Evidence Law

Circumstantial Evidence - Last Seen Theory - Absence of Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Value of Scientific Evidence – Principles - The Supreme Court reiterated the 'five golden principles' for sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence - the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, of a conclusive nature, must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt, and must form a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence - Held dock identification without Test Identification parade unreliable when witness had no familiarity with accused - noted that It is well settled that dock identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior familiarity with the accused - Both witnesses identified the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a TIP, renders their dock identification less credible - Their testimonies, therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1984 4 SCC 116; P. Saikumar v. State; Paras 27-28] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Circumstantial Evidence - Last seen theory - Supreme Court acquitted accused for rape-murder case, on following grounds - i. Prosecution failed to establish a clear and convincing motive; ii. Testimonies of the witnesses who claimed to have last seen the accused with the victim were unreliable due to significant delays in recording their statements and the fact that they did not see the victim with the accused; iii. The links in the chain of circumstances were broken; iv. There is strong inference of evidence planting; v. the DNA report, which was primary basis for conviction, was considered unreliable and inconsistent - Held that death penalty can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases on unimpeachable evidence - Trial Court had not properly evaluated mitigating circumstances before awarding it and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12, 51- 56] Akhtar Ali @ Ali Akhtar @ Shamim @ Raja Ustad v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 890 : 2025 INSC 1097

Circumstantial Evidence – Murder – Motive - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120B, 302, 201 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 27, 65B – Held - Upheld conviction of appellant relying on - i. motive of appellant was proved by statement of her close friend who clearly stated that appellant confessed her unwillingness to marry the deceased; ii. Call Record Details (CDR) were proven to be admissible under Section 65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) considering certificates furnished by Airtel and Reliance; iii. CDR proved communications between the accused persons during engagement ceremony of appellant, at the time of incident and even immediately after the incident; iv. Recovery of scooter and iron steel used for attacking the deceased was upheld and separate 'voluntary' statements of the two appellants were also recorded; v. delay in sending steel rod for FSL analysis was rejected as a ground to discard the evidence (Relying on State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal and anr. (2019) 12 SCC 326) vi. Absence of messages on phones, coupled with the failure of accused to offer a sufficient explanation for their exhaustive communications right before incident, would establish the offence under section 201 IPC - Held chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, leading to confirmation of conviction. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 54, 56-59, 83-86, 96] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Circumstantial Evidence - Rape and Murder – Acquittal – Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances and pointed out several significant issues - i. DNA report was inconclusive and a supplementary report was inadmissible as the expert witness was not examined and the report was not presented to the accused under Section 313 CrPC; ii. 'Suspicious conduct' of the accused, cited by prosecution witnesses, was found to be a natural action for a labourer returning home from work and could not be considered an incriminating circumstance; iii. Recovery of a comb used, by the sniffer dog was deemed doubtful due to contradictory witness testimonies regarding its color - Procedure involving the dog squad was also not properly documented; iv. Recovery of the victim's underwear from the accused's field was found to be a 'planted recovery' as it was not mentioned in the original complaint filed by the victim's father- Present case is yet another classic example of lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure which has led to the failure of a case involving brutal rape and murder of an innocent girl child - The prosecution had 'fallen woefully short of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants by clinching evidence and acquitted them, giving them the benefit of doubt - Appeal allowed. [Paras 65 - 79] Putai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2025 INSC 1042

Criminal Law – Evidence – Appreciation of Evidence – Hostile Witness – Settlement of Law – Supreme Court reiterated that the evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile cannot be rejected in its entirety - Such evidence must be subjected to closer scrutiny, and the portions consistent with either the prosecution or the defense's case may be accepted - Held that the High Court erred in ignoring the testimony of PW-4 solely on the ground of him being declared hostile. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra (1996) 10 SCC 360; Para 19] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395

DNA Evidence handling Guidelines - directions to be followed - 1. DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift packaging including - a. FIR number and date; b. section and statute involved; c. details of Investigating Officer (I.O.), police station; and d. serial number shall be duly documented. Document recording selection shall have signatures and designations of medical professional, I.O. and independent witness - Absence of medical witness shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of evidence - 2. I.O. shall be responsible for transportation of DNA evidence to police station or hospital or forensic laboratory not later than 48 hours - If in any case 48-hour timeline cannot be complied with then reason for delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary - 3. DNA samples are stored pending trial, appeal etc, no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without authorization of Trial Court - 4. From the point of collection to the logical end i.e. conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be annexed as part of Trial Court record- failure to do the same, I.O. shall be responsible for lapse. Directed Director General of Police of all states to prepare sample forms of Chain of Custody Register. [Para 43, 44] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Dock Identification After Long Delay – Unreliable - Held, identification of the accused for the first time in Court after 8½ years, that too through video-conferencing, by an elderly witness with weak distant vision, is inherently unsafe to rely - The witness was not wearing spectacles despite admitting weak eyesight; no prior TIP was conducted with her presence; improvement regarding clothes (black shirt) introduced for first time during deposition - all cumulatively render dock identification unreliable. [Paras 52 - 56] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Dying Declaration – Multiple dying declarations – Evidentiary value – Corroboration by independent evidence - Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court's order, affirming the conviction – Held, in a case of multiple dying declarations, each must be considered independently - The first dying declaration given to the independent witness, which stated the appellant poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze, and disclosed the motive, was found to be duly proved and trustworthy - Minor discrepancies in subsequent statements do not weaken first dying declaration if found reliable and consistent - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769; Paras 10-14] Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1042 : 2025 INSC 1268

Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Reliability – Held, when the genesis and manner of the incident itself are doubtful, conviction cannot be sustained - When the prosecution has suppressed the origin and genesis of the occurrence, the proper course is to grant the accused the benefit of doubt - The conflicting versions given by the eye-witnesses, coupled with the suppression of the genesis of the occurrence and the shifting of the place of the incident, demolish the very substratum of the prosecution case - It is unsafe to uphold a conviction based on testimony full of contradictions and inherent improbabilities - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192; Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714; Paras 57-60] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Expert Witness (Medical Evidence) - is examined for their specialized knowledge to prove the contents of reports like a post-mortem report - Evidence provided by an expert is advisory in nature, and its credibility depends on the reasons and underlying data supporting their conclusions - An accused cannot be convicted of murder solely based on medical evidence. [Paras 27, 28] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Extra-Judicial Confession - Held that an extra-judicial confession is considered a weak piece of evidence and must be accepted with great care and caution - Standard of Proof: The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was genuinely made, voluntary, and its contents were true - The standard is even higher when the entire case rests on the EJC – Corroboration - Held that the court will generally look for independent, reliable corroboration before relying on an EJC, especially if suspicious circumstances surround it - Held that the circumstances, taken together, do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction, even in the case of a heinous crime - Supreme Court held that evidence not clear, there can't be moral conviction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116 Para 35; Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab: (2023) 7 SCC 727; Paras 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Hostile Witness - Sole Eye-witness – Held, testimony of prosecution witness is not be discarded in its entirety merely because the witness has turned hostile - Courts are entitled to rely upon any portion of such testimony which is found to be credible and is corroborated by other evidence on record - Maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” does not apply in India - Conviction can be bases on testimony of a single eyewitness, if such testimony is found to be trustworthy and inspires confidence. [Paras 16] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Principles for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Supreme Court reiterated the established principles governing cases of circumstantial evidence, noting that the chain of events must be so established that the Court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused person. If any doubt creeps in at any stage, the benefit must flow to the accused. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to lead to only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, and mere suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof. If two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted - Supreme Court pointed out several deficiencies in prosecution's case - i. Non-examination of material witness; ii. Doubtful arrest and recovery; iii. Lack of forensic; iv. Last seen theory weakness - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 13-18, 20-30] Mohamed Sameer Khan v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1045 : 2025 INSC 1269

Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence – Classification of Witnesses - Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles for assessing the credibility of witnesses, classifying them into: (1) Wholly reliable; (2) Wholly unreliable; and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable - For the third category, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony is required - Held that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614; Para 28] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Scientific Evidence – Inconclusive FSL Report – Motive – Held, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reported that no complete DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits (rope, axe, and clothes), making the only scientific evidence neutral, as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated the oral testimony - Noted that an inconclusive or exculpatory scientific report cannot be dismissed as inconsequential in a circumstantial evidence case, and to convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof - The alleged motive of revenge for an insult was vague and unproven - Noted that the absence of motive in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance in favor of the accused. [Relied on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 52- 56] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused's failure to explain certain circumstances does not alleviate this burden. In circumstantial evidence cases, the chain of evidence must be complete, consistent, and exclude all reasonable alternative hypotheses. While absence of motive is not a basis for acquittal, it is a relevant factor in evaluating guilt in such cases. (Para 26) Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2025 INSC 800 : (2025) 8 SCC 315

Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. [Relied on R. M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417 (Para 10)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

BHARATIYA SAKSHYA ADHINIYAM, 2023, (BSA) / INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, (IEA)

Section 6. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Section 8 (Conduct) and Section 27 (Discovery) - Circumstantial Evidence - Five Golden Principles - i. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established ("must" or "should" be proved, not "may be" proved); ii. The established facts should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, excluding every other hypothesis; iii. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; iv. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; v. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused - Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish a cogent link in the cabin of circumstances and did not satisfy the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sardas case - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 25, 39, 56-58] Nilesh Baburao Gitte v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2025 INSC 1191

Section 8 IEA - Circumstantial Evidence and Motive - In murder trials relying on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete chain of evidence that eliminates reasonable doubt, but proof of motive is not mandatory. A fact is considered proved when it excludes reasonable doubt based on reason and common sense, not trivial or fanciful doubts. Circumstantial evidence must form a cohesive chain, with each circumstance independently verified, consistently pointing to the accused's guilt and excluding alternative hypotheses. The Supreme Court upheld the accused's conviction for murder based on circumstantial evidence, finding a clear pattern of evidence establishing guilt. The appeal was dismissed, reaffirming that the law requires elimination of reasonable doubt, not proof beyond all doubt. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793 : (2025) 9 SCC 31

Section 8 IEA - Forensic Evidence - Incriminating evidence, including the recovery of the murder weapon (gun and pellets) linked to the deceased's injuries through forensic and ballistic analysis, bolstered the prosecution's case. The accused's silence and failure to explain the recovery of the weapon further strengthened the prosecution's case. (Para 10) Chetan v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2025 INSC 793 : (2025) 9 SCC 31

Section 7. Facts necessary to explain or introduce fact in issue or relevant facts

Section 9 IEA - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 9 IEA - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Non-examination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312

Section 9. When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.

Section 11 – Credibility of Eyewitness – Omission in FIR – Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the omission of the accused's name in the FIR, despite the informant having received a detailed account from the sole eyewitness immediately after the incident, is a material lacuna that goes to the root of the matter - Supreme Court observed that the eyewitness (PW-2) provided minute details of the assault to the informant (PW-1) but omitted the name of the accused, who was her own brother-in-law and well-known to her - The subsequent explanation that she was "unwell" or that the accused's "mask fell off" during the incident was viewed as a "subsequently cooked up" story and a "clear manipulation" to implicate the appellant due to prior enmity - Held that if the eyewitness had actually identified the accused by name in her initial statement, there was no justification for conducting a TIP - The conduct of a TIP for a known person indicates that the witness could not identify the assailants at the time of the incident - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026; Paras 41-48] Govind Mandavi v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1182 : 2025 INSC 1399

Section 11 – Omission of Names in FIR – Held, failure to name two of the three Appellants in the First Information Report (FIR), despite the complainant's familiarity with them, cast a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them - Such a significant omission in the earliest version of events raises a legitimate inference of false implication and undermines the prosecution narrative - Omissions of important facts affecting the probabilities of the case are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 815, Para 29] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Section 11 – Omission to name some accused in FIR is a relevant fact under Section 11 Evidence Act. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raghuvir Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Section 15. Admission defined

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Inadmissibility of Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements Against Co-Accused at Bail Stage - Whether statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., implicating a co-accused, can be considered at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Held, statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by an accused implicating a co-accused are inadmissible at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, cannot be used against a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 315 - Exculpatory Statements - Lack credibility and cannot be tested by cross-examination unless the maker testifies under Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. They can only be used to contradict the maker or ascertain their stance, not to implicate a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Inculpatory Statements - If confessional, they are inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act unless proven during trial under Section 30, and only if the confession implicates both the maker and the co-accused in a joint trial. Admissions are admissible only against the maker per Sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Conditions for using confessions against co-accused - A confession implicating a co-accused can be considered only during trial, subject to: relevance and admissibility under the Evidence Act; being duly proven against the maker; implicating both the maker and the co-accused; both accused undergoing a joint trial for the same offence. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Criticism of High Court's approach - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for relying on co-accused statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to deny anticipatory bail, emphasizing that such statements are barred by Sections 17, 21, 25, and 26 of the Evidence Act at the bail stage. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Political Vendetta in Bail Considerations - The Court clarified that while political bias or vendetta is a relevant factor in bail pleas, it cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before factoring in political motives. The case arose from an Excise Policy scandal in Andhra Pradesh involving allegations of favoritism towards select liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore in losses. The accused, charged under Sections 409, 420 of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which relied on co-accused statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail plea but clarified the legal position on Section 161 statements. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Section 22. Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding

Section 24 IEA – Confession – Admissibility – Held, confession recorded under Section 164 CrPC was inadmissible as it was recorded after 60 days of uninterrupted police custody without meaningful legal aid, and the accused was under the influence/proximity of the Investigating Officer – The confession contained assertions of tutoring and torture, attracting the bar under Section 24 of the Evidence Act – A statement judicially discredited in 12 other cases cannot be treated as voluntary in the present case. [Paras 11, 17] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Sections 24, 25, 26, 45 IEA – Child Rape and Murder – Death Penalty – DNA Evidence – Held: Trial conducted in a flawed and irregular manner. Trial Judge erroneously permitted the investigating officer to narrate the accused's confessional statements during examination-in-chief and admitted them as evidence, violating admissibility rules. Non-examination of the scientific expert who conducted DNA profiling was fatal to the prosecution's case. Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody for forensic samples, with unsealed samples and unverified transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory, raising concerns of tampering. Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside. [Paras 40, 47, 50, 54, 55] Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2025 INSC 444

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra-Judicial Confession - Circumstantial Evidence - Credibility - Extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require rigorous scrutiny. They must be voluntary, truthful, and inspire confidence. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. Extra-judicial confessions require corroboration by other evidence. (Para 16 – 19 & 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Extra-Judicial Confession - Credibility and Voluntariness - The credibility of the witnesses testifying to the confession is crucial. Confessions made in a doubtful mental state lack voluntariness and reliability. (Para 19) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 and 162 - Material Omissions and Contradictions - Significant omissions in statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., that contradict courtroom testimony, undermine credibility. Such omissions can be considered contradictions under the explanation to section 162 of the Cr.P.C. (Para 21 & 22) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for credible evidence. Convictions must be based on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 24) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Benefit of Doubt - If the evidence is weak and lacks credibility, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. (Para 24 & 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 24 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - The accused was convicted of murdering his livein partner. The conviction was primarily based on extra-judicial confessions to witnesses. The accused's mental state was questioned, and there was a lack of corroborating physical evidence. Material omissions were noted in witness statements. Therefore, the conviction was overturned. (Para 25) Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : 2025 INSC 147 : AIR 2025 SC 961 : 2025 Cri LJ 1471

Section 23. Confession to police officer

Section 27 IEA - Circumstantial Evidence - Recovery of Weapon – Held, conviction cannot be solely based on the recovery of a pistol and an FSL Report when the alleged eye-witnesses turn hostile, the motive is unproved, and the recovery is made from a place accessible to other family members; the prosecution must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of cogent material and evidence- For a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to be relevant, the information received from the accused must "relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” - The disclosure statement must make it clear that the recovered pistol was the one used in the commission of the offence - Mere recovery of a weapon, even with a supporting FSL report, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of other corroborative evidence connecting the accused to the crime - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manjunath & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 15-25] Govind v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1106 : 2025 INSC 1318

Section 27 IEA – Discovery – Recoveries made at the instance of the accused rejected- Supreme Court noted that no contemporaneous disclosure memo was proved, remand papers were contradictory, and the recovery site (open drain/strip) was accessible to the public and police before the accused's arrival – Once prior knowledge is established and disclosure is not contemporaneously proved, Section 27 ceases to operate – Recoveries of skulls/bones treated as seizure from an already known place rather than discovery. [Paras 12, 18] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Section 27 IEA - Disclosure Statement - Circumstantial Evidence, DNA Report - The theory of a confessional/disclosure statement under Section 27 leading to the discovery of incriminating articles and the body was held to be a "creation of the Investigating Officer - This was because the officer had already shared the minute details of the crime and the body's location with the complainant before the appellant's purported confession was recorded - The DNA report was rendered redundant as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the chain of custody of the forensic samples (seized articles and blood samples) from the time of seizure till they reached the FSL, thereby breaching the sanctity of the procedure - Held that prosecution had failed to prove the 'last seen' circumstance, the credibility of the CCTV footage, the validity of confessional statements, and the integrity of forensic/DNA evidence, rendering the chain of circumstantial evidence incomplete. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 666; Para 54, 60, 71, 74, 76] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Sections 25, 26, and 27 IEA - Confession to Police Officer and Discovery of Fact - Admissibility - Held that – i. Section 27 is an exception to the substantive provisions of Sections 25 and 26; ii. Sections 25 and 26 provide that no confession made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of any offence; iii. Section 27 provides an exception, stating that so much of the information received from an accused person in custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be admissible; iv. Only the part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime; v. The statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The recovery of the weapons of crime, allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants, was not sufficient to connect the appellants with the crime as no effort was made to match the blood on said weapons with that of the deceased - No report of the forensic laboratory was produced to establish that the weapons so recovered were smeared with the blood of the deceased to prove that they were actually used in the murder. [Relied Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor 1947 MWN CR 45; Manjunath and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 28, 29, 31, 33] Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2025 INSC 1193

Section 27 IEA – Held, for joint disclosure statements, made by multiple accused simultaneously, to become admissible under Section 27 of the Act, high scrutiny is needed to rule out the possibilities of tutoring of the accused - Courts must exercise heightened caution, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the disclosures were genuine, independent and corroborated by other evidence - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26 - 31] Nagamma @ Nagarathna v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 930 : 2025 INSC 1135

Sections 27, 65B – Held - Upheld conviction of appellant relying on - i. motive of appellant was proved by statement of her close friend who clearly stated that appellant confessed her unwillingness to marry the deceased; ii. Call Record Details (CDR) were proven to be admissible under Section 65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) considering certificates furnished by Airtel and Reliance; iii. CDR proved communications between the accused persons during engagement ceremony of appellant, at the time of incident and even immediately after the incident; iv. Recovery of scooter and iron steel used for attacking the deceased was upheld and separate 'voluntary' statements of the two appellants were also recorded; v. delay in sending steel rod for FSL analysis was rejected as a ground to discard the evidence (Relying on State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal and anr. (2019) 12 SCC 326) vi. Absence of messages on phones, coupled with the failure of accused to offer a sufficient explanation for their exhaustive communications right before incident, would establish the offence under section 201 IPC - Held chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, leading to confirmation of conviction. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 54, 56-59, 83-86, 96] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - Admissibility of Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Held, the testimony of an Investigating Officer relying solely on witness statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 162 Cr.P.C., as such statements lack evidentiary value and can only be used to contradict witnesses during trial. While police officers may be competent witnesses for recoveries of physical evidence under Section 27, their testimony cannot be used to substantiate witness statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to prove motive, conspiracy, or preparation for a crime. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 161, 162 - The High Court reversed the trial court's acquittal of the accused, relying on the Investigating Officer's testimony based on statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to address deficiencies in the prosecution's case. The trial court had rejected this evidence due to the bar under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Held, the prosecution failed to substantiate the allegations, as all witnesses turned hostile, and the Investigating Officer's testimony, based solely on Section 161 statements, was inadmissible. (Para 26, 48) Renuka Prasad v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : 2025 INSC 657

Section 27 IEA - Admissibility of accused's statement under Section 27 when the recovery of evidence is not proved to be based on the accused's disclosure. Held, for a confessional statement to be admissible under Section 27, the discovery of a fact must directly result from the accused's information, demonstrating their knowledge of its existence. In this case, discrepancies in witness testimonies and lack of evidence linking the recovery to the appellant's disclosure rendered the statement inadmissible. The chain of circumstantial evidence, including the "last seen together" circumstance and extrajudicial confessions, was incomplete due to inconsistencies and a significant time gap between the last sighting and the recovery of the body. The absence of motive, supported by evidence of the appellant's relationship with the deceased and assurances of marriage, further weakened the prosecution's case. Non-examination of material witnesses, such as the appellant's mother and brother-in-law, also undermined the prosecution's claims. In cases based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be conclusively proved to sustain a conviction. The appeal was allowed, and the accused were acquitted, as the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 22 - 50] Md. Bani Alam Mazid @ Dhan v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2025 INSC 260

Section 27 IEA lifts the ban, though partially, to the admissibility of confessions. The removal of the ban is not of such an extent so as to absolutely undo the object of Section 26. As such the statement whether confessional or not is allowed to be given in evidence but that portion only which distinctly relates to discovery of the fact is admissible. A discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the Appellant-accused as to its existence. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are threefold: i. The information given by the accused must led to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. ii. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. iii. The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of such offence. If the recovery memos have been prepared in the police station itself or signed by the panch witnesses in the police station, the same would lose their sanctity and cannot be relied upon by the Court to support the conviction. (Para 19, 20, 27) Raja Khan v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2025 SC 1254 : 2025 Cri LJ 1295 : (2025) 3 SCC 314

Section 27 - Disclosure statements and subsequent recoveries - The Investigating Officer failed to provide the exact words of the accused, neglected to exhibit the statements or recovery memorandums, and did not establish a clear connection between the accused and the recovered articles. Procedural irregularities, such as the absence of sealing or test identification, further weaken the evidentiary value of the recoveries. (Para 20 & 21) Thammaraya v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2025 INSC 108 : (2025) 3 SCC 590

Section 27 IEA - A disclosure statement under Section 27 unaccompanied by the supporting evidence is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction cannot be solely based on the disclosure statement because it is considered a weak piece of evidence. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Section 27 IEA - Unreliable Witness Testimony - Lack of Corroborative Evidence - Eyewitness testimony must be free from material omissions and contradictions to be relied upon for conviction. The prosecution must examine all material witnesses and provide corroborative evidence to support its case. Vinobhai v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2025 INSC 119 : AIR 2025 SC 845

Sections 25, 27, 106 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 26. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.

Section 32(1) IEA – Dying Declaration – Statement under Section 161 CrPC – Admissibility – A statement made to a police officer under Section 161 CrPC regarding the cause or circumstances of death assumes the character of a dying declaration upon the death of the declarant - Such a statement is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding the bar in Section 162 CrPC - The absence of a Magistrate or a doctor's certificate of mental fitness does not ipso facto render the declaration unacceptable; these are matters of prudence, not mandatory legal requirements. [Relied on Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P. (2024) 8 SCC 60; Paras 14, 15] Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171 : 2025 INSC 1386

Section 32 IEA – Dying Declaration – Lapse of Time – The law does not require the declarant to be under the "shadow of death" or expect imminent death at the time of making the statement - A statement is a valid dying declaration as long as it relates to the cause of death or circumstances leading to it, regardless of whether a substantial period (e.g., nearly two months) passed between the statement and the death. [Relied on: Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. (1997) 4 SCC 161; Para 16-18] Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1171 : 2025 INSC 1386

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration - Reliability and Corroboration - A dying declaration is a significant piece of evidence in criminal law and can solely form the basis for conviction if its quality is ascertainable and consistent with the case facts. In cases of multiple or inconsistent dying declarations, courts must scrutinize the evidence carefully to determine which declaration is credible, requiring corroborative evidence to resolve contradictions. In the present case, the deceased's initial statements to a doctor and police constable claimed an accidental fire while cooking, but a later statement to a Judicial Magistrate implicated the appellant, alleging he poured kerosene and set her on fire. The inconsistencies, lack of corroborative evidence, and absence of clarification regarding earlier statements render the dying declaration doubtful. Conviction based solely on such a declaration is unsafe without supporting evidence, especially where the deceased's explanation for earlier false statements lacks credibility and contradicts other evidence on record. (Para 12-14) Suresh v. State, AIR 2025 SC 1561 : 2025 INSC 318 : (2025) 4 SCC 794

Section 32, 145, 154 (3), 157 IEA - FIR Admissibility - An FIR is not substantive evidence by itself unless it falls under Section 32 (dying declaration) or is used to corroborate/contradict the informant's version under Sections 157 or 145 of the Evidence Act. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 32 - Dying Declaration - FIR as Evidence - Role of Investigating Officer - The investigating officer can only identify signatures on the FIR and confirm its registration details (date and police station). The officer cannot prove the FIR's contents unless it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. (Paras 30, 34) Lalita v. Vishwanath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2025 INSC 173

Section 29. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty

Section 35 IEA - Relevancy of Entry in public Record - Section 74 - Public Documents - High Court declared respondent 2 as 'Juvenile' – Held, a school transfer certificate issued by a private school where entry of date of birth was based solely on the oral representation of the father, without any supporting documents, is unreliable - Such school's records are not “public documents” and its Headmaster is not a 'public master' for the purposes of Evidences Act - In cases where school records about age on oral representations and are contradicted by statutory documents like a Family Register (maintained under U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947), Voters List and a Medical Board Report, the latter hold more weight - Medical evidence based on scientific investigation should be given due weight and precedence over school administration records that give rise to hypothesis and speculation - Benevolent legislation of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant for genuine child accused and cannot be used as a ploy to subvert justice by accused individuals of matured mind - In serious offences, documents and statutory public records should take precedence over school records that create reasonable doubt about juvenility - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21-23, 25, 26] Suresh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2025 INSC 918

Section 39. Opinions of experts

Section 45, 73 IEA - Comparison of Signature/Handwriting - Suit for Declaration and Injunction – Held, power under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Act, which allows the court to compare disputed signatures or handwriting with admitted ones, can only be invoked for an admitted document for the purpose of comparison of signatures or handwriting - The High Court erred in allowing an application under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, at the revisional stage, after the trial had already concluded - Appeal allowed. Hussain Bin Awaz v. Mittapally Venkataramulu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1083

Section 45 IEA - Expert Opinion - Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, provides that opinions of experts skilled in foreign law, science, art, or identification of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such expert opinions, while significant, are not binding on the court and are subject to judicial scrutiny. Courts may rely on expert opinions, particularly in scientific matters, but such reliance is contingent upon the opinion being clear, reasoned, and supported by credible data. The credibility of an expert witness depends on the reasons and materials underpinning their conclusions, which must be intelligible, convincing, and testable to assist the court in forming an independent judgment. If an expert report is inadequate, cryptic, or lacks clarity, it is not safe for the court to rely on it wholly. The court must analyze the expert report alongside other evidence to determine its reliability. These principles, though discussed in criminal law contexts, are applicable to other cases involving expert evidence. (Para 56-60) Gastrade International v. Commissioner of Customs, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2025 INSC 411 : (2025) 8 SCC 342

Section 45 IEA - Expert evidence on handwriting is opinion-based and cannot substitute substantive evidence, requiring corroboration by clear direct or circumstantial evidence. A cautious approach to handwriting identification due to its imperfect nature, requiring careful examination of the expert's reasoning and, where appropriate, corroboration, though convincing uncorroborated expert testimony may be accepted if no reliable contrary evidence exists. Relying on a handwriting expert's report without examining the expert in court is improper, as it denies the accused the opportunity to cross-examine, especially when the report's authenticity is not admitted by the accused. (Para 42 - 44) Patel Babubhai Manohardas v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2025 INSC 322 : 2025 Cri LJ 1843

Section 44. Opinion on relationship, when relevant.

Section 50 IEA - Opinion on relationship when relevant – Held, the testimony of a witness, even if not a blood relative, can establish a familial relationship under Section 50, if it is based on personal knowledge and longstanding acquaintance with parties - Opinion of such a person, expressed by conduct, is a relevant fact, and mere hearsay or gossip is insufficient - In a case where there is a lack of documentary evidence, such testimony can assume significant evidentiary value, especially if it remains unshaken during crossexamination. [Paras 22-25, 39-42] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Section 62. Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record

Sections 65A & 65B IEA - Customs Act, 1962 - Section 138C(4) - Admissibility of Electronic Evidence - Non-Compliance of mandatory provision - Whether the acknowledgment of documents in statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act amounts to due compliance of Section 138C(4) – Held, Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act is a mandatory provision and Section 138C(4) of the Customs Act is pari materia to it - Supreme Court applied two maxims i.e. impotentia excusat legem (impossibility excuses the law) and lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform), to determine how the mandatory nature of the provision should be understood and complied with, depending on facts and circumstances of each case - Strict compliance with Section 138C(4) in the form of a specific certificate is not always necessary - In this case, documents on record, including the records of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of Customs Act, constitute due compliance - A certificate not in the prescribed format will not be rendered invalid, particularly when the authenticity of the documents is not disputed - Where substantial compliance is shown and authenticity is undisputed, the absence of a certificate does not invalidate the record of proceedings - Appeals partly allowed. [Paras 37- 47] Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Suresh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 860 : 2025 INSC 1050

Section 63. Admissibility of electronic records

Section 65B(4) IEA – Held, non-production of contraband in trial not fatal if seizure, sample-drawing duly recorded as per Section 52A NDPS Act - Retrial may be ordered only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and that non-production of contraband cannot justify such a course where electronic evidence, duly certified under Section 65B of Evidence Act, along with records - Once an electronic evidence was certified under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, it is admissible in evidence and there's no requirement that the evidence must be supplied to each witness - If clarification was needed, Appellate Court could have recalled witnesses or admitted further evidence under Section 391 CrPC, instead of ordering a fresh trial - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21, 25, 29, 31 - 33] Kailas Bajirao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2025 INSC 1117

Section 65B IEA - Electronic Evidence - Electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage, must be accompanied by a Section 65-B certificate to be admissible in court. Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2025 INSC 116 : AIR 2025 SC 1103 : (2025) 7 SCC 401

Section 67. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested

Sections 68 IEA - Succession Act, 1925 - Section 63 – Will - Proof of Will - Suspicious circumstances – Issue - whether the will executed by deceased husband wherein he excluded his wife and did not even mention her status as his wife was valid - High Court held that the will was a suspicious document and had not been executed of his free will - This Court Held - The onus is upon the propounder to prove due execution of the will and dispel all suspicious circumstances that cast doubt on testator's mind - Exclusion of natural heirs without reasons raises doubt about genuineness of Will - Court noted that will is completely silent with regard to the existence of his own wife and natural heir or any reason for disinheritance, whereas husband and wife lived together till last days and wife was nominated to accept his pension, showing acceptance as legally wedded wife - there was no evidence of bitterness in the relationship - Court noted that such unusual erasure of marital status and existence of his wife raises serious doubt that will was executed as per the dictates of appellant and is not the free will of the testator - Upheld order of High Court. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur & Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 369; Ram Piari vs. Bhagwant & Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 364; Paras 11-13, 18-20] Gurdial Singh v. Jagir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : 2025 INSC 866

Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Section 68 IEA - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : (2025) 2 SCC 633

Section 68 IEA - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : (2025) 4 SCC 289

Section 94. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document.

Sections 91 and 92 IEA - Oral evidence contradicting written terms is inadmissible unless exceptions like fraud or mistake apply. (Para 23) Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 411 : 2025 INSC 466 : AIR 2025 SC 2025

Section 104. Burden of proof.

Sections 101, 102 IEA - Burden of Proof and Onus of Proof – Held, a distinction exists between the burden of proof, which rests on the party asserting a fact and never shifts, and the onus of proof, which is a continuous process that shifts between parties based on the evidence presented - Once the plaintiffs have sufficiently discharged their initial burden of proof, the onus shifts to the defendants to rebut the claim with evidence. [Paras 43-48] Chowdamma v. Venkatappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2025 INSC 1038

Section 108. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions

Section 105 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part I and 201 - The appellant, along with friends, encountered the deceased in an inebriated condition beneath a bridge. An altercation ensued, during which the appellant struck the deceased with a cement brick, causing fatal head injuries. The appellant subsequently set the deceased's body on fire to destroy evidence. Both Trial Court and High Court held the appellant guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC, citing grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years of rigorous imprisonment for Section 304 Part I and 2 years for Section 201 IPC. Held, the Court examined the applicability of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, which requires the provocation to be both grave and sudden, depriving the accused of self-control. The Court noted that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of the moment, with the appellant using a nearby cement brick, not a weapon. However, the Court found that the provocation (a slap and verbal abuse) was not sufficiently grave to fully justify the reduction of the crime from murder to culpable homicide. While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (4 years), considering the appellant's time served and the circumstances of the case. Appeal partly allowed; conviction upheld but sentence reduced to time already served. Vijay @ Vijayakumar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2025 INSC 90

Section 109. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge

Section 106 IEA - Burden of Proof - Circumstantial Evidence – Murder - Acquittal Reversal – Held, a conviction for murder can solely rest on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is complete and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused - When an accused offers a false explanation regarding the cause of death that took place within the confines of his house, such falsity becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused - While the general burden of proof is on the prosecution, Section 106 applies to exceptional cases where it would be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused - Supreme Court reverses acquittal of man for daughter-in-law's murder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681; Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (1956) 1 SCC 337; State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Others (2000) 8 SCC 382; Paras 12-21] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Janved Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1003 : 2025 INSC 1229

Section 106 IEA - Burden of Proof – Held, onus to prove legal necessity lies on the alienee-purchaser of the joint family property - The purchaser is not required to prove facts exclusively within Special knowledge of the coparceners or HUF, consistent with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Onus of proof on the stranger-purchaser cannot run counter to the principle of reverse burden enshrined in Section 106 of the Evidence Act and saddle him with the liability to prove facts which are within the special knowledge of the coparceners of the HUF. [Paras 16-19] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - Prosecution must disprove accused's plea of alibi before convicting based on 'last seen' theory. Mere fact that the husband and wife were last seen together in their shared home does not, by itself, justify convicting the husband for the alleged murder if he raises a plea of alibi and the prosecution fails to effectively disprove it. The High Court wrongly placed the burden on the accused to prove his alibi, despite his early claim of absence in an intimation to the police and the police's failure to investigate the same. While a husband's failure to explain his wife's death in their shared home can be a strong incriminating circumstance, it cannot alone establish guilt, especially when he has raised a plausible plea of alibi offering an explanation about his absence at the place of incident. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Plea of Alibi - Last Seen Theory - If the prosecution establishes that shortly before the crime, they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also resides, then if the accused does not offer any explanation or offers an explanation which is palpably false; that would be a strong circumstance, establishing his culpability in the crime. However, it cannot be the sole circumstance leading to the conclusion of guilt on the part of the accused husband. In the present case, the accused has also offered an explanation that he had gone for duty at the cement factory; which is also mentioned in the first intimation given by the accused. The police ought to have inquired about his presence at the factory to disprove his alibi. Even before the FIR was registered, the intimation recorded clearly indicated this fact. The explanation was not one offered as an after-thought nor can it be termed to be false or even an improbable one. A mere suspicion cannot lead to a finding of guilt, especially when there is not available a chain of circumstances, unequivocally pointing to the guilt of the accused in the alleged crime. (Para 9) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Murder - Acquittal - Reversal by High Court - Deceased, married for two years, found dead with ligature mark on neck - Trial Court acquitted husband and in-laws, finding death to be suicide - High Court convicted husband under Section 302 IPC, citing failure to explain death under Section 106 and disbelief in alibi. Held, High Court erred in reversing acquittal without evidence of manifest illegality or perversity in Trial Court's findings - Medical evidence inconclusive on homicidal death - Prosecution failed to disprove husband's plausible alibi of being at work, supported by initial police intimation - Section 106 inapplicable absent prima facie evidence of guilt - No chain of circumstances established guilt unequivocally - Allegations under Sections 498A, 306 IPC unsubstantiated - Conviction set aside, Trial Court's acquittal restored - Appeal allowed. (Para 13 & 14) Jagdish Gond v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2025 INSC 460 : AIR 2025 SC 2423

Section 106 IEA - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - Application in Criminal Cases - Burden of Proof - Prima Facie case requirement - The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which places the burden of proving facts within the special knowledge of a person on that person, must be applied with care and caution in criminal cases. It cannot be invoked to compensate for the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case. The prosecution must first prove all elements necessary to establish the offence, and only then does the burden shift to the accused to explain facts within their special knowledge. Failure to provide a reasonable explanation or giving a false one may be considered a circumstance against the accused, but the prosecution retains the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Court found sufficient prima facie evidence, including the accused's presence at the scene, suspicious conduct, and failure to explain incriminating circumstances, justifying the application of Section 106. The Court set aside the accused's acquittal, allowing the State's appeal. (Paras 76, 78, 80, 82, 88) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 106 IEA - Held, the accused's failure to explain the circumstances of his wife's death, which occurred within their home with only their daughter present, was a significant factor. The Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of a man accused of murdering his wife, relying heavily on the credible testimony of their seven-year-old daughter. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Sections 106, 118 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302, 201, and 34 - The case involved a man accused of murdering his wife and secretly cremating her body. The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the IPC, but the High Court acquitted him, questioning the reliability of his seven-year-old daughter's testimony due to an 18-day delay in recording. The Supreme Court, finding no evidence of tutoring and noting the testimony's consistency and corroboration by circumstantial evidence, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. The State's appeal was allowed, reaffirming that a credible child witness's testimony does not require corroboration to sustain a conviction. (Para 59) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 106 IEA - Brutal murder of wife and four minor daughters - Death Sentence Commuted to Life Imprisonment - Circumstantial Evidence - Mitigating Factors - Held, even in cases involving multiple murders, no death sentence could be imposed if the convicts display a reform potential supported by other mitigating factors such as age, lack of criminal antecedents, income, etc. The Court found the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the scene with a blood-stained axe, recovery of weapons, and postmortem reports, sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While confirming the conviction, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. The case, though heinous, did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category warranting the death penalty, considering mitigating factors such as the appellant's lack of criminal antecedents, satisfactory conduct in prison, and potential for reformation. The prosecution successfully established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's presence at the crime scene, recovery of incriminating weapons, and medical evidence corroborating the cause of death. The appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act further strengthened the prosecution's case. Reports from the jail superintendent and probation officer indicated the possibility of reformation, leading the Court to opt for life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Section 106 IEA - Extra judicial confession - Held, the High Court erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession made to the Village Police Patil even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer. The Court emphasized the need for clear and unambiguous evidence of the confession, which was lacking in this case. Further, the Court found the evidence regarding the discovery of the alleged murder weapon, an iron rod, to be insufficient, as the panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer's testimony did not adequately prove the contents of the discovery panchnama. While acknowledging the circumstantial nature of the case and the principle that the accused, especially in domestic murder cases, should offer an explanation, the Court stressed that the initial burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. The prosecution must establish foundational facts before invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act to shift the burden of proof to the accused. In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts, rendering the reliance on Section 106 improper. The Court reiterated the importance of evaluating extra-judicial confessions with great care and caution, especially when surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the prosecution's case rested on weak and unreliable evidence, insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2025 INSC 93 : (2025) 4 SCC 275

Section 106 IEA - Initial burden is upon the prosecution to first prima facie establish the guilt of the accused and then only the burden shifts upon the accused to explain the circumstances as contemplated by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials and places the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, does not, in any way, stand modified by the provisions contained under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The said provision cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce the evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. The said provision cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all elements necessary to establish the offence. In other words, the prosecution does not stand absolved from its initial liability to prove the offence and it is only when such an onus is discharged and a prima facie case of guilt is made out that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act may come into play. Ravi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2025 SC 1215 : 2025 Cri LJ 1382 : (2025) 3 SCC 584

Section 111. Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years

Section 108 IEA - Presumption of Death (Civil Death) – Held, in cases of civil death, a person is presumed to be dead only if their whereabouts are not heard of for seven years from the date the person went missing - The death will be presumed to be on the expiry of seven years from the date the person disappeared, unless a contrary or specific date of death is proved by adducing cogent evidence - A decree of a Civil Court declaring a person to be dead, pursuant to the seven-year statutory period having elapsed, does not, by itself, fix a precise date or time of death - The decree is silent on the specific date of death unless direct or circumstantial evidence is provided - The burden to prove the date or time of the death lies upon the person who makes such an assertion. [Relied on LIC v. Anuradha, (2004) 10 SCC 131; Paras 6, 7] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

Section 113. Burden of proof as to ownership

Section 113 BSA - The Section embodies the well-recognised principle that possession is prima facie proof of ownership. A person in possession is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title under Section 113 of the BSA. Therefore, once the plaintiff proves that he has been in possession of the suit property, the burden of proving that the plaintiff is not the owner is on the defendant who affirms that the plaintiff is not the owner. The Section does not make a distinction between the Government and a private citizen. Section 113 is, therefore, equally applicable where a Government claims to be the owner or challenges the ownership of the plaintiff who is in possession of the property. It is not disputed that before the possession of the Subject Land was taken over, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property for more than twenty years. The onus, therefore, under section 113 of the BSA was on the State to prove that the Government had a subsisting title to the Subject Land. (Para 72) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Section 116. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy

Section 112 IEA – Presumption of Legitimacy– DNA Test– Held that presumption under Section 112 is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage- It can only be displaced by strong, cogent, and unambiguous evidence of “non-access” between the spouses- Mere assertions of adultery, simultaneous access, or the wife's willingness to undergo a test are insufficient to rebut this presumption- A DNA test cannot be ordered as a matter of course to rove into paternity when the presumption remains unrebutted. [Paras 23-26, 37] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 112 IEA - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004

Section 117. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman

Sections 113A and 113B IEA - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Section 118. Presumption as to dowry death

Section 113B IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 304B and 498A - Essential ingredients of - The testimonies contained significant omissions and contradictions, particularly regarding dowry demands and acts of cruelty. The prosecution failed to prove any specific instances of cruelty or harassment "soon before the death," which is a crucial requirement under Section 304-B. The belated statements of the witnesses, recorded more than two months after the incident, appeared to be afterthoughts and lacked credibility. The Court quashed the impugned judgments of the lower courts and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reiterates the importance of proving the essential ingredients of Section 304-B, particularly the requirement of cruelty or harassment "soon before death," and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence in dowry death cases. The Court also emphasized the role of State Judicial Academies in addressing recurring errors in the application of dowry-related laws. Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2025 INSC 133

Section 119. Court may presume existence of certain facts

Section 114 IEA - Invocation of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is not at all permissible when the prosecution has failed to discharge its initial burden- The weakness in the defence or the accused's failure to substantiate the fact while answering question in his accused statement cannot become the strength of the prosecution. (Para 37) Hiralal Babulal Soni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 266 : AIR 2025 SC 1522

Section 114 IEA – Adverse Inference – Held that an adverse inference for refusal to undergo a DNA test can only be drawn if the court first validly orders the test after finding an “eminent need.”- If the prerequisites for ordering the test (rebuttal of Section 112 presumption) are not met, the question of drawing an adverse inference does not arise- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia 2023 INSC 146; Paras 50] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Section 120. Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape

Section 114A IEA - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615 : (2025) 8 SCC 281

Section 124. Who may testify

Child Victim - Evaluation of Evidence - Discrepancies in Testimony - The silence of a traumatized child victim cannot be equated with the silence of an adult and should not automatically benefit the accused. The absence of direct testimony from the victim does not preclude conviction when other compelling evidence exists. Courts must be sensitive to the unique vulnerabilities of child victims and avoid placing undue burden on them. Testimony of persons with disabilities must be given full legal weight, and any judicial attitude that stems from bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities is to be avoided. (Para 17) State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2025 INSC 360 : AIR 2025 SC 1755 : 2025 Cri LJ 1807 : (2025) 8 SCC 613

Section 118 IEA - Child a Competent Witness - Law on Child Witness Testimony - No Minimum Age for Testimony - Preliminary Examination Mandatory - Appellate Scrutiny - Admissibility of Testimony - Demeanor Recording - No Mandatory Corroboration - Caution with Discrepancies - Ruling Out Tutoring - Handling Tutored Testimony - Partial Reliability - Minor Discrepancies – Summarized. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 118 IEA - The Supreme Court laid down comprehensive principles governing child witness testimony emphasizing that: (i) A child is a competent witness if they can understand questions and provide rational answers, with no minimum age prescribed. (ii) Trial Courts must conduct a preliminary examination to assess the child's ability to understand the sanctity of giving evidence and record their satisfaction, including the child's demeanor and responses. (iii) Appellate courts may review the Trial Court's assessment of a child's competency by examining the preliminary examination, testimony, or demeanor during deposition and cross-examination. (iv) A child's testimony is admissible if they demonstrate the ability to understand questions and provide coherent, rational answers. (v) Trial Courts must document the child's demeanor during deposition and ensure the testimony is voluntary and not influenced. (vi) Credible and consistent child testimony does not require corroboration and can solely support a conviction if it inspires confidence and explains events without embellishments. (vi) Corroboration may be required if the testimony is tutored or contains material discrepancies, depending on the case's facts. (viii) Courts must carefully scrutinize child testimony to rule out tutoring, relying on confidence-inspiring testimony absent ulterior motives. (ix) Improvised or fabricated testimony must be addressed by confronting the witness with contradictions or proving tutoring through foundational facts and evidence of motive, delay, or discrepancies. (x) Even if parts of a child's testimony are tutored, the untutored portions can be relied upon if they inspire confidence and can be separated. (xi) Minor inconsistencies or coached elements do not discredit a child's testimony if the core account remains credible and withstands cross-examination. (Para 58) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2025 INSC 261 : (2025) 8 SCC 545

Section 128. Communications during marriage.

Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37 (Para 8, 8.8, 12)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. (Para 8, 8.8, 12) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 122 IEA - Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. (Para 10) Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Section 132. Professional communications

Section 132 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 179 – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Section 147. Evidence as to matters in writing

Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Adverse Inference Not Justified - Courts below erred in drawing adverse inference from the accused's refusal to participate in TIP when - i. Prosecution failed to establish that accused was kept baparda post-arrest; arrest memo showed no such entry; ii. Witness never attended any TIP proceedings; prosecution produced no document proving her presence; iii. TIP proceedings fundamentally flawed; identifying witness's signature absent on TIP documents - Supreme Court issues mandatory directions - When a witness is examined through video-conferencing, and the defence wishes to contradict the witness using previous written statements, the statement/document must be electronically transmitted to the witness and Sections 147–148 BSA (144–145 Evidence Act) procedure must be strictly followed - This ensures fair trial and effective cross-examination - Supreme Court reiterates that although it generally does not interfere with concurrent findings, it will do so when such findings are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or result in grave miscarriage of justice, held that interference is warranted when material evidence is ignored or misappreciated. [Relied upon Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253; Paras 31-33, 42-49, 57–65] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Section 148. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing

Section 145 IEA - Exculpatory statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. have limited evidentiary value, usable only for contradicting or re-examining the maker under Section 145 of the Evidence Act or Section 315 Cr.P.C., if the accused testifies. Such statements cannot be used against a co-accused due to lack of credibility and inability to be tested by cross-examination. (Para 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725

Section 145 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 – Held, Trial Court failed to follow the proper procedure for contradicting prosecution witnesses with their Section 161 CrPC statements. The portions of a witness's prior statement used for contradiction must be formally proved through the investigating officer and marked as evidence by the trial judge. Merely reproducing contradicted portions in brackets without proof is erroneous. Such portions should be marked (e.g., AA, BB) and cannot form part of the deposition unless duly proved. Consequently, the impugned judgments were quashed, and the appellant was acquitted. (Para 11) Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2025 INSC 209 : AIR 2025 SC 943 : 2025 Cri LJ 1268 : (2025) 3 SCC 680

Section 156. Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity

Section 153 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 401 r/w. 397 & 372 - Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 - Murder - Reversal of Acquittal - The appellants were acquitted by the trial court in a murder case. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The appellants challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the reversal of acquittal into conviction was in violation of the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC, which prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Additionally, the appellants contended that they were not given an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice and their constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, despite the statutory bar under Section 401(3) CrPC ? Whether the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal ? Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is retrospective in operation and applicable to the case ? Whether the appellants are entitled to compensation for unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights? Held, the High Court committed a grave error in reversing the acquittal and convicting the appellants in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 401(3) CrPC expressly prohibits the conversion of an acquittal into a conviction in revisional proceedings. The High Court's action was in direct violation of this statutory bar. The Court further held that the High Court violated the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants an opportunity to be heard before reversing the acquittal. The appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 22(1) were infringed, as they were not given a fair chance to defend themselves. The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which grants victims the right to appeal against acquittals, is not retrospective in operation. Since the revision petition was filed in 2006, before the proviso was introduced in 2009, the victim had no statutory right to appeal at the time. The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- to each of the appellants for the unlawful detention and violation of their fundamental rights. The State Government was directed to pay the compensation within four weeks. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on revisional jurisdiction and upholding the principles of natural justice. The State Government was held responsible for the violation of the appellants' rights and was ordered to pay compensation. Section 401(3) CrPC prohibits the High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revisional jurisdiction. Natural Justice requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed. Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is not retrospective and does not apply to cases filed before its introduction in 2009. Compensation can be awarded for unlawful detention and violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the State Government was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation to each appellant within four weeks. Mahabir v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2025 INSC 120

Section 157. Question by party to his own witness

Criminal Law - Kidnapping, Rape, POCSO, SC/ST Act - Concurrent Convictions - Evidence - Reliability of Victim's Testimony - Proof of Age - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 154 - Hostile Witness - Judicial Discretion - Supreme Court expressed concern over the indiscriminate granting of permission to declare a witness hostile - Held that before a witness can be declared hostile and cross-examined by the party calling him, there must be some material to show that the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited an element of hostility - The contingency of cross-examining one's own witness is an extraordinary phenomenon, and permission should be given only in special cases after the Court scans and weighs the circumstances properly - Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating a witness hostile - The permission to cross-examine one's own witness should only be granted when- i. the witness exhibits 'an element of hostility'; ii. The witness has resiled from a “material statement” made earlier; iii. The court is satisfied the witness is “not speaking the truth” - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 1976 4 SCC 233; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 Paras 10-15, 19] Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1006

Section 160. Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact.

Section 157 IEA - Confessional FIR - Admissibility in Evidence - FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence - It can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 or to contradict under Section 145 of IEA - In a criminal trial, if the maker of the FIR is the accused, it cannot be used against him as evidence if it is inculpatory in nature - The exception is if the accused offers himself to be examined as a witness - A confessional statement made by an accused person to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence against him due to absolute protection provided under section 25 of IEA and also protected by Section 162 CrPC - FIR can be used for limited purposes - i. to prove conduct under section 8; ii. Admissions under section 21; iii. Discovery under Section 27- High Court erred in corroborating Medical evidence with confessional contents of FIR lodged by appellant himself - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16-25] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Section 168. Judge's power to put questions or order production

Section 165 IEA - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 84 & 302 - Murder - Plea of Insanity - Absence of Motive - The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of a mother, who killed her daughters (aged 3 and 5), from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, imposing a maximum sentence of 10 years. The appellant's claim of acting under an "invisible influence," coupled with her behavior—shouting during the act, crying afterward, and not fleeing—suggested an impaired mental state, possibly temporary insanity. Although the insanity defense under Section 84 IPC was not fully accepted due to insufficient medical evidence, the absence of motive in such a grave offense supported the plea, raising doubts about mens rea. Noting the appellant had served 9 years and 10 months, the Court ordered her release. Trial courts were directed to proactively seek truth under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in cases involving bizarre, inexplicable acts or claims of mental instability, especially when temporary unsoundness of mind is suggested. Courts must consider that rural, less-educated individuals may not articulate mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) precisely, and such pleas should not be dismissed summarily. Lack of motive and erratic behavior may cast reasonable doubt on intent, warranting careful evaluation to ensure justice in grave offenses. (Para 33, 36, 39, 50, 58, 64) Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2025 INSC 577 : AIR 2025 SC 2370

Section 165 IEA - Courts can summon additional witness as prosecution witness if omitted due to oversight; powers complementary for just decision – Held, Section 311 of the CrPC, courts may permit the examination of an additional witness as a prosecution witness if such a person ought to have been included but was omitted due to oversight or other reasons. The wide discretionary powers under Section 311 CrPC, exercisable suo moto or on application by either party, are complementary to Section 165 of the Evidence Act, enabling courts to summon material witnesses or question persons present at any stage of a trial, even after evidence is closed, to ensure the best evidence is available for a just decision. The Court distinguished between summoning an additional witness (allowing full examination and cross-examination) and a court witness (with restricted cross-examination, subject to court's leave). (Para 48, 49) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 165 IEA - Court Witnesses - Prosecution cannot contradict with prior police statements, but court can – Held, a "Court Witness," summoned under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act, cannot be cross-examined by the prosecution using prior statements made to the police under Section 161 CrPC. The proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC restricts such contradiction to prosecution witnesses only, with court permission. However, the Court itself, under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, can question a Court Witness to contradict prior police statements, as this provision is not limited by Section 162 CrPC. The Court distinguished between additional witnesses (under Section 311 CrPC) and Court Witnesses, noting that the former allows broader cross-examination, while the latter is restricted to questions posed through the Court. (Para 51) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576 : AIR 2025 SC 2545

Section 165 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 311 - Powers of Court to Summon and Examine Witnesses - Wide Discretion of Courts - Role of the Judge - Section 311 CrPC grants courts broad discretionary powers to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of a trial, including after evidence closure, either suo moto or on application by parties, to ensure the availability of valuable evidence for a just decision. Section 311 CrPC works in tandem with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, empowering courts to actively participate in trials by questioning witnesses to elicit truth, without being limited by Section 162 CrPC restrictions. Courts may allow additional prosecution witnesses not listed in the charge-sheet if their examination is deemed necessary due to oversight or other reasons, following standard procedures of examination-in-chief and cross-examination. Courts can summon witnesses under Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act if neither party calls them but their evidence is essential for justice. Cross-examination of court witnesses is permitted only with court approval and is restricted to their court testimony, not prior statements under Section 161 CrPC. Unlike prosecution witnesses, court witnesses cannot be contradicted with prior statements under Section 161 CrPC, as per the proviso to Section 162(1) CrPC. However, courts retain wide powers under Section 165 Evidence Act to ask any question, relevant or irrelevant, without such restrictions. A judge must actively participate in trials as a truth-seeker, not a mere referee, using Section 165 Evidence Act powers to question witnesses while avoiding prosecutorial bias, ensuring fairness to both prosecution and defense. (Para 48 - 52) K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2025 INSC 576