against society at large, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny and a firm deterrent judicial response to uphold the majesty of law and send an unequivocal message against this social evil - Such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R. Rathinam v. State by DSP 2000 2 SCC 391; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc. 2025 INSC 979; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC 207; Paras 17-25] Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1150 : 2025 INSC 1367
Article 21 - Right to Life - Right to a Healthy Environment - River Pollution - Sustained Administrative apathy- Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the grave environmental catastrophe in the Jojari, Bandi, and Luni river system in Rajasthan, noting the pollution affects 2 million lives and is a fallout of "sustained, systemic collapse of regulatory vigilance and utter administrative apathy stretching over nearly two decades"- Held that when environmental degradation reaches such proportions, the injury transcends the ecological realm and becomes a "direct constitutional injury" requiring immediate judicial redress- The belated flurry of administrative activity, triggered solely by judicial intervention, underscores a prolonged period of regulatory apathy and institutional neglect- The installed capacities of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) and Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) are grossly inadequate, resulting in the discharge of untreated/partially treated effluents, which is emblematic of a systemic failure- The interim stay previously operating on the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, is modified, clarified, and lifted to allow the implementation of the substantive remedial, regulatory and preventive directions contained therein- he interim stay shall continue to operate only in respect of (i) the remarks made against RIICO and other authorities/Corporations, and (ii) the direction imposing environmental compensation of Rs. 2 Crores upon them- Directed the constitution of a High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee, headed by a retired High Court Judge, to supervise the remedial measures- The Committee is mandated to oversee the full implementation of NGT directions, prepare a comprehensive River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the entire river system, map all discharge points, and conduct recurring audits of all treatment and monitoring infrastructure. [Relied on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598; Paras 9, 11, 22, 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
Article 21 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Right to Speedy Investigation – Held, criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed under the inherent power of the High Court when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in completing the investigation, which violates the accused's right under Article 21 of the Constitution - The cumulative effect of a vitiated sanction under Section 197 CrPC and an unexplained delay of 15 years in investigation warrants the quashing of criminal proceedings - Supreme Court issued directions - i. To file a supplementary chargesheet is a part of section 173(8) CrPC; Court is not rendered functus office having granted such permission; ii. Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law; iii. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered. [Relied on Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (1979) 4 SCC 172; Paragraph 21- 23] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Article 21 – Investigation – Fair Trial – Supreme Court criticized the investigation for negligence, delay, and failure to probe material angles like organ trade – Failure to secure the crime scene, lack of independent medical documentation during custody, and botched forensic collection undermined the prosecution's case– Held that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubtPetition allowed. [Paras 15, 18, 21] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Article 21 – Right to Privacy – DNA Profiling – Held that compelling an individual to undergo DNA testing is a grave intrusion into their bodily autonomy and privacy- Such a direction must satisfy the threefold requirement of (i) legality, (ii) legitimate State aim, and (iii) proportionality- In a case alleging cheating and harassment, proving biological paternity is collateral and lacks a direct nexus to the offence, thereby failing the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2019 1 SCC 1; Paras 46-48, 53] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Article 21 and 25 – Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act) – Section 4 (Unamended) – Locus Standi to lodge FIR - Locus Standi is Restricted – Held that the right to initiate criminal proceedings under the U.P. Conversion Act is strictly circumscribed and can only be set in motion at the behest of the aggrieved converted individual, or their immediate family members or blood relatives - This restriction is rooted in the recognition that the freedom to profess, practice, or propagate religion (and the liberty to convert) is a facet of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India - This liberty lies in the innermost domain of human conscience and decisional autonomy - To permit the initiation of criminal proceedings at the instance of strangers or unrelated third parties would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations - Held that criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. [Paras 110-111, 139] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249
Article 21 – Right to Livelihood and Dignity – Held, termination of a qualified transgender teacher solely on the ground of her gender identity is a violation of her right to dignity and livelihood – Mandamus - Supreme Court issued a continuing mandamus and comprehensive directions to remedy administrative lethargy - i. Compensation: Directed the payment of ₹50,000 each by the discriminating private school, the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the State of Gujarat to the Petitioner for the violation of her rights and the lack of proper redressal mechanisms; ii. constituted an Advisory Committee (headed by Justice Asha Menon, Retd. Judge, Delhi High Court) to draft a comprehensive National Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons; iii. Directed the Union of India to bring forth its own Equal Opportunity Policy within three months of the Committee's report. The Court mandated that this Union Policy shall be enforceable at any establishment that fails to frame its own policy; iv. Directed States/UTs to immediately establish Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells; v. Directed all establishments to designate Complaint Officers and designated the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) as the appellate authority for grievances against the establishment head's decision. [Paras 164-174, 217] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Article 21 – Illegal Detention/Breach of Article 21 - Murder Convict – Claim of Juvenility - Supreme Court ordered release of the murder convict under the JJ Act, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence in 1981 – Held, JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act - The plea of juvenility, which can be raised at any stage, is governed by Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000 - This section mandates that courts are under an obligation to consider the plea and grant appropriate relief if the convict was a juvenile on the date of the offence - The maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the JJ Act, 2000, is 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) - Since the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and had been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty was curtailed "not in accordance with procedure established by law." Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is "writ large," thereby extending the benefit of release from detention - The Court considered the respondent's contentions regarding the heinous nature of the offence (murder) and the petitioner's act of absconding and evading arrest from 2009 to 2022. However, the Court granted relief, noting that the petitioner had "suffered incarceration for more than the period permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2005 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2010 5 SCC 344; Para 4, 5, 12-14] Hansraj v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993 : 2025 INSC 1211
Article 21 - Road Accidents – Issue - Whether the State and roadowning authorities are constitutionally and statutorily obligated to ensure pedestrian safety, enforce lane discipline, mandate helmet usage, and curb misuse of dazzling lights and unauthorized sirens to mitigate alarming rates of road fatalities in India - Supreme Court emphasized that safe, encroachment free and well-maintained footpaths constitute a judicially recognized right under Article 21 of the constitution – Held; The State, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), and municipal authorities are duty-bound to ensure the construction, maintenance, and safety of pedestrian infrastructure in accordance with statutory mandates and standards laid down by the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The Court noted that in 2023 alone, 1,72,890 lives were lost in road accidents—35,221 of them pedestrians- Footpaths are vital for pedestrians' right to safe mobility - Pedestrian deaths indicate grave governance and planning failure - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) must strictly implement IRC Guidelines 103–2022 to make roads safe - The right to safe pedestrian access flows from precedents - Pedestrian safety is an essential part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. Non-compliance with prescribed road safety standards constitutes a violation of that right. State inaction regarding pedestrian infrastructure amounts to dereliction of constitutional duty, warranting judicial intervention and binding directives. [Relied on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, (1997) 11 SCC 121; Sudhir Madan v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2009) 17 SCC 332; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2019) 10 SCC 614; Paras 7-14, 18-24] S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2025 INSC 1189
Article 21 - Right to speedy trial - Duty of Trial Court - Supreme Court reiterated that Section 309 of CrPC (now Section 346 of BNSS, 2023) mandates that once examination of witnesses begins, the trial must proceed from day to day until all witnesses in attendance are examined, save for special reasons recorded in writing - The Court expressed disapproval of the conventional practice where examinationin-chief is recorded in a particular month and cross-examination follows in subsequent months, emphasizing that such adjournments, unless based on compelling and recorded reasons, undermine the legislative intent of speedy trials - The right to speedy trial is integral to Article 21 of the Constitution and extends to all stages of criminal proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and retrial - Delay in cross-examination or piecemeal trial, unless occasioned by unavoidable circumstances and with reasons recorded, is a practice condemned by the Court and violates not only statutory mandates but also constitutional guarantees. [Para 12, 13, 20-25, 28, 31] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949 : 2025 INSC 1155
Article 21 - Illegal detention - Supreme Court orders MP Govt. to pay Rs. 25 lakhs compensation to convict who spend extra 4.7 years in jail after serving sentence in a rape case - Petitioner was not released until 06.06.2025, despite completing the term in June 2021 - Delay amounted to unlawful detention and curtailment of liberty - Supreme Court raised concern over other convicts languishing unjustly and called for the High Courts to investigate the issue comprehensively. [Paras 2-8, 16-21] Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 938
Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA) - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country – Held, constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare centric approach to vulnerable populations, including inmates of beggars' homes - Such institutions are not penal facilities but places for rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality - BPBA and corresponding Rules provide the statutory backdrop regulating beggars' homes, their management, and inmates' rights - Considered balance between public order and guaranteeing dignified living conditions and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates - Noted extensive oversight measures, multiple inspections, reports from authorities and NGOs, and continuing reforms addressing infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid, and vocational training - Mandated a paradigm shift from punitive detention to social justice and protective custody with comprehensive rehabilitation. [Paras 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country under following heads - i. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and Food safety; iv. Vocational Training and rehabilitation; v. Legal Aid and awareness; vi. Child and Gender Sensitivity; vii. Accountability and oversight - Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars' Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members to prepare - i. Prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars' Homes and; ii. Maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths and remedial actions taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next kin of the deceased; v. initiate departmental and where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible; v. State Govt's/ UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow up. [Para 23] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Article 21 - Right to fair trial – Held, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental aspect of Article 21- Segregation order was passed by the Trial Court suo moto, without prior notice or an application from the prosecution, and without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard - This is a serious procedural and constitutional infraction, stating that mere physical presence of counsel does not constitute a meaningful opportunity for a hearing - Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant - The discretion to file a chargesheet lies exclusively with the investigating agency - Noted that even if separate charge sheets are filed, offences arising from the same transaction should be tried together. [Paras 14 - 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Article 21 - Right to shelter – Held, right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 - Urged the Union Government to come up with a revival fund to provide financing for stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings - Home-buying should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or a speculative instrument - the State has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of homes and prevents developers from defrauding homebuyers - Speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for the revival and protection of sick companies - In case of real estate, the IBS's purpose is to protect genuine homebuyers, the judgment underscored, clarifying that such speculative investors have alternative remedies under the consumer protection laws, RERA, or through civil courts - Government cannot remain a 'silent spectator' and must fulfil its constitutional duty to safeguard homebuyers. [Para 20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Article 21 - Right to mental health – Held, mental health is an integral component of the right to life under Article 21 of Constitution- Guidelines for mental Health protection and suicide prevention - Supreme Court laid down immediate interim guidelines for mental health protection - i. noted “deepening crisis” of student suicides in the context of contemporary education, recognising it as a broader underlying generational societal issue; ii. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy, drawing cues from UMMEED Draft Guidelines, Manodarpan initiative and National Suicide Prevention Strategy; iii. All educational institution with 100 or more enrolled students shall appoint at least 1 qualified counsellor, psychologist or social worker; iv. Written protocols should be established for immediate referrals; v. annual reports shall be prepared indicating number of wellness interventions and training session. [Paras 31, 35] Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2025 INSC 893
Pecuniary Compensation - Violation of right to life under Article 21 – Held, pecuniary compensation is an appropriate right and effective remedy for infringement of fundamental rights caused by State officials and defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable - This compensation shall focus on compensatory element and serve as a balm to the victim, without prejudice to other remedies in civil or criminal law - Injuries caused to appellant during his illegal detention, complete mutilation of his genitalia, use of chili powder and electric shocks on his genitalia are shocking, leading to violation of Article 21 - Supreme Court directed State to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as compensation to appellant. [Para 34, 36, 37] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876
Article 21 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act); Sections 40, 45; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017; Rule 15 - United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006; Articles 31 - Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021 - Constitutional and Statutory Obligations – Accessibility and Reasonable Accommodation in Prisons - Whether the State has a constitutional and moral obligation to ensure the rights of prisoners with disabilities, including non-discriminatory treatment, reasonable accommodation, and effective rehabilitation - Compliance of Tamil Nadu prison infrastructure and policies with the RPwD Act and the UNCRPD - Adequacy of prison facilities, including accessible infrastructure, healthcare, and rehabilitation services for prisoners with disabilities. Held: The Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the State's constitutional and moral obligation under Article 21 to ensure dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. The Court directed: 1. Identification and Accessibility: Prison authorities to identify prisoners with disabilities upon admission and provide rules and information in accessible formats (e.g., Braille, sign language). 2. Infrastructure Upgrades: All prisons to be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments within six months, with periodic audits per the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021). 3. Healthcare and Rehabilitation: Provision of equivalent community-level healthcare, including physiotherapy, psychotherapy, and assistive devices, with trained medical officers and tailored nutrition. 4. Training and Sensitization: Mandatory training for prison staff on disability rights, non-discrimination, and appropriate handling of disability-related challenges. 5. Policy Reforms: Amendment of the Tamil Nadu State Prison Manual within six months to align with the RPwD Act, 2016, and UNCRPD, incorporating provisions against discrimination and for reasonable accommodation. 6. Monitoring and Data: Establishment of a monitoring committee for periodic inspections, maintenance of disaggregated disability data, and public disclosure with privacy safeguards. 7. Compliance Reporting: Director General of Prisons to file a compliance report with the State Human Rights Commission within three months. The Court underscored that reasonable accommodations are integral to a humane and just carceral system, and systemic transformation is required to prevent further deprivation or suffering of prisoners with disabilities. The petition arose from a case involving an advocate with Becker Muscular Dystrophy and Autism Spectrum Disorder, who faced inadequate facilities during incarceration, leading to compensation of ₹1 lakh by the Tamil Nadu Government. [Referred: Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2017), Paras 34, 35] L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 702 :2025 INSC 844
Article 21 - Land Acquisition – Rehabilitation - Right to livelihood - Whether Respondents are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative plots in addition to monetary compensation as per Scheme of 1992 or revised scheme of 2016 – Held, it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must - Any beneficial measures taken by the government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners - Rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable - Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in Policy. [Relied on Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Para 78, 84] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843
Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37 (Para 8, 8.8, 12)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829
Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868
Article 21 - Right to Safe Pedestrian Infrastructure – Right to unobstructed, accessible, and disabled-friendly footpaths forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution – Supreme Court directs all States and Union Territories to formulate and implement guidelines for pedestrian safety, ensuring compliance with Indian Roads Congress standards and High Court directives – States and Union Territories to file compliance reports within two months – Union of India to submit policies on pedestrian rights within two months – National Road Safety Board under Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to be constituted within six months. (Paras 1 - 6) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 643
Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768
Article 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 84 - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618
Article 21 - Human Rights Act, 1993; Section 2(1)(d) - Dignity - FIR Registration - Police Misconduct - Compensation - Every citizen approaching a police station to report a crime is entitled to be treated with dignity. The Supreme Court upheld the State Human Rights Commission's order directing the government to pay ₹2 lakh as compensation, recoverable from a police inspector who refused to register an FIR and used derogatory language against the complainant's mother. The inspector's actions, including failure to register the FIR and use of objectionable language, were held to violate human rights under Section 2(1)(d). The High Court's order affirming the SHRC's decision was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. (Para 6 - 8) Pavul Yesu Dhasan v. Registrar State Human Rights Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2025 INSC 677
Article 21 and 243G - Public Interest Litigation - Public Libraries in Villages - The Supreme Court refused to direct State Governments to establish public libraries in rural areas, emphasizing that pressing issues like clean water, sanitation, health, and education under Article 21 (Right to Life) take precedence over library initiatives. The Court highlighted the lack of comprehensive data on rural conditions and financial constraints, noting that resource allocation is a policy matter for governments. While acknowledging the value of libraries in promoting knowledge and democratic values, the Court encouraged States to explore innovative solutions, such as e-libraries and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds, to address the issue within their means. The petition was disposed of with a call for States to take effective steps to promote library facilities in rural areas. (Paras 3 - 6) Mundona Rural Development Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 452
Article 21 - U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973; Section 27 and 43 - Right to Shelter - Illegal Demolition of Residential Structures – Compensation – Held, demolition of appellants' residential structures by Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA) was illegal and arbitrary due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Sections 27 and 43 of the 1973 Act. Show-cause notice and demolition order affixed without multiple attempts at personal service, violating requirement to ensure person “cannot be found”. Demolition within 24 hours of serving subsequent communication denied appellants opportunity to appeal under Section 27(2). Action breached principles of natural justice, right to shelter under Article 21, and rule of law. PDA ordered to pay Rs. 10 lakh compensation to each of six individuals for illegal demolition of their homes. The Court directed the PDA to scrupulously follow the directions in the case of In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 884 which laid down guidelines for serving notices and carrying out demolitions, in the future. Zulfiquar Haider v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2025 INSC 480
Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 21, 51A(e) - Rights of Breast-Feeding Women – Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2025 INSC 302
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940
Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197
Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21, 22 - Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Articles 21 and 22(1) - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 21 - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Motor Vehicle Accident Fund - Directions Issued - Despite the provision being in force since April 1, 2022, no such scheme has been formulated. The Court emphasized the importance of the golden hour in saving lives and noted that delays in treatment due to financial or procedural reasons often lead to fatalities. The Court referred to Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286 which underscored the duty of hospitals to provide immediate medical aid to accident victims. The Court expressed concern over the lack of a scheme under Section 162(2) despite the creation of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund under Section 164-B and the framing of related rules in 2022. The draft concept note submitted by the Central Government proposed a maximum treatment limit of ₹1,50,000 and coverage for only seven days, which the Court found inadequate to achieve the objective of saving lives during the golden hour. The Court noted that 1,026 claims under the hit-and-run compensation scheme were pending as of August 31, 2024, due to documentation deficiencies. The Central Government was directed to frame and implement the scheme under Section 162(2) by March 14, 2025, and submit an affidavit detailing the implementation plan by March 21, 2025. The General Insurance Council (GIC) was directed to process pending claims based on seven essential documents and to develop a portal for streamlined claim processing by March 14, 2025. The judgment reinforces the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and highlights the statutory obligation of the Central Government to ensure timely medical treatment for road accident victims during the golden hour. The Court's directions aim to address systemic delays and ensure the effective utilization of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. The Central Government is mandated to expedite the formulation of a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, with strict compliance deadlines set by the Court. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36
Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28
Article 21A. Right to education
Article 21A - Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ('the 2009 Act') - Supreme Court directed the Kerala government to take immediate steps to establish government lower primary and upper primary schools in all regions where none currently exist, emphasising that the right to education under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be denied due to geographical or financial constraints - the Supreme Court clarified and modified the directions, mandating a phased approach for the State of Kerala to ensure compliance with the 2009 Act - Phase I - Comprehensive Survey and Holistic Policy - Directed State to undertake a comprehensive survey of the entire State and formulate a holistic policy decision for establishing Government Lower Primary Schools in all areas where none presently exist within the distance parameters prescribed under the 2009 Act; Priority must be given to locations with difficult/inconvenient geographic terrain or regions prone to torrential rainfall; Phase II - Establishment of Schools - The State shall establish schools in all areas where - i. No Government Lower Primary School exists within a radius of one kilometre; ii. No Government Upper Primary School exists within a radius of three kilometres - Directed State to identify suitable private buildings for temporarily housing schools as an interim measure, while simultaneously making necessary budgetary allocations for the construction of permanent school buildings. Gram Panchayats may be directed to provide 'shamlat' or panchayat-owned lands, preferably free of cost, for this purpose. [Para 9] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162
Article 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases
Article 22 - Grounds of Arrest - Mode of Communication - Mandatory Requirement – Held, to achieve the intended objective of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without exception - The mode of communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language the arrested person understands - The constitutional safeguard would be rendered nugatory if authorities are merely permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance - The constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights and is not a mere procedural formality - It is an unexceptional duty cast upon the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of arrest to enable that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice - If the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance results in a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, rendering the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254; Suhas Chakma v. Union of India & others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031; Paras 8, 22, 34-56] Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066 : 2025 INSC 1288
Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Article 22 – Grounds of Arrest - Held, constitutional and statutory framework mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest but it does not prescribe a specific form or insist upon written communication in every case. [Paras 20, 23] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979
Article 22 - Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Arrest and remand set aside. Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 367
Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 22 (1) - The Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 interpreting Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), held that the requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and must be meaningfully fulfilled to serve its constitutional and statutory purpose. The Court emphasized two key aspects of Section 19(1): (1) the authorized officer must record in writing the reasons for believing the arrestee is guilty of an offence under the PMLA, and (2) the arrestee must be informed of these grounds as soon as possible. The Court clarified that providing written grounds of arrest to the arrestee is essential to avoid disputes over compliance and to enable the arrestee to seek legal counsel and challenge the arrest under Section 45 of the PMLA for bail. Failure to furnish written grounds could lead to immediate release, as seen in V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51. The Court further noted that oral communication or mere reading of voluminous grounds is insufficient, as it does not allow the arrestee, often in a distressed state, to effectively comprehend or recall the grounds for pursuing legal remedies, thereby rendering the constitutional protection under Article 22(1) and statutory mandate under Section 19(1) ineffective. (Para 10) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 22(2) - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation – Rights of Prisoners – Persons with Disabilities (PwD)– Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Extension of Guideline - Petition seeking legal framework and facilities for PwD inmates (undertrials or convicts) in prisons across India - Petitioner alleged deficient prison manuals regarding accessible infrastructure (ramps), mobility, and healthcare, violating the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Supreme Court observed that most issues were addressed in the precedent of L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others - Supreme Court directed that the 15 specific directions issued in L. Muruganantham (including prompt identification of PwD at admission, accessible infrastructure, universal accessibility audits, and healthcare equivalent to the community) shall now be extended to all States and Union Territories mutatis mutandis. [Relied on L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1444; Paras 6-8] Sathyan Naravoor v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1176
Extraordinary Powers of Constitutional Courts - Reiterated that the extraordinary power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI investigation must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police - Held that it must be necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 12-41] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224
Article 32 – Held, jurisdiction under Article 32 is a 'special constitutional safeguard' that remains available to death row convicts, even after appeals, reviews and mercy petitions have been rejected, due to the irreversible nature of capital punishment - Procedural finality cannot prevent the Court from intervening to cure a constitutional violation that impacts life or liberty - Court has an inherent power to correct its own errors to prevent 'manifest injustice' - Supreme Court emphasized on Manoj an others v. State of Madhya Pradesh which mandated the collection of mitigating circumstances such as collecting comprehensive mitigating circumstances - including psychiatric, psychological and social-history reports - have become an 'indispensable' procedural safeguard - a death sentence imposed without these safeguards violates Article 14, 21 of the Constitution - Judgments of Constitutional Courts are presumed to apply retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise - Hence, death row convict is entitled to the benefit of the Manoj judgment even if their sentence was finalized before the guidelines were established - Petition under Article 32 is maintainable because the petitioner is seeking to enforce a right that was not available at the time of their prior judicial proceedings - Article 32 is the bedrock of constitutional remedies but its exceptional scope cannot be permitted to become a routine pathway for reopening concluded matters - Reopening will be reserved for only those cases where there is clear, specific breach of new procedural safeguards, as these breaches are so serious that if left uncorrected, they would undermine the accused person's basic rights like dignity and fair process - Maintained conviction of Petitioner and referred the matter to be heard on sentencing - Petition allowed. [Paras 21-26, 33, 42-58] Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2025 INSC 1043
Article 32 - Maintainability of Writ Petition - A writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable only if it discloses a violation or imminent threat of violation of a fundamental right - Generally, a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order - The validity of a law on the ground of legislative competence will not be decided in an Article 32 petition if the law does not, infact infringe any fundamental rights - Mere failure to apply a rule which ought to have been applied may not, by itself justify an invocation of powers under Article 32. Writ petition filed by Petitioner is not maintainable. [Paras 66-70, 80] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884
Article 32 - Writ Petition filed by petitioner alleging that the administrative requirement of Allahabad High Court that mandates personal appearance of litigants at High Court for issuance of photo affidavits was arbitrary, lacked statutory backing and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution -Petitioner alleged that this is causing hardship and harassment to litigants - This Court held that administrative decisions taken by High Court are not to be interfered with by this Court under Article 32 - Court granted liberty to Petitioner to file representation before Chief Justice of the High Court in accordance with law - Writ Petition dismissed. [Paras 3-5] Biswajit Chowdhury v. Registrar General, Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 719
Article 32 and 226 - Fake Encounters - The petitioner, an advocate, challenged a High Court order dismissing his Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into alleged fake police encounters in Assam. The petition claimed over 80 fake encounters since May 2021, citing non-compliance with PUCL guidelines, including failure to register FIRs against police personnel and inadequate investigations. Specific cases, such as the Tinsukia encounter, were highlighted, alleging procedural irregularities and police coercion. The Supreme Court directed the Assam Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to conduct an independent, expeditious inquiry into allegations of 171 fake encounters, ensuring victim participation and confidentiality. The petition alleged widespread violation of guidelines laid down in People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 635, regarding police encounter investigations. The Court underscored the role of human rights commissions in safeguarding civil liberties and the rule of law, noting that proven fake encounters violate Article 21 of the Constitution. While each of the 171 cases requires objective scrutiny, blanket directions based solely on compiled allegations were deemed unwarranted. The AHRC was granted authority to initiate further investigations, with state cooperation mandated and institutional barriers to be removed. The Assam State Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to victims, and measures were ordered to protect the identities of victims, families, and witnesses. The Court dismissed concerns raised by the Solicitor General about potential misuse of legal assistance, affirming confidence in the judicial system. The petitioner's locus standi was upheld, recognizing the role of individuals in exposing alleged state excesses. While most cases did not prima facie indicate flagrant violations of PUCL guidelines, some warranted further scrutiny. The Court clarified that PUCL guidelines mandate investigation of the encounter incident, not necessarily the police officers involved. (Para 55) Arif Md Yeasin Jwadder v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2025 INSC 785 : (2025) 8 SCC 804
Article 32, 226 - Village Recognition - Inter-District Boundary Dispute - Non-Compliance with Village Recognition Criteria - Inadequate Consideration of Objections - Requirement for Fresh Public Notice and Comprehensive Objection Review - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order directing recognition of Kakiho Village within three months, holding that the conditions for village recognition under the Nagaland State Government's Memoranda dated March 22, 1996, and October 1, 2005, were not satisfied. The Court found that objections, including those raised by the appellant (Jalukai Village Council), were not adequately considered. It directed the State to issue a fresh public notice for Kakiho Village's recognition, conduct a comprehensive review of all objections, and complete the process within six months, with strict compliance mandated. The Court clarified that the inter-district boundary dispute between Kohima and Dimapur is irrelevant to Kakiho Village's recognition, as the village is located approximately 3.7 km outside the disputed buffer zone. The matter was listed as part-heard, to be reviewed after six months. (Paras 49, 63, 73) Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2025 INSC 766
Article 32 - National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 - Court cannot issue any direction under Article 32 of the Constitution to compel any State to adopt the NEP. G.S. Mani v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 572
Article 32, 226 - Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution. (Para 7) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Article 32, 226 - Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court's consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty. (Para 9) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Article 32 - Writ Petition - Challenge to Supreme Court's Final Judgments - Impermissible - Article 32 cannot be used to challenge the Supreme Court's final judgments, directly or indirectly, as it undermines judicial finality, hierarchy, and the principle of res judicata. A conscious distinction of an earlier precedent does not render a judgment per incuriam. Aggrieved litigants must seek remedies through review or curative petitions, not writ proceedings under Article 32, which is a remedial provision for enforcing fundamental rights. In this case, retired employees challenged the Court's ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77, which upheld the repeal of a pension scheme with cut-off dates, alleging it was per incuriam for ignoring D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305. The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that Rajesh Chander Sood validly distinguished D.S. Nakara and remains binding. The petitioners were directed to pursue review or curative remedies. Writ petition dismissed as misconceived. (Para 29, 30, 32) Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2025 INSC 491 : AIR 2025 SC 2050
Article 32 - Validity of the laws relating to Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments of the States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - Petitioners sought declaration of provisions as ultra vires Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29, and 31A – Held, Challenges to state-specific legislation more effectively addressed by respective High Courts due to distinct legislative schemes and sociocultural contexts. Liberty granted to petitioners to approach jurisdictional High Courts. High Courts advised to consider historical, socio-economic, and religious aspects and may constitute Expert Committees. Writ petitions disposed of. (Para 4 – 8) Sh.Dayanand Saraswati Swamiji v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2025 INSC 465
Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their inhouse pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2025 INSC 351
Article 32, 226, 248 - The Supreme Court dismissed the Union Government's appeals against the High Court's ruling, holding that lottery distributors are not liable to pay service tax under clause (zzzzn) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that the activity of promoting, marketing, or organizing lotteries constitutes "betting and gambling" under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusively within the State Legislature's taxing competence. The relationship between lottery distributors and the State of Sikkim was held to be principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus no service is rendered by distributors to attract service tax liability. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the said clause is ultra vires the Constitution and reiterated that only the State Government can levy gambling tax on such activities. [Para 15 - 18] Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2025 INSC 181 : (2025) 5 SCC 601
Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140
Article 32 - The Supreme Court of India disposed of a public interest litigation (PIL) filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the use of public funds for constructing statues, parks, and memorials glorifying the Chief Minister and the election symbol of a political party. The petitioners alleged that the expenditure of crores of rupees from the state exchequer for such purposes was a misuse of public funds, violated the principles of free and fair elections, and was contrary to the constitutional duty of protecting public resources. The respondents defended the actions, stating that the memorials honored Dalit leaders and social reformers, and the expenditure was approved through proper budgetary processes. The Election Commission of India (ECI) had earlier declined to grant relief, citing the difficulty in assessing the impact of such constructions on elections. The Court, while disposing of the petition, emphasized the need for compliance with ECI guidelines issued in 2016, which prohibit the use of public funds or places for political propaganda. The Court refrained from adjudicating on the specific prayers but underscored the importance of adhering to the ECI's directives to ensure free and fair elections. Ravi Kant v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 107
Article 41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases
Article 41 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Graduate Medical Education Regulations (Amendment), 2019 - National Medical Commission (NMC) - The condition of “both hands intact” lacks legal sanctity, fails to provide functional assessment, and perpetuates ableism, undermining the RPwD Act and Article 41. The Court emphasized the need for individualized functional assessments over a “one size fits all” approach, as mandated by precedents in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The AIIMS assessment report was found inadequate for not adhering to the functional competency tests laid down in prior judgments and for failing to provide reasons for denying admission. The Court reiterated the need to revise NMC guidelines to align with the RPwD Act, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and constitutional principles, as previously directed in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The approach advocated by Dr. Satendra Singh, allowing candidates to pursue MBBS and choose non-surgical or medical branches post-course, was endorsed as fair and inclusive. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256
Article 51A. Fundamental duties
Article 51A - Legality of Ex-Post Facto Environmental Clearances (ECs) under Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 - Supreme Court declared ex-post facto ECs for projects, particularly mining, commenced without prior EC as illegal and restrained the Central Government from granting such clearances in the future. Set aside the 2017 Notification, 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), and related circulars/orders permitting ex-post facto ECs as violative of the EIA Notification, 2006. Clarified that ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain unaffected. Held that the EIA Notification, 2006 mandates prior EC, and ex-post facto approvals contradict this requirement. Projects initiated without prior EC cannot be regularized, as such actions by companies, real estate developers, and others constitute "gross illegalities." The 2021 and 2022 OMs created an impermissible framework for post-facto approvals, undermining the mandatory "prior environmental clearance" requirement reiterated 34 times in the EIA Notification, 2006. Rejected the Union's argument that denying regularization would cause environmental harm through demolitions, emphasizing compliance with the polluter pays principle and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (Para 32 -34) Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2025 INSC 718 : AIR 2025 SC 2843
Article 74. Council of Ministers to aid and advise President
Articles 74(2) and 163(3) - West Bengal School Selection Commission Act, 1997 - Illegal Appointments - CBI Investigation - Supernumerary Posts - Cabinet Decision - Constitutional Immunity - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction for a CBI investigation into the Government's cabinet decision to create supernumerary posts during the pendency of a challenge to the 2016 WB SSC appointments. Held, the High Court erred in ordering the CBI probe, as: (1) the writ petition before the High Court lacked a specific prayer challenging the cabinet decision or seeking investigation into the order dated 19.5.2022; (2) a government note dated 5.5.2022 clarified that actions under S.19 of the WB SSC Act, 1997, were subject to the pending litigation's outcome; and (3) Articles 74(2) and 163(3) of the Constitution bar judicial inquiry into advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Governor. The Court clarified that its observations were limited to the supernumerary posts issue and did not affect other aspects of the CBI's investigation into the Teachers' Recruitment Scam. State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 484
Article 124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court
Article 124 - 'Misbehaviour' - Meaning and Scope - The term 'misbehaviour' is not defined in the Constitution and must be given a wide import, not a narrow construction - It is to be understood in the context of the alleged misbehaviour, the office in question, and the standards required of a person holding such office - 'Misbehaviour' generally refers to conduct that could erode public faith and confidence in the constitutional office - It is a vague and elastic term encompassing various facets of conduct contrary to good conduct - Misbehaviour is different from 'proved misbehaviour' under Article 124(4) of Constitution - Standard of proof is not 'beyond reasonable doubt' but rather the ' reasonable preponderance of probabilities' – Held, allegations were general in nature and inquiry Committee did not name Ms. Bage as an accused or indicate her involvement in the paper setting, moderating or leakage. [Para 20-25, 27-28, 34, 35] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047
Articles 124(4), 124(5), 217, 218 - Judicial Misconduct - In House Procedure - Constitutional Validity - Removal of Judges - Fundamental Rights - Confidentiality of Inquiry - In-house procedure devised by the Supreme Court is a legally sanctioned, internal mechanism to address complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting judges of High Court and Supreme Court - It is not a parallel or extra-constitutional mechanism - the inquiry under the “in-house procedure” is a confidential, fact-finding exercise, distinct from a guilt-finding inquiry and is akin to a preliminary inquiry preceding disciplinary proceedings - the 'in-house procedure' has legal sanction, finding its roots in the law declared by Supreme Court under Article 141 of Constitution - The report of such an inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final - Paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the “in house procedure”, which allow the CJI to intimate the President and PM regarding serious misconduct short of impeachment serving as a vital mechanism for maintaining institutional integrity, public confidence and judicial accountability - The entire process under the “in house Procedure” is confidential, and placing incriminating evidence (like photographs/video footage) against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided or approved by the procedure - Held that this procedure violates Article 14 and 21 is unsustainable, as the procedure laid down is considered fair and just and does not compromise judicial independence. [Paras 80, 112, 114, 116, 121, 123-125] xxx v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782 : 2025 INSC 943
Article 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record
Article 129, 137, 142 and Curative Jurisdiction– Supreme Court Rules, 2013– Order XLVIII– Nithari Killings– Supreme Court allows curative petition and acquits accused-petitioner, setting aside the death sentence (commuted to life) affirmed in 2011– Held, allowing a conviction to stand on an evidentiary foundation that the Court has subsequently rejected as involuntary or inadmissible in companion cases arising from the same facts violates Articles 14 and 21 – To preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory process, the Court must intervene ex debito justitiae when two sets of outcomes rest on an identical evidentiary foundation but are irreconcilable. [Relied on Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra 2002 4 SCC 388; Paras 1, 10, 15, 22] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Article 129 – Environmental Law – Contempt of Court – Unauthorised Tree-Felling in Delhi Ridge – Delhi Development Authority (DDA) – Constitutional Morality – Public Interest – Afforestation Measures – The Supreme Court held DDA officials in contempt for unauthorised tree-felling in the Delhi Ridge without prior court approval for a road-widening project to facilitate access to CAPFIMS Paramilitary Hospital. Two violations identified: (i) failure to seek court permission, and (ii) deliberate concealment of tree-felling, constituting criminal contempt. Contempt proceedings against former DDA Vice Chairman Subhashish Panda closed due to his dissociation from DDA. Other DDA officials fined ₹25,000 each as an environmental fee, with formal censure, without prejudice to departmental action. The Court directed: (i) mandatory disclosure of pending court proceedings in all notifications/orders related to afforestation, tree-felling, or ecologically impactful activities; (ii) urgent afforestation by DDA and GNCTD within three months, overseen by a court-constituted committee; (iii) identification of 185 acres for afforestation, costs borne by DDA; (iv) joint compliance reports by DDA and Forest Department; and (v) a one-time levy on beneficiaries of the road-widening project. The Court emphasized constitutional morality, social justice, and public interest in providing medical access to paramilitary personnel, while condemning the incident as a “classic case of institutional missteps and administrative overreach” due to non-compliance, disregard for court orders, and environmental degradation. Ignorance of pending court proceedings no longer a valid defense. Afforestation plan to be framed and implemented under committee supervision, with periodic compliance reports. (Paras 16, 21, 28, 32 & 33) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2025 INSC 784 : AIR 2025 SC 2901
Article 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
Constitution of Independent Committee Indispensable for Complex Housing Disputes - Article 136 Jurisdiction Inadequate - The Supreme Court has directed the constitution of a one-member committee headed by Justice Pankaj Naqvi (Retd.), former Judge of the Allahabad High Court - i. to conduct an independent inquiry into the long-pending housing dispute involving the Shiv Kala Charms Project in Greater Noida; ii. List those willing to jointly develop and complete the remaining towers; iii. Formulate a fair mechanism to apportion GNIDA's dues among verified allottees; iv. Prepare a comprehensive plan for completion of the project in a time-bound manner; v. Explore the auction of unclaimed or unverifiable flats in Towers 3 and 4 to recover construction and land costs, if necessary - The case, pending for nearly two decades, involves hundreds of defrauded homebuyers who had invested in the project developed under the Golf Course Sahkari Awas Samiti (GCSAS), in collaboration with M/s Shiv Kala Developers Pvt. Ltd. - The Supreme Court, observed that the matter had acquired considerable administrative magnitude and intricacy, and that the resolution of overlapping issues concerning restoration of lease, identification of genuine allottees, determination of dues, and completion of stalled construction was "unlikely if not impossible in the proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India" - held that the constitution of an independent Committee was indispensable to ensure an expeditious and efficacious resolution of the controversy. [Paras 33-45] Ravi Prakash Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1075 : 2025 INSC 1291
Article 136 - Unlawful Assembly - Murder and Attempt to Murder - Interference with Concurrent Findings (Article 136 of the Constitution of India) - The Supreme Court reiterated that it generally exercises caution in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record - Noted that present case did not meet this threshold - Supreme Court noted that there was - i. delay in FIR and non-recovery of weapon not fatal, where there is consistent medical evidence and ocular evidence; ii. Testimonies of injured eye witness holds presumption of truth; iii. Intention to cause death can be gathered from various factors like attacking with lathis, spades, phawadas etc - Held that appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, formed an unlawful assembly, and some were armed with sharp-edged deadly weapons, committing the murder of the deceased and attempting to murder the injured witness - The conviction and sentence were upheld - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2023 12 SCC 558; State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand 2001 6 SCC 71; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab 2009 9 SCC 719; Paras 24, 25, 33-39, 42, 43, 46-48, 49, 50]. Om Pal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 : 2025 INSC 1262
Article 136 - Maintainability of Second Special Leave Petition – Held, withdrawal of a special leave petition (SLP) without obtaining liberty to file a fresh petition bars a subsequent challenge to the same order, as the principle of public policy embodied in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to SLPs under Article 136 of the Constitution - Second SLP is not maintainable when the earlier petition was unconditionally withdrawn, particularly where no liberty was granted to approach the Court again, and the litigant seeks to re-agitate the same issue after exhausting review remedies. [Paras 19-21] Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 934 : 2025 INSC 1140
Articles 136, 226, 227 - Anti Defection Laws - Speaker's power under Tenth Schedule - Timelines for deciding disqualification petitions - Judicial Review of Speaker's inaction - Petitions were filed alleging speaker's inaction and delay in disqualification petitions - Supreme Court urges Parliament to revisit provisions allowing speakers to decide disqualification under Anti-defection law and recommended constituting a tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court or some other outside mechanism to ensure that disputes are decided swiftly- Held that speaker issued notice only after matters were filed or heard before Supreme Court, this inaction over 7 months was not considered “expeditious” - the original intent of entrusting disqualification proceedings to speaker was to ensure expeditious decisions, preventing matters from being dilly-dallied and tossed about in the Courts of law - Allowing such delays frustrates the very purpose of the Tenth Schedule and amounts to 'playing fraud on democracy' - Speaker's failure to exercise jurisdiction by leaving the disqualification question undecided was considered a fundamental error warranting interference - Speaker while discharging functions under tenth schedule, acts as a Tribunal and his decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review - Scope of judicial review under Articles 136, 226, 227 of the Constitution of India is confined only to jurisdictional errors i.e. infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity - It is justified in issuing directions to the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a specified period of time to uphold constitutional values and prevent anti-defection law from being rendered otiose by inaction. [Paras 33, 42, 50, 71, 72, 78, 91-94, 100] Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 755 : 2025 INSC 912 : AIR 2025 SC 3618
Article 136 - Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction - Limited Interference with Concurrent Findings - Exceptional Circumstances - No Ordinary Appellate Jurisdiction - Scope of Review - In criminal appeals by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is distinct from its appellate jurisdiction under Article 134. The scope of interference in such appeals is limited and subject to self-imposed constraints, as established in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2022) 10 SCC 321] and Mst Dalbir Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab [(1976) 4 SCC 158]. Key principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 include: The Supreme Court does not generally interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Trial Court and High Court based on pure appreciation of evidence. Reappraisal or review of evidence is not undertaken unless the assessment is vitiated by: Errors of law or procedure. Misreading of evidence. Non-consideration of glaring inconsistencies or striking features that demolish the prosecution's case. Violation of principles of natural justice or mandatory legal provisions causing serious prejudice or injustice. Interference is warranted only in rare and exceptional cases where there is manifest illegality, substantial and grave injustice, or disregard of judicial process, as highlighted in Pappu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (paras 63, 71) and Mst Dalbir Kaur (paras 2, 3, 8). The Supreme Court is not an ordinary court of criminal appeal. Appeals under Article 136 are not regular appeals, and the Court does not reassess evidence or credibility of witnesses to substitute its own opinion unless special circumstances exist, such as perverse findings or conclusions based on no evidence. The Court examines the High Court's judgment and evidence to determine if the principles laid down are followed. Findings of fact may be disturbed if the High Court overlooks critical evidence that undermines the prosecution's case or arrives at conclusions that are manifestly perverse or unsupportable. These decisions do not preclude reappreciation of evidence to assess whether a case falls within the parameters for interference but emphasize that such power is exercised sparingly to prevent grave miscarriage of justice. (Paras 37 - 39) Agniraj v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2025 INSC 774 : AIR 2025 SC 2674
Article 136 - Tripartite Agreement - Subvention Scheme - Homebuyers alleged collusion between builders, banks, and Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) in subvention schemes, where builders promised to pay EMIs until possession but defaulted, leaving buyers liable for EMIs despite incomplete projects. Held, a prima facie “unholy nexus” existed between builders, banks, and HFCs, indicating a systematic failure by statutory and government authorities to perform their duties. The Court noted circumvention of the regulatory framework by banks and HFCs, with coercive actions taken against homebuyers despite incomplete units and no valid offer of possession. The Supreme Court directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to register seven Preliminary Enquiries to thoroughly investigate the alleged collusion, ascertain the modus operandi, and identify any criminality involved. (Paras 1, 2, 17) Himanshu Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 574
Article 136 - The 73-year-old petitioner, a former employee, filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging a labour dispute denial of reinstatement. Appearing in person due to financial constraints, he struggled with English submissions. The Court appointed Advocate Sanchar Anand as Amicus Curiae, who rendered pro bono assistance over 14 hearings spanning two years, facilitating a negotiated settlement. The respondents (employer) agreed to a lump-sum payment in lieu of reinstatement under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, initially offering Rs.10 lakhs, revised to Rs.15 lakhs, and finally settled at Rs.20 lakhs. Issue(s): 1. Whether a lump-sum compensation of Rs.20 lakhs in lieu of reinstatement is just and equitable for an aged workman who waives claims on merits, per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The ethical duty of advocates, particularly young members of the Bar, to provide voluntary legal aid to indigent litigants to ensure access to justice, and to dispel the misconception that the Supreme Court is accessible only to the wealthy. Held, the Court directed the respondent-employer to pay Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) via Demand Draft within three weeks as full and final settlement of all claims, extinguishing the petitioner's rights to reinstatement or further relief. This was deemed just, equitable, and proportionate given the petitioner's advanced age (73 years), long pendency, waiver of merits-based claims, mutual consent, and the employer's voluntary enhancement of the offer. No costs were awarded. As appreciation for the Amicus Curiae's selfless service, the Court directed an additional Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid to him by the respondents (Paras 9-11, 15) Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200
Article 136 - There is no bar for the Supreme Court to erase defective orders by setting them aside, even in the absence of any challenge thereto. (Para 21) Om Prakash Gupta v. Satish Chandra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2025 INSC 183 : AIR 2025 SC 1201
Article 136 - While exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court possesses the authority to scrutinize not only the conviction of an accused but also the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. (Para 23) Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124 : 2025 INSC 111
Article 137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court
Article 137 – Review – Held - General principle is that a judgment is usually final, but departure is justified by substantial and compelling circumstances or to manifest wrong - the power of review under article 137 of the Constitution is limited, with grounds including the discovery of new and important matter of evidence, or a mistake apparent of the record - In child custody matters, orders are considered interlocutory and can be altered in the child's best interest, which is the paramount consideration. [Relied on Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Kamal Sengupta & Ors.; Para 11-14, 16] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853
Article 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts
Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta — Article 141 of the Constitution of India — Supreme Court observed that the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 16 SCC 287 does not constitute a binding precedent on the point that the PC Act is a "self-contained code" excluding the CrPC - A judgment serves as a binding precedent only when it discloses material facts and discusses the legal principles applied to those facts; a conclusion reached without detailed discussion of the statutory scheme or relevant provisions passes sub silentio - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 15, 16] State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1189 : 2025 INSC 1413
Article 141 - Legal Maxims & Judicial Precedents – Finality of Judicial Verdicts – Judicial Discipline- Bail Cancellation – Article 141 of the Constitution- Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts for the rule of law and public confidence- Held that the conclusive nature of judicial orders ensures the resolution of disputes and prevents endless litigation- The pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court- Allowing a verdict to be reopened because a later different view appears better would defeat the purpose of Article 141 and undermine the Court's authority- A subsequent bench of a different combination should defer to the view expressed by the earlier bench, unless there is a patent reason to interfere- Held that overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict does not necessarily mean that justice is better served.”, adding that any modification to the bail condition would violate the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution to give finality to the decision of the Supreme Court- Application dismissed. [Relied on Brown v. Allen and referenced Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388; Paras 48-51] Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1146 : 2025 INSC 1360
Articles 141 and 144 - Judicial Discipline - Stare Decisis - Duty of Courts – Held, law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on every court and authority in the country - Judicial discipline is a constitutional duty and requires courts to apply precedent as it stands and give full and faithful effect to appellate directions - A judgment that minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent, undermining the unity of law and credibility of the courts. [Paras 14] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296
Article 141 - Ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon. What is relevant is the ratio and not the stage. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490
Article 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc
Opinion on Tamil Nadu Governor judgment- The Tamil Nadu judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, in which the Court held that the Tamil Nadu Governor acted mala fide in reserving the Bills for the President after they were re-enacted by the State Assembly. It therefore held that those Bills were "deemed assented" using Article 142 and consequently laid down timelines for the President and the Governor to follow- Supreme Court held that prescribing timelines were wrong- The bench also held that there was no occasion for the two-judge bench to having laid down timelines for the President- Held that the paragraphs 260-261 of the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu, pertaining to the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 are erroneous- Supreme Court also pointed out that there was no occasion for the issue of setting a timeline for disposal of Bills referred to the President under Article 201, to arise before this Court, while considering State of Tamil Nadu- Held that any observations on the aspect of timelines applicable to the President under Article 201, or conclusions thereof on this aspect, are merely obiter, and ought to be treated as such- Held that the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. [Paras 153-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Guidelines on seniority - Supreme Court issued certain guidelines for the filling up of the DJ posts invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution - i. The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR; ii. Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated; iii. If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made; iv. After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre; v. The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented - Clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute - The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services - The guidelines will not reopen any decided issues related to inter-se seniority disputes. [Paras 97-100] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328
Article 142 - Inherent Power to Quash- The Supreme Court, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed an FIR in its entirety, including the offence of Dacoity which the High Court had sustained despite an amicable settlement - Held that once the High Court accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR for the other offences there was no justification to sustain the FIR for the dacoity charge, as the factual matrix for all offences was inseparable and arose from a single transaction- Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 15] Prashant Prakash Ratnaparki v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1114 : 2025 INSC 1323
Article 142 - Scope of power to do complete justice - Supreme Court is justified in exercising its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, without being bound by procedural provisions, where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end - When setting aside an unworkable or patently illegal award, relegating the parties to fresh arbitration/litigation after a protracted period (e.g., 16 years) would be a travesty of justice - In such cases, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 is the only viable alternative. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited 2025 7 SCC 1; Paras 58, 60] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277
Article 142 – Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272
Article 142 - Multiple First Information Report (FIRs) - Principles on FIR Clubbing and Transfer – Held, prayers for clubbing of FIRs from various states and for future FIRs are overambitious and outright illegal, as the power to grant such relief for future FIRs does not exist under any law - The power exercised in under Article 142 of the Constitution was with the consent of the States and cannot be replicated as a matter of course - Subsequent FIRs concerning the same cognizable offence must be treated as statements under Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., ensuring fairness to complainants who may file protest petitions - In cases involving financial fraud with investors across multiple states, clubbing all FIRs into one police station is impractical due to the necessity of producing geographically dispersed witnesses during trial - Where consolidation was permitted only for FIRs within Madhya Pradesh, and explicitly rejected transfer of cases from Karnataka and Jharkhand, reinforcing the principle of jurisdictional limits. [Paras 12-15] Odela Satyam v. State of Telangana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2025 INSC 1174
Article 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498A of IPC, finding allegation to be 'common place, banal and vague” and “without any specific instances mentioned” having been filed one year after the couple's admitted separation - Set aside order of High Court and quashed FIR and ended marriage by using its powers under Article 142. [Paras 13-16] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Article 142 - Uniform pay and allowances structure for Presidents and Members of State and District Consumer Commissions across all States and Union Territories - Significant disparities in remuneration due to varying State rules under Section 102 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, despite the Central Government's Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020. The Supreme Court emphasized that adequate remuneration is essential for the effective discharge of duties under the 2019 Act, which aims to protect consumer interests and ensure efficient dispute resolution. (Paras 5–7) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650
Article 142 - Writ petition seeking guidelines for judicial recusal - Held, recusal is a matter of judicial discretion and Article 142 cannot be invoked to frame such guidelines. Chandraprabha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 648
Article 142, 246, 254 - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC); Sections 14, 238 - Moratorium under Section 14 of IBC does not bar property attachments under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (MPID Act). The MPID Act, enacted under the State List, enables recovery for victims of financial fraud through asset attachment, and such vesting with the State Competent Authority is unaffected by the IBC moratorium. No inconsistency exists between the IBC and MPID Act, negating claims of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. Arising from the 2013 NSEL scam involving ₹5,600 crore in defaults, the case involved a challenge to property attachments under the MPID Act during an IBC moratorium. The Court, exercising its powers under Article 142, upheld the actions of a Supreme Court-appointed Committee in executing decrees and distributing proceeds from attached properties to ensure equitable distribution to depositors, despite the IBC moratorium. Section 238 of the IBC was held inapplicable due to the absence of conflict between the two statutes. (Paras 48, 51, 52) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694 : (2025) 8 SCC 393
Article 142 - It is only rarely, and in extraordinary cases, that this Court may, in the exercise of its plenary power to temper justice with mercy grant a convict a prison-term waiver. As and by way of illustration, a convict (on bail) who is too ill to understand why he needs to be sent to prison or too ill to be taken to prison or the like, could qualify for grant of extreme leniency by this Court but only on production of unimpeachable evidence to that effect. (Para 30) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654
Article 142 - Law is, thus, well-settled that exercise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. The statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by this Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. (Para 28) Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2025 INSC 654
Article 142 - The Supreme Court set aside the approval of JSW Steel Ltd.'s resolution plan for the corporate debtor, Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd. (BPSL), holding it illegal, non-compliant with Section 30(2) IBC, and vitiated by the Resolution Professional's (RP) dereliction of statutory duties and the Committee of Creditors' (CoC) failure to exercise commercial wisdom. The Court ordered immediate liquidation of BPSL under Section 33(1) IBC, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to prevent further abuse of process. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622
Article 142; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Sections 34 and 37 - The Supreme Court's plenary powers under Article 142 can be cautiously exercised to modify arbitral awards to ensure complete justice and expedite protracted proceedings, provided such modifications do not interfere with the award merits or violate the core principles of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Modifications must align with fundamental rights and the legislative intent of the Act, aiming to resolve disputes efficiently while saving time and costs, without rewriting the award. [Relied: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375]. Justice KV Viswanathan dissented, holding that Article 142 cannot be used to modify arbitral awards, as Section 34 provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging awards under the 1996 Act. He opined that such modifications contravene substantive law, undermine the ethos of arbitration, and could create uncertainty, thereby diminishing arbitration's efficacy as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. (Paras 85 & 157) Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : 2025 INSC 605 : (2025) 7 SCC 1
Article 142 - If the initial appointment is illegal, then the candidate cannot claim equitable relief to secure the post invoking the special powers under Article 142. If a candidate gained entry through a process which was not legal and valid, then the Court cannot come to his rescue in the exercise of powers under Article 142. (Relied on: Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54; Para 38 - 40) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425
Article 142 - Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305
Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to mandate regularization of long-serving ad hoc employees in public institutions where systemic delays and non-compliance perpetuate injustice, bypassing procedural hurdles like UPSC approval if equity demands. - Prolonged ad hoc engagements, absent bona fide recruitment efforts, constitute exploitation; Umadevi prohibits regularization of backdoor entries but does not bar relief for qualified incumbents denied due process by employer inaction. Governments must ensure accountability for rule violations in public hiring; judicial orders for schemes (e.g., regularization) bind all arms of state, including UPSC. Addresses entrenched malpractices in Union Territory education recruitment, emphasizing equity for deserving employees while mandating vigilance against nepotism/corruption. Reinforces judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional mandates against executive inertia. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Article 142 - Out of 51 sanctioned lecturer posts at Motilal Nehru Government Polytechnic College, Puducherry, 45 were filled on an ad hoc basis, despite the introduction of recruitment rules in 2006 - Respondent Nos.1-3 were appointed ad hoc in 2005 and sought regularization with back benefits. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Madras Bench, and Madras High Court granted relief, citing parity with 15 similarly situated lecturers who had obtained prior CAT orders (upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court in 2007) for regularization - The Union of India (UoI) and Directorate of Technical Education, Puducherry, appealed, citing UPSC's refusal to regularize "illegal" appointees. No recruitment process was initiated post-2006 rules, despite the lecturers' unblemished service and qualifications - In 2007, the Supreme Court had directed a scheme for regularizing casual lecturers, but compliance lapsed, with UPSC obstructing the 15 prior cases despite past regularizations in other Puducherry institutions. Issues 1. Whether ad hoc lecturers, appointed pre-2006 rules and serving without blemish, are entitled to regularization despite UPSC's objection to "illegal" appointments. 2. Validity of prolonged ad hoc engagements without legitimate recruitment, in defiance of court orders and statutory rules. 3. Accountability for systemic non-compliance and illegal appointments in public employment. Held, Regularization Ordered: Invoking extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to secure "complete justice," the Court directed the Government of Puducherry to regularize the services of all 18 lecturers (15 prior + 3 respondents) forthwith, without UPSC involvement. This overrides exploitative delays, as the lecturers possessed requisite qualifications and had served since 2005. Critique of Authorities: Described the situation as a "very sorry state of affairs." Lamented UPSC's "audacious" stance against a subsisting 2007 Supreme Court order and non-compliance by Puducherry authorities. Noted failure to initiate recruitment post-2006 rules, enabling prolonged ad hoc exploitation. Precedential Clarification: Reaffirmed State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1] does not shield employers from regularization where no recruitment process was undertaken despite opportunities, per Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, (2023) 9 SCC 172]. Public employment mandates selecting the "best available talent" via open advertisement; ad hoc arrangements post-rules are impermissible. Future Safeguards: Prohibited ad hoc appointments for the 6 vacant posts or future vacancies; all must follow 2006 Puducherry Recruitment Rules. Investigation Directed: Ordered a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) probe into illegal appointments, fixing responsibility on culpable officials (serving or retired). CVC report due by 14 May 2025. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Article 142 - Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Article 142 - Scope of Appeal - Special leave petition was granted on a limited question regarding the applicability of the PC Act and the quantum of sentence for other offenses. Whether the scope of appeal could be expanded beyond the limited notice issued by the Supreme Court. Held, even when a limited notice is issued, the Court has the discretion to expand the scope of the appeal under Article 142 of the Constitution if substantial justice so requires. This discretionary power remains with the Court even after granting special leave. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2025 INSC 85
Article 142 - The appellant along with other accused, was convicted under various sections of IPC including Sections 148, 307/149, 326, 323/149, and 452. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, acquitted charges under Sections 307, 148, and 149 IPC but upheld his conviction under Sections 326, 325, 452, and 323 IPC, modifying his sentence. A related criminal case involving a clash between two family groups on the same day was settled amicably, and the accused in that case were granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellant sought similar relief, citing the settlement and prolonged legal proceedings. The Supreme Court, considering the settlement between the parties, the appellant's age (70 years), and the fact that he had already served over four months of his six-month sentence, extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, directing the appellant's release on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 with a surety of like amount for six months. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted probation under the same terms as the accused in the cross case, with an additional Rs. 100 imposed as prosecution expenses. The Court emphasized the interconnected nature of the cross cases and the need for consistency in judicial outcomes. Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 43
Article 143. Power of President to consult Supreme Court
Governor's Power To Assent To Bills– Discretion – Timelines– Judicial Review– The Supreme Court, exercising its Advisory Jurisdiction under Article 143(1), provided its opinion on the scope and contours of the powers of the Governor under Article 200 and the President under Article 201 regarding the assent, withholding, or reservation of Bills passed by the State Legislature- The Governor has three constitutional options when a Bill is presented: (i) assent, (ii) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or (iii) withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments- The power to 'withhold' assent simpliciter under the substantive part of Article 200 is qualified by the first proviso, requiring the Governor to return the Bill for reconsideration (unless it is a Money Bill)- The first proviso qualifies "withholds assent" in the substantive part of Article 200, mandating return with comments rather than creating a fourth option of withholding simpliciter, as withholding without return defies constitutional logic especially for Money Bills- Held that timelines can't be fixed for Governors/President for bills' assent, there is no concept of deemed assent- held that the concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" to the Bills if the timelines are breached was antithetical to the spirit of the Constitution and against the doctrine of separation of powers- The concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" is virtually a take-over of the functions reserved for the Governor- Held that held that Governors and President cannot be subjected to judicially prescribed timelines for their decisions on Bills under Articles 200/201- Supreme Court warned that allowing the Governor to simply withhold the Bill, without returning it to the Assembly, will negate the principles of federalism which hold that federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. [Paras 38-40, 44-50] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Article 161. Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases
Article 161 - Power of Governor to grant pardons - Difference between Constitutional power and Statutory power - Scope and purpose of reformation – Held - appellants are allowed to seek pardon from Karnataka Governor under Article 161, considering that appellant committed crime out of frustration of being forced to marry against her will citing that 22 years have lapsed since the incident - Court noted that power under Article 161 is sovereign and wider than statutory powers in sections 473, 474 of BNSS - While statutory powers are derived from laws enacted by legislatures and remain subject to amendment or repeal, constitutional powers originate from the constitution itself - Constitutional powers under Article 161 embodies State's commitment to humanity and equity, even in the administration of punishment - Court acknowledged the significance of reformation and rehabilitation, especially when the offender is not entirely responsible for the causes leading to crime, and society also has its role in shaping criminal behaviour - Held that Article 161 powers remain inviolable and exercisable when statutory mechanisms exist, ensuring justice is not constrained by procedural norms. [Relied on Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 107; Shatrughan Chauhan and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 1; Paras 13, 15, 16] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830
Article 166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State
Tripura State Rifles Act, 1983 (TSR Act) - Tripura State Rifles (Recruitment) Rules, 1984 (TSR Rules) - Executive Instructions v. Statutory Rules – Held, Executive instructions cannot supplant statutory rules that already occupy the field - The recruitment for the post of Enrolled followers was governed by the Tripura State Riffles Act, 1983 and Rules, and the cancellation of the process through an executive memorandum was not permissible - State failed to prove that the existing recruitment process was unfair or non-transparent - The Court affirmed that 'changing the rules after the game has begun' is not permissible - The recruitment process was at an advanced stage, with interviews already conducted and the application of the new policy, which abolished interviews, was contrary to this principle - Appellants, having participated in and cleared various stages of the recruitment process, had a legitimate expectation that the process would be completed - The cancellation was arbitrary and not justified on the pretext of 'larger public interest' - The Court directed the respondents to finalize and complete the recruitment process as per the TSR Act and TSR Rules within 2 months - Executive instructions issued under Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India cannot override the act done under the Statute and the rules made thereunder - The Executive instructions can only supplement the act and rules through which recruitment process was carried out, but it cannot supplant the specific provisions which already occupy the field - Burden is on the State to justify the decision on the anvil of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution and show how its decision was in furtherance of larger public interest - State has failed in discharging such burden - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31- 35, 42- 44, 47- 60] Partha Das v. State of Tripura, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 850 : 2025 INSC 1049
Article 170. Composition of the Legislative Assemblies.
Article 170 - Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Held that it is subject to constitutional limitations - it is a well-recognized principle, rooted in ideals of fairness, non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive action - It arises when a public authority, either through a consistent past practice, an express promise or a statutory policy, creates an expectation in the mind of an individual or class of persons that a certain course of action will be followed - It is not a rigid rule and must be conceded where a superseding public interest or a statutory or constitutional bar exists - Legitimate expectation may guide how discretionary powers are exercised, it cannot be invoked to compel an authority to act contrary to a binding legal or constitutional command - Section 26 of the 2014 Act, which provided for an increase in number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, is expressly “subject to” Article 170 of the Constitution - Article 170(3) of the constitution imposes a constitutional embargo on any readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies until the publication of census data following the first census conducted after the year 2026 - The delimitation exercise in the UT of J & K is governed by Article 239A of Constitution, which applies to UT, and not by Article 170, which deals exclusively with State Legislatures - There is a clear of constitutional distinction between States and UT regarding delimitation, and the claim of parity is unsustainable - Petition dismissed. [Paras 32-37] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894 : (2025) 9 SCC 722
Article 200. Assent to Bills
Article 200 - Constitutional Duty of the Governor - The Governor must act in harmony with the State legislature and government, respecting the democratic will of the people, and avoid actions driven by political expediency. The constitutional oath mandates prioritizing the welfare of the State's people. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - Constitutional Values - Constitutional authorities must uphold the spirit of the Constitution, reflecting on whether their actions align with their oath and the ideals enshrined therein, as emphasized by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's remarks on the efficacy of the Constitution depending on those who operate it. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - First Proviso - The first proviso is intrinsically linked to the option of withholding assent, mandating the Governor to return the bill with a message for reconsideration by the House(s) "as soon as possible" when withholding assent. The decision in State of Punjab correctly interprets this linkage, and the expression in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary that a bill "falls through unless the procedure under the first proviso is followed" does not imply discretion in initiating the proviso. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - Governor's Discretion - The Governor generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 200, except in cases under the second proviso to Article 200, specific constitutional provisions requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 31C, 254(2)), or where a bill endangers fundamental principles of representative democracy. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481
Article 200 - Judicial Precedents - The decision in State of Punjab is not per incuriam and aligns with Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary. However, B.K. Pavitra is per incuriam to the extent it suggests the Governor has discretion in reserving bills for the President's consideration or that such actions are beyond judicial scrutiny, contradicting Samsher Singh and the removal of "in his discretion" from the Government of India Act, 1935. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - Judicial Review - The Governor's actions under Article 200, particularly when exercised in discretion, are subject to judicial review on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrelevance. The President's actions under Article 201 are also justiciable, especially for arbitrary withholding of assent or inaction beyond three months. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - No Pocket or Absolute Veto: The concepts of 'pocket veto' or 'absolute veto' are impermissible under Article 200. The Governor must act expeditiously, as the phrase "shall declare" and "as soon as possible" indicate a constitutional obligation to choose one of the three options without delay or arbitrary inaction. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 – Powers and Functions of the Governor – Legislative Process – Assent to Bills – Judicial Review - Options under Article 200: The Governor, under Article 200, has three options when a bill passed by the State legislature is presented: (i) to give assent; (ii) to withhold assent; or (iii) to reserve the bill for the President's consideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - Reconsideration of Bills - The Governor cannot reserve a bill for the President's consideration in the second round after reconsideration under the first proviso, unless the bill is materially different from the original. The phrase "shall not withhold assent therefrom" mandates assent in such cases. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - The Governor's reservation of ten bills for the President's consideration in the second round on 28.11.2023 was illegal and set aside, as was any subsequent Presidential action. Due to the Governor's undue delay and lack of bona fides, the bills are deemed assented to on 18.11.2023 under Article 142. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - The writ petition is disposed of, declaring the Governor's actions erroneous and non-est, with the ten bills deemed assented to on 18.11.2023. The Governor and State Government are urged to work harmoniously for the people's welfare. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 200 - Timelines for Action: While Article 200 does not prescribe explicit time-limits, the Governor must act within a reasonable period. The Court prescribes: (i) one month for withholding assent or reserving a bill for the President with the Council's advice; (ii) three months for withholding assent or reservation contrary to advice; and (iii) one month for granting assent after reconsideration. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Governor Not Bound by Aid and Advice- Held that the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising his function under Article 200- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- The Governor's decisions under Article 200 are not justiciable on merits, but Courts may issue limited mandamus for prolonged inaction without merits review; no judicial timelines or deemed assent permissible, as Article 142 cannot supplant constitutional functions. [Relied on In Re: Special Courts Bill 1978 1979 1 SCC 380; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh 1952 INSC 28, para 235; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary 1979 INSC 93, para 19; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1983 INSC 61, Paras 85-99, 103-114, 154-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Article 201. Bills reserved for consideration
Article 201 - President's Role under Article 201 - The President must either grant or withhold assent to a reserved bill, with reasons for withholding, and act within three months. In cases of patent unconstitutionality threatening democratic principles, the President should seek an advisory opinion under Article 143. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 419 : 2025 INSC 481 : (2025) 8 SCC 1
Article 212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature
Article 212 – Legislative Privilege - Expulsion – Proportionality – Judicial Review – Held: Legislative decisions, distinct from proceedings, are subject to judicial review. Ethics Committee recommendations are not immune from scrutiny as they do not constitute legislative functions. Disproportionate punishment undermines democratic principles and electorate rights. The Supreme Court quashed expulsion of a Member of Legislative Council (MLC) for defamatory remarks against the Chief Minister, finding the punishment "grossly excessive" and disproportionate. Though the MLC's conduct was "reprehensible" and unbecoming, permanent expulsion was unwarranted. The expulsion violated fundamental rights and the electorate's rights. The Council's process breached natural justice principles, including denying the MLC an adequate opportunity to defend himself. The seven months of expulsion already served were deemed sufficient as a suspension. Judicial review of such decisions does not infringe legislative privilege under Article 212. The bye-election notification for the MLC's seat was quashed, and he was cautioned against future misconduct. Invoking Article 142, the Court substituted the punishment to uphold proportionality and democratic values. (Para 88) Dr. Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2025 INSC 264
Article 224A. Appointment of retired Judges at sittings of High Courts
Article 224A - Appointment of ad-hoc Judges - Rising backlog of cases in High Courts - Implementation of continuing mandamus for judicial appointments - The Supreme Court, while considering the issue of pendency of cases in High Courts, observed that as of 25.01.2025, over 62 lakh cases were pending, with more than 18.2 lakh criminal cases and over 44 lakh civil cases. Referring to its earlier judgment dated 20.04.2021, the Court reiterated that the Constitution should be dynamic to address existing judicial challenges. In light of the situation, the Court temporarily set aside the condition that appointments under Article 224A should only be made if 80% of the sanctioned judicial strength was either working or recommended. The Court allowed High Courts to appoint ad-hoc Judges (ranging from 2 to 5, not exceeding 10% of the sanctioned strength) to expedite the disposal of criminal appeals. These ad-hoc Judges would function under a Bench presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The Court directed that the existing Memorandum of Procedure be followed for such appointments and granted liberty to the parties to file further applications if necessary. The matter remains open for further directions. Lok Prahari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 144
Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
Article 226 / 227 - Challenge to Lok Adalat Award — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Held, the statutory finality attached to a Lok Adalat award leaves no room for an appellate or plenary civil remedy - The validity of such an award cannot be reopened through an ordinary civil suit or by treating execution proceedings as a vehicle for setting it aside - The only recognized avenue of challenge is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory and exceptional in nature - This applies equally to a party to the award and a third party affected by it. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480; Paras 8-14] Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1188
Article 226 - Quashing of FIR - Blanket protection from arrest – Held, the High Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the FIR but simultaneously granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused until the filing of the charge sheet - Such orders are a “stark example in self-contradiction” and cause “grave prejudice to the investigation of the case” - While the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 to prevent miscarriage of justice, these powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot be used to mechanically grant what is effectively anticipatory bail while refusing to quash the proceedings - Passing "no coercive steps" or "no arrest" orders till the investigation is completed, after opining that no case is made out to quash the FIR, is wholly impermissible - Provisions of pre-arrest bail are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. An accused seeking such protection must avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent Sessions Court at the first instance rather than seeking blanket protection in a criminal writ petition for quashing of FIR. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 5-11] Sanjay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1170
Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Article 226 & 32 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Second FIR - Held that the Court has a self-imposed discipline to ordinarily direct petitioners to the High Court, Article 32, being a fundamental right, cannot be rendered nugatory. The Supreme Court can entertain a petition under Article 32 to quash an FIR in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty - The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not restricted to the stage of the FIR; the High Court/Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction even when a charge-sheet has been filed, to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice - A second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence or an occurrence that constitutes a single, composite transaction is not maintainable. Subsequent complaints that are merely counter-versions, modifications, or supplemental in nature to the first one must be treated as a part of the first FIR and investigated accordingly. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) 335; Para 84, 95, 100-105, 145] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249
Article 226 – Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15 - Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution - Service Law - Recruitment Disputes - Alternate Remedy - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, High Courts should not entertain Writ Petition in matters within domain of Tribunals - The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition challenging the provisional select list, as an efficacious alternative remedy was available before the KSAT - The Tribunal is the Court of first instance for all service disputes, and litigants cannot directly approach the High Courts, even to question the vires of statutory legislations - The present case does not fall under the recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, e.g., enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to the vires of the parent legislation - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261; T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of T.N. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 581; Paras 27-29, 32, 49-51] Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1013 : 2025 INSC 1242
Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241
Article 226, 227 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR / Chargesheet - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, Article 226 cannot be invoked to quash chargesheet if cognizance has been taken, remedy is available under Section 528 - FIRs or chargesheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognizance is taken but once cognizance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS, to challenge both FIR/Chargesheet and even the cognizance order - The High Court did have the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to consider the petitioner's grievance for quashing the FIR, chargesheet and any cognizance order - High Court misunderstood the ruling in Neeta Singh v State of U.P. 2024 - Order of High Court was set aside. [Paras 7-10] Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875
Article 226 – Supreme Court issued guidelines to be followed in cases where, after the commencement of an inquiry or investigation by on authority, another inquiry or investigation on same subject matter is initiated by a different authority- i. An assessee must comply with a summons or show cause notice as its mere issuance does not confirm that an investigation has been formally initiated; ii. If an assessee discovers an overlapping inquiry, they must immediately inform the authority that started the subsequent investigation; iii. Tax authorities must communicate with each other to verify the assessee's claim to avoid redundant proceedings and optimize resources; iv. If the investigations are on different "subject matters," the authorities must inform the assessee in writing, explaining the reasons and specifying the distinct subjects; v. Authorities can proceed with their inquiry until it is confirmed that a duplicate investigation or show cause notice for the same liability already exists, in which case the subsequent show cause notice will be quashed; vi. When an overlap is confirmed, the authorities must decide which one will continue the investigation, and the other must forward all relevant materials, as the assessee has no legal right to choose; vii. If authorities cannot agree, the investigation will be handled by the one that started it first, and courts can order the transfer; viii. If authorities do not follow these guidelines, the assessee may file a writ petition with the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Para 97] Armour Security v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : 2025 INSC 982
Article 226 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Misuse of Public Funds - Naming of government schemes after political leaders - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of using courts to settle political scores between rival political parties, stating that political battles should be fought before the electorate - Held that writ petition challenging a government welfare scheme named “ungaludan Stalin” was misconceived in law and an abuse of the process of law - Petitioner rushed to High Court within 3 days of making the representation to the ECI, without giving the ECI an opportunity to decide on the matter - Previous judgments in Common Cause I, II, III, and IV dealt with the use of photographs of political leaders and heads of executive in public-funded advertisements, they do not prohibit a scheme from being names after a political leader - Supreme Court dismissed writ petition with costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to be deposited with the State for implementation of welfare schemes for the underprivileged - Appeals allowed. [Paras 17-25] Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Thiru. C.Ve. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2025 INSC 976
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability - Works contract - Exclusive Jurisdiction - Withdrawal of Reference – Limitation - High Court refused to set aside the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Appellant and reaffirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of M.P. Arbitration Tribunal established under 1982 Act to adjudicate disputes arising from works contract involving State or its instrumentalities – Held, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private party if the dispute involves a public law element, rather than being confined to private contractual obligations, and the private party performs a public duty or is subject to a statutory obligation in relation to a state entity - In cases where a state owned entity-respondent files a writ petition to challenge the invocation of arbitration under 1996 Act due to existence of a statutory remedy under the 1983 Act, the issue pertains to the availability and exclusivity of a statutory dispute resolution mechanism, this involving a public law element, making the writ petition maintainable - Upheld order of High Court and directed appellant to file an application to recall withdrawal order and seek restoration of reference petition. [Para 8] Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 752 : 2025 INSC 907 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2114
Article 226/227 - Exhaustion of remedy - Whether an application under section 156(3) of CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities – Held, the informant must first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station under section 154 CrPC, and if refused, then the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC - Only after exhausting these remedies can the informant approach the Magistrate under section 156(3) CrPC - Magistrates ought not to ordinarily entertain such application directly, doing so is a “mere procedural irregularity” - therefore the order would not be “without jurisdiction” or “vitiated on this count” - Order merely set the criminal law in motion and caused no prejudice to the petitioner - The Magistrate's satisfaction that a cognizable offence was disclosed, even if wrongly recorded, should not be interfered with by the higher courts in inherent powers - Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of Constitution are discretionary and not obligatory for minor procedural irregularities, especially when there is no miscarriage of justice - Upheld order of High Court refusing to quash the order - Petitions dismissed. [Paras 19-22 28-33, 41] Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 742 : 2025 INSC 895
Article 226 - Public Trust Doctrine – Transparent Allocation of Public Resources – Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Article 226 - Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Article 226 - In academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same. However, when the academicians themselves act in a manner that adversely affects the career aspirations of lakhs of students, the Court is left with no alternative but to interfere. (Para 8) Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2025 INSC 714
Article 226 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565
Article 226 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - Suo motu powers - It is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. Writ Courts have the authority to exercise suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation if it violates fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, rendering it void and unconstitutional. Constitutional Courts possess inherent powers to strike down patently unconstitutional subordinate legislation in exceptional cases, even without a formal challenge, provided the State is heard. (Para 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Article 226 - The responsibility, of fixing qualifications for purposes of appointment, promotion etc. of staff or qualifications for admissions, is that of expert bodies (in the present case, the AICTE), and so long as qualifications prescribed are not shown to be arbitrary or perverse, the Courts will not interfere. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. However, this does not mean that Courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. (Para 25) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605
Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 226 - Writ Petition - Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 226 - Conflicting Supreme Court Judgments - When two Supreme Court decisions appear inconsistent, High Courts must not prefer one over the other but should attempt to reconcile both, following the decision most aligned with the facts of the case at hand. (Para 35) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - Mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not deprive a High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant appropriate relief. If the State disputes facts solely to create grounds for rejecting a writ petition, the High Court must reject such contentions and investigate the disputed facts when required in the interest of justice. The Court clarified that issues like possession, as in this case involving the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, not purely a factual dispute. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, which had overturned a Single Judge's ruling, and restored the Single Judge's judgment, emphasizing that Article 226 remains effective even in cases involving disputed facts if the State's objections are merely tactical. (Para 48) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. (Para 22) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 226 - The power of judicial review in matters concerning implementation of policy objectives should transcend the standard power of judicial review to issue writs to perform statutory duty and proceed to examine whether the duty bearers, the authorities and bodies constituted properly and also whether they are functioning effectively and efficiently. By ensuring institutional integrity we achieve our institutional objectives. Further, effective and efficient performance of the institutes can reduce unnecessary litigation. (Para 23) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 226 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591
Article 226 - Contempt Proceedings - Mediation - Validity of High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without mutual consent - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without the consent of both parties. Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. The Court criticized the High Court's approach of referring the matter to mediation based solely on the State's willingness to offer alternative land, despite opposition from the appellant. The Supreme Court directed the State to comply with the High Court's earlier judgment dated 10th February 2020, failing which the Chief Secretary was ordered to appear before the Court. High Court's mediation order set aside; State directed to comply with High Court's judgment. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245
Article 226 - Blacklisting of Contractors - An authority's power to blacklist a contractor must be exercised judiciously, based on substantial grounds, not mere allegations of contractual breach. A show cause notice for blacklisting must comply with judicial principles, ensuring careful evaluation of facts and the nature of the alleged violation. Blacklisting, being a severe measure that can ruin a contractor's livelihood, requires significant deviation or aberrant conduct, as held in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70. Issuing a show cause notice without sufficient grounds is a hollow formality, leading to avoidable litigation. Relying on Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 9, the Court identified three grounds for blacklisting: habitual failure to supply equipment on time, unsatisfactory performance of supplied equipment, or unjustified failure to honor a bid. In this case, the appellant faced a show cause notice for blacklisting and forfeiture of EMD due to delays in printing books caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting portion of the notice as unjustified, while upholding other parts. The Court criticized authorities for issuing show cause notices with predetermined intent to blacklist, burdening High Courts with unnecessary litigation. Authorities must apply judicial principles at the notice stage to prevent such outcomes. (Para 30, 32) Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 217 : 2025 INSC 236
Article 226 - High Court Remand Order—Scope of Appellate Review - An appellate court (Division Bench) cannot remand a matter as a matter of routine where it has already affirmed procedural validity and exhaustively evaluated merits based on evidence. Remand must not be an "empty formality"; appellate courts should dispose of appeals on merits to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Judicial review under Article 226 targets the decision-making process, not substitution of views on merits. Held: The Division Bench's remand to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration (while upholding procedure) was legally flawed and untenable, as the dissolution's substantive validity was conclusively determined. Remand set aside; matter finally resolved in favor of dissolution. Appeal Dismissed. State Government's dissolution order upheld; High Court's remand quashed. No costs. [Relied on: Nadekerappa since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. v. Pillamma since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 387); Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors v. State of Gujarat and Ors.; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997 SCC OnLine SC 135)]. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211
Article 226 - Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 - Promissory Estoppel - Public Interest - Electricity Tariff Rebates - Recovery of Incentives - Public Exchequer - Whether the Goa Government's withdrawal of electricity tariff rebates under the 1991 Notification and recovery of rebates erroneously granted under the 1996 amendments, as mandated by the 2002 Act, violates promissory estoppel. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Goa Government's authority to withdraw electricity tariff rebates in the public interest, particularly when such incentives strain public finances. The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply rigidly when government promises conflict with public interest, as safeguarding the public exchequer prevails over private commercial interests. The Court affirmed the High Court's ruling that demand notices for recovery of rebates were valid, relying on Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2010) 6 SCC 499, which upheld the constitutionality of the 2002 Act. The 1996 amending notifications, which purported to extend rebate benefits, were declared void ab initio by the Bombay High Court in 2001, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. Citing Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251, the Court reiterated that public interest overrides strict enforcement of promissory estoppel in cases involving withdrawal of incentives. The appeal by the industrial units was dismissed, as they were not entitled to rebates post the rescission of the 1991 Notification on 31 March 1995, despite applying for power supply prior to its withdrawal. (Para 28) Puja Ferro Alloys v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2025 INSC 217
Article 226 - High Courts, under Article 226, exercise discretionary powers and may refrain from interfering in cases of procedural violations if it serves substantial justice. The Court set aside a High Court judgment that invalidated a 2007 bank auction sale due to a procedural lapse (non-issuance of 15-day notice), emphasizing that such technicalities should not override equitable considerations when the auction had attained finality. The appellant, an auction purchaser, faced frivolous litigation initiated by the guarantor in 2008, despite the sale certificate being issued and significant investment (approx. Rs. 1.5 Crore) made in the property. The High Courts should adopt a practical approach, considering the factual context and equities, rather than acting as a court of appeal. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside; no costs imposed on the respondent. [Para 5, 8, 10] M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : 2025 INSC 177
Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159 : (2025) 4 SCC 342
Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111
Article 226 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2025 INSC 91 : (2025) 4 SCC 1
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - Bank Officials - Adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. (Para 16) General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601
Article 226 - Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63
Article 226 - Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Interpretation of Statutes - A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266
Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court
Article 227 - High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (Bombay) - Civil Manual - Pursis Claiming 'No Instructions' - Withdrawal of Vakalatnama - Whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with the suit after the 'no instructions' pursis was filed by the defendants' advocate, claiming no instructions, without serving a fresh notice on the defendants - Held that the Appellate Court's finding that the Trial Court did not commit a wrong in proceeding with the matter was a plausible view based on the material on record and did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution - Held that the pursis was simply an intimation of prospective action and did not reflect a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama - The Trial Court rightly decided to ignore such pursis as it was not a valid notice/intimation to the Court about the withdrawal of the Vakalatnama as contemplated under the Advocates Act and Civil Manual - The procedure prescribed for the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama (Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960) requires the advocate to file a note requesting permission to withdraw and also file a copy of the intimation to the client along with its written acknowledgment, or a letter from the client instructing withdrawal - This procedure was not applicable as the pursis did not pray for, nor was it treated as, a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama by the Trial Court - Held that the High Court, in considering the procedure for withdrawal of Vakalatnama, clearly exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the Appellate Court - Held that power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors - The Appellate Court's order was not amenable to interference - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675; Paras 15-23] Shri Digant v. P.D.T. Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1140 : 2025 INSC 1352
Article 227- Supreme Court examined rights of a tenant claiming possession of a secured asset under an unregistered tenancy agreement against measures initiated by a financial institution under SARFAESI Act - High Court entertained application of tenant under Article 227 and directed restoration of possession - Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly entertained application under Article 227, as alternate remedies exists under section 18 of SARFAESI Act - After 2016 amendment, Section 17(4A) enables lessees/tenants to approach DRT against measures under Section 13(4) and DRT orders are appealable under Section 18 - Supreme Court noted that it has always disapproved interference of High Courts under Article 226/227 in matters of SARFAESI Act - Held High Court wrongly relied on Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. (2014) 6 SCC 1, to entertain such application, which was applicable prior to amendment. [Para 12, 13] PNB Housing Finance v. Sh. Manoj Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 723 : 2025 INSC 847
Article 227 — Bank Guarantees — Interim Relief - In exceptional circumstances, a High Court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to grant interim relief in arbitration proceedings, notwithstanding the Arbitration Act's emphasis on minimal judicial interference and the availability of remedies under Section 37(1)(b), where denial of such relief would occasion irreparable harm, such as the irretrievable injustice from encashment of a bank guarantee amid ongoing arbitration. The appellant, a construction contractor, furnished an unconditional bank guarantee of ₹3.73 crore to secure an advance payment under a residential construction contract with the respondent real estate company. Citing delays and poor performance, the appellant terminated the contract and invoked the guarantee. The respondent sought interim stay of encashment under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, which the Commercial Court denied. Invoking Article 227, the High Court stayed encashment pending arbitration, subject to extension of the guarantee's validity. Dismissing the appellant's appeal against the High Court's interference, the Supreme Court upheld the order, emphasizing the guarantee's ongoing validity, the arbitration's pendency, and the need to preserve the status quo to avert irreversible prejudice to the respondent. The Court directed expeditious disposal of the Section 9 petition within eight weeks, with the guarantee to subsist until final adjudication. Judicial restraint in arbitration is paramount, but Article 227 empowers exceptional intervention to prevent fraud of an egregious nature or irretrievable injustice; here, the High Court's interim measure balanced interests without prejudging merits, aligning with the Act's pro-arbitration ethos. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. v. Bansal Infra Projects, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 544 : 2025 INSC 640
Article 227 - Supervisory Jurisdiction - Rejection of Plaint - High Court cannot reject a plaint while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as this power is limited to ensuring courts/tribunals act within their jurisdiction - The Court set aside the High Court's decision to reject a plaint as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, emphasizing that such rejection is a function of the trial court under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), appealable under Section 96 - Article 227 cannot be used to usurp the trial court's original jurisdiction or bypass statutory remedies under the CPC - The Court criticized procedural shortcuts by an overburdened judiciary, stating they undermine the rule of law and procedural safeguards. (Paras 8 - 10) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606
Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2025 INSC 26 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 376
Article 233. Appointment of district judges
Article 233 - Appointment of District Judges - Reference to Constitution Bench - A person not already in the service of the Union of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if they have been for not less than 7 years an advocate or a pleader and are recommended by the High Court for appointment - Supreme Court referred two substantial questions of law regarding the interpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution to a Constitution Bench of five judges - Whether a judicial officer who has already completed seven years at the bar, recruited for subordinate judicial services, would be entitled to appointment as ADJ against a bar vacancy - Whether eligibility for appointment as a DJ is to be seen only at the time of appointment or at the time of application or both - Writ Petition was filed for review of decision passed in Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, which held that an advocate who applies for the post of DJ by way of direct recruitment should continue to be a practising advocate until date of appointment and should not already be in judicial service of Union or State and held that rules framed by High Court debarring Judicial officers from staking their claim as against posts reserved for direct recruitment from Bar would not be ultra vires to the Constitution - Supreme Court directed registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for obtaining appropriate orders for Constitution of 5 judge bench. [Paras 17-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 793 : 2025 INSC 965
Article 245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States
Articles 245 and 246 - Legislative Powers - Source of Power v. Field of Legislation - The power to legislate is derived from Articles 245 and 246 of Constitution - Entries in 7th Schedule (Union, State and Concurrent Lists) are merely 'legislative heads' or 'fields of legislation' - 1983 Act, which enables the creation of admission rules, traces its power to Entry 25 of List III of Seventh Schedule and Article 371D. [Paras 15, 17-19, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058
Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127
Article 246A. Special provision with respect to goods and services tax
Article 246A - A penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246-A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Sections 69 and 70 of the GST Acts must fail and is accordingly rejected. Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Article 246A - Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act); Sections 69 and 70 - Constitutionality of - Power to Arrest and Summon - Legislative Competence under Article 246A - Incidental Powers for Tax Evasion. The constitutional validity of Sections 69 (power to arrest) and 70 (power to summon) of the CGST Act, and analogous provisions in State GST Acts, was challenged. Petitioners contended that Article 246A, which empowers Parliament and State Legislatures to levy and collect GST, does not authorize criminalization of violations, such as through arrest and summons. They argued these powers fall outside legislative competence, being neither ancillary to GST levy nor covered by Entry 93 of List I (offences against laws of the Union) in the Seventh Schedule. Whether Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act are constitutionally valid and within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 246A. Held, Provisions upheld as constitutionally valid. Challenge to vires rejected; provisions do not violate constitutional limits. (Para 75) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Article 298. Power to carry on trade, etc.
Article 298 – State as Model Litigant - Held that lethargy and indifference by a public authority, where contractual obligations demand prompt responsiveness, falls short of the standards of fairness required of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298 of the Constitution – The State must act as a model litigant – fair, responsive, and transparent in its dealings – Silence or procedural evasion by senior officers is inconsistent with the constitutional trust reposed in public authorities - Public Officers are custodians of public faith, not mere administrators – A stern warning was issued to the then Managing Director of the respondent company for such neglect, cautioning that any repetition may invite adverse remarks or even personal accountability. [Relied on State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (2000) 9 SCC 94; Para 11, 15-19] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Article 300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law
Article 300A (Right to Property) - Freedom to Sell Property - Immovable Property Transactions - The constitutionally protected right to own immovable property inherently includes the freedom to freely acquire, possess, and dispose of it at will - Courts must balance the freedom to buy and sell property with the Governmental duty to ensure integrity in transactions - A requirement in rules/regulations that impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property is illegal, as it has the direct effect of 'depriving of property' and such delays impinge on the right to hold and dispose of property. [Paras 29, 30] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292
Article 300A - Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550
Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383
Article 300-A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580
Article 304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States.
Article 304(a) - Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (VAT) - Exemption from payment of VAT on sale of asbestos cement sheets/ bricks (containing fly ash 25%) was granted only to manufacturers within the State, challenged as violative of Article 304(a) of the Constitution due to discrimination against goods imported from outside Rajasthan – Held, for taxation under Article 304(a), discrimination exists if there is an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation creating an economic barrier and an unfavourable bias against goods imported from outside the State vis-à-vis local goods - It was found that the exemption was not grounded in any manifest public purpose, nor was it limited to a particular class such as "new industries" for a specified period - The notifications merely restricted the benefit to local manufacturers, whereas asbestos products containing the specified fly ash content manufactured outside Rajasthan would not get similar benefits - Exemption was found to be blanket, lacking intelligible differentia or rational justification linked to the stated policy objective; merely citing “public interest” was inadequate - Supreme Court distinguished Video Electronics, clarifying that the precedent applies only to case-specific exemptions for a narrow, new industrial class for a limited period, with valid justification; it cannot be used to justify general, indefinite or unjustified preferences - Rajasthan notification granting VAT exemption discriminates against similar goods from outside the State is ultra vires Article 304(a) - General or indefinite tax exemptions in favour of local manufacturers without clear and reasonable policy justification cannot be sustained - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12] U.P. Asbestos v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 946 : 2025 INSC 1154
Article 309. Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.
Article 309 - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension Rules), 1982 - Death cum Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) - Appellant's mother was a teacher in Maharashtra Government's aided school and upon her death, appellant claimed gratuity under the 1972 Act - High Court rejected the claim. Whether legal heirs of a deceased teacher in aided school would be entitled to gratuity under the Act of 1972 or under the Rules of 1982 – Held, Aided School Teacher's post akin to post under State Govt. and gratuity governed by State Rules - Payment of gratuity would not be governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Court directed to grant benefits under Rules of 1982 - Appellant's mother served in a government aided school and was not a state government employee, her post is equivalent to a post under the State Government - as service conditions and monetary benefits of pay and allowances were governed by State framed rules under Article 309 of Constitution of India. Court permitted appellant to approach respondent with an application for payment as per Rules of 1982. Appeal allowed. [Para 7, 12] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824
Article 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State
Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656
Article 311 - Termination of Judicial Officers - Adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Punitive Action - Natural Justice - Misconduct Allegations - Termination of judicial officers based on adverse ACRs without timely communication, opportunity to explain, or expungement of adverse remarks is arbitrary and illegal. "Poor performance" claims must be substantiated by clear and consistent evidence; contradictory or unsubstantiated claims in ACRs are insufficient grounds for termination. "Other material" used as a basis for termination, such as pending or concluded complaints, necessitates a fair opportunity to be heard, especially when such complaints form the foundation of termination, in adherence to Article 311 of the Constitution and relevant Conduct Rules. Termination based on misconduct allegations and "inefficiency," even if complaints were closed or resulted in advisories, is punitive and stigmatic, rendering it illegal if done without due process. Termination orders based on such flawed procedures are liable to be set aside, as they violate established principles of law and natural justice. (Para 16) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289 : (2025) 9 SCC 297
Article 311 - Administrative order punishing a delinquent employee - Certain generic principles governing interference with orders of punishment that are passed following inquiry proceedings have evolved over a period of time. Law is well settled that an administrative order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to correction in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere to set things right. After all, public servants to whom Article 311 of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards, enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly demonstrated. (Para 33) Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83
Article 317. Removal and suspension of a member of a Public Service Commission
Article 317(1) - Removal of member of Public Service Commission on grounds of misbehaviour - This case arises from a reference by President of India for the removal of Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage, a member of Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission (APPSC), on the ground of misbehaviour – Held, the charges of misbehaviour against Ms. Mepung Tadar Bage were not proved - The principle of 'collective responsibility' does not apply to a reference for removal under Article 317, as removal is individual and not collective - There was no direct evidence to prove the respondent's involvement in the paper setting, moderation or leakage - Allegations were not substantiated by cogent evidence and that her actions did not meet the threshold of 'misbehaviour' or even a 'lapse' - State's actions were based on prejudice without sufficient material to support a conclusion of misbehaviour - Supreme Court recommended that suspension be revoked forthwith and that she be entitled to all consequential and monetary benefits. [Paras 28, 29, 69-71, 75-77] In Re: Mepung Tadar Bage, Member, Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 849 : 2025 INSC 1047
Article 320. Functions of Public Service Commissions
Article 320 (3) (a) - deals with recruitment in service – Held - Consultation with Commission is directory but once Regulations are framed these are framed these are to be followed - State's regulations are subservient to UGC Act and Regulations - UGC Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII - State Government exercise powers under Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to make laws relating to “education”- Entry 25 of List III is subject to Entry 66 of List I - Court emphasized on importance of Regulations framed under Article 320(3) of the Constitution and cautioned against casual bypassing of Regulations – Held - that in present case Regulations were already in existence in Punjab known as Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 1955 - so posts advertised were within purview of the Commission, making it mandatory to consult commission – Held - State of Punjab itself adopted the standards and process laid down by the UGC, therefore it was bound to follow these regulations - Upheld order passed by High Court Single Judge citing that there is total arbitrariness in present selection. Relied on State of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4; Paras 18-24, 47, 48] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834
Article 320 - University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations of 2010 - Functions of Public Service Commissions – Facts - State wanted to recruit 1091 posts of Assistant Professors and 67 posts of Librarians through departmental selection committee on an urgent basis - 45-day deadline was set for commencement and conclusion of whole recruitment process and selection on basis of single written test. [Para 3] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834
Article 348. Language to be used in the Supreme Court and in the High Courts and for Acts, Bills, etc.
Article 348 - Interestingly, Urdu words have a heavy influence on Court parlance, both in criminal and civil law. From Adalat (Adalat means 'Court') to Halafnama (Halafnama means 'affidavit') to Peshi (Peshi means 'appearance' or 'presence'), the influence of Urdu is writ large in the language of the Indian Courts. For that matter, even though the official language of the Supreme Court and the High Courts as per Article 348 of the Constitution is English, yet many Urdu words continue to be used in this Court till date. These include vakalatnama, dasti, etc. Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2025 INSC 486 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 1558 : (2025) 7 SCC 293
Article 366. Definitions
Article 366(29-A)(b)—Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948— Sections 2(d), 2(h), 2(m), 3F(1)(b)- Sales Tax—Works Contract—Transfer of Property in Goods—Levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used by the assessee for printing lottery tickets—Assessee contended that these materials were 'consumables' not subject to tax, and that lottery tickets, being 'actionable claims', were not 'goods'- Supreme Court upholds tax in ink & chemicals used to print lottery tickets, says their deemed sale occurs with lottery sale - U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (1948 Act) - Levy of Tax - The levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used in the printing of lottery tickets under Section 3F(1)(b) of the 1948 Act, is upheld - i. Works Contract (Printing): The contract for printing lottery tickets, where the paper is supplied by the customer, constitutes a works contract; ii. Transfer of Property in Goods (Ink & Chemicals): When the ink, after being diluted with the processing chemical, is applied to the paper, a tangible transfer of the diluted ink (a composite good) occurs, and it becomes a part of the final lottery ticket; iii. Since the property in the ink and chemicals has been transferred in the execution of the works contract, the value of these materials is subject to tax under Section 3F(1)(b) and does not qualify as an excluded consumable under Section 3F(2)(b)(x). [Paras 72-75, 132, 151-154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188
Article 371D. Special provisions with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana
Article 371D - Telangana Medical and Dental Colleges Admission Rules, 2017 - Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee), Act, 1983 (1983 Act) - 'Local Candidate' - Held, the authority of State of Telangana to define 'local candidate' for preferential admission to medical courses through subordinate legislation is a valid exercise of power under Article 371D and the Presidential Order - High Court's expansion of this definition under Article 226 was an impermissible interference with legislative wisdom - The rule defining a 'local candidate' based on residence and education within the State for a specified period is no arbitrary or violative of Article 14 - The definition is intended to benefit individuals with a real bond to the state, who are presumed to remain and serve the local population after they qualify - Upheld similar rules that provide for domicile or residential requirements for admission to educational institutions - High Court cannot expand a legislative definition based on its 'subjective satisfaction' - High Court's reading down of the rule to include any students with a residence certificate would lead to an unworkable and anomalous situation - There was no warrant for reading down when the definition is clear, in consonance with the Presidential Order - Set aside order of High Court and upholds Telangana Domicile Rule mandating 4 year continuous study in State with relaxation to children of govt. servants - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19, 22-25, 32] State of Telangana v. Kalluri Naga Narasimha Abhiram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 859 : 2025 INSC 1058