Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums - The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) against an order of the NCDRC which had upheld the decisions of the State and District Consumer Forums directing LIC to compensate the respondent-claimants under the “Jeevan Arogya” hospital cash benefit policy. The deceased insured, a chronic alcoholic, had suppressed this fact in the proposal form, answering “No” to questions regarding alcohol consumption. Following his hospitalization and death due to complications linked to chronic liver disease and cardiac arrest, LIC repudiated the claim under Clause 7(xi) of the policy, which excludes coverage for conditions arising from alcohol misuse. Held, the lower forums erred in interpreting the policy terms and the exclusion clause, as the deceased's chronic alcoholism was a material fact directly related to his hospitalization and death. Overruling the NCDRC's reliance on Sulbha Prakash Motegaoneker v. LIC, the Court clarified that suppression of a pre-existing condition justifies repudiation if it is linked to the cause of death. The appeal was allowed, the NCDRC order was set aside, and the repudiation upheld. However, considering the respondents' hardships and payments already made (approximately ₹3,00,000), the Court directed that no recovery of these amounts be sought, though no further payments were to be made. (Para 16 – 21) Life Insurance Corporation v. Sunita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 346

Consumer Forum - Qualification for appointment - A bunch of appeals and review petitions arose from Bombay High Court orders invalidating aspects of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”), concerning appointments to consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, particularly in Maharashtra. In Impugned Order I, the Bombay High Court struck down Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules for executive dominance in the selection process (violating judicial independence per Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 (“MBA – III”), and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455 (“MBA – IV”)) and partially invalidated Rule 10(2) on tenure extensions; absent clear reappointment rules, it applied Rule 8(18) of the Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances, and Conditions of Service of President and Members of State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2019, temporarily. Impugned Order II clarified that directions in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 231] (“Limaye – I”) on written examinations apply only to non-judicial members of State Commissions and District Commission members. Impugned Order III (Telangana High Court) set aside District Commission appointments predating Limaye – I. The Supreme Court examined consumerism's constitutional foundations under Articles 38, 39, and 47, its evolution, and the adequacy of tenure-based grievance redressal mechanisms. Issues: (i) Feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum (e.g., Consumer Tribunal or Consumer Court) for consumer disputes, replacing or supplementing tenure-based appointments with permanent judicial/non-judicial members, staff, and Presiding Officers (potentially headed by sitting judges), alongside enhanced strength and infrastructure; (ii) Notification of revised recruitment rules ensuring judicial independence (majority judicial selection committees), efficiency (five-year tenures per precedents), and differentiated processes (no examinations for judicial posts; mandatory for non-judicial); (iii) Validity of 2020 Rules' provisions on selection committees, examinations, and reappointments; (iv) Scope of Limaye – I directions; (v) Status of existing/pending appointments, terminations, and recruitments amid transitions. Held: Upholding consumerism as a constitutionally embedded right integral to participatory democracy, economic activity, and environmental justice, the Court held that impermanent, tenure-based offices undermine security of tenure, motivation, judicial quality, efficiency, and consumer trust—necessitating a shift to permanency for qualitative, timely decisions. Exercising Article 142 powers, it advocated revamping consumer fora toward permanency at district, state, and national levels, aligning with precedents on judicial independence (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, “MBA – IV”). Struck down unsustainable aspects of 2020 Rules; clarified Limaye – I requires no written examinations/viva voce for Presidents/Judicial Members of State Commissions or District Commission Presidents, but mandates them (in consultation with State Service Commissions) for Non-Judicial Members; restricted District Commission President qualifications to serving/retired District Judges; set aside Impugned Order I (qua 2019 Rules' applicability for reappointments), upheld Impugned Order II, set aside Impugned Order III; allowed review petitions exempting judicial posts from examinations; mandated four-year tenures for continuing appointments (five-year for future ones); applied judgment prospectively except as directed. Directions: (i) Union of India to file affidavit within 3 months assessing constitutional viability of permanent Consumer Tribunal/Court with permanent staff/members/Presiding Officers, enhanced strength, infrastructure, and independence; (ii) Union to notify new Rules within 4 months incorporating five-year tenures, majority judicial selection committees, differentiated examination requirements, and restricted qualifications per precedents (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, MBA – IV); (iii) States to complete fresh recruitments within 4 months of notification. Granted interim protections (under Article 142) to seven categories of Presidents/Members, with continuing appointments limited to four-year tenures: (1) Maharashtra appointees (05-10-2023, post-examination) to complete tenures or continue until new process completion; (2) Maharashtra terminated members (06-10-2023) eligible for reappointment consideration under new Rules (judicial posts exempt from examination; non-judicial required); (3) Pre-Limaye – I (pre-2023) serving Presidents/Members to complete tenures or continue until new process; (4) Other States' serving/appointed Presidents/Judicial Members (with/without examinations) to complete tenures; stay-delayed selectees to be appointed for full terms; (5) Pre-Limaye – I non-judicial selectees (without examinations): serving to complete tenures; post-Limaye – I to continue until new process (no appointment if only selected); (6) Post-examination non-judicial selectees: serving to complete tenures; stay-delayed to be appointed for full terms; (7) Other States' terminated members eligible for reappointment under new Rules (judicial exempt from examination; non-judicial required). Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

Consumer Tribunal - The Union of India is directed to file an affidavit on the feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum for consumer disputes, either in the form of a Consumer Tribunal or a Consumer Court, within a period of 3 months from today, on the touchstone of the constitutional mandate. Such a forum shall consist of permanent members, including both staff and the Presiding officers. The Union of India may also consider facilitating sitting Judges to head the fora. The strength may be increased adequately. Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634

Even in a consumer dispute under the Arbitration Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the 'consumer' alone. (Para 25) Citicorp Finance v. Snehasis Nanda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2025 INSC 371

Insurance Claim - National Permit - The appellant's truck, registered in Bihar and covered under a valid insurance policy, suffered an electrical short-circuit fire on June 8, 2014, while operating within Bihar. The insurer repudiated the claim, contending that the national permit (valid from October 14, 2012, to October 13, 2017) was invalidated due to non-payment of the state authorization fee beyond October 14, 2013. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar, allowed the claim, but the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission set it aside, holding no valid permit existed. Whether non-payment of the state authorization fee for a national permit invalidates an insurance claim when the vehicle is used solely within its home state and a valid national permit subsists. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the NCDRC order and restoring the State Commission's decision. A valid national permit remains operative for insurance purposes even without payment of the state authorization fee, provided the vehicle operates within its registered state. Such fee is required only for inter-state movement. Here, the incident occurring in Bihar rendered the repudiation frivolous, entitling the appellant to the claim. The Court emphasized that the national permit, issued by Bihar authorities, complied with policy terms absent any out-of-state travel. Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2025 INSC 154

Peaceful Protest by consumers – Held, a right to protest peacefully without falling foul of the law is a corresponding right, which the consumers ought to possess just as the seller enjoys his right to commercial speech. Any attempt to portray them as criminal offences, when the necessary ingredients are not made out, would be a clear abuse of process and should be nipped in the bud. (Para 16, 22, 30 and 34) Shahed Kamal v. A. Surti Developers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 433 : 2025 INSC 502 : AIR 2025 SC 2166 : (2025) 9 SCC 547

Medical Negligence - National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) overstepped its jurisdiction by creating a new case that was not based on original complaint - Complainant had not alleged any deficiency in antenatal care, rather, he had asserted that tests were prescribed and undergone - A decision must be based on the case pleaded and that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings - Multiple medical boards, constituted at the request of the complaint, had reviewed the case and found no 'gross medical negligence' in the management of the patient by the treating doctors - The doctor cannot be held liable for an unfavourable outcome without strong evidence of negligence, and that Courts and Consumer Forums should not substitute their own views for those of medical specialists - Appeal allowed and directed complainant to return Rs. 10 lakhs. [Paras 23-30] Deep Nursing Home v. Manmeet Singh Mattewal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2025 INSC 1094

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d)— 'Consumer'— 'Commercial Purpose'— Exclusion from definition - Held, for an activity or transaction to be considered for a "commercial purpose," it should have a close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity- What must be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction—whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser - "commercial purpose" is understood to include business-to-business transactions between commercial entities - Where an established company buys a product license (software) to automate its business processes, the object is to reduce costs and maximise profits- Such a transaction has a nexus with the generation of profits and is therefore for a commercial purpose - The 'Explanation' to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, which excludes use for earning a livelihood by means of self-employment, does not apply to a company - Held that there is a difference between a self-employed individual and a corporation. [Relied on: Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and Ors. 2020 2 SCC 265; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors and Ors. ((2023) 8 SCC 362; Para 15-18, 20-27] Poly Medicure Ltd. v. Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1102 : 2025 INSC 1314

Execution of Orders - Interpretation of Statutes - Section 25 - Section 27A – Appeal – Revision – Held, there was a drafting error in Section 25(1) of Act of 1986 and applied the principle of casus omissus and purposive interpretation - The words “where an interim order” in Section 25(1) should be read as “where any order” to ensure all orders, final or interim, are enforceable - This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of the Act, which is to provide effective remedies to consumers - An appeal from an order passed by the District Forum in an execution petition lies to the State Commission under Section 15 of Act of 1986 and no further remedy of appeal or revision is available - Revision petitions against such orders would be treated as appeals since State Commission had the jurisdiction to hear them - Supreme Court requested NCDRC Chairman to take appropriate steps to ensure the expeditious disposal of thousands of execution petitions - Supreme Court read down Section 25(1) of 1986 Act, as amended via 2002 amendment to 1986 Act, making it in line with the Act of 2019 and pre-amendment era - This order is made retrospectively applicable covering all pending execution cases from 2003 to 2020, when Act of 2019, reinstated original position by expressly making 'every order' enforceable - An order passed by any Court or any forum is merely a kind of paper decree unless effective relief is granted to the party entitled thereto - The consumers of justice should feel that they have received justice in reality and not merely on appears. [Paras 18-29, 38] Palm Groves Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Magar Girme and Gaikwad Associates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 826 : 2025 INSC 1023

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2025 INSC 398

Section 2(1)(d) - Definition of 'Consumer' - SelfEmployment – Commercial Purpose - When a product is bought to be utilised in an established commercial venture by the buyer's employees and not the buyer himself, the buyer cannot be considered a 'consumer'. While a buyer using a product for 'self-employment' can be considered a 'consumer' under the Act, the facts of each case need to be examined. [Relied on: Paramount Digital Colour Lab v. Agfa India Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 81] Virender Singh v. Darshana Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 359

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - "Consumer" - Project Loan - Commercial Purpose - Deficiency in Service - Whether a borrower of a project loan for commercial purposes falls within the definition of "Consumer" - Held, no. A company availing a project loan for the post-production of a movie, with the dominant intention of generating profits, does not fall within the definition of "Consumer" under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The transaction constitutes a business-to-business transaction for a commercial purpose, and the explanation to Section 2(1)(d) regarding self-employment does not apply. The dominant purpose of the loan, even if partly for brand-building, is ultimately profit generation. The NCDRC lacks jurisdiction in such cases. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - The "commercial purpose" exclusion in Section 2(1)(d)(ii) applies to loans availed for profit-generating activities. Business-to-business loan transactions for commercial purposes are outside the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. (Para 19 & 21) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - 'dominant intention' - The dominant intention behind the transaction determines whether it is for a commercial purpose. Dominant purpose test is crucial in determining whether a person availing services qualifies as a 'consumer.' [Relied on: National Insurance Company v. Harsolia Motors, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 313 and Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers. (2020) 2 SCC 265; (Para 18 & 21)] Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(d)(ii) - Project Loan – Wrongful Reporting to CIBIL – Maintainability of Complaint before NCDRC - The NCDRC held the Central Bank of India liable for deficiency in service and wrongful reporting of the respondent company as a defaulter to CIBIL, thereby causing reputational and financial loss. The NCDRC awarded compensation of Rs. 75,00,000/- and litigation costs of Rs. 20,000/- in favor of the respondent, along with a direction to issue a certificate stating that the loan account was settled and that the wrongful reporting was incorrect. Held, the Respondent which availed a project loan of Rs. 10 crores for the post-production of a movie, did so with the dominant purpose of generating profits. Hence, it was a business-to-business transaction and fell within the ambit of 'commercial purpose.' Since the loan had a direct nexus with profit generation and commercial gain, the respondent did not fall within the definition of 'consumer' under the Act. Consequently, the complaint before the NCDRC was not maintainable. (Para 22) Chief Manager Central Bank of India v. Ad Bureau Advertising, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2025 INSC 288

Section 2(1)(r) - "unfair trade practice" - In 2014, the respondents booked an apartment in the Godrej Summit project in Gurgaon, Haryana, entering into an Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) with the appellant-builder, Godrej Projects Development Ltd. The ABA included a clause allowing forfeiture of 20% of the earnest money upon cancellation. In 2017, after the apartment was ready for possession, the respondents canceled the booking citing market recession and declining property prices, seeking a full refund of ₹51,12,310 paid. The appellant invoked the forfeiture clause. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) ruled in favor of the respondents, permitting forfeiture of only 10% of the Basic Sale Price (BSP) as reasonable earnest money, with the balance refundable at 6% interest per annum. The builder appealed. Issues 1. Whether the 20% forfeiture clause in the ABA constitutes an excessive penalty under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, rather than genuine pre-estimated liquidated damages. 2. Whether one-sided, unreasonable forfeiture clauses in builder-buyer agreements amount to an "unfair trade practice" under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (now 2019). 3. Enforceability of such clauses where buyers lack bargaining power. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the NCDRC's order. The 20% forfeiture was deemed excessive, arbitrary, and a penalty, limited to 10% of BSP as reasonable earnest money. One-sided clauses in standard-form builder-buyer agreements, tilted in favor of developers, constitute unfair trade practices under consumer protection laws and are unenforceable. Godrej Projects Development Ltd. v. Anil Karlekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 150 : 2025 INSC 143 : (2025) 4 SCC 259

Section 27 – Penalties imposed by the NCDRC are regulatory and punitive in nature, aimed at ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws, and do not fall within the definition of "debt" under the IBC. The interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC applies only to debts and does not extend to regulatory penalties or criminal proceedings. The Court distinguished between civil debt recovery proceedings and regulatory penalties, emphasizing that the latter serve a public interest function and cannot be stayed under the IBC moratorium. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on precedents related to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, noting that penalties under the Consumer Protection Act are distinct and serve a different purpose. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to comply with the NCDRC's penalty orders. (Para 29, 38, 40) Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2025 INSC 314 : (2025) 4 SCC 629

Consumer Protection Act, 2019

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) - Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and held that in cases where a builder charges a high rate of interest (18% p.a.) for delay by the buyer, equity and fairness demand that the same rate be awarded to the buyer when the builder commits default in offering possession, when justified by conduct and delay - directed refund of the principal amount paid by the appellant to the respondent with interest at 18% per annum, enhancing the rate from the 9% awarded by NCDRC due to the respondent's persistent delay, harassment, and inequitable conduct - held that there is no absolute rule of parity in interest and compensation rates between builders and buyers, but reasonable compensation must be determined case-to-case - Held that a manifestly unfair bargain in the contract can be judicially corrected - Interest charged by builder can be granted to buyer - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11-12, 19-20] Rajnesh Sharma v. Business Park Town Planners Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2025 INSC 1149

Constitution of India; Article 142 - Uniform pay and allowances structure for Presidents and Members of State and District Consumer Commissions across all States and Union Territories - Significant disparities in remuneration due to varying State rules under Section 102 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, despite the Central Government's Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020. The Supreme Court emphasized that adequate remuneration is essential for the effective discharge of duties under the 2019 Act, which aims to protect consumer interests and ensure efficient dispute resolution. (Paras 5–7) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Consumer Protection Act, 2019; Section 102 - Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Model Rules, 2020; Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 - Directions - State Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale as per the Second National Judicial Pay Commission, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 of the Model Rules inapplicable. District Commission Presidents entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the super-time scale, with Rules 7, 8, and 9 inapplicable. District Commission Members entitled to pay and allowances equivalent to District Judges in the selection grade, with Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 inapplicable. Last pay drawn by Presidents/Members to be protected if higher than prescribed, minus applicable pension. No distinction between full-time/part-time or judicial/non-judicial members; all treated as full-time for pay purposes. States/Union Territories paying higher remuneration may continue to do so. Directions effective from 20 July 2020; arrears to be disbursed within six months. States/Union Territories to amend rules to align with these directions; compliance report due by 22 September 2025. (Paras 8–9) In Re Pay Allowance of the Members of The UP State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Judicial Role in Legislative Ecosystem - Scope of judicial power to direct executive performance audits of statutes to assess their implementation and efficacy. Held, auditing and assessing the implementation of statutes is an integral component of the Rule of Law. Constitutional courts possess both the power and duty to direct the executive to conduct performance audits of laws where there is demonstrable evidence (e.g., judicial data or cogent material) that the statute has failed to ameliorate beneficiary conditions or is gridlocked by bureaucratic/judicial delays. Such judicial directions facilitate executive introspection, promote debate, and ensure statutes function as intended, but cannot compel legislative reforms or amendments. In the specific context of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Central Consumer Protection Council (under Sections 3, 5) and Central Consumer Protection Authority (under Sections 10, 18-22) were directed to undertake surveys, reviews, and advisory measures to the government for effective implementation, emphasizing efficiency, expertise, integrity, transparency, accountability, and regular audits. Given India's government-dominated legislative process (with rare private member bills), courts must bridge gaps by directing audits, but only on prima facie findings of inefficacy, not as a routine oversight. The Act's built-in mechanisms (Council and Authority) are statutorily obligated to monitor and advise on implementation. Their effective coordination is essential to protect consumer interests, warranting judicial nudges for operational enhancements without overstepping into legislative domain. This judgment reinforces the judiciary's facilitative role in statutory accountability, expanding beyond constitutional challenges to proactive audits, while delineating limits on reform compulsion. It underscores the need for empirical evidence to trigger such directions, balancing separation of powers. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Sections 34, 47, and 58 - Pecuniary jurisdiction based on value of consideration paid (not compensation claimed) - Constitutional validity - The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased individual who perished in a fire caused by a manufacturing defect in a Ford Endeavour vehicle (purchase price: ₹44 lakhs), filed a consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) seeking damages exceeding ₹50 crores. The NCDRC dismissed the complaint for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, as the value of consideration paid fell below the ₹2 crore threshold under Section 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the 2019 Act—prescribing pecuniary jurisdiction of District, State, and National Commissions based on the value of goods/services paid as consideration (up to ₹50 lakhs for District; ₹50 lakhs–₹2 crores for State; above ₹2 crores for National), rather than the compensation claimed—alleging violation of Article 14 (equality) due to irrational classification and anomalies in forum allocation. Whether the pecuniary jurisdiction provisions under Sections 34, 47, and 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019—determining forum competence based on the value of consideration paid for goods/services, instead of the quantum of compensation claimed—are constitutionally valid and non-discriminatory under Article 14. Held, upheld as constitutional. The classification of claims based on the value of consideration paid is neither illegal, discriminatory, nor manifestly arbitrary under Article 14. It constitutes a valid, non-suspect classification with a direct rational nexus to the Act's objective of establishing a hierarchical structure of consumer fora for efficient redressal. The value of consideration is objectively verifiable, closely relatable to the transaction's worth, and preferable to self-assessed damage claims, which may inflate jurisdiction. This basis ensures streamlined adjudication without undermining access to remedies. Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Section 67 - Marine Insurance - Monsoon Clause - An insurance company cannot reject a marine insurance claim based on a contract condition impossible to fulfill. The Court set aside the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's dismissal, holding that a monsoon clause requiring a voyage to complete before the monsoon was non-material, as the policy was intended to cover the voyage during foul weather. The insurer's repudiation of the claim for a barge's total loss due to engine failure was deemed invalid, as the insured had disclosed voyage details, and the condition's strict interpretation would defeat the policy's purpose. The matter was remanded to NCDRC to determine the payable insured sum. (Para 20 & 21) Sohom Shipping v. New India Assurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2025 INSC 453

Whether consumer forum can award interest on loan taken by allottee in addition to agreed interest on deposited amount – Held, consumer forums cannot award interest paid by an allottee on a home loan, in addition to the agreed upon interest on the deposited amount, when compensating for delayed possession or deficiency in service - The amount of interest awarded on investment made by complainant is the compensation for being deprived of the fruits of that investment - Hence, awarding additional interest on a loan taken by the allottee would amount to awarding compensation under multiple heads for a singular default, which is unsustainable - Consumer Forums have power to award compensation for loss or injury due to negligence, including punitive damages, such awards cannot be arbitrary - Compensation should be just and determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case - There are no “exceptional or strong reasons” in the present case to justify GMADA paying the interest on the loan taken by respondents - Modified the order of NCDRC to exclude the payment of interest on loan taken by respondents - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711; DLF Homes Panchkula (P) Ltd. v. D.S. Dhanda (2020) 16 SCC 318; Paras 13-17] Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) v. Anupam Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : 2025 INSC 808