Constitution of IndiaArticle 8 - The Court clarified that when a person acquires a foreign citizenship, the cessation of Indian citizenship happens by operation of law by virtue of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. Hence, such cessation of citizenship cannot be regarded as voluntary. Therefore, children of such persons cannot seek to resume Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) of the...
Constitution of India
Article 8 - The Court clarified that when a person acquires a foreign citizenship, the cessation of Indian citizenship happens by operation of law by virtue of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act. Hence, such cessation of citizenship cannot be regarded as voluntary. Therefore, children of such persons cannot seek to resume Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) of the Citizenship Act. As per Section 8(2), children of persons who have voluntarily renounced Indian citizenship can seek Indian citizenship within one year of attaining majority. The Court interpreted that this option is not available for children of those who acquired foreign citizenship. The Court also clarified that a person who was born outside India after the commencement of the Constitution cannot seek citizenship under Article 8 of the Constitution on the ground that his grandparents were born in the undivided India. The Court held that allowing such an interpretation would lead to "absurd results", as foreign nationals born long after the independence, by claiming that their grandparents were born in the undivided India. Union of India v. Pranav Srinivasan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 816
Article 12 and 13 - The Army Welfare Education Society cannot be considered as "State" under Article 13 of the Constitution. The High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondents herein holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the school run by the Appellant Society imparts education. Imparting education involves public duty and therefore a public law element could also be said to be involved. However, the relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. (Para 42) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464
Article 12 and 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – 'State' or 'Other Authority' – The respondent employer, Air India Limited (AIL) after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – The writ petitions were maintainable on the date of institution but whether they continued to be maintainable as on the date the same were finally heard? – Held, the issue about exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would arise only on the date when the writ petitions were taken up for consideration and decision. The subsequent event of disinvestment of the Government Company and its devolution into a private company would make the company immune from being subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, even if the litigant had entered the portals of the Court while the employer was the Government. (Para 5, 32 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384
Article 12 and 226 – Writ Jurisdiction of High Court – The High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for any other purpose. Held, since, respondent employer (AIL) had been disinvested and had assumed the character of a private entity not performing any public function, the High Court could not have exercised the extraordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such private entity. (Para 34 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384
Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process. The Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 13 (2) - The entire statute does not need to be struck down each time that certain provisions of the statute are held to not meet constitutional muster. The statute is only void to the extent that it contravenes the Constitution. (Para 101) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854
Article 14 - The recruitment process begins with the issuance of an advertisement inviting applications and concludes with the filling of vacancies. Eligibility criteria specified at the start of the recruitment process cannot be altered midway unless permitted by the applicable rules or the advertisement itself, provided such changes comply with Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of non-arbitrariness. The ruling in K. Manjusree, (2008) 3 SCC 512 establishes valid law and is distinct from Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 as the former pertains to the right to be included in the Select List, while the latter addresses the right to appointment from the Select List. Recruitment bodies may adopt procedures consistent with the rules to conclude the process, provided such procedures are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rationally connected to the objective. Statutory rules governing recruitment are binding. In the absence of such rules or if they are silent, administrative instructions may be applied to fill procedural gaps. Inclusion in the Select List does not guarantee an indefeasible right to appointment. While the State or its instrumentalities may choose not to fill vacancies for bona fide reasons, they cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to eligible candidates within the Select List if vacancies exist. Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864
Article 14 - Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008; Rule 13(v) which provides for age relaxation to the persons serving under educational projects is challenged to be discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Fixing of minimum and maximum age requirement is a policy decision – There was a valid classification based on intelligible differentia which distinguished applicants with project experience and those who lacked project experience. Further the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Rules. Held, the historical background leading to the enactment of the Rules itself provides a justification for granting relaxation to the persons serving under the educational project, if they fulfil the condition that they were within the age limit when they were initially engaged. Hence, relaxation provided for in Rule 13(v) is not arbitrary or unreasonable. (Para 22, 24 & 25) Mahesh Chand Bareth v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 442
Article 14 - The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration proceedings, including the appointment of arbitrators. The Arbitration Act permits Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) to maintain empanelled arbitrators, but arbitration clauses cannot compel the other party to select arbitrators exclusively from such panels. Clauses allowing unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator raise justifiable doubts about the arbitrator's independence and impartiality and hinder equal participation in the appointment process. In three-member tribunals, requiring one party to select its arbitrator from a PSU-curated panel violates the principle of equal treatment, as it creates an imbalance in the appointment process. Unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts contravene Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The express waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act permits parties to waive claims of bias against unilaterally appointed arbitrators after disputes arise, enabling them to consider the necessity of waiving the nemo judex rule. The judgment applies prospectively to arbitrator appointments made after its pronouncement, including appointments in three-member tribunals. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. Eci Spic Smo Mcml (Jv), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 874
Article 14 - Manifest Arbitrariness – Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 struck down – Protection of heritage institutions – Scope of judicial review – Legislative purpose and reasonableness - Held, the Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it was enacted on a manifestly arbitrary basis. The reasoning that the establishment of Khalsa University would shadow and damage the heritage and pristine glory of Khalsa College, a significant icon of Khalsa heritage established in 1892, was found to be non-existent. The Khalsa College was neither part of the Khalsa University nor adversely affected by its establishment. The Court noted specific undertakings and evidence that safeguarded the distinct identity and heritage of Khalsa College. Consequently, the Repeal Act was deemed unconstitutional, and the Khalsa University Act, 2016, was restored. Khalsa University v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 773
Article 14 – Unlimited corporate funding – Arbitrariness of Section 182 of Companies Act - Removal of restrictions on political contributions is arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution – Unlimited contribution by companies to political parties is antithetical to free and fair elections because it allows certain persons/companies (including shell companies) to influence the electoral process and policy making. This is violative of the principle of free and fair elections and political equality captured in the value of “one person one vote”. The ability of a company to influence the electoral process through political contributions is much higher when compared to that of an individual. Companies and individuals cannot be equated for the purpose of political contributions. Companies before the amendment to Section 182 could only contribute a certain percentage of the net aggregate profits and could be classified between loss-making companies and profit-making companies for the purpose of political contributions. The underlying principle of this distinction was that it is more plausible that loss-making companies will contribute to political parties with a quid pro quo and not for the purpose of income tax benefits. The amended provision does not recognize that the harm of contributions by lossmaking companies in the form of quid pro quo is much higher. Thus, the amendment to Section 182 is manifestly arbitrary for (a) treating political contributions by companies and individuals alike; (b) permitting the unregulated influence of companies in the governance and political process violating the principle of free and fair elections; and (c) treating contributions made by profit-making and loss-making companies to political parties alike. The observations means that the law must not treat companies and individual contributors alike because of the variance in the degree of harm on free and fair elections. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 14 - UGC's letter to University directing regularization of the teachers who were selected through a regular selection process and possessed required qualifications was not followed by university. Appellants' appointments were made according to a regular selection process. Held, considering the statutory position of UGC, there was no reason for the University not to follow directions of UGC. The University's action of not continuing them and starting a fresh selection process is unjust, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the employment of the appellants will have to be continued after merger with the regular establishment of the University. Respondents directed to reinstate the appellants. (Para 20, 23 & 28) Meher Fatima Hussain v. Jamia Milia Islamia, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : AIR 2024 SC 2097
Article 14 - In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the rejection of a claim for compassionate appointment made by the son of a deceased government employee, who had attained the age of majority 11 years after his father's demise. The appellant's claim was rejected on the basis of Haryana Government instructions dated 22.03.1999, which stipulated that a minor dependent must attain the age of majority within three years from the date of the employee's death to qualify for compassionate appointment. The Court held that compassionate appointment is not a vested right but an exception to the general rule of public employment. It emphasized that such appointments are aimed at alleviating immediate financial distress caused by the death of a government employee. The Court further clarified that equality under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity, such as extending benefits beyond the scope of applicable rules or policies. However, recognizing the prolonged pendency of the appellant's claim and the lack of timely communication by the State regarding his mother's entitlement to ex-gratia compensation, the Court directed the State to allow the appellant's mother to submit a representation seeking lump sum ex-gratia compensation under the relevant rules. The State was instructed to decide on the representation within six weeks, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum would apply to any compensation granted. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs. Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 886
Article 14 – Exemption of certain projects or activities from mandatory obtaining environment clearance – Unguided and blanket exemption, is, per se, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Item 6 grants exemption from the requirement of obtaining EC for “extraction or sourcing or borrowing of ordinary earth for linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc. Held, when an exception is sought to the requirement of obtaining EC, the exception must be specific. There is no specification about the quantum of ordinary earth, which can be extracted or the area which can be used to extract ordinary earth. “Linear projects” have not been defined making the term “linear projects” very vague. Even the amended item 6 continues to suffer from the same vice of arbitrariness, which Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits. The exemption granted without incorporating any safeguards is completely unguided and arbitrary and such blanket exemption completely defeats the very object of the EP Act. Hence, on account of the violation of Article 14, item 6 in the impugned notification, as well as the amended impugned notification, is struck down. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871
Article 14 – Right to equality of the underprivileged – Held, forests play a pivotal role in controlling pollution, which significantly affects the underprivileged, violating their right to equality. It is the vulnerable sections of the society who would be most affected by the depletion of forests, considering the fact that the more affluent sections of society have better access to resources as compared to the underprivileged. The concept of sustainable development is to be understood from an eco-centric approach. First and foremost, it is the environment that needs to be sustained, while the anthropogenic development must follow later. (Para 30 & 32) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466 : (2024) 6 SCC 461
Article 14 and Income Tax Rules, 1962; Rule 3(7) (i) – Fixing single benchmark for interest rates charged by different banks – Rule 3(7) (i) is challenged to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 insofar as it treats the PLR of SBI as the benchmark to determine the value of benefit to the assessee in comparison to the rate of interest charged by other individual banks – Held, it is neither arbitrary nor unequal exercise of power. By fixing a single clear benchmark for computation of the perquisite or fringe benefit, the rule prevents ascertainment of the interest rates being charged by different banks from the customers and, thus, checks unnecessary litigation. Rule 3(7) (i) ensures consistency in application, provides clarity for both the assessee and the revenue department, and provides certainty as to the amount to be taxed. Rule 3(7) (i) is based on a uniform approach and fair determining principle which aligns with constitutional values. Hence, Rule 3(7) is held to be intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 32 & 33) All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Central Bank of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : (2024) 9 SCC 664
Article 14 - Substantive legitimate expectation and fairness in recruitment process - Whether the High Court's decision violated the substantive legitimate expectation of the petitioner. Held, for a public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation, it must objectively demonstrate an overriding public interest. The petitioner claimed a legitimate expectation under the unamended MJS Rules, 2005, that the merit list would be based on the aggregate marks of the written examination and viva voce. However, a minimum 40% cut-off for the viva voce was introduced after the recruitment process had begun, without prior notice to the candidates. Such a post-hoc imposition violated the petitioner's substantive legitimate expectation, rendering the process arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner's participation in the recruitment process did not preclude him from challenging the process's illegality, reaffirming the principle that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override the law. In conclusion, the Court ordered that the petitioner, having secured over 50% in aggregate marks, be declared successful in the recruitment test. The petitioner was granted appointment with notional seniority from 2015 for superannuation purposes but without retrospective monetary benefits. The directions were to be implemented within four weeks. Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur at Imphal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 636
Article 14 - Judicial Review in Government Contracts – Principles and Application - The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles governing judicial intervention in matters of government contracts, emphasizing that courts do not act as appellate bodies but review the decision-making process to ensure it is free from arbitrariness, mala fides, and bias, and aligns with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779
Article 14 - Impugned Decision Set Aside - The Court invalidated the rejection of the appellant's technical bid and the selection of the respondent as the successful bidder, finding the process grossly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. A fresh tender process was ordered to ensure adherence to constitutional and legal norms. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779
Article 14 - Government instrumentalities must uphold constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality, and non-arbitrariness in tender processes, especially in large-scale public projects, to safeguard public interest and ensure compliance with Article 14. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 779
Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Removal of Caste References - Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023 – Immediate deletion of the “caste” column and related references in prisoners' registers - The impugned provisions of the prison manuals and rules were declared unconstitutional - Issued comprehensive directions aimed at addressing caste-based discrimination in prisons and ensuring compliance across all States and Union Territories. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Rejects view that caste-based segregation of prisoners will prevent violence - It is the responsibility of the prison administration to maintain discipline inside the prison without resorting to extreme measures that promote caste-based segregation. (Para 167) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – Separate but equal' philosophy has no place in constitution - Adopting the logic accepted by the High Court is similar to the argument which was given in the United States to legalize race-based segregation: separate but equal. Such a philosophy has no place under the Indian Constitution. Even if there is rivalry between individuals of two groups, it does not require segregating the groups permanently. Discipline cannot be secured at the altar of violation of fundamental rights and correctional needs of inmates. The prison authorities ought to be able to tackle perceived threats to discipline by means that are not rights-effacing and inherently discriminatory. (Para 167) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 - Caste-based Discrimination in Prisons – the differentia between inmates that distinguishes on the basis of “habit”, “custom”, “superior mode of living”, and “natural tendency to escape”, etc. is unconstitutionally vague and indeterminate. These terms and phrases do not serve as an intelligible differentia, that can be used to demarcate one class of prisoners from the other. These terms have resultantly been used to target individuals from marginalized castes and denotified tribes. (Para 168) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 - The High Court judgment and the AIIMS Nagpur Disability Assessment Board's report dated 13 August 2024 were quashed for non-compliance with statutory and regulatory standards. AIIMS Nagpur is directed to create a supernumerary seat for the appellant, subject to their non-allocation elsewhere. Colleges must implement recommendations to support the appellant's pursuit of the MBBS program, ensuring protection against victimization. The judgment shall have universal applicability. New disability-inclusive guidelines for medical admissions must be formulated by a committee including disability experts, aligned with contemporary disability justice principles. The Disability Assessment Boards must move beyond a benchmark model, ensuring fairness, transparency, and inclusion of health professionals with disabilities. Denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination, violating equality principles under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Encouraging persons with disabilities in the medical profession enhances healthcare quality and promotes fraternity. A database on college accessibility and accommodations must be created, with NEET applicants informed of such provisions. These units must facilitate clinical accommodations for students with disabilities. The appeal is allowed. Pending applications are disposed of, and the judgment is transmitted to relevant governmental authorities for compliance. Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857
Articles 14 and 16 - The main issue was the legality of the OBC reservation, which was applied retroactively through a notification issued after the recruitment process had commenced. The petitioners argued that this change infringed upon their rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the original recruitment notice did not include any reference to OBC reservations. The High Court set aside the selection made on 242 seats of OBC finding the retroactive application of the OBC reservation as illegal because proper opportunity was not served to all the candidates belonging to the OBC category to apply for the said posts. Held, changing the rules of the selection process mid-way would undermine the fairness of the selection process as it would deny equality of opportunity to other candidates eligible to be recruited in the OBC category. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision which annulled the selection of 242 candidates for Primary Teacher positions in the OBC category due to procedural flaws. The State should draw up a fresh selection list following the High Court's judgment limiting appointments to the originally stated 1,423 vacancies. The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of equitable treatment for all similarly situated candidates following a recruitment process initiated in 2006. The Court observed that judgments declaring law, such as the High Court's decision on 06.10.2015, should be treated as judgments in rem, benefiting all candidates, irrespective of their involvement in litigation. The revised select list must be prepared strictly based on merit, with appointments confined to the originally notified 1,423 vacancies. The Court held that excluding candidates who did not litigate would violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the prolonged recruitment process disadvantaged many. However, those appointed in 2011 and not listed in the revised merit list may face job displacement, with the government retaining discretion over their continued service. No arrears of salary were granted, but notional appointments from 09.12.2011 were recognized for superannuation benefits. The appeals filed by the State of Manipur were dismissed, and the recruitment process was ordered to conclude within specified timelines. Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi v. State of Manipur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 792
Articles 14 and 16 - Whether a government employee, recommended for promotion before retirement but unable to assume the post due to administrative delays, is entitled to notional financial benefits for the promotional post post-retirement - Applicability of Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules in denying retrospective financial benefits without assuming the duties of the higher post. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Government of West Bengal, holding that Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules stipulates that an employee must assume the duties and responsibilities of a higher post to be eligible for the corresponding financial benefits. As respondent No. 1 retired before assuming such duties, he could not be granted financial benefits retrospectively. While the right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the right to promotion itself is not absolute. Promotion becomes effective only upon the assumption of duties. Although the delay in processing the promotion was caused by the appellants' inaction, it does not override the statutory bar on retrospective promotions or the requirement of assuming the post's duties. Promotion becomes effective from the date an employee assumes charge of the higher post, not from the vacancy date or recommendation date. Retrospective promotions are not permissible unless explicitly enabled by statutory provisions. The impugned judgments of the High Court and the Administrative Tribunal were set aside. Respondent No. 1 was not entitled to notional financial benefits post-retirement. Government of West Bengal v. Dr. Amal Satpathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 927
Article 14 and 16 - Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Constitutionality of the Rules stipulating minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce test, as a part of the selection criteria, is challenged – Held, the Prescription of minimum qualifying marks for interview is permissible and this is not in violation of All India Judges Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others which accepted certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission. Further held, the minimum cut-off of 20% for the Bihar recruitment and 40% for the Gujarat recruitment cannot be considered to provide a high threshold if one keeps in mind that the recruitment is for selection of judicial officers. The object of viva voce set out in Rule 8(5) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 has a reasonable and direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e. the appointment of well-rounded judicial officers. For recruitment of judicial officers, ideally the effort should be to not only test the candidate's intellect but also their personality. The prescription of minimum cut off is also not perceived to be of such a nature that it reeks of irrationality, or was capricious and/or without any adequate determining principle. It does not appear to be disproportionate so as to adversely affect “meritorious” candidates and certainly not manifestly arbitrary, or irrational or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The concerned recruitment Rules cannot be said to be unconstitutional. The impugned selection process in the State of Bihar and Gujarat are found to be legally valid and are upheld. (Para 66, 67 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596 : (2024) 7 SCC 262
Article 14, 16 and 21 - Reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities, - Fixation of cut-off marks - Horizontal vs. Vertical Reservations - The appellants challenged the recruitment process of 120 posts of Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate initiated by the Rajasthan High Court, contending that the respondents failed to publish cut-off marks for the category of persons with benchmark disabilities in the preliminary examination results. The appellants claimed this omission was discriminatory and violated their fundamental rights and the applicable state rules regarding reservation for persons with disabilities. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities is treated as an "overall horizontal reservation" and not compartmentalized into specific vertical categories such as SC, ST, or OBC. Candidates with disabilities were required to meet the cut-off marks for the vertical category they applied under. The Court found no statutory mandate requiring separate cut-off marks for the persons with benchmark disabilities in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, or the Rajasthan Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2018. The Court reaffirmed that those who participate in a selection process cannot challenge its methodology post-facto upon failing to succeed. Hence, the action of the respondents was not discriminatory or violative of the appellants' fundamental rights. Appeals dismissed. Rekha Sharma v. High Court of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : AIR 2024 SC 4241
Article 14, 19, 21, 48A & 51A(g) – Fundamental rights and Directive principle of state policy are complimentary to each other – Article 48A and 51A(g) ought to be understood in light of Articles 14, 19 and 21, as they represent the collective conscience of the Constitution. If the continued existence and protection of forests is in the interest of humanity and nature, then there can be no other interpretation than to read the constitutional ethos into these provisions. Part III and Part IV of the Constitution are like two wheels of a chariot, complementing each other in their commitment to a social change and development. There is a constitutional duty enjoined upon every court to protect and preserve the environment. Courts will have to apply the principle of parens patriae in light of the constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 48A, 51A, 21, 14 and 19 of the constitution. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on a developer or industrialist and also on the State in a given case to prove that there is no degradation. (Para 25, 26 & 38) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466 : (2024) 6 SCC 461
Articles 14 and 21 - Disability assessment boards must apply mind - Disability assessment boards are not just monotonous automation to just look at the quantified benchmark disabilities as set out in the certificate of disability to cast aside a candidate. Such an approach would be antithetical to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and all canons of justice, equality and good conscience. The Disability assessment boards are obliged to assess the further question as to whether the candidate, in the opinion of the experts, would be eligible to pursue the course or in other words whether the disability will or will not come in the way of the candidate pursuing the course in question. (Para 46) Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770
Articles 14 and 21 - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 18 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail for offenses under the Act. The provision does not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as the offenses under the Act form a separate class arising from the historical practice of untouchability and systemic oppression against SC/ST communities. Section 18 was upheld as it is necessary to prevent potential threats and intimidation by the accused, ensuring victims are not obstructed in pursuing justice. The Court acknowledged concerns of misuse but emphasized that the provision aligns with the object of the Act to protect vulnerable sections of society and uphold their dignity. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Article 14 and 21 – The right to a healthy environment and the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change – The right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. Even if there is no umbrella legislation in India which relates to climate change and the attendant concerns this does not mean that the people of India do not have a right against the adverse effects of climate change. As the havoc caused by climate change increases year by year, it becomes necessary to articulate this as a distinct right. It is recognised by Articles 14 and 21. Without a clean environment which is stable and unimpacted by the vagaries of climate change, the right to life is not fully realised. States are compelled to prioritize environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root causes of climate change and safeguarding the wellbeing of present and future generations. It is a fundamental right of all individuals to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. (Para 19, 24, 25 & 35) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286
Articles 14 and 51A - Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers in the States - Submission that no such office is stipulated in the Constitution – Held, Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers not unconstitutional. A Deputy Chief Minister is, first and foremost, a Minister in the Government of the State. The appellation of a Deputy Chief Minister does not breach the constitutional position. (Para 1) Public Political Party v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Article 14 and 341 - Issue of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Sub-classification of Scheduled Castes Permissible - Article 14 allows sub-classification within a class that is not homogenous, provided it meets the intelligible differentia standard. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Article 15 - Colonial rulers imported caste-based allocation of work to prisons due to pressure from oppressor castes. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 15 - End caste-based allotment of work to prisoners, delete caste columns in prison registers - Guidelines for the prevention of segregation and division of labour solely on the basis of the caste of the prisoners in Prisons - Struck down the provisions of the Prison Manuals of several States as per which jobs were assigned to prisons based on their castes - Assigning cleaning and sweeping to the marginalised castes and assigning cooking to higher-caste prisoners is nothing but a direct caste discrimination and a violation of Article 15. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 15 (1) - The tendency to treat members of denotified tribes as habitual to crime or having bad character reinforces a stereotype, which excludes them from meaningful participation in social life. When such stereotypes become a part of the legal framework, they legitimize discrimination against these communities. Members of the denotified tribes have faced the brunt of colonial caste-based undertones of discriminating against them, and the prison Manuals are reaffirming the same discrimination. (Para 175) Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 15(4) and 16(4) - Indra Sawhney Case - Applicability - The principle of sub-classification applies beyond Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and extends to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) - In Indra Sawhney, the Court did not restrict sub-classification to Other Backward Classes, but extended it to other beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Article 16(1), 16(4) and 335 - Efficiency of Administration - Article 335 does not limit sub-classification; rather, it reinforces the importance of inclusion and equality in public services in line with Article 16(1). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Article 17 - No social group born as 'scavenger class'; notion that some occupations are 'degrading' is an aspect of untouchability. Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 771
Article 19 - A criminal defamation case was filed against the owner of a newspaper for an article published against an advocate. The Magistrate rejected the complaint, stating that the news article in question was published in good faith and in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Magistrate's view cannot be termed as "illegal or unjustified," and therefore, there is no justification for interference by the Sessions Court or the High Court. (Para 8 & 9) Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 67 AIR 2024 SC 811 : (2024) 3 SCC 718
Article 19 - The Supreme Court upheld a rule issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) barring Chartered Accountants from accepting more than the "specified number of tax audit assignments" (at present, the upper limit is set at 60) in a financial year. The rule (para 6.0 of Chapter VI of the Council Guidelines No. 1-CA(7)/02/2008 dt. 08/08/2008 and the subsequent amendments) are not violative of the fundamental right to practise profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The clause will be deemed to be effective from 01.04.2024 and quashed the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the members for violation of the clause. The ICAI will be at liberty to enhance the number of audits that a CA can undertake. Shaji Paulose v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 397
Article 19(1)(a) – Commercial speech includes advertisements and is protected under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, subject to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). Commercial speech that is deceptive, unfair, misleading, and untruthful is excluded from such constitutional protection and can be regulated and prohibited by the State. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the producer/ advertiser has the freedom to creatively and artistically promote his goods and services. (Para 5) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333 : (2024) 10 SCC 515
Article 19(1)(a) – Constitutionality of Section 182(3) of Companies Act as amended by Section 154 of Finance Act – Non-disclosure of particulars of political contribution is violative of Right to Information – After amendment, Section 182(3) only requires the disclosure of the total amount contributed to political parties in a financial year. The deletion of the mandate of disclosing the particulars of contributions violates the right to information of the voter since they would not possess information about the political party to which the contribution was made which, is necessary to identify corruption and quid pro quo transactions in governance. Such information is also necessary for exercising an informed vote. The only purpose of amending Section 182(3) was to bring the provision in tune with the amendment under Section 29C of the RPA exempting disclosure requirements for contributions through electoral bonds. The amendment to Section 182(3) of the Companies Act serves no practical purpose as the Electoral Bond Scheme and relevant amendments to the RPA and the IT Act mandating non-disclosure of particulars on political contributions through electoral bonds is held unconstitutional. Hence, Section 182(3) as amended by the Finance Act 2017 is unconstitutional. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 19(1)(a) – Infringement of the Right to information of the voter – The non-disclosure of information about electoral contributions under amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme is violative of the right to information of the voter traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The information about funding to a political party is such an 'essential' information for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The right to information of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions. Anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156
Article 19(1)(a) - Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) - Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Infringement of the right to information of the voters for the purposes of curbing black money – Proportionality standard applied – Least restrictive means stage –The Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information. The legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money such as contributions through cheques, bank draft, electronic clearing system or electoral trusts. Hence, the Electoral Bond Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. Further, the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156
Article 20 - Constitutional validity of provisions in the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, as amended by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 - Applicability of the 2016 Amendment Act retrospectively or prospectively - Held, the Court recalled its judgment dated August 23, 2022, which declared Section 3(2) of the 1988 Act unconstitutional for being arbitrary and violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Section 5 of the 1988 Act was also declared unconstitutional for being arbitrary. The 2016 Act, being substantive, cannot apply retrospectively for forfeiture provisions under Section 5. The constitutional challenge cannot be adjudicated without a proper lis between the parties. The review petition is allowed, recalling the judgment dated August 23, 2022. Civil Appeal No. 5783 of 2022 is restored for fresh adjudication by a new Bench. Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 851
Article 20 - Calling upon the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution alongwith the list under Section 294 of Cr.P.C., could not be said to be in any way prejudicial to the right of the accused, nor could it be said to be compelling him to be a witness against himself as contemplated under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. However, the Court deleted the observations made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order, which suggested that deliberate denial of a document's genuineness could be considered an aggravating circumstance during sentencing. The petitioner is allowed to raise all legally permissible contentions during the trial. (Para 2 - 4) Ashok Daga v. Directorate Of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 480
Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212
Article 20(3) and Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 42(1) – Power of search and seizure under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, is inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution as well as statutory limitations. Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not be affected by the provisions of search and seizure. The statutory provisions conferring authorities with the power to search and seize are a mere temporary interference with the right of the accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions itself. (Para 41) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Article 21 - Judicial Conduct – Delay in Pronouncement of Judgments – Ante-dating of Orders - Judicial discipline requires prompt delivery of reasoned judgments and emphasized that delays undermine litigants' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Reasons should follow promptly after the pronouncement of the operative part to avoid suspicion and uphold judicial integrity. Judges were reminded of the three options for delivering judgments: (i) dictation in open court, (ii) reserving for a later date, or (iii) issuing the operative part with reasons to follow within a strict timeline. Any delay beyond five days must be avoided to maintain trust in the judiciary. While recognizing human fallibility and the workload on judges, the Court stressed the importance of judicial propriety and integrity in safeguarding the justice system's credibility. Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 820
Article 21 - The failure to implement these provisions, particularly Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, denies victims the fundamental right to dignity and protection guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It directed strict implementation of these provisions to prevent victims from facing situations where their right to make informed choices about their future is compromised. The State is duty-bound to provide shelter, support, and financial assistance to victims, ensuring their reintegration into society and protecting their right to lead a dignified life. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Article 21 - Bail on grounds of undue delay in Trial despite bar in NDPS Act – Failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered. Held, section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, does not fetter the grant of bail to an accused on the ground of undue delay in the completion of the trial. Direction given to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 416
Article 21 - Here the accused is lodged in jail for a considerable period and there is little possibility of trial reaching finality in the near future. The liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution does not get abrogated even for special statutes where the threshold twin bar is provided and such statutes, in our opinion, cannot carve out an exception to the principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception. The cardinal principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception will be entirely defeated if the petitioner is kept in custody as an under-trial for such a long duration. This is particularly glaring since in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence prescribed is only 7 years for the offence of money laundering. (Para 12) Vijay Nair v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 644
Article 21 - Court must balance the statutory twin conditions required for bail with the fundamental principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Even in cases under PMLA, the overarching principle of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution prevails, ensuring that statutory conditions for bail should not override constitutional safeguards. Thus, courts should be guided by the higher constitutional mandate of speedy trial and personal liberty, especially where prolonged incarceration occurs without the conclusion of trial. (Para 11) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Article 21 - The appellants had been in custody for 2 years and 1 year 9 months, respectively. Initially, an FIR under various sections of the IPC was registered, but no scheduled offence under PMLA was present at the time of filing the charge-sheet. Subsequently, Section 384 IPC was added, but its validity as a scheduled offence was in question. Whether the appellants were entitled to bail under Section 4 of the PMLA Act, considering the absence of a valid scheduled offence at the time of filing the PMLA complaint and the prolonged incarceration. Held, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, observing that at the time of filing the PMLA complaint, there was no scheduled offence under the Act. The addition of Section 384 IPC later did not retrospectively validate the absence of a scheduled offence at the relevant time. Continued incarceration of the appellants violated their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Laxmikant Tiwari v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 787
Article 21 - Expeditious adjudication of bail matters - High Court's duty to ensure timely justice - Supreme Court's directive to High Court of Bombay - Constitutionality of Article 21 - Liberty of citizen paramount - Urgency in deciding bail applications emphasized. (Para 3 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159
Article 21 - Once a court concludes that an accused is entitled to bail, the implementation of the bail order cannot be postponed. Such a postponement would violate the accused's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Jitendra Paswan Satya Mitra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 655
Article 21 – Bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish and must be within the four corners of Section 437(3). The bail conditions must be consistent with the object of imposing conditions. While imposing bail conditions, the Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required. In case of the accused whose guilt is yet to be established, the presumption of innocence is applicable and such person cannot be deprived of all his rights guaranteed under Article 21. Further held, Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions. Hence, while granting bail, the Courts can curtail the freedom of the accused only to the extent required for imposing the bail conditions warranted by law and cannot be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. (Para 7 & 7.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Article 21 – Validity of bail condition – The condition of dropping pin on google map – Bail condition of dropping a PIN on Google Map gives an impression that the condition will enable to monitor the movements of the accused on a realtime basis, which will be violative of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Held, this cannot be a condition of bail and deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. (10, 10.2) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Article 21 - Whether the suspension of the substantive sentence by the High Court extended to the sentence of fine imposed on the respondent. Whether the respondent could avoid imprisonment for default of fine payment despite partial compliance. Held, a fine is a distinct form of punishment under Section 53 of the IPC, and its suspension is within the ambit of Section 389 CrPC. The High Court's order suspending the respondent's sentence implicitly covered the fine, given the substantial embezzlement allegations. However, to balance justice and ensure compliance, the Court modified the suspension to be conditional upon the deposit of ₹15,00,000. The Court clarified that a sentence of fine is as significant as imprisonment, and its suspension should be assessed case-wise, considering the accused's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Imposing an impossible financial condition for suspension could undermine the right to appeal. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Sirpal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 840
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. (Para 22) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Article 21 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973 – Right to a speedy trial – Application for bail on grounds of delay in trial of 4 years – Held, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment – If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. Further held, the court is inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for reasons: (i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years; (ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and (iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses. As it cannot be assumed by what time the trial will ultimately conclude, howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions. (Para 7, 8, 9, 19 & 23) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : (2024) 9 SCC 813
Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously and shunting away the matter on one or the other ground would deprive the party of their precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 3) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159
Article 21 – Right to just and fair trial – Actions of the authorities concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act 1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding the rights of the accused in order to allow the accused to have a fair trial. (Para 24) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Article 21 – Pre-conviction detention – Liberty of a pre-trial detenue – Detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet stage has the sanction of law but any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure. Pre-conviction detention must be proportionate in the facts of a given case depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed. (Para 38) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 Cri LJ 2001 : (2024) 6 SCC 591
Article 21 – Primacy of consent of pregnant person in abortion – The right to choose and reproductive freedom is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of a pregnant person in decisions of reproductive autonomy and termination of pregnancy is paramount and the MTP Act does not allow any interference with the personal choice of a pregnant person in terms of proceeding with the termination. The Act or indeed the jurisprudence around abortion developed by the courts leave no scope for interference by the family or the partner of a pregnant person in matters of reproductive choice. In case there is a divergence in the opinion of a pregnant person and her guardian, the opinion of the minor or mentally ill pregnant person must be taken into consideration as an important aspect in enabling the court to arrive at a just conclusion. (Para 32, 35 & 37) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499 : (2024) 6 SCC 327
Article 21 – Right to abortion – The right to abortion is a concomitant right of dignity, autonomy and reproductive choice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of a pregnant person is not compromised for reasons other than to protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. (Para 21) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499 : (2024) 6 SCC 327
Article 21 – The expression 'life' unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and dignity. Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one's surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter. Held, pre-conceived notions of prevailing stereotypes associated with a particular community, often render them 'invisible victims' and impede their right to live a life with self-respect. (Para 14 & 15) Amanatullah Khan v. Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2024 SC 2340 : (2024) 6 SCC 804
Article 21 – Right to health – The fundamental right to health encompasses the right of a consumer to be made aware of the quality of products being offered for sale by manufacturers, service providers, advertisers and advertising agencies. (Para 23) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : (2024) 8 SCC 46
Article 21 – Procedure of inviting objections to the draft Environmental clearance (EC) notification – Held, before the issue of the second EC notification, the procedure of inviting objections to the draft notification was followed, and the objections were considered. Hence, there is no reason to dispense with the requirement of inviting objections before publishing the impugned notification. Article 21 guarantees a right to live in a pollution-free environment and therefore, the participation of the citizens is very important by allowing them to raise objections to the proposed notification. Hence, their participation cannot be prevented by casually exercising the power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5. (Para 22) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871
Article 21 & 22(1) & 22 (5) – Mandatory to inform' grounds of arrest' – The requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Noncompliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be. (Para 30) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967 : 2024 Cri LJ 2450 : (2024) 8 SCC 254
Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147
Article 21 and 47 – Right to food – Although the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. (Para 5) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248
Article 22 - The provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA – It is a statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest. Both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India and the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied. (Para 17, 18, 22 & 34) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967 : 2024 Cri LJ 2450 : (2024) 8 SCC 254
Article 22 - The High Court had previously dismissed the appellant's writ petition, which claimed that relevant documents were not supplied, impairing the detenue's right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Held, the grounds for detention were nearly identical to those in a prior case where the High Court quashed the detention orders due to the non-supply of similar documents, particularly WhatsApp chats. The Court emphasized the necessity for judicial discipline and adherence to precedent within the same High Court, ruling that the second Division Bench should have followed the earlier decision. Quashed the detention order and its confirmation, reinstating the rights of the detenue. Shabna Abdulla v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 588
Article 22(1) and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Section 43B (1) – The proceedings of arrest and the police custody remand of appellant is questioned – On grounds that mandator requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested is not provided – The arrest memo nowhere conveys the grounds on which the accused was being arrested. Keeping the accused in police custody without informing him the grounds on which he has been arrested; deprives the accused of the opportunity to avail services of the legal practitioner of his choice to oppose the prayer for police custody remand and seek bail. Held, the copy of the remand application in the purported exercise of communication of the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the accused appellant or his counsel before passing of the order of remand which vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand of the appellant. Further held, the mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused. The arrest of the appellant followed by remand order are hereby declared to be invalid in the eyes of law and are quashed and set aside. Hence, the appellant is entitled to a direction for release from custody. (Para 48, 50 & 51) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967 : 2024 Cri LJ 2450 : (2024) 8 SCC 254
Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 29 and 226 - Right to Separate Language Channel – Petition sought mandamus for setting up a dedicated Sindhi language channel on Doordarshan under Article 226. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no constitutional obligation on Doordarshan to establish a separate channel for the Sindhi-speaking population under Article 29 of the Constitution. The feasibility of a separate Sindhi channel had been thoroughly evaluated, considering factors like viewership and costs, and the decision to deny it was deemed reasonable and non-arbitrary. The Court clarified that the relief was confined to the plea for a separate channel and did not include any broader relief. Special Leave Petition dismissed. Sindhi Sangat v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 833
Article 30 (1) - Interpretation of - Minority Educational Institutions – Universities established before Constitution - Dual Nature of Article 30(1) - Proof of Establishment - Definition of Minorities - Retention of Minority Character - Criteria for Establishment by Minorities - Validity of Reference - Overruling of Azeez Basha - Impact on Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) - The reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya regarding the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha was valid, adhering to the parameters laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community. Article 30(1) serves as both an anti-discrimination and a special rights provision. It prohibits discrimination against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions and guarantees greater administrative autonomy to such institutions. Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established the institution for it to qualify as a minority educational institution under Article 30(1). Article 30(1) rights extend to universities established before the Constitution's commencement. The right under Article 30(1) applies to minorities as defined at the Constitution's commencement. No new right-bearing groups can be identified for pre-Constitution institutions. Incorporation of a university does not automatically result in the loss of its minority character. Courts must assess the surrounding circumstances and statutory provisions to determine if the minority character was relinquished upon incorporation. The idea, purpose, and implementation of the institution must originate from the minority community. The administrative setup must affirm the institution's minority character and its purpose to protect minority interests. The view that a minority cannot establish an institution if it derives its legal character through a statute is overruled. The minority status of AMU must be determined based on the principles laid down in this judgment. Reference disposed of. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 869
Article 30 (1) guarantees the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice to religious and linguistic minorities. However, the State has an interest in ensuring that the minority educational institutions impart secular education along with religious education or instruction. The constitutional scheme allows the State to strike a balance between two objectives: (i) ensuring the standard of excellence of minority educational institutions; and (ii) preserving the right of the minority to establish and administer its educational institution. The State generally strikes a balance by enacting regulations accompanying the recognition of minority educational institutions. The High Court erred in holding that education provided under the 2004 Act is violative of Article 21A because (i) The RTE Act which facilitates the fulfilment of the fundamental right under Article 21 – A contains a specific provision by which it does not apply to minority educational institutions; (ii) The right of a religious minority to establish and administer Madarsas to impart both religious and secular education is protected by Article 30; and (iii) the Board and the state government have sufficient regulatory powers to prescribe and regulate standards of education for the Madarsas. (Para 79) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854
Article 31C - The provision of Article 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India, remains operative. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 32 - The petitioner, a person with benchmark disability under the Act, 2016, sought enforcement of inclusive accessibility guidelines at airports and training for airport staff to sensitively assist passengers with disabilities. The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution, raising concerns over the implementation of accessibility standards and discriminatory practices during security screening. Held, the Supreme Court, emphasizing the assimilation of persons with disabilities into mainstream society, mandated the enforcement of detailed guidelines proposed by the Union of India. These include: Development of a real-time wheelchair availability mobile application. Mandatory mechanized wheelchairs at designated airport points. Coding of boarding passes with disability-specific identifiers and severity scales. Integration of the Unique Disability Identity Database (UDID) into ticket booking systems for seamless verification. Installation of specialized kiosks with voice recognition for enhanced accessibility. Regular sensitization training for airport staff, categorized into frequent training for frontline staff and periodic training for others. The Court extended these guidelines to include elderly and injured passengers requiring assistance and clarified that physical assistance currently provided at airports must continue alongside the new measures. Writ Petition disposed of with the above guidelines made mandatory. Arushi Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 907
Article 32 – Writ petition – Double taxation challenged – Legality of different State Governments levying and collecting Authorization Fee/Border Tax in violation of All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023 in question – Held, the State enactments, rules and regulations being not under challenge, it cannot be said that the demand of Border Tax/Authorization Fee at the borders by the respective State Governments is bad under law. The petitioners, in order to succeed, have to first consider challenging the State provision contained in the Act. (Para 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : AIR 2024 SC 3496
Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147
Article 32 and 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition in Supreme Court – Held, the petitioners ought to have first approached their jurisdictional High Courts to challenge their respective State enactments. Court is not inclined to enter into the merits of the matter at the present stage. (Para 9 & 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : AIR 2024 SC 3496
Article 39 (b) - Interpretation of - The majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy explicitly distanced itself from the minority opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer. Consequently, the reliance on this minority view in Sanjeev Coke was erroneous. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 39 (b) - Observation in Mafatlal - The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal Industries—stating that “material resources of the community” include privately owned resources—is not part of its ratio decidendi and is therefore not binding. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 39 (b) - Material Resources of the Community: The phrase “material resources of the community” in Article 39(b) may theoretically include privately owned resources. However, the Court rejects the broad interpretation in Justice Krishna Iyer's minority judgment and emphasizes that not all privately owned resources qualify as “material resources of the community” merely by serving material needs. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 39 (b) - Context-Specific Inquiry - Determining whether a resource falls under Article 39(b) requires a context-specific analysis based on factors such as: The nature and characteristics of the resource; Its impact on community well-being; Its scarcity; and Potential consequences of private ownership concentration. The Public Trust Doctrine may guide this determination. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 39 (b) - Scope of 'Distribution' - The term “distribution” under Article 39(b) has a broad meaning. It encompasses various state mechanisms, including vesting resources in the state or nationalization, provided the distribution serves the common good. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855
Article 131 - Scope of - Explained - CBI under administrative control and superintendence of Union Govt. - The State's suit against the Union over the registration of cases by the CBI despite revocation of its general consent is maintainable. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Article 136 - The bar of limitation cannot be obviated or circumvented by taking recourse of proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution when a statutory appeal is available. Gopal Krishnan MS v. Ravindra Beleyur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 5
Article 136 - A judgment setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 is appealable under Section 37. The jurisdiction under Section 37 is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and restricted to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34. As per section 37(3) of Arbitration Act, a recourse to Section 37 is the only appellate remedy available against a decision under Section 34 and no second appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 37. Held, nothing in the section 37(3) takes away the constitutional right under Article 136 to grant Special Leave to Appeal against a decision rendered in appeal under Section 37. This is the discretionary and exceptional jurisdiction of this Court to grant Special Leave to Appeal and it is a third stage at which this court tests the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts acting under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. (Para 41, 42) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070 : (2024) 6 SCC 357
Article 136 - The Court reaffirmed that locus standi under Article 136 of the Constitution can be extended to third parties with a bona fide interest in the matter, provided the appeal advances substantial justice. The Court held that the appellant, a socially spirited individual connected to the matter, had locus standi to maintain the appeal, especially given the grave allegations of interference with judicial processes. The Court observed that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings based on Section 195(1)(b). The initiation of the proceedings stemmed from judicial directions and not from a private complaint. The Court emphasized that judicial or administrative orders by a subordinate court are sufficient to overcome the statutory bar under Section 195(1)(b). The Court upheld the High Court's direction for a de novo trial, citing the principles in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 89 and emphasizing that retrial is permissible in exceptional circumstances to avert miscarriage of justice. Locus standi under Article 136 is context-dependent and must be exercised with vigilance to prevent abuse. The bar under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. applies only when offences are committed with respect to documents in judicial custody and not prior. Retrial is justified in rare cases where procedural or substantive lapses lead to miscarriage of justice. M.R. Ajayan v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 905
Article 136 - Extraordinary Powers of the Supreme Court - Article 136 of the Constitution confers plenary and extraordinary powers upon the Supreme Court, enabling it to interfere in any judgment, decree, or order passed by any court or tribunal in India. Unlike statutory appellate powers, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal but provides discretionary authority to address exceptional cases where substantial injustice or a significant question of law arises. These powers are not bound by procedural limitations. This jurisdiction, though wide, is sparingly exercised, especially in matters where grave miscarriage of justice is evident. Article 136 acts as a corrective and protective jurisdiction, with the Court exercising its discretion to uphold justice, maintain legal consistency, and safeguard fundamental rights. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : AIR 2024 SC 5081
Article 136 - The Supreme Court's powers under Article 136 are plenary and extraordinary, unfettered by statutory provisions and distinct from ordinary appellate powers. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is invoked in cases of grave injustice or substantial legal questions of public importance, even extending to the correction of factual errors where lower courts have acted perversely or improperly. This discretionary power, exercisable by special leave, is not restricted by procedural limitations and can be invoked by private parties as well as the State. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : AIR 2024 SC 5081
Article 136 - The Court has emphasized the need for this power to be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, to ensure justice is upheld and miscarriage of justice is prevented. It is a corrective and supervisory jurisdiction aimed at maintaining consistency in legal precedents and safeguarding the rights and liberties of individuals. The inherent limitations are self-imposed and exercised with judicial discretion to avoid arbitrary decisions. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : AIR 2024 SC 5081
Article 136 – Interference not warranted – The Technical Assistants are not claiming against the 75% posts available for direct recruits. Their claim is only towards 25% posts which are required to be filled in from Junior Draughting Officers, Overseers and Technical Assistants who have put five year service and have acquired B.E./A.M.I.E. qualification. Held, the Technical Assistants are not encroaching upon the quota apportioned for directly recruited Assistant Engineers. The continuation of the appellants as Assistant Engineers would not amount to encroaching upon the 75% posts apportioned for the members of the appellants' association. Hence, any interference at this stage is likely to undo the settled position which has been prevalent almost for a period of last 18 years. (Para 21, 25 & 26) Association of Engineers v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : AIR 2024 SC 2061
Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 18 & 23) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230
Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : AIR 2024 SC 3135 : (2024) 4 SCC 469
Article 136 – Scope of interference in arbitral award – While adjudicating the merits of a Special Leave Petition and exercising its power under Article 136, the Supreme Court must interfere sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist, justifying the exercise of the Court's discretion. The Supreme Court must be slow in interfering with a judgement delivered in exercise of powers under Section 37 unless there is an error in exercising of the jurisdiction. Held, the judgment of the Division Bench provided more than adequate reasons to come to the conclusion that the arbitral award suffered from perversity and patent illegality. There was no valid basis for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. (Para 43 & 71) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070 : (2024) 6 SCC 357
Article 136 – Special leave petition – Interference not required – Findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court are based on evidence and is not perverse. (Para 11) Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : AIR 2024 SC 2105
Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230
Article 136 - Custodial Death - It is a fact that, in ordinary circumstances, we ought not to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to invalidate an order granting bail to an accused. But this criteria, while dealing with the question of granting bail, would not apply in a case of custodial death, where police officials are arraigned as accused. Such alleged offences are of grave and serious nature. Ajay Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 266
Article 141 – Held, directions of the court shall be treated as the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Para 24) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : (2024) 8 SCC 46
Article 141 - Directions against misleading ads – Held, before an advertisement is printed/aired/displayed, a Self-declaration shall be submitted by the advertiser/advertising agency on the lines contemplated in Rule 7 of the Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994. The Self-declaration shall be uploaded by the advertiser/advertising agency on the Broadcast Sewa Portal run under the aegis of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. No advertisements shall be permitted to be run on the relevant channels and/or in the print media/internet without uploading the self-declaration as directed above. Further held, the directions shall be treated as the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23 & 24) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : (2024) 8 SCC 46
Article 142 - Vacancies not filled up to be carried forward –Respondent no.1 has been made to run from pillar to post to get an appointment, though there is a large backlog of vacancies in various PWD categories. The appellant has taken a stand which defeats the very object of enacting laws for the benefit of persons with disability. Held, by applying the principles governing Section 36 of the PWD Act, 1995, the cases of respondent no.1 and the other 10 candidates who are above him in merit could have been considered, especially when there is a gross default on the part of the appellant (Union of India) in promptly implementing the provisions of the PWD Act, 1995. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Respondent shall be considered for appointment against the backlog vacancies of PWD candidates either in IRS (IT) or in other service/branch. (Para 9, 14 & 15) Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 444
Article 142 – Joint application to declare the marriage void – Held, marriage between the parties is not a 'Hindu marriage' having regard to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. Hence, the registration certificate is null and void. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 334
Article 142 - The complainant purchased a BMW 7 Series vehicle and reported a defect. A complaint was lodged for alleged offences under Sections 418 and 420 of the IPC, naming the manufacturer, Managing Director, and other directors as accused. The High Court concluded that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were not established based on the contents of the FIR. Having come to this conclusion, there was no justification for the High Court thereafter to direct the manufacturer to replace the vehicle with a new BMW 7 Series. Held, the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings, as the ingredients of cheating were not established based on the FIR. The Court deemed it unnecessary to continue prosecution, given the nature of the dispute and the elapsed time. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed BMW India Private Limited to pay Rs 50 lakhs to the complainant in full settlement. (Para 10 - 15) State of Andhra Pradesh v. BMW India P.Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 466
Article 142 - The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking the incorporation of provisions similar to Section 377 IPC in the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita. The petitioner requested the invocation of Article 142 of the Constitution to address the alleged lacuna in the law. The Court, however, held that the power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to define acts as offences, as such matters fall within the domain of Parliament. The petition was dismissed, with the Court suggesting that the petitioner may approach the Union Government for redress if a lacuna in the law is perceived. Pooja Sharma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 834
Article 142 – Action of forfeiture of security deposit is challenged to be punitive – Claiming re-commencement of the e-auction process on grounds of bona fide mistake – Held, the system pop-up gives only one option to the bidder to submit the bid with the digital signature with no scope of rectification or retraction. There was no opportunity available on the platform for the appellant to rectify the error in the bid, having once entered it. Even if the bidder had realized that the bid amount requires to be rectified, it could not have done so because of the system not permitting such a course. Further held, it can be inferred from the circumstances that the mistake in entering the bid was committed inadvertently and the appellant on discovery of the error or mistake acted promptly in informing the authority concerned for rectification of the bid. Held, applying the balancing test to the factual matrix of the present case, it is clear that the forfeiture of entire security deposit of the appellant as against evident human error is punitive. (Para 10, 14, 21) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477
Article 142 – Negligence in competitive bidding process – E-auction in process was a competitive bidding process which demanded a high degree of caution and care on the part of the appellants. The human error envinces a degree of remiss and carelessness the result of which is bound to cost the public exchequer heavily in terms of time, effort and expense. Held, on account of the appellant's failure to act with the required degree of care, the liberty granted to conduct fresh e-auction is confirmed. Hence, the appellant id directed to pay to the first respondent Rs 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees three crore only) within a month from date. (Para 25) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477
Article 142 – Power to constitute SearchcumSelection Committee for selection of VC– Held, to do complete justice the Supreme Court may pass a common order for constitution of SearchcumSelection Committee for all the subject Universities. Further held, the court resolves to constitute SearchcumSelection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion, irrespective of the fact that the relevant provision of the Statute of the concerned University may contain slight variations. While shortlisting the experts for composition of the SearchcmSelection Committee, the nature of subjects and disciplines in which education is being imparted in different Universities can be focused on. (Para 10 & 11) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : AIR 2024 SC 3319 : (2024) 8 SCC 369
Article 142 doesn't empower Courts to ignore substantive rights of litigants - Issued guidelines on exercise of inherent powers. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Article 142 – Direction of Supreme Court for automatic vacation of interim stay due to lapse of time – The jurisdiction of Supreme Court under article 142 cannot be exercised to make judicial legislation. By a blanket direction in the exercise of power under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time. Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elementary principles of natural justice, mandate that an order vacating or modifying interim relief is to be passed only after hearing all the affected parties and order passed without hearing the beneficiary is against the basic tenets of justice. If an interim order is automatically vacated only because the High Court cannot hear the main case within the time limit, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” will apply, i.e. no litigant should be allowed to suffer due to the fault of the Court. Further, automatic vacation on lapse of time gives an unfair advantage to the respondent in the case and adversely affects a litigant's right to the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Such orders virtually defeat the right of a litigant to seek and avail of statutory remedies such as revisions, appeals, and applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Constitutional Courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. (Para 16, 17, 24, 28 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Article 142 – Direction of Supreme court to dispose stay cases on a day-to-day basis – Such directions of the Supreme Court virtually amounts to judicial legislation. The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given. Therefore, the issue of giving out-ofturn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. (Para 28, 30 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Article 142 – Scope of powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 – The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court. Although the Supreme Court under Article 142 can always issue procedural directions to other Courts, the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right. Hence, Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence. (Para 19 & 22) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Article 142 – Power to ensure electoral democracy – The Court is duty-bound, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by subterfuges. The Court must step in exceptional situations to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. The extraordinary situation of electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself, justifies the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142. (Para 37) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Article 142 – Setting aside the Election Process – It would be inappropriate to set aside the election process in its entirety when the only infirmity which has been found is at the stage when the counting of votes was recorded by the Presiding Officer. Allowing the entire election process to be set aside would further compound the destruction of fundamental democratic principles which has taken place as a consequence of the conduct of the Presiding Officer. (Para 35) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Article 142 and Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 354D & 506 – Power of court exercised to quash conviction of accused – Held, the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused, and the fact that the appellant and the complainant have married each other during the pendency of the appeal gives rise to a reasonable belief that both were involved in some kind of relationship even when the offences alleged were said to have been committed. Hence, on grounds that the accused and the complainant married each other and the affirmation of the conviction of accused would have the disastrous consequence on the matrimonial relationship of the accused with the complainant, the appellant is acquitted of the charges. (Para 7, 9 & 11) Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : AIR 2024 SC 2879
Article 142 – Maintainability of the Curative Petition – Test of 'manifest injustice' – The exercise of the curative jurisdiction of this Court should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course and create a fourth or fifth stage of court intervention in an arbitral award. The Court may entertain a curative petition to (i) prevent abuse of its process; and (ii) to cure a gross miscarriage of justice. The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause cannot be considered less important than the principle of finality. There are certain situations, which would require reconsideration of a final judgement even after the review has been dismissed to set right a miscarriage of justice. The interference by Supreme Court by setting aside the judgement of the Division Bench, has resulted in restoring a patently illegal award and has caused a grave miscarriage of justice. Hence, curative petition is allowed applying the standard of a 'grave miscarriage of justice'. (Para 32, 33 & 70) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070 : (2024) 6 SCC 357
Article 142 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – There is nothing on record to show that the appellant had any ill intention of cheating or defrauding the complainant. The transaction between the parties was purely civil in nature which does not attract criminal law in any way. Held, all pending criminal appeals is liable to be quashed. (Para 13) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : (2024) 8 SCC 588
Article 142 – Applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger – The extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis." Held, the doctrine of merger is not of universal application and powers under Article 142 of the Constitution shall be deemed as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. (Para 33) Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 420 : (2024) 7 SCC 370
Article 163 and 239AA(4) - Delhi Lt. Governor position not akin to that of a State's Governor - There is a clear distinction between the discretionary power of the Governor under Article 163 and that of the Lt. Governor under Article 239AA(4). While Article 163 requires Governor of a State to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, 'except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion', the exception in so far as the Lt. Governor, under Article 239AA(4) is concerned, he will act in his discretion, 'in so far as he is required by or under any law'. Article 239AA of the Constitution takes into account the unique position of NCTD and therefore adopts the mandate of 'law' as a distinct feature for exercise of discretion". Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 551
Articles 217 and 221 - High Court Judges – Equality in Service Benefits and Pension – Non-discrimination based on Recruitment Source – Financial Independence and Judicial Independence - High Court judges, regardless of their source of appointment (from the Bar or district judiciary), are holders of constitutional offices in equal measure. They form a homogeneous class under the Constitution, and any differentiation in their service conditions or retiral benefits based on the source of appointment violates Articles 217 and 221 of the Constitution. Judicial independence, a fundamental aspect of the Constitution's basic structure, is intrinsically linked to the financial independence of judges. Ensuring parity in salaries, allowances, and pensions for all High Court judges is essential to uphold judicial independence. The Constitution mandates non-discrimination in the determination of service conditions and benefits for High Court judges. Conditions of service, including pension benefits, must be uniform and cannot be affected by the source of recruitment. The communication dated 30 December 2022, which excluded judges appointed from the district judiciary under a contributory pension scheme from subscribing to the General Provident Fund, was quashed as unconstitutional. Directions were issued to ensure that all High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source, are treated equally with respect to the General Provident Fund and retiral benefits. Contributions to the General Provident Fund are to commence from their date of appointment, and amounts credited under the New Pension Scheme are to be refunded. Communication dated 30 December 2022 is quashed. Petitioners are entitled to equality in pension and service benefits as High Court judges. Justice Shailendra Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 872
Article 225 and 329(a) - Judicial review in delimitation matters is not completely barred by Article 329(a) of the Constitution. Constitutional courts can intervene under Article 226 if the delimitation process is found to be arbitrary or unconstitutional. Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 556
Article 226 - Electoral Bond Scheme - Constitutionality and Investigations - The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the grievances regarding quid pro quo or criminality must be addressed through available legal remedies under the law, such as invoking criminal procedure or approaching the High Courts under Article 226. The Court further declined to order the constitution of an SIT, emphasizing that existing statutory mechanisms, such as the Income Tax Act, must be followed. The Court ruled that premature invocation of its jurisdiction under Article 32 was not warranted when statutory remedies had not yet been exhausted, reiterating that judicial review was reserved for constitutional challenges, not ordinary criminal investigations. Common Cause v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 567
Article 226 - The Committee of Creditors (CoC) of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Limited, undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), challenged a High Court Order which deferred the CIRP. The High Court passed this direction while declining to consolidate the CIRP of KSK Mahanadi with two other entities. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court lacked justification to defer the CIRP after refusing consolidation. The Court emphasized that such directions breached the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as Article 226 jurisdiction cannot be invoked to override the insolvency framework. The impugned High Court order deferring the CIRP was set aside. CoC of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 815
Article 226 - A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172
Article 226 - The accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old. When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are committed, by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the High Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been proved. Even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution. (Para 21 & 23.1) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Article 226 - The power to deal with such verification has been specifically vested with Scrutiny Committee and it falls within the exclusive domain of it in view of Rule 13(b) of 2012 Rules and Section 6. Section 7 further empowers the Scrutiny Committee with suo motu powers or otherwise to call for record and enquire into correctness of a caste certificate if it is of the opinion that such certificate was obtained fraudulently and also vests the Committee with the power to cancel and confiscate the certificate in question in accordance with law. Such order of Scrutiny Committee is said to be final and protected from any challenge before any authority except High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. For the purposes of verification, the Scrutiny Committee has all the powers of Civil Court while trying a civil suit. (Para 10 & 12) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Article 226 - The High Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can entrust investigation to the CBI. However, for doing so, it has to come to a reasoning as to why it finds that investigation by State police is not fair or is partisan. Merely, on the basis of some letters, such exercise is not warranted. Such an exercise of entrusting the investigation by the High Court has to be done in very rare cases. A perusal of the order passed by the learned single judge would reveal that there is not even a whisper as to why it finds the investigation by the state to be unfair or impartial so as to find it necessary to direct an enquiry to be conducted by CBI. For the very same reasons, the order passed by the learned Division Bench is also not sustainable in law. State of West Bengal v. Jashimuddin Mondal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 759
Article 226 - Custody and disposal of the property pending an inquiry or trial – When any property is produced before any criminal court during the course of inquiry or trial, it is the criminal court which would have the jurisdiction and the power to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of such property or for selling or disposing of such property. The appellant without approaching the concerned court under Section 451 of CrPC, directly approached the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Held, when there is a specific statutory provision contained in the CrPC. empowering the criminal court to pass appropriate order for the proper custody and disposal of the property pending the inquiry or trial, the appellant could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking release of his vehicle. (Para 5 & 6) Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : AIR 2024 SC 2139 : 2024 CriLJ 2092
Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2024 CriLJ 1894
Article 226 - Under Section 432(1) of the CrPC and Section 473(1) of the BNSS, the appropriate Government may remit a convict's sentence wholly or partially, either unconditionally or subject to reasonable conditions. A convict has no inherent right to remission but is entitled to a fair consideration of their case in accordance with the law and applicable policy. Conditions imposed must be reasonable. Arbitrary conditions violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The cancellation of remission impacts the convict's liberty and requires adherence to natural justice. A show cause notice specifying grounds must be served, allowing the convict to respond and be heard before a reasoned order is passed. Convicts can challenge remission cancellations through remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution. Registration of a cognizable offence is not sufficient grounds for cancellation. Each case must be assessed on its facts, and only serious breaches supported by substantive evidence justify cancellation under Section 432(3) of the CrPC or Section 473(3) of the BNSS. Minor breaches are insufficient. Mafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 819 : AIR 2024 SC 5470
Article 226 - Whether the High Court was correct in quashing criminal proceedings based on affidavits indicating a settlement without verifying their genuineness and securing the personal presence of the victim. Whether affidavits executed by an illiterate victim without proper endorsement explaining their contents can be relied upon in quashing criminal proceedings for serious offences. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing criminal proceedings and remanded the matter for further inquiry into the authenticity of the alleged settlement and affidavits. In cases involving serious offences under IPC and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the High Court must verify the genuineness of any alleged settlement before exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The personal presence of the victim, particularly an illiterate one, is critical for the Court to verify whether affidavits or settlements are genuine and made with informed consent. In absence of an endorsement indicating that the contents of an affidavit were explained to the affirming party, especially when illiterate, such affidavits cannot be relied upon without further inquiry. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, requiring the personal presence of the appellant and an inquiry into the affidavits. The High Court was directed to consider whether the settlement was genuine and, if so, whether the power to quash proceedings could be exercised in light of the seriousness of the allegations. Appeal partly allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. XYZ v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 887
Article 226(3) – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition under Article 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. It provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified. (Para 26) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Article 226 - Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : (2024) 7 SCC 555
Article 226 – Error of jurisdiction of High Court – The petitioner had expressly consented to the High Court to evaluate the entirety of the matter in its full perspective. As the petitioner has agreed to the evaluative action by the High Court, it cannot be concluded that the High Court has committed an error of jurisdiction. (Para 16 & 17) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397
Article 226 – Delay defeats equity – Writ petition dismissed on grounds of Delay or Laches – An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. The High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. The High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is not gainsaid that in all cases of delay the petition is to be dismissed and in certain circumstances depending on the facts of each case, if the court thinks fit can on its discretion condone the delay. For filing a writ petition, there is no fixed period of limitation prescribed but the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches of the applicant in approaching a writ court. (Para 9, 10 & 11) Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : AIR 2024 SC 2717
Article 226 – Entertaining petition under Article 226 in case of availability of alternative remedy – The High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an alternate effective remedy is available. This rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. (Para 15) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893 : (2024) 6 SCC 579
Article 226 – Exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy – (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. (Para 29) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893 : (2024) 6 SCC 579
Article 226 – Power of High court to interfere – Reopening the issue is not allowed under Article 226 – Held, the High Court could have interfered in the confirmed auction sale only in cases of fraud or collusion. As the case is not of fraud or collusion, the effect of the order of the High Court would be again reopening the issues which have achieved finality. (Para 26) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893 : (2024) 6 SCC 579
Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of High Court to overturn finding of scrutiny committee – The High Court ought not to have interfered, especially when Scrutiny Committee had followed the due procedure under Rule 12, 17 and 18 of the 2012 Rules and that there was nothing perverse about a finding of fact. The order of validation of caste claim by Scrutiny Committee is based on subjective satisfaction. The Scrutiny Committee is an expert forum armed with fact finding authority. Held, order passed by Scrutiny Committee reflects due appreciation of evidence and application of mind and in absence of any allegation of bias/malice or lack of jurisdiction, disturbing the findings of Scrutiny Committee cannot be sustained. The High Court has clearly overstepped by reappreciating the evidence in absence of any allegation of malafide or perversity. (Para 15, 17 & 19, 22) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Article 226 – Writ of certiorari – Object – The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the Court exercising it, ought to refrain to act as an appellate court unless the facts so warrant. The writ of certiorari is expended as a remedy and is intended to cure jurisdictional error, and should not be used by superior Court to substitute its own views by getting into fact-finding exercise unless warranted. High Courts as well as Supreme Court should refrain themselves from deeper probe into factual issues like an appellate body unless the inferences made by the concerned authority suffers from perversity on the face of it or are impermissible in the eyes of law. (Para 17 & 19) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Article 226 – Civil Suit filed to declare clause 8 of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) arbitrary – Clause 8 of the NIT mandated deposit of five post-dated cheques and bank guarantee to secure the payment of balance auction amount – Held, once the respondent-writ petitioner had participated in the tender process being fully conscious of the terms and conditions of the auction notice, he was estopped from taking a U-turn so as to question the legality or validity of the terms and conditions of the auction notice. By dragging the matter to litigation, the respondent himself was responsible for the delay occasioned in issuance of the work order which deprived him of the opportunity to work for the entire period of 365 days. The impugned order granting payment of pro-rata auction amount for the 33 days, that he has worked less than the contract period, is ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction. Hence, the same is quashed and set aside. (Para 21 & 24) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855
Article 226 – Claim of damages in Writ Petition – Held, such relief is not subject matter of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that disputes arising out of purely contractual obligations cannot be entertained by the High Court in exercise of the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. Hence, the High Court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner (respondent herein) to the competent Court for claiming damages. (Para 22 & 23) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855
Article 226 – Writ petition – Petition rejected by High Court on grounds of delay – Held, delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. It would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. Hence, impugned order of High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. (Para 25) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : (2024) 10 SCC 605
Article 226 - the High Court by way of the interim order could not have passed an order which had the effect of encroaching upon the areas reserved for the Legislature and the Executive. Our Constitution recognizes the independence of the three wings of the State, i.e. the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. No doubt that if the High Court found that the legislature concerned was not valid on account of any of the grounds available within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it could set aside such a legislation. But by way of an interim order it could not have in effect stayed the operation of the said Statute. (Para 8 - 10) State of Uttar Pradesh v. In Re Constitution of Education Tribunals, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 71
Article 226 - Abandonment of Service - Termination - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), setting aside the High Court's decision to reinstate the respondent who had been terminated on grounds of abandonment of service. Whether the termination of the respondent for abandonment of service under Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Regulations, 1960, was valid. Whether the High Court erred in granting relief to the respondent without considering his suppression of material facts. The respondent, employed as an Assistant Administrative Officer by the LIC, was absent from duty without informing his employer since September 25, 1995. Multiple notices issued to the respondent went unanswered, and postal remarks indicated he had abandoned his job. The respondent was terminated on June 25, 1996, under Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Regulations, treating his prolonged absence as abandonment of service. The respondent later secured employment with the Food Corporation of India (FCI) on April 14, 1997, a fact not disclosed in his writ petition challenging the termination. Held, the LIC acted within its authority under Regulation 39(4)(iii) to terminate the respondent, as he had failed to respond to notices and had not informed the employer of his whereabouts. The respondent's suppression of his subsequent employment with the FCI disentitled him to equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court erred in reinstating the respondent without considering the full factual matrix, including his abandonment of service and subsequent conduct. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order granting relief to the respondent was quashed. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Om Parkash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 899
Article 227 – Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with order of trial court – Held, the High court could not have interfered with the order of the trial Court, unless found the view taken by the learned trial Judge was perverse or impossible. (Para 19) P. Seshareddy v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 379
Article 229 - Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts - Article 229 (2) pertains only to the service conditions of 'officers and servants' of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice, in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief Justice under Article 229. (Para 25) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Article 229 (2) - The High Court did not have the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further, the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it on the administrative side. (Para 24 – 30) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Article 234 - Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Consultation with public service commission required under Article 234 of the Constitution for amending the rules –The prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce under Rule 8(3) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 as amended in 2011 was only in consultation with the High Court of Gujarat but not with the Gujarat Public Service Commission. Held, the Governor is under no compulsion to consult the Public Service Commission in case the Commission does not wish to be consulted. The concerned Gujarat Rules cannot, therefore, be declared to be void particularly when the Rules were framed with due consultation with the High Court. (Para 93, 97 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596 : (2024) 7 SCC 262
Article 285 - 'Enemy property' vested in the possession of the Union Government-appointed 'custodian', as per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, cannot be considered a property of the Union Government to claim the exemption from the municipal taxes under Article 285 (1) of the Constitution of India. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156
Article 293 – Borrowing by states – Plaintiff -State seeks interim injunction against Union of India to restore the position that existed before the Defendant union imposed ceiling on all the borrowings of the Plaintiff state – The Triple-Test, are followed by the Courts as the pre-requisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, are: (a) A 'Prima facie case', which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; (b) 'Balance of convenience', such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and (c)'Irreparable injury', which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms. Held, the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish a prima facie case that even after adjusting the over-borrowings of the previous year, there is fiscal space to borrow. The balance of convenience, thus, clearly lies in favour of the Defendant – Union of India as the mischief that is likely to ensue in the event of granting the interim relief, will be far greater than rejecting the same. Further Plaintiff – State has sought to equate 'financial hardship' with 'irreparable injury'. Held, it appears prima facie that 'monetary damage' is not an irreparable loss. If the State has essentially created financial hardship because of its own financial mismanagement, such hardship cannot be held to be an irreparable injury that would necessitate an interim relief against Union. Since the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish the three prongs of proving prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, State of Kerala is not entitled to the interim injunction, as prayed for. (Para 3, 12, 25, 33, 35 & 37) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269
Article 300A - Though, the Right to Property is no more a Fundamental Right, still it is recognized as a Constitutional Right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Depriving a citizen of his Constitutional Right to use the land for 20 years and then showing graciousness by paying the compensation and beating drums that the State has been gracious is unacceptable. The state is not doing charity by paying compensation to the citizens for acquisition of land. (Para 25 & 26) Sudha Bhalla @ Sudha Punchi v. Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Article 300A - The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. (Para 18) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156
Article 300A – Right to property – The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that the State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. (Para 18) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : (2024) 10 SCC 605
Article 300A – Sub-rights to Right to property – The seven sub-rights or strands constituting the right to property. These are: i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property – the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition – the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the right of conclusion. Held, the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. The sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands. Further held, noncompliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. (Para 26, 28 & 29) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to notice – A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. (Para 30.1) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to be heard – It is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham. (Para 30.2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to a reasoned decision – It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector. The declaration is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have effect. (Para 30.3) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Duty to acquire only for public purpose – The acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. Further, the decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. (Para 30.4) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right of restitution or fair compensation – A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition. Fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process. (Para 30.5) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to an efficient and expeditious process – It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A. (Para 30.6) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right of conclusion – The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A. (Para 30.7) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A - Legality of the demolition of the petitioner's ancestral house without due process. Procedural safeguards required for actions against alleged encroachments. State accountability for high-handed and unauthorized actions. The petitioner alleged that his ancestral home in Maharajganj, Uttar Pradesh, was unlawfully demolished during a road widening project for National Highway 730. The demolition was carried out without written notice, based solely on public announcements. The NHRC and Commissioner's reports revealed procedural lapses, including lack of demarcation, absence of land acquisition, and demolition beyond the alleged encroachment. No evidence was presented by the State to establish the width of the highway or the extent of encroachment. The demolition exceeded the purported encroachment of 3.70 meters, going up to 8 meters in some areas. No compensation was provided, and the State failed to follow due process as mandated by law. The demolition was declared illegal, high-handed, and violative of procedural safeguards under Article 300A of the Constitution, which protects the right to property. The Court emphasized the requirement of due process, written notice, and proper demarcation before taking actions against alleged encroachments. State authorities were ordered to adopt procedural safeguards, including written notice, demarcation, and compensation, before initiating demolitions. Disciplinary and criminal proceedings were recommended against officials involved in unauthorized actions. The principle of “justice through bulldozers” was condemned as incompatible with the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. The Court held that any demolition of private property must strictly adhere to legal procedures to uphold constitutional protections and ensure public accountability. Arbitrary actions by the State undermine the rule of law and cannot be justified in a civilized society. In Re Manoj Tibrewal Akash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 878
Article 341 - Determination of Scheduled Caste Status Post-Conversion to Christianity - Whether an individual who has converted to Christianity can continue to claim Scheduled Caste status for availing reservation benefits under the Constitution. Upon conversion to Christianity, an individual loses their caste identity, as Christianity does not recognize caste distinctions. The appellant, who was baptized and actively practices Christianity, cannot claim Scheduled Caste status while professing Christian faith. The principle of reconversion to Hinduism and resumption of caste membership requires evidence of both a genuine conversion ceremony and acceptance by the original caste community. The appellant failed to meet these requirements. The appellant's claim to Scheduled Caste status, while maintaining adherence to Christianity, amounts to misrepresentation and undermines the constitutional policy of reservation. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant, a practicing Christian, could not legally identify as a member of a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of availing reservation benefits. C. Selvarani v. Special Secretary cum District Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 923
Article 341 – Power to amend list of schedule caste – The list of scheduled caste can be amended, altered only by law made by Parliament. The Resolution extending benefit of Scheduled Castes to the members of the “Tanti-Tantwa” community by merging it with 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr' community under Entry 20 of the list of Scheduled Castes, was patently illegal, erroneous as the State Government had no competence/ authority/power to tinker with the lists of Scheduled Castes published under Article 341 of the Constitution. “TantiTantwa” Caste, which does not appear in the list of Scheduled Castes of Bihar cannot be issued Scheduled Castes Certificates treating them to be 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr'. Hence, whether synonymous or not, any inclusion or exclusion of any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within the castes, races or tribes has to be, by law made by the Parliament, and not by any other mode or manner. Further held, that that such posts of the Scheduled Castes Quota which had been filled up by members of “Tanti-Tantwa” community availing benefit on the basis of Resolution may be returned to the Scheduled Castes category and such candidates of “Tanti-Tantwa” community be accommodated by the State in their original category of Extremely Backward Classes by taking appropriate measures. (Para 2, 3, 36 & 42) Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Vichar Manch v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : AIR 2024 SC 3531
Article 341 intends to only give 'constitutional identity' to scheduled castes; not to hold them as 'homogenous class'. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Article 341 (1) - Interpretation of - Article 341(1) does not create an integrated homogenous class, as the castes notified by the President are "deemed" to be Scheduled Castes but can be further classified. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Article 341 (2) - Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes does not violate Article 341(2), unless it results in a preference or exclusive benefit to certain castes over all the seats reserved for the class. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Public notification of 'tribes or tribal communities' by the President of India, upon consultation with the Governor, is a sine qua non for deeming such tribes or tribal communities to be 'Scheduled Tribes' in relation to that State or Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. (Para 15) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139
Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Insofar as a person claiming benefit having regard to his status as a Scheduled Tribe in a State, when he migrates to a Union Territory where a Presidential Order has not been issued at all insofar Scheduled Tribe is concerned, or even if such a Notification is issued, such an identical Scheduled Tribe does not find a place in such a Notification, the person cannot claim his status on the basis of his being noted as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin. (Para 29) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139
Articles 341 and 342 - Validity of Scheduled Caste Certificates - While the appellants had obtained their certificates through lawful processes, subsequent circulars issued by the Government of Karnataka, effectively revoked those certificates and classified the appellants as General Merit category candidates. The court emphasized that only Parliament has the authority to amend the list of Scheduled Castes as stipulated under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India. The court acknowledged the pragmatic decision by the State to protect the employment of individuals who obtained their certificates under earlier erroneous inclusions but clarified that they would not be entitled to future benefits from the reserved category. Ultimately, the court quashed the notices issued by respondent banks to terminate the appellants' services, upheld their entitlement to protection based on prior government circulars, and allowed the appeals. K. Nirmala v. Canara Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : AIR 2024 SC 4503
Article 368 - Challenge to the insertion of the words "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. Allegation that the amendment was unconstitutional due to its enactment during the Emergency period and the extended tenure of the Lok Sabha. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the Parliament has the power to amend the Preamble under Article 368 of the Constitution, provided the amendment does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. The inclusion of "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble reflects the evolving ethos of the Constitution as a living document. These terms represent the principles of economic and social justice and the commitment to equal respect for all religions, both of which are consistent with the constitutional framework. The challenge to the amendment nearly four decades after its enactment was deemed untenable, as the additions had attained widespread acceptance and had not restricted legislative or policy actions within the constitutional framework. The Court reiterated its earlier rulings in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), and other landmark cases that secularism and socialism are integral to the Constitution's basic structure. The argument regarding the amendment's retrospectivity was rejected, as the Constitution permits amendments to its provisions without being constrained by the date of adoption. The Court emphasized that "socialism" in the Indian context does not mandate a specific economic model but underscores a welfare state's commitment to equity and social justice. The writ petitions and related applications were dismissed for lack of merit and absence of a valid cause of action. The constitutional position regarding the Preamble's amendment remains unambiguous and upheld. Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 917
A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
A statute can be struck down only for the violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or for being without legislative competence. The constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for the violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The reason is that concepts such as democracy, federalism, and secularism are undefined concepts. Allowing courts to strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will introduce an element of uncertainty in our constitutional adjudication. Recently, this Court has accepted that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute for violation of the basic structure is a technical aspect because the infraction has to be traced to the express provisions of the Constitution. Hence, in a challenge to the validity of a statute for violation of the principle of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism. (Para 55) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854
Ad-interim order of stay – When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad-interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad-interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. (Para 14) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Animal Birth Control Rules, 2001 - Under all circumstances, there cannot be any indiscriminate killings of canines and the authorities have to take action in terms of the mandate and spirit of the prevalent legislation(s) in place. There is no gainsaying in the fact that exhibiting compassion to all living beings, is the enshrined Constitutional value and mandate, and cast obligation on the authorities to maintain. (Para 11) Animal Welfare Board of India v. People For Elimination of Stray Troubles, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 434
Appointment of Vice Chancellors (VC) - Power to decide on dispute regarding appointment of (VC) – Held, in case(s) where the Chief Minister of the State has objected to the inclusion of any name in the panel and such objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has an objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files shall be put up before the Supreme Court. The final decision in this regard shall be taken by the Supreme Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors. (Para 22) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : AIR 2024 SC 3319 : (2024) 8 SCC 369
Constitutional Conduct - The Court emphasized the responsibility of all Constitutional functionaries to respect each other's roles and discouraged unwarranted comments, stressing the importance of mutual respect among the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Guntakandla Jagadish Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 733
Constitutional courts should exercise caution while interfering in contractual and tender matters, disguised as public interest litigations. The respondent no. 1, being an interested party could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. The prayer made in writ petition, makes it clear that the real grievance of respondent no 1 is about the grant of contract in favour of another bidder. The High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition on behalf of an interested person who sought to convert a judicial review proceeding for enhancing personal gain. (Para 19 & 21) Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 207
Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It is disruptive of the aspirations and deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy. (Para 104) Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Fundamental Right - Bar association's resolution to not represent a party - Such a Resolution could not have been passed. Right to defend oneself is a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer. (Para 3) Rupashree H.R. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 126
Government's policy of preferential land allotment to housing societies comprising MPs, MLAs, judges, civil servants, defence personnel, and journalists - The Court deemed this policy arbitrary, unreasonable, and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality. The Court annulled the 2005 Government Orders (GOs) that categorized these groups as a distinct class eligible for land allotment at basic rates. The Court also nullified subsequent GOs from 2008 that facilitated such allotments, concurring with a 2010 High Court judgment. The Court criticized the policy for perpetuating inequality by favoring privileged groups, thereby undermining the principles of fairness and equality enshrined in the Constitution. It emphasized that state resources should be allocated in a manner that benefits all citizens, particularly the marginalized and socio-economically disadvantaged, rather than a select elite. This ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding constitutional principles and ensuring that government policies do not arbitrarily favor certain sections of society at the expense of others. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr Rao VBJ Chelikani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 918
Grounds on which interim order comes to an end – Can come to an end by disposal of the main case either on merits or for default or other reasons, by the High Court, in which the interim order has been passed or by a judicial order vacating interim relief, passed after hearing the contesting parties on the above stated grounds. (Para 16) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Guidelines issued to secure the fundamental rights and dignity of intimate partners, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities in illegal detention – Mandatory in nature – Habeas corpus petitions and petitions for protection must be given a priority in hearing and courts must avoid adjournments or delays in the disposal of the case; In evaluating the locus standi of a partner or friend, the court must not make a roving enquiry into the precise nature of the relationship between the appellant and the person; Effort must be to create an environment conducive for a free and un-coerced dialogue to ascertain the wishes of the corpus; The court must ensure that the corpus is produced before the court and given the opportunity to interact with the judges in-person in chambers to ensure the privacy and safety of the detained or missing person; The court must ensure that the wishes of the detained person is not unduly influenced by the Court, or the police, or the natal family during the course of the proceedings; Upon securing the environment and inviting the detained or missing person in chambers, the court must make active efforts to put the detained or missing person at ease; If a detained or missing person expresses their wish to not go back to the alleged detainer or the natal family, then the person must be released immediately without any further delay; Courts must grant an ad-interim protection while dealing with a petition for police protection by intimate partners on the grounds that they are a same sex, transgender, inter-faith or inter-caste couple to maintain their privacy and dignity; The Court must not adopt counselling or parental care as a means of changing the mind of the appellant, or the detained/missing person; The Judge during the interaction with the corpus to ascertain their views must not attempt to change or influence the admission of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the appellant or the corpus and Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual and no stigma or moral judgment must be imposed when dealing with cases involving parties from the LGBTQ+ community. (Para 16 & 17) Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249
Hierarchy in judiciary – Any orders passed by the Supreme Court, ought to be respected and fully complied with, in view of the fact that the hierarchy in the judiciary needs to be respected by one in all. In that hierarchy, the orders passed by the Supreme Court would bind not just the parties, but the judicial officers as well. (Para 8) Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Gopinath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 428
High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief – The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties if (a) A litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b) The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. A long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances. These grounds are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. (Para 15) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Judicial service is an integral and significant component of the functions of the State and contributes to the constitutional obligation to sustain the rule of law. Judicial service is distinct in its characteristics and in terms of the responsibilities which are cast upon the officers of the District Judiciary to render objective dispensation of justice to citizens. The State is duty bound to ensure that the conditions of service, both during the tenure of office and after retirement, are commensurate with the need to maintain dignified working conditions for serving judicial officers and in the post-retirement emoluments made available to former members of the judicial service. Members of the district judiciary are the first point of engagement for citizens who are confronted with the need for dispute resolution. The conditions in which judicial officers across the country are required to work are arduous. The work of a judicial officer is not confined merely to the working hours rendered in the course of judicial duties in the court. Every judicial officer is required to work both before and after the court working hours. The judicial work of each day requires preparation before cases are called out. A judicial officer continues to work on cases which may have been dealt with in court, in terms of preparing the judgment and attending to other administrative aspects of the judicial record. That apart, members of the district judiciary have wide ranging administrative functions which take place beyond working hours, especially on week-ends including the discharge of numerous duties in relation to prison establishments, juvenile justice institutions, legal service camps and in general, work associated with the Legal Services Act 1987. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
Madarsa Education - The High Court erred in holding that a statute is bound to be struck down if it is violative of the basic structure. Invalidation of a statute on the grounds of violation of secularism has to be traced to express provisions of the Constitution. Further, the fact that the State legislature has established a Board to recognise and regulate Madarsa education is not violative of Article 14. The Madarsa Act furthers substantive equality. (Para 73) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854
Military Nursing Service - Terminating women officer on ground of marriage - Such rule was exfacie manifestly arbitrary, as terminating employment because the woman has got married is a coarse case of gender discrimination and inequality. Acceptance of such patriarchal rule undermines human dignity, right to non-discrimination and fair treatment. Laws and regulations based on gender-based bias are constitutionally impermissible. Rules making marriage of women employees and their domestic involvement a ground for disentitlement would be unconstitutional. Union of India v. Ex. Lt. Selina John, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 135
Object of passing interim orders – An order of interim relief is usually granted in the aid of the final relief sought in the case. An occasion for passing an order of stay of proceeding arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately. Further, to avoid the possibility of passing an order of remand, the grant of stay of proceedings is called for in many cases. (Para 13) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Parliamentary processes not taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Pension is a right and not a bounty. It is a constitutional right for which an employee is entitled on his superannuation. However, pension can be claimed only when it is permissible under the relevant rules or a scheme. If an employee is covered under the Provident Fund Scheme and is not holding a pensionable post, he cannot claim pension, nor the writ court can issue mandamus directing the employer to provide pension to an employee who is not covered under the rules. (Para 35) U.P. Roadways Retired Officials and Officers Association v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 517
Pensionary payments to Judges constitute a vital element in the independence of the judiciary. As a consequence of long years of judicial office, Judges on demitting office do not necessarily have the options which are open to members from other services. The reason why the State assumes the obligation to pay pension to Judges is to ensure that the protection of the benefits which are available after retirement would ensure their ability to discharge their duties without “fear or favour” during the years of judgeship. The purpose of creating dignified conditions of existence for Judges both during their tenure as Judges and thereafter has, therefore, a vital element of public interest. Courts and the Judges are vital components of the rule of law. Independence of the judiciary is hence a vital doctrine which is recognized in the constitutional scheme. The payment of salaries and dignified pensions serves precisely that purpose. Hence, any interpretation which is placed on the provisions of the Act must comport with the object and purpose underlying the enactment of the provision. (Para 25) Union of India v. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 277
Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence – Both the Supreme Court and the High Court are constitutional Courts. A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India and is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court. (Para 23) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : (2024) 6 SCC 267
Power of constitutional courts to transfer case to CBI – The powers of the Supreme Court for directing further investigation regardless of the stage of investigation are extremely wide. This can be done even if the chargesheet has been submitted by the prosecuting agency. Held, unresolved crimes tend to erode public trust in institutions which have been established for maintaining law and order. In the present case the investigation has been ineffective is self-evident. Hence, this case needs to be handed over to CBI, for a proper investigation and also to remove any doubts in the minds of the appellants, and to bring the real culprits to justice. Case shall be transferred from SIT to the CBI. (Para 14 & 16) Awungshi Chirmayo v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 263
Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : (2024) 7 SCC 555
Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601
Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Remission – Appellant granted liberty to prefer an appropriate representation addressed to the State Government praying for remission of sentence. Considering the fact that the appellant has undergone almost 11 years of imprisonment so far i.e. almost half of his life lived so far has been spent undergoing the ordeal of the criminal prosecution. Held, when a crime is committed, a variety of factors are responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations. (Para 85 & 86) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 Cri LJ 2377
Reserved category candidate can claim general category seat of horizontal reservation based on merit. Ramnaresh @ Rinku Kushwah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : AIR 2024 SC 4252
Retrospective Application of Statutes – Requirement of Clear Legislative Intention - Rights accrued under an old Act cannot be extinguished with the enforcement of the new Act unless a retrospective effect was given to the New Act. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790
Right to free and fair elections – It is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives – both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. (Para 36) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261
Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231
Scope of judicial review in policy matters – The Courts do not and cannot examine the correctness, suitability or appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisors to the executive on the matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The Courts cannot direct the States to implement a particular policy or scheme on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, would be the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review in examining the policy matters is very limited. (Para 8) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248
Social Heterogeneity of Scheduled Castes - Historical and empirical evidence shows that Scheduled Castes are socially heterogeneous. Therefore, the State can classify them further if there is a rational principle with a clear nexus to the purpose of sub-classification. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Special leave Petition against order of High Court – To set aside impugned termination order – Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to major misconduct for which punishment of termination from service should be imposed. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered. Termination from service order is liable to be set aside. Chatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : AIR 2024 SC 948
Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Data Collection and Representation - The State can sub-classify based on inadequate representation, provided backwardness is established through data. The State must collect data on inadequate representation in public services, which can serve as an indicator of backwardness. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is permissible to ensure substantive equality of opportunity, provided it is based on backwardness and inadequate representation. The decision in Chinnaiah that barred sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is overruled. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538
Summoning of Government Officials before Courts - Law officers act as the primary point of contact between the courts and the government. Courts must refrain from summoning officials as the first resort. While the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to judicial review, summoning officials frequently without just cause is not permissible. Exercising restraint, avoiding unwarranted remarks against public officials, and recognizing the functions of law officers contribute to a fair and balanced judicial system. Courts across the country must foster an environment of respect and professionalism, duly considering the constitutional or professional mandate of law officers, who represent the government and its officials before the courts. Constantly summoning officials of the government instead of relying on the law officers representing the government, runs contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution. (Para 41 & 44) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Supreme Court asks Yamuna River Board to decide Delhi Govt's plea for additional water; HP Govt withdraws statement on surplus water. Government of NCT of Delhi v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 429
The decision of the Supreme Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of the stage of pendency thereof because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception. (Para 16) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444
The Madarsa Act to the extent to which it seeks to regulate higher education, including the 'degrees' of Fazil and Kamil, is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature since it conflicts with Section 22 of the UGC Act. Entry 25 of List III, pursuant to which the Madarsa Act has been enacted, has been expressly made subject to Entry 66 of List I. The UGC Act governs the standards for higher education and a state legislation cannot seek to regulate higher education, in contravention of the provisions of the UGC Act. (Para 99) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854
The power of the Court to enter the regulatory domain of SEBI in framing delegated legislation is limited. The court must refrain from substituting its own wisdom over the regulatory policies of SEBI. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator is to scrutinise whether it violates fundamental rights, any provision of the Constitution, any statutory provision or is manifestly arbitrary. (Para 67 (a)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First, it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to resolve them. Second, legislators are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not. The presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement. The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted. Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
The proportionality standard - To determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified – The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441 : (2024) 5 SCC 1
The role of the constitutional courts is to ensure that such environmental bodies function vibrantly, and are assisted by robust infrastructure and human resources. The constitutional courts will monitor the functioning of these institutions so that the environment and ecology is not only protected but also enriched. (Para 32) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 74
The rule of 'Judicial Discipline and Propriety' and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength. (Para 1) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224
The scope of judicial review, when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator, is to scrutinize whether it (i) violates the fundamental rights of the citizens; (ii) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution; (iii) is opposed to a statutory provision; or (iv) is manifestly arbitrary. The legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review, (Para 17 (b)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
The State has the constitutional duty to not only protect water bodies within the state but also to restore those water bodies which have been illegally filled in. Mirza Abid Beg v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 488
The Supreme Court expressed concern that despite the decision of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177, High Courts were issuing directions for expeditious trials without considering the existing pendency of criminal cases in the State of Bihar. Santosh Kumar @ Santosh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 505
Unlicensed Arms - The Court highlighted the grave threat posed by unlicensed arms to the rule of law and public safety, emphasizing that the Constitution of India does not grant a fundamental right to bear arms, unlike the U.S. Constitution. Observing an increasing trend in crimes involving illegal arms, the Court directed States, Union Territories, and the Union of India to submit affidavits detailing the prevalence of unlicensed firearms, actions taken to curb their use, and statistical data on cases under the Arms Act, 1959. The Union of India and Amicus Curiae submitted detailed suggestions for strengthening the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. Despite existing laws, the Court noted ineffective implementation and a rise in illegal manufacturing, smuggling, and use of firearms. To address these issues, the Court ordered the constitution of a five-member committee in each State and Union Territory, chaired by the Chief Secretary, to formulate and implement an action plan addressing illegal firearms. The committee's tasks include auditing arms factories, analyzing smuggling patterns, and preventing the use of illegal arms in crimes. The Court directed the Committees to submit their action plans within ten weeks and scheduled the matter for further consideration on 30.01.2025. Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 885
Voters right to know - Candidates non-disclosure of fact of substantial character – Held, 'right to privacy' of the candidate would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character. (Para 44) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : AIR 2024 SC 2121
When an application for remission is granted under the provisions of the Constitution, the following among other tests may apply to consider its legality by way of judicial review of the same. (i) that the order has been passed without application of mind; (ii) that the order is mala fide; (iii) that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (iv) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; (v) that the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Para 55 (i) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289
While the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice. (Para 19) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563
Writ Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of the Writ Court in entering into fact-finding exercise while testing legality of an award of tribunal – For revision of wages and other facilities, the standard criteria followed by the industrial adjudicator is the 'industry-cum-region test', which implies that the prevailing pay and other allowances should be compared with equally placed or similarly situated industrial units in the same region. To determine comparability of units applying the industry-cum-region test, the financial capacity of the employer would be a strong factor. Held, where the employer contested comparability of the concerned units, on grounds of its financial position, the proper course would have been to remit the matter to the Industrial Tribunal rather than entering into these factual question independently in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The High Court ought not to re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own finding for that of the Tribunal, it would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court in its power of judicial review to altogether eschew such a process. (Para 12 & 15) VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. VVF India Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 299
Writ Petition - In public law proceedings, when it is realised that the prayer in the writ petition is unattainable due to passage of time, constitutional courts may not dismiss the writ proceedings on the ground of their perceived futility. In the life of litigation, passage of time can stand both as an ally and adversary. Our duty is to transcend the constraints of time and perform the primary duty of a constitutional court to control and regulate the exercise of power or arbitrary action. By taking the first step, the primary purpose and object of public law proceedings will be subserved. (Para 20) Manoj Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 143 : AIR 2024 SC 1265 : (2024) 3 SCC 563
Writ petition – Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226
Writ petition – Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226