Article 12. Definition Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC...
Article 12. Definition
Article 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 80 – State – Notice – Held, Appellant, being a State Financial Corporation and thus a 'State' under Article 12 of Constitution was entitled to mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC - When a suit is filed against State instrumentality, the plaintiff must either issue a notice under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section 80(2) CPC - Failure to do so bars the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, rendering the suit unsustainable and liable to dismissal - A judgement rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, including execution or collateral proceedings - The Trial Court has a duty to address the satisfaction of Section 80 notice as a precondition for initiating a suit. [Para 13, 29, 30] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928
Article 12 - Whether Air Force School constitutes a “State” or “authority” under Article 12 of the Constitution, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for teachers' employment disputes. Held, Air Force School is not a “State” under Article 12. The school, managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, operates as a non-profit, non-public fund entity primarily funded by student fees and voluntary contributions from IAF personnel, not from the Consolidated Fund of India. No evidence of deep or pervasive control by the Government or Indian Air Force (IAF) over the school's administration. Ex-officio IAF officers on governing committees do not indicate statutory or governmental control. The school's operations, including staff employment, are governed by private contracts, lacking a public law element. Even if the school performs a public function (education), this alone does not bring it within Article 12. Appeals dismissed. [Relied on: St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society, (Para 22-24)] Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2025 INSC 749
Article 12 - Police officers must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. Police machinery is a part of the State within the meaning of Article 12. Moreover, the police officers being citizens, are bound to abide by the Constitution. They are bound to honour and uphold freedom of speech and expression conferred on all citizens. (Para 29) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 12 and 226 - Function Test for Writ Jurisdiction - The Court emphasized the "function test" for determining whether a body is subject to writ jurisdiction. A private entity may be subject to writ jurisdiction only if it discharges a public duty or function, which Muthoot Finance Ltd. does not. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that no case was made out for interference. The petitioner was left free to pursue civil remedies or arbitration. The judgment reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not available against private entities unless they perform public functions or are statutorily obligated to do so. Private disputes, even involving regulated entities, must be resolved through civil or arbitration proceedings. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Regulatory Compliance and Writ Jurisdiction - The petitioner argued that Muthoot Finance Ltd., being a non-banking financial institution regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), could be subject to writ jurisdiction if it breached statutory regulations. The Court rejected this argument, stating that regulatory compliance does not transform a private entity into a "State" or imbue it with public functions. The Court clarified that the petitioner's appropriate remedy lies in civil litigation or arbitration, as per the arbitration clause in the loan agreement. The High Court had also protected the petitioner's interests by directing the deposit of Rs. 24,39,085/- (from the sale of pledged gold) in a fixed deposit, with interest accruing to the petitioner. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 12 and 226 - Writ Jurisdiction and Private Entities - Public vs. Private Law - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that Muthoot Finance Ltd., a private company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, does not qualify as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it does not perform any public or sovereign functions. The Court reiterated the distinction between public and private law, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is generally limited to actions involving public duties or functions. Private entities, unless performing public functions or discharging statutory obligations, are not subject to writ jurisdiction. S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 125
Article 14. Equality before law
Articles 14 and 16 – Compassionate Appointment, whether a matter of right – Held, compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of public employment and is not a vested right- The objective is to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over sudden financial crisis on humanitarian grounds. It is a concession and not a right- The mere eligibility of an applicant does not entitle them to a specific post or a higher post than what was held by the deceased- Once a dependent has applied for, accepted, and joined a post on compassionate grounds, the right to be considered for such appointment stands consummated- No further or second consideration for a higher post arises, as it would lead to "endless compassion"- The purpose of relieving the family's financial distress is served once the initial appointment is made. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 138; State of Karnataka v. V. Somyashree (2021) 12 SCC 20; State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh (1994) 6 SCC 560; Paras 11- 12] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423
Article 14 – Contractual Employment – Termination– Educational Qualification – Purposive Interpretation – Held, insisting solely on the title of a degree without considering the actual curriculum amounts to elevating form over substance - Where a candidate possesses a postgraduate degree (M.Com.) with the required subjects (Statistics) as principal courses, and no standalone degree with the prescribed nomenclature is offered in the state, the candidate must be deemed to satisfy the eligibility criteria - Even in contractual matters, the State is bound by the obligations of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 14 - The expression “Postgraduate degree in Statistics” must be understood contextually and purposively - The termination arbitrary as the State ignored its own expert authority's recommendation confirming the appellant's eligibility based on his curriculum and work experience - Singling out one candidate for termination while others with similar qualifications were retained violates the guarantee of equal protection under Article 14 - Appeal allowed. [Relied on GRIDCO Ltd. v. Sadananda Doloi, (2011) 15 SCC 16; Paras 32-41] Laxmikant Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1174 : 2025 INSC 1385
Article 14 - Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Administrative Action – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness- Held even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Articles 14, 16 - Equality before law - Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - Migration to unreserved category permissible or not - Held that this depends on the presence of a specific rule or policy - In absence of an embargo in recruitment rules or employment notifications, reserved candidates who score higher than the last selected unreserved candidate are entitled to migrate to and be appointed against unreserved seats - However, if an embargo is imposed by the relevant recruitment rules, such candidates are not permitted to migrate to the general category - Distinguished present facts of the case from Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119 and held that this case does not have universal application - The general principles from Jitendra Kumar case do not apply when there is a contrary circular or rule - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18-22, 32] Union of India v. Sajib Roy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 881 : 2025 INSC 1084
Articles 14, 16, 21 - Regularization of Service - State as a Constitutional employer - Daily wage employees - Right to be considered for regularization - State is a constitutional employer and cannot balance budgets by exploiting those who perform basic and recurring public functions - When work is perennial, the public institution's sanctioned strength and engagement practices must reflect that reality - Long term use of temporary labels for regular labour corrodes confidence in public administration and violates the promise of equal protection - While financial constraints are relevant to public policy, they cannot override fairness, reason and duty to organize work on lawful lines – Held, outsourcing cannot be a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial - Later policy to outsource Class IV / Driver functions cannot retrospectively validate earlier arbitrary refusals or be used to deny consideration to workers on whose continuous services the establishment relied for decades - Misuse of temporary employment contracts by government institutions mirrors exploitative practices in private sector and can erode public trust - Where work recurs day after day and year after year, establishment must reflect that in reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices - Quashed State's refusal to sanction posts as unsustainable - Directed all appellants to be regularized - Appeals allowed. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12] Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818 : 2025 INSC 998
Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 - Army Act, 1950 - Section 12 - Indian Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch - Short Service Commission (SSC) – Recruitment Policy - Gender Discrimination - Supreme Court quashes Army policy to reserve higher number of JAG posts for men than woman – Held, once the Union of India has permitted the induction of women into JAG branch under Section 12 of Army Act, it cannot restrict the number of women candidates through policy or administrative instruction - Reserving a double number of vacancies for males through a notification dated January 18, 2023, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 14, 15, 16 - The selection criteria and process for both male and female candidates in JAG are identical, with only minor differences in physical attributes and overall process is intended to be 'gender neutral' and merit based - A combined merit list should be prepared and any recruitment policy leading to indirect discrimination is unconstitutional - Fundamental rights, particularly the Right to Equality cannot be waived, especially when marks obtained by candidates were not in the public domain - True meaning of gender equality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected - Directed Union of India and Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender that is if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected - The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which is discriminatory to women. Petition allowed. [Paras 83-98, 101, 105-108, 114] Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788 : 2025 INSC 954
Article 14, 170, 239A - Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (2014 Act) - Section 26 - Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019 - Delimitation Act, 2002 - Delimitation of Constituencies - Increase in Assembly Seats - The petitioners challenged notifications issued by the Union of India which conducted a delimitation exercise for the Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, increasing the number of seats in its legislative assembly, while excluding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - The Petitioners sought a direction to similarly increase the number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in terms of the applicable statutory provisions - Supreme Court dismissed the Petition, holding that the exclusion of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana from delimitation process was not arbitrary or discriminatory - the delimitation process is a legislative and executive function, if compelled such an exercise through judicial fiat, it would likely be construed as an interference in the policy-making prerogative of the Executive - Held that the constitutional mandate under Article 170(3) of the Constitution serves as a bar on any delimitation exercise concerning the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, or any other State. [Paras 15-22, 26-29] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894 : (2025) 9 SCC 722
Whether recruitment process was made in violation of UGC Regulations and whether selection ought to have been made through Commission as these posts were under purview of Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution – Held - UGC Regulations binding on State once adopted - Purpose of formation of Public Service commission at both Union and State level - was to have an impartial and autonomous body to select the best possible persons for government posts and to have fairness and transparency in procedure – Held - elimination of viva-voce which is vital component in overall appreciation of merit of a candidate and replacing well considered selection parameters prescribed by UGC with single MCQ based written test, establish the arbitrary nature of exercise which cannot pass the test of reasonableness - State and its instrumentalities have a duty and responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of mandate of Article 14 of Constitution - when a thing is done in haste, mala fide would be presumed - A State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden change without valid reasons will always be seen with suspicion – Held - State-respondent did not adhere to UGC Regulations and took posts out of purview of Commission without following due procedure under law, amounting to arbitrariness - no valid reason given by State for not adopting UGC Regulations and avoiding Public Service Commissions, set aside and quash entire recruitment process. Appeals allowed. [Relied Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Para 51, 52, 56] Mandeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2025 INSC 834
Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757
Articles 14, 16, 21 - Reasonable Accommodation - Persons with Benchmark Disability (PwBD) - MBBS Admission - Held, reasonable accommodation for PwBD candidates is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 16, and 21, not a discretionary benefit. The Supreme Court directed the allotment of an MBBS seat for the 2025-26 session at AIIMS, New Delhi, under the Scheduled Castes Persons with Benchmark Disability (SC/PwBD) quota for the appellant, who has congenital absence of multiple fingers in both hands and left foot involvement. Denial of admission was deemed "grossly illegal, arbitrary, and violative" of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16, reflecting institutional bias and systemic discrimination. The Court declared the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring "both hands intact" for MBBS admission as arbitrary and directed its revision within two months, before the 2025-26 counselling session, in line with Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236. The appellant, with a NEET-UG 2024 category rank of 176, was found functionally capable by a Medical Board, with the minor challenge of wearing sterilized gloves insufficient to justify denial of admission. The Court ordered admission without requiring the appellant to reappear for NEET-UG 2025, emphasizing individualized, evidence-based assessments to ensure substantive equality and dignity for PwBD candidates. (Paras 9, 14) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2025 INSC 623 : AIR 2025 SC 2861
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Article 14 - A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute. (Para 15) Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : 2025 INSC 535
Article 14 and 16 - Bihar Chaukidari Cadre (Amendment) Rules, 2014; Rule 5 (7) proviso (a) - Constitutional validity of - Hereditary Appointment - Allowing chaukidars to nominate dependent kin for appointment prior to retirement – Held, appointment to the public posts cannot be done on hereditary basis. The High Court's suo motu action in declaring the proviso void was upheld, as it was manifestly contrary to fundamental rights and binding precedents. The impugned proviso was deemed an archaic practice favoring a select group, undermining equality of opportunity in public employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's judgment which struck down the aforementioned proviso as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 10, 11, 32 & 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Articles 14 and 16 - West Bengal Central School Service Commission Recruitment Case (2016) - Selection Process for Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X, XI-XII) and Non-Teaching Staff (Groups C, D) - Cancellation of Entire Process - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's en bloc cancellation of the 2016 recruitment process conducted by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission (WBSSC) for 12,905 Assistant Teachers (Classes IX-X), 5,712 Assistant Teachers (Classes XI-XII), 2,067 Group C, and 3,956 Group D non-teaching staff, due to systemic irregularities including OMR sheet manipulation, rank jumping, out-ofpanel appointments, and destruction of records. The Court found segregation of tainted and untainted candidates impossible due to WBSSC's failure to retain OMR sheets and discrepancies in recovered data, justifying cancellation despite some selectees' claims of innocence. Principles of natural justice were deemed satisfied by public notices, given the scale of fraud (over 6,276 illegal appointments). Pleas of delay and laches were rejected as illegalities surfaced in 2021-2022. The Court modified the High Court's relief: tainted candidates' services terminated with salary refunds at 12% interest; untainted appointees terminated without refunds; previously employed candidates allowed to rejoin prior posts with preserved seniority; disabled candidates (except one) to continue with wages until fresh selection, with age relaxation for all eligible candidates. (Para 43 – 51) State of West Bengal v. Baishakhi Bhattacharyya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 385 : 2025 INSC 437 : AIR 2025 SC 1882
Article 14 - Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255
Article 14 and Article 300A - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - Constitutional Imperative - Section 3J created an "intelligible differentia"-less disparity between similarly situated landowners (NH Act vs. other acquisitions), violating equality. Retrospective rectification is essential to uphold Article 14 and Article 300A (right to property), especially as the 2013 Right to Fair Compensation Act applies post-2015. The ruling does not reopen concluded cases but extends benefits to unresolved claims, avoiding violation of the doctrine of immutability. NHAI's plea indirectly evades unequivocal directions in Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304. Granting solatium/interest is a core compensatory mechanism, not disruptive. Financial strain is untenable where NHAI has already paid thousands of claims; costs ultimately pass to project proponents and commuters (e.g., via tolls) under public-private partnerships, not justifying constitutional evasion. Appeals dismissed; authorities directed to compute and disburse solatium/interest per Tarsem Singh. No costs. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146
Article 14, 15 - Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2025 INSC 125 : AIR 2025 SC 1445
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - The Court recognized the appellant's right to dignity in death and freedom of religion but balanced it against the State's duty to maintain public order and provide designated burial grounds. The Court criticized the Gram Panchayat for failing to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the dispute. The Court underscored the importance of secularism and fraternity, as enshrined in the Constitution, and called for harmony among different religious communities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, directing the appellant to bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with State support. The Court also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months to avoid similar controversies in the future. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 - Right to dignity in death and freedom of religion - Burial ground / Graveyard - Whether the appellant, a Christian, has the right to bury his deceased father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors were buried, despite objections from the local Hindu and tribal communities. Whether the State's refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard and insistence on using a Christian burial ground 20-25 km away violates the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Whether the Gram Panchayat's failure to formally designate a burial ground for Christians in the village constitutes a violation of the appellant's rights. The appellant, a third-generation Christian, sought to bury his father in the village graveyard of Chhindwada, where his ancestors had been buried for decades. However, the local villagers, predominantly Hindu and tribal, objected to the burial, leading to threats and police intervention. The appellant approached the High Court seeking permission to bury his father in the village graveyard and police protection. The High Court denied relief, citing potential public unrest and the availability of a Christian burial ground in a nearby village, Karkapal, 20-25 km away. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to allow burial in the village graveyard violated his fundamental rights, including the right to dignity in death and freedom of religion. Justice B.V. Nagarathna held that the appellant should be allowed to bury his father in his private agricultural land in Chhindwada, with police protection. She emphasized that the Gram Panchayat had failed to formally designate a burial ground for Christians, leading to the controversy. She also directed the State to demarcate exclusive burial sites for Christians within two months. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented, holding that the appellant should bury his father in the designated Christian burial ground in Karkapal, as per the State's rules. He emphasized the importance of maintaining public order and the State's duty to provide designated burial grounds for all communities. The Supreme Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed that the appellant bury his father in the Christian burial ground at Karkapal, with logistical support and police protection from the State. The Court emphasized the need for an expeditious and dignified burial, given the prolonged delay. Ramesh Baghel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : 2025 INSC 109
Article 14 and 16 - Fair and open recruitment processes - Negative Equality - The petitioner's claim of discrimination based on the promotion of two other employees to the post of Tracer was rejected. Held, Article 14 does not permit negative equality, and illegal actions by the State cannot be perpetuated. Past illegalities cannot justify future violations of statutory rules. The Court expressed concern over the State's casual approach in handling the litigation, noting that the relevant 1979 Rules were not properly presented before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Court criticized the State for creating false hopes among employees by granting promotions contrary to the Rules, leading to unnecessary litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Tracer is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the 1979 Rules, and the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid unnecessary litigation and ensure justice. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary of Odisha for corrective action. Petition dismissed. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87
Articles 14 and 16 - The Jharkhand High Court issued an advertisement on July 29, 2010, for recruitment of IV Class Employees, which omitted mention of the total number of posts, reservation ratios (reserved vs. unreserved seats), and any decision against providing reservations based on adequate representation data. - Candidates were selected and appointed through this process, but their services were later terminated due to procedural irregularities. - Aggrieved candidates challenged the termination before the Supreme Court. Whether advertisements for public employment are valid if they fail to specify the total number of posts, reservation ratios, minimum qualifications, selection procedures, and any decision to forgo reservations, thereby lacking transparency and violating constitutional mandates under Articles 14 and 16. Held, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of the selected candidates and set aside the entire 2010 recruitment exercise as illegal, unconstitutional, and a nullity in law. Advertisements inviting applications for public employment must mandatorily include: (i) the total number of seats; (ii) the ratio of reserved and unreserved seats; (iii) minimum qualifications; and (iv) procedural clarity on selection stages (e.g., written exams, interviews). Failure to do so renders the advertisement invalid due to lack of transparency. If the State opts against reservations due to quantifiable data showing adequate representation, this decision must be explicitly stated in the advertisement alongside the above details. Any appointment in violation of statutory rules or Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality in public employment) of the Constitution is void ab initio. The Court emphasized that such omissions deprive candidates of fair opportunity and equal access, undermining the constitutional scheme for public recruitment. The judgment reinforces trite law on transparent public hiring, ensuring procedural fairness and non-arbitrariness. [Relied on: Renu v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (2014) 14 SCC 16; State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176
Article 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 15 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Article 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
Article 16 - Equal opportunity in public employment - Even as we near 80 years of independence, generating enough jobs in the public sector to absorb those eager to enter public service remains an elusive goal. While there is no dearth of eligible candidates in the country waiting in the queue, the quest for 2 public employment is thwarted by a lack of sufficient employment opportunities. (Para 13) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Article 16—Public Employment—Eligibility Criteria—Mandatory Nature - In appointments to public office under statutory schemes, eligibility criteria prescribed by law, including minimum years of experience in specified leadership roles, constitute mandatory requirements that cannot be waived or relaxed by administrative authorities. Such criteria ensure fairness, non-arbitrariness, and reasonableness under Article 16 of the Constitution. Where an appointee misrepresents experience or lacks verifiable proof of requisite qualifications, the selection process stands vitiated, warranting judicial interference notwithstanding limited scope of review in service matters absent mala fides. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201
Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.
Article 19(1)(g) – Issue - Whether the impugned tender condition prescribing past local supply experience is reasonable, non-arbitrary, and constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or whether it constitutes an artificial barrier excluding competent bidders and violating the doctrine of level playing field – Held, government discretion in tender conditions is subject to the tests of reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness - The principle of non-discrimination under Article 14 and the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) were applied, including the doctrine of level playing field that mandates equal opportunity to equally placed competitors - The tender condition restricting eligibility to bidders with past supply experience specifically in Chhattisgarh was held arbitrary and disproportionate to the objective of ensuring effective supply - Noted that such restriction encourages cartelization and violates constitutional provisions by closing the market to competent outside bidders without sufficient justification - The State's justification based on Maoist affected areas was rejected as untenable since the tender concerned non-security sensitive goods and localized conditions did not justify exclusion - Held tender condition requiring past supply within one state irrational, violates Article 19(1)(g) - Set aside High Court order and Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 1973 3 SCC 489; Paras 16-21] Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2025 INSC 1182
Article 19(1)(a) - Right to Information - Supreme Court examined legal framework on the right to information affirming that the right of citizens to know about candidates is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) - This right is essential for a well-informed electorate to make an intelligent decision while exercising their franchise - A fine balance must be struck between the voter's right to information and the sanctity of people's mandate - Minor procedural errors or technical objections should not be allowed to override the mandate of electorate - The will of the people expressed through the election result is sacrosanct and should be respected unless it has been corrupted by fraudulent practices. [Paras 8, 9] Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Laxmi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : 2025 INSC 992
Distinction between remission and release on completion - Held remission applies when the sentence is not yet complete and involves a reduction in sentence imposed - Release on completion occurs when the convict has served the full period of incarceration they were sentenced to undergo - In case of an indeterminate life sentence, remissions cannot lead to automatic release, a final order is required - For a fixed term sentence, completion of the term, especially one 'without remission' entitles release - If convict is detained beyond actual release date, it would violate Article 19(d) and 21 of Constitution of India. [Paras 8,9] Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2025 INSC 969
Article 19(1)(g) - Right to carry on Business - Article 19(1)(g) includes right to shut down a business subject to reasonable restrictions - Right to close down a business is an integral part of the right to carry it on. [Para 7] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286
Article 19 - Freedom of Speech and Expression - The poem falls under the appellant's fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This right includes dissent and protest, essential to democracy, unless restricted reasonably under Article 19(2). The FIR's registration was a mechanical act, bordering on perversity, and an abuse of process, violating constitutional ideals of liberty of thought and expression. (Para 36) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 19(1)(a) - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 499, 500 – Criminal Defamation – Quashing of Proceedings – Freedom of Speech – Media Responsibility – The Supreme Court quashed a criminal defamation case filed in 2014 against the Editorial Director of Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. (Times of India) and others over an article allegedly implying the complainant auctioned counterfeit artworks. The Court set aside the High Court's order and the Magistrate's summons, citing insufficient specific allegations, non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC, and failure to demonstrate reputational harm. Highlighting the primacy of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), the Court underscored the media's responsibility to exercise caution in publishing content, given its influence on public opinion and potential to cause reputational damage. (Para 20, 21) Jaideep Bose v. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2025 INSC 241
Article 19, 21, 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Natural Justice - The courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions. Administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 16) Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545
Article 19, 21, 32 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90
Article 20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences
Article 20 (1) - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section 6 – Held, retrospective application of enhanced punishment violates Article 20(1) - Amended provision of Section 6 of POCSO Act, which came into effect on August 16, 2019, could not be applied to the appellant's case since the offence was committed on May 20, 2019 - Retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty is barred by Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence - Sentence of “imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life” did not exist on the date of the incident under the unamended Section 6 - Maximum punishment then permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense - Supreme Court upheld the conviction of appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, and modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 9-12] Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2025 INSC 892
Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753
Article 21. Protection of life and personal liberty
Article 21 - Right to Life - Right to a Healthy Environment - River Pollution - Sustained Administrative apathy- Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the grave environmental catastrophe in the Jojari, Bandi, and Luni river system in Rajasthan, noting the pollution affects 2 million lives and is a fallout of "sustained, systemic collapse of regulatory vigilance and utter administrative apathy stretching over nearly two decades"- Held that when environmental degradation reaches such proportions, the injury transcends the ecological realm and becomes a "direct constitutional injury" requiring immediate judicial redress- The belated flurry of administrative activity, triggered solely by judicial intervention, underscores a prolonged period of regulatory apathy and institutional neglect- The installed capacities of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) and Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) are grossly inadequate, resulting in the discharge of untreated/partially treated effluents, which is emblematic of a systemic failure- The interim stay previously operating on the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, is modified, clarified, and lifted to allow the implementation of the substantive remedial, regulatory and preventive directions contained therein- he interim stay shall continue to operate only in respect of (i) the remarks made against RIICO and other authorities/Corporations, and (ii) the direction imposing environmental compensation of Rs. 2 Crores upon them- Directed the constitution of a High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee, headed by a retired High Court Judge, to supervise the remedial measures- The Committee is mandated to oversee the full implementation of NGT directions, prepare a comprehensive River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the entire river system, map all discharge points, and conduct recurring audits of all treatment and monitoring infrastructure. [Relied on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598; Paras 9, 11, 22, 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
Article 21 - Applicability of Section 436-A CrPC - Article 21 vs. National Security - Supreme Court clarified that Section 436-A CrPC expressly excludes offences for which death is a prescribed punishment - the accused were charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 16 UAPA (both punishable by death), they were ineligible for bail under this specific provision - While Article 21 rights (speedy trial, liberty) are sacrosanct and apply to all prisoners, they are not absolute - In cases involving "heinous offences" that threaten national security or sovereign authority, individual liberty must be balanced against the integrity of the nation - In statutes like UAPA where a "reverse burden of proof" exists (Section 43E), prolonged incarceration is particularly "insidious." - Held that the State and Judiciary must ensure such accused are "meaningfully equipped" with legal aid and resources to reclaim their innocence, as procedural delays otherwise make liberty "hostage to clogged dockets." - Held that the High Court erred in its initial legal reasoning for granting bail, the Supreme Court declined to cancel it- Noted the "glacial pace" of the trial (15 years pending) and that the accused had not misused their liberty, influenced witnesses, or delayed the trial during the three years they were out on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 11-16, 18, 19, 21, 22] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418
Article 21 – Investigation – Fair Trial – Supreme Court criticized the investigation for negligence, delay, and failure to probe material angles like organ trade – Failure to secure the crime scene, lack of independent medical documentation during custody, and botched forensic collection undermined the prosecution's case– Held that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubtPetition allowed. [Paras 15, 18, 21] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Article 21 – Right to Privacy – DNA Profiling – Held that compelling an individual to undergo DNA testing is a grave intrusion into their bodily autonomy and privacy- Such a direction must satisfy the threefold requirement of (i) legality, (ii) legitimate State aim, and (iii) proportionality- In a case alleging cheating and harassment, proving biological paternity is collateral and lacks a direct nexus to the offence, thereby failing the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2019 1 SCC 1; Paras 46-48, 53] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Article 21 – Right to Livelihood and Dignity – Held, termination of a qualified transgender teacher solely on the ground of her gender identity is a violation of her right to dignity and livelihood – Mandamus - Supreme Court issued a continuing mandamus and comprehensive directions to remedy administrative lethargy - i. Compensation: Directed the payment of ₹50,000 each by the discriminating private school, the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the State of Gujarat to the Petitioner for the violation of her rights and the lack of proper redressal mechanisms; ii. constituted an Advisory Committee (headed by Justice Asha Menon, Retd. Judge, Delhi High Court) to draft a comprehensive National Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons; iii. Directed the Union of India to bring forth its own Equal Opportunity Policy within three months of the Committee's report. The Court mandated that this Union Policy shall be enforceable at any establishment that fails to frame its own policy; iv. Directed States/UTs to immediately establish Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells; v. Directed all establishments to designate Complaint Officers and designated the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) as the appellate authority for grievances against the establishment head's decision. [Paras 164-174, 217] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Article 21 - Illegal detention - Supreme Court orders MP Govt. to pay Rs. 25 lakhs compensation to convict who spend extra 4.7 years in jail after serving sentence in a rape case - Petitioner was not released until 06.06.2025, despite completing the term in June 2021 - Delay amounted to unlawful detention and curtailment of liberty - Supreme Court raised concern over other convicts languishing unjustly and called for the High Courts to investigate the issue comprehensively. [Paras 2-8, 16-21] Sohan Singh @ Bablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 938
Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 (BPBA) - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country – Held, constitutional framework emphasizes the right to life with dignity under Article 21 and mandates a welfare centric approach to vulnerable populations, including inmates of beggars' homes - Such institutions are not penal facilities but places for rehabilitation and care, and must adhere to humane conditions consistent with constitutional morality - BPBA and corresponding Rules provide the statutory backdrop regulating beggars' homes, their management, and inmates' rights - Considered balance between public order and guaranteeing dignified living conditions and rehabilitation opportunities for inmates - Noted extensive oversight measures, multiple inspections, reports from authorities and NGOs, and continuing reforms addressing infrastructure, medical facilities, hygiene, nutrition, legal aid, and vocational training - Mandated a paradigm shift from punitive detention to social justice and protective custody with comprehensive rehabilitation. [Paras 11-15, 16, 17, 19-22] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Article 21 - Right of life with dignity - Supreme Court issued directions to ensure humane conditions in beggars' homes across country under following heads - i. Preventive Healthcare and Sanitation; ii. Infrastructure and capacity; iii. Nutrition and Food safety; iv. Vocational Training and rehabilitation; v. Legal Aid and awareness; vi. Child and Gender Sensitivity; vii. Accountability and oversight - Directed that every State/UT shall constitute a Monitoring Committee for Beggars' Homes, comprising officials from the Social Welfare Department, Public Health authorities, and independent civil society members to prepare - i. Prepare and publish annual reports on the condition of Beggars' Homes and; ii. Maintain accurate records of illnesses, deaths and remedial actions taken; iii. In every case where the death of an inmate is attributed to negligence, lack of basic facilities, or failure to provide timely medical care; iv. The State/UT shall pay reasonable compensation to the next kin of the deceased; v. initiate departmental and where warranted, criminal proceedings against the officials found responsible; v. State Govt's/ UTs shall maintain a centralised digital database of all inmates, recording details of admission, health, training, release and follow up. [Para 23] M.S. Patter v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 908 : 2025 INSC 1115
Article 21 - Right to fair trial – Held, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental aspect of Article 21- Segregation order was passed by the Trial Court suo moto, without prior notice or an application from the prosecution, and without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard - This is a serious procedural and constitutional infraction, stating that mere physical presence of counsel does not constitute a meaningful opportunity for a hearing - Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant - The discretion to file a chargesheet lies exclusively with the investigating agency - Noted that even if separate charge sheets are filed, offences arising from the same transaction should be tried together. [Paras 14 - 23] Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : 2025 INSC 1113
Article 21 - Right to shelter – Held, right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 - Urged the Union Government to come up with a revival fund to provide financing for stressed real estate projects undergoing insolvency proceedings - Home-buying should not be treated as a mere commercial transaction or a speculative instrument - the State has a constitutional obligation to create a framework that ensures timely possession of homes and prevents developers from defrauding homebuyers - Speculative participants driven purely by profit motives cannot be permitted to misuse the IBC, which is a remedial framework for the revival and protection of sick companies - In case of real estate, the IBS's purpose is to protect genuine homebuyers, the judgment underscored, clarifying that such speculative investors have alternative remedies under the consumer protection laws, RERA, or through civil courts - Government cannot remain a 'silent spectator' and must fulfil its constitutional duty to safeguard homebuyers. [Para 20] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110
Article 21 - Right to mental health – Held, mental health is an integral component of the right to life under Article 21 of Constitution- Guidelines for mental Health protection and suicide prevention - Supreme Court laid down immediate interim guidelines for mental health protection - i. noted “deepening crisis” of student suicides in the context of contemporary education, recognising it as a broader underlying generational societal issue; ii. All educational institutions shall adopt and implement a uniform mental health policy, drawing cues from UMMEED Draft Guidelines, Manodarpan initiative and National Suicide Prevention Strategy; iii. All educational institution with 100 or more enrolled students shall appoint at least 1 qualified counsellor, psychologist or social worker; iv. Written protocols should be established for immediate referrals; v. annual reports shall be prepared indicating number of wellness interventions and training session. [Paras 31, 35] Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 740 : 2025 INSC 893
Pecuniary Compensation - Violation of right to life under Article 21 – Held, pecuniary compensation is an appropriate right and effective remedy for infringement of fundamental rights caused by State officials and defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable - This compensation shall focus on compensatory element and serve as a balm to the victim, without prejudice to other remedies in civil or criminal law - Injuries caused to appellant during his illegal detention, complete mutilation of his genitalia, use of chili powder and electric shocks on his genitalia are shocking, leading to violation of Article 21 - Supreme Court directed State to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as compensation to appellant. [Para 34, 36, 37] Khursheed Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 732 : 2025 INSC 876
Article 21 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act); Sections 40, 45; Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017; Rule 15 - United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006; Articles 31 - Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India, 2021 - Constitutional and Statutory Obligations – Accessibility and Reasonable Accommodation in Prisons - Whether the State has a constitutional and moral obligation to ensure the rights of prisoners with disabilities, including non-discriminatory treatment, reasonable accommodation, and effective rehabilitation - Compliance of Tamil Nadu prison infrastructure and policies with the RPwD Act and the UNCRPD - Adequacy of prison facilities, including accessible infrastructure, healthcare, and rehabilitation services for prisoners with disabilities. Held: The Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to uphold the rights of prisoners with disabilities in Tamil Nadu, emphasizing the State's constitutional and moral obligation under Article 21 to ensure dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. The Court directed: 1. Identification and Accessibility: Prison authorities to identify prisoners with disabilities upon admission and provide rules and information in accessible formats (e.g., Braille, sign language). 2. Infrastructure Upgrades: All prisons to be equipped with wheelchair-friendly spaces, accessible toilets, ramps, and sensory-safe environments within six months, with periodic audits per the Harmonized Guidelines and Standards for Universal Accessibility in India (2021). 3. Healthcare and Rehabilitation: Provision of equivalent community-level healthcare, including physiotherapy, psychotherapy, and assistive devices, with trained medical officers and tailored nutrition. 4. Training and Sensitization: Mandatory training for prison staff on disability rights, non-discrimination, and appropriate handling of disability-related challenges. 5. Policy Reforms: Amendment of the Tamil Nadu State Prison Manual within six months to align with the RPwD Act, 2016, and UNCRPD, incorporating provisions against discrimination and for reasonable accommodation. 6. Monitoring and Data: Establishment of a monitoring committee for periodic inspections, maintenance of disaggregated disability data, and public disclosure with privacy safeguards. 7. Compliance Reporting: Director General of Prisons to file a compliance report with the State Human Rights Commission within three months. The Court underscored that reasonable accommodations are integral to a humane and just carceral system, and systemic transformation is required to prevent further deprivation or suffering of prisoners with disabilities. The petition arose from a case involving an advocate with Becker Muscular Dystrophy and Autism Spectrum Disorder, who faced inadequate facilities during incarceration, leading to compensation of ₹1 lakh by the Tamil Nadu Government. [Referred: Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2017), Paras 34, 35] L. Muruganantham v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 702 :2025 INSC 844
Article 21 - Land Acquisition – Rehabilitation - Right to livelihood - Whether Respondents are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative plots in addition to monetary compensation as per Scheme of 1992 or revised scheme of 2016 – Held, it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must - Any beneficial measures taken by the government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners - Rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable - Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in Policy. [Relied on Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Para 78, 84] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843
Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868
Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768
Article 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 84 - Legal Insanity - Held, a person with mental insanity cannot be held criminally liable as they lack the capacity to exercise their right to self-defense under Article 21. The Court found prosecution witnesses' evidence raised reasonable doubt about the appellant's mental condition at the time of the offence in 2018. Under Section 84 IPC, the accused need only establish reasonable doubt of legal insanity, not conclusive proof. Medical examination conducted in 2023, five years post-incident, was deemed irrelevant. The Court criticized the prosecution's failure to conduct a timely medical examination despite evidence of the appellant's mental instability. Granting the benefit of doubt, the Court acquitted the appellant. Convictions under Sections 302, 352, and 201 IPC set aside due to reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental sanity at the time of the offence. (Paras 8, 10) Dashrath Patra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 618
Article 21 - Human Rights Act, 1993; Section 2(1)(d) - Dignity - FIR Registration - Police Misconduct - Compensation - Every citizen approaching a police station to report a crime is entitled to be treated with dignity. The Supreme Court upheld the State Human Rights Commission's order directing the government to pay ₹2 lakh as compensation, recoverable from a police inspector who refused to register an FIR and used derogatory language against the complainant's mother. The inspector's actions, including failure to register the FIR and use of objectionable language, were held to violate human rights under Section 2(1)(d). The High Court's order affirming the SHRC's decision was upheld, and the petition was dismissed. (Para 6 - 8) Pavul Yesu Dhasan v. Registrar State Human Rights Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : 2025 INSC 677
Article 21 and 243G - Public Interest Litigation - Public Libraries in Villages - The Supreme Court refused to direct State Governments to establish public libraries in rural areas, emphasizing that pressing issues like clean water, sanitation, health, and education under Article 21 (Right to Life) take precedence over library initiatives. The Court highlighted the lack of comprehensive data on rural conditions and financial constraints, noting that resource allocation is a policy matter for governments. While acknowledging the value of libraries in promoting knowledge and democratic values, the Court encouraged States to explore innovative solutions, such as e-libraries and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds, to address the issue within their means. The petition was disposed of with a call for States to take effective steps to promote library facilities in rural areas. (Paras 3 - 6) Mundona Rural Development Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 452
Article 21 - Duty of Courts - Courts must zealously protect freedom of expression, a cornerstone of democracy and dignified life under Article 21. The effect of words must be judged by reasonable, strong-minded standards, not weak or insecure ones. Even if a large number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right of the person to express the views must be respected and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. (Para 38 & 39) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 21, 51A(e) - Rights of Breast-Feeding Women – Establishment of feeding rooms, child care rooms, and other related facilities for nursing mothers and infants in public places - Court directed the Union of India to issue a reminder communication to all States and Union Territories to ensure compliance with the advisory. The States and Union Territories were urged to incorporate such facilities in existing and upcoming public buildings, ensuring privacy and dignity for nursing mothers. (Para 18 – 23) Maatr Sparsh an initiative by Avyaan Foundation v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2025 INSC 302
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940
Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197
Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21, 22 - Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Articles 21 and 22(1) - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120
Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India - Directions Issued - Construction and Maintenance of Toilets - Formation of Committees - Maintenance and Hygiene - Special Facilities - Funding and Transparency - Compliance Reporting - All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must ensure the construction and availability of separate toilet facilities for males, females, PwD, and transgender persons in all court premises and tribunals across the country. Toilets must be clearly identifiable, accessible, and equipped with functional amenities such as water, electricity, hand soap, napkins, and toilet paper. Each High Court shall constitute a committee chaired by a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice, with members including the Registrar General, Chief Secretary, PWD Secretary, Finance Secretary, and a representative of the Bar Association. The committee will conduct a survey, assess infrastructure gaps, and ensure the implementation of adequate toilet facilities. Regular maintenance of toilets must be ensured, preferably through outsourcing to professional agencies. A mandatory cleaning schedule and periodic inspections must be implemented. A grievance redressal mechanism must be established for reporting and resolving issues related to toilet facilities. Separate washrooms must be provided for judges, advocates, litigants, and staff. Child-friendly washrooms must be constructed in family courts. Nursing rooms with breastfeeding facilities and changing stations must be provided for mothers. Sanitary pad dispensers must be installed in women's, PwD, and transgender washrooms. State Governments/UTs must allocate sufficient funds for the construction and maintenance of toilet facilities. A transparent and separate monetary fund must be established for this purpose. All High Courts and State Governments/UTs must file a status report within four months. The Supreme Court disposed of the writ petition with the above directions, emphasizing that access to proper sanitation is not merely a matter of convenience but a fundamental right essential for human dignity and the fair administration of justice. This judgment reinforces the constitutional obligation of the State to provide basic sanitation facilities as part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. It also highlights the need for inclusive and accessible infrastructure in public spaces, particularly in judicial premises, to ensure equality and justice for all. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 21, 47 and 48A - Whether the lack of adequate and hygienic toilet facilities in court premises across India violates the fundamental right to life and dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Whether the State and Union Territories are obligated to provide separate, accessible, and well-maintained toilet facilities for men, women, persons with disabilities (PwD), and transgender persons in all court complexes. Held, access to clean, functional, and hygienic toilet facilities is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life includes the right to live with dignity, and the absence of proper sanitation facilities in court premises undermines this right. The State's duty under Articles 47 and 48A of the Constitution to improve public health and protect the environment, which includes providing adequate sanitation facilities. Rajeeb Kalita v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2025 INSC 75 : AIR 2025 SC 468
Article 21 - Right to Appeal against Conviction - Appeal challenging the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the High Court due to a delay of 1637 days in filing - The appellant, convicted under Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, sought condonation of delay, citing lack of monetary resources and his absence from the station to earn a livelihood. The High Court had dismissed the delay condonation application, construing the appellant's absence as absconding, and consequently dismissed the appeal. Held, right to appeal, particularly in cases affecting personal liberty, is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Dismissing an appeal solely on the grounds of delay without examining the reasons for the delay is erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, restored the criminal appeal, and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. Mahesh Singh Banzara v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 28
Article 21A. Right to education
Article 21A - Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ('the 2009 Act') - Supreme Court directed the Kerala government to take immediate steps to establish government lower primary and upper primary schools in all regions where none currently exist, emphasising that the right to education under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be denied due to geographical or financial constraints - the Supreme Court clarified and modified the directions, mandating a phased approach for the State of Kerala to ensure compliance with the 2009 Act - Phase I - Comprehensive Survey and Holistic Policy - Directed State to undertake a comprehensive survey of the entire State and formulate a holistic policy decision for establishing Government Lower Primary Schools in all areas where none presently exist within the distance parameters prescribed under the 2009 Act; Priority must be given to locations with difficult/inconvenient geographic terrain or regions prone to torrential rainfall; Phase II - Establishment of Schools - The State shall establish schools in all areas where - i. No Government Lower Primary School exists within a radius of one kilometre; ii. No Government Upper Primary School exists within a radius of three kilometres - Directed State to identify suitable private buildings for temporarily housing schools as an interim measure, while simultaneously making necessary budgetary allocations for the construction of permanent school buildings. Gram Panchayats may be directed to provide 'shamlat' or panchayat-owned lands, preferably free of cost, for this purpose. [Para 9] State of Kerala v. T. Muhammed Faisi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1162
Article 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases
Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Article 22 – Grounds of Arrest - Held, constitutional and statutory framework mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest but it does not prescribe a specific form or insist upon written communication in every case. [Paras 20, 23] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979
Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
Article 32 - Maintainability of Writ Petition - A writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable only if it discloses a violation or imminent threat of violation of a fundamental right - Generally, a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order - The validity of a law on the ground of legislative competence will not be decided in an Article 32 petition if the law does not, infact infringe any fundamental rights - Mere failure to apply a rule which ought to have been applied may not, by itself justify an invocation of powers under Article 32. Writ petition filed by Petitioner is not maintainable. [Paras 66-70, 80] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884
Article 32 - Writ Petition filed by petitioner alleging that the administrative requirement of Allahabad High Court that mandates personal appearance of litigants at High Court for issuance of photo affidavits was arbitrary, lacked statutory backing and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution -Petitioner alleged that this is causing hardship and harassment to litigants - This Court held that administrative decisions taken by High Court are not to be interfered with by this Court under Article 32 - Court granted liberty to Petitioner to file representation before Chief Justice of the High Court in accordance with law - Writ Petition dismissed. [Paras 3-5] Biswajit Chowdhury v. Registrar General, Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 719
Article 32 and 226 - Fake Encounters - The petitioner, an advocate, challenged a High Court order dismissing his Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking an independent probe into alleged fake police encounters in Assam. The petition claimed over 80 fake encounters since May 2021, citing non-compliance with PUCL guidelines, including failure to register FIRs against police personnel and inadequate investigations. Specific cases, such as the Tinsukia encounter, were highlighted, alleging procedural irregularities and police coercion. The Supreme Court directed the Assam Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to conduct an independent, expeditious inquiry into allegations of 171 fake encounters, ensuring victim participation and confidentiality. The petition alleged widespread violation of guidelines laid down in People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2014) 10 SCC 635, regarding police encounter investigations. The Court underscored the role of human rights commissions in safeguarding civil liberties and the rule of law, noting that proven fake encounters violate Article 21 of the Constitution. While each of the 171 cases requires objective scrutiny, blanket directions based solely on compiled allegations were deemed unwarranted. The AHRC was granted authority to initiate further investigations, with state cooperation mandated and institutional barriers to be removed. The Assam State Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to victims, and measures were ordered to protect the identities of victims, families, and witnesses. The Court dismissed concerns raised by the Solicitor General about potential misuse of legal assistance, affirming confidence in the judicial system. The petitioner's locus standi was upheld, recognizing the role of individuals in exposing alleged state excesses. While most cases did not prima facie indicate flagrant violations of PUCL guidelines, some warranted further scrutiny. The Court clarified that PUCL guidelines mandate investigation of the encounter incident, not necessarily the police officers involved. (Para 55) Arif Md Yeasin Jwadder v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2025 INSC 785 : (2025) 8 SCC 804
Article 32, 226 - Village Recognition - Inter-District Boundary Dispute - Non-Compliance with Village Recognition Criteria - Inadequate Consideration of Objections - Requirement for Fresh Public Notice and Comprehensive Objection Review - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order directing recognition of Kakiho Village within three months, holding that the conditions for village recognition under the Nagaland State Government's Memoranda dated March 22, 1996, and October 1, 2005, were not satisfied. The Court found that objections, including those raised by the appellant (Jalukai Village Council), were not adequately considered. It directed the State to issue a fresh public notice for Kakiho Village's recognition, conduct a comprehensive review of all objections, and complete the process within six months, with strict compliance mandated. The Court clarified that the inter-district boundary dispute between Kohima and Dimapur is irrelevant to Kakiho Village's recognition, as the village is located approximately 3.7 km outside the disputed buffer zone. The matter was listed as part-heard, to be reviewed after six months. (Paras 49, 63, 73) Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2025 INSC 766
Article 32, 226 - Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us. It is the Constitution which imposes limits and restrictions on the powers vested in the three organs. The power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary. Statutes are subject to judicial review to test their constitutionality as well as for judicial interpretation. Therefore, when the constitutional courts exercise their power of judicial review, they act within the framework of the Constitution. (Para 7) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Article 32, 226 - Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court's consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty. (Para 9) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647
Article 32 - Writ Petition - Challenge to Supreme Court's Final Judgments - Impermissible - Article 32 cannot be used to challenge the Supreme Court's final judgments, directly or indirectly, as it undermines judicial finality, hierarchy, and the principle of res judicata. A conscious distinction of an earlier precedent does not render a judgment per incuriam. Aggrieved litigants must seek remedies through review or curative petitions, not writ proceedings under Article 32, which is a remedial provision for enforcing fundamental rights. In this case, retired employees challenged the Court's ruling in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, (2016) 10 SCC 77, which upheld the repeal of a pension scheme with cut-off dates, alleging it was per incuriam for ignoring D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305. The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that Rajesh Chander Sood validly distinguished D.S. Nakara and remains binding. The petitioners were directed to pursue review or curative remedies. Writ petition dismissed as misconceived. (Para 29, 30, 32) Satish Chander Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 431 : 2025 INSC 491 : AIR 2025 SC 2050
Article 32 - Validity of the laws relating to Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments of the States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana - Petitioners sought declaration of provisions as ultra vires Articles 14, 19, 25, 26, 29, and 31A – Held, Challenges to state-specific legislation more effectively addressed by respective High Courts due to distinct legislative schemes and sociocultural contexts. Liberty granted to petitioners to approach jurisdictional High Courts. High Courts advised to consider historical, socio-economic, and religious aspects and may constitute Expert Committees. Writ petitions disposed of. (Para 4 – 8) Sh.Dayanand Saraswati Swamiji v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 413 : 2025 INSC 465
Article 32 - Plea to regulate private hospitals that compel patients to purchase medicines, devices, implants, and consumables from their inhouse pharmacies at exorbitant prices. The Court disposed of the writ petition, directing all State Governments to consider the issue of unreasonable charges and patient exploitation in private hospitals and take appropriate policy decisions. (Para 16 – 18) Siddharth Dalmia v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2025 INSC 351
Article 32, 226, 248 - The Supreme Court dismissed the Union Government's appeals against the High Court's ruling, holding that lottery distributors are not liable to pay service tax under clause (zzzzn) of Section 65(105) of the Finance Act, 1994, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that the activity of promoting, marketing, or organizing lotteries constitutes "betting and gambling" under Entry 62, List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusively within the State Legislature's taxing competence. The relationship between lottery distributors and the State of Sikkim was held to be principal-to-principal, not principal-to-agent, thus no service is rendered by distributors to attract service tax liability. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the said clause is ultra vires the Constitution and reiterated that only the State Government can levy gambling tax on such activities. [Para 15 - 18] Union of India v. Future Gaming Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2025 INSC 181 : (2025) 5 SCC 601
Article 32 - The petitioners sought several reliefs, including a declaration that a judgment of the High Court was illegal for being passed without hearing necessary parties, a direction to survey properties to ascertain encroachment on government land, regularization of their apartments, and an injunction against interference by the State and its agents. Held, the High Court's judgment could not be declared illegal under Article 32. The petitioners were advised to pursue alternative remedies, such as filing for recall of the judgment or challenging it under Article 136. The writ petition was dismissed, leaving the petitioners free to explore other legal remedies. Vimal Babu Dhumadiya v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 140
Article 41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in certain cases
Article 41 - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Graduate Medical Education Regulations (Amendment), 2019 - National Medical Commission (NMC) - The condition of “both hands intact” lacks legal sanctity, fails to provide functional assessment, and perpetuates ableism, undermining the RPwD Act and Article 41. The Court emphasized the need for individualized functional assessments over a “one size fits all” approach, as mandated by precedents in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The AIIMS assessment report was found inadequate for not adhering to the functional competency tests laid down in prior judgments and for failing to provide reasons for denying admission. The Court reiterated the need to revise NMC guidelines to align with the RPwD Act, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and constitutional principles, as previously directed in Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857. The approach advocated by Dr. Satendra Singh, allowing candidates to pursue MBBS and choose non-surgical or medical branches post-course, was endorsed as fair and inclusive. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256
Article 51A. Fundamental duties
Article 51A - Legality of Ex-Post Facto Environmental Clearances (ECs) under Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 - Supreme Court declared ex-post facto ECs for projects, particularly mining, commenced without prior EC as illegal and restrained the Central Government from granting such clearances in the future. Set aside the 2017 Notification, 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), and related circulars/orders permitting ex-post facto ECs as violative of the EIA Notification, 2006. Clarified that ECs already granted under the 2017 Notification and 2021 OM remain unaffected. Held that the EIA Notification, 2006 mandates prior EC, and ex-post facto approvals contradict this requirement. Projects initiated without prior EC cannot be regularized, as such actions by companies, real estate developers, and others constitute "gross illegalities." The 2021 and 2022 OMs created an impermissible framework for post-facto approvals, undermining the mandatory "prior environmental clearance" requirement reiterated 34 times in the EIA Notification, 2006. Rejected the Union's argument that denying regularization would cause environmental harm through demolitions, emphasizing compliance with the polluter pays principle and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. (Para 32 -34) Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2025 INSC 718 : AIR 2025 SC 2843