Lender Does Not Hold Mortgage Security In Trust For Borrower: Supreme Court Quashes FIR Over Alleged Use Of Land As Cross-Collateral
| The Court further held that the alleged RERA violations cannot be the basis for the criminal prosecution against the lenders L&T and EARC.
The relationship between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor and debtor, and not trustee and beneficiary, the Supreme Court has held, ruling that a lender advancing a loan against security does not receive the mortgaged property in trust.
The Court observed that a lender taking a mortgage to secure repayment of its own loan holds the security for itself and not in the capacity of a banker entrusted with property belonging to a customer. Consequently, the offence of criminal breach of trust by a banker under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) cannot be invoked merely because a lender holds a mortgage over property offered as security for a loan.
The Court explained that Section 409 IPC contemplates entrustment of property in the capacity of a public servant or in the course of business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. The aggravated punishment under the provision is founded on the breach of trust reposed in a person by virtue of that particular capacity.
A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta made these observations while quashing criminal proceedings against L&T Finance Limited and Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (EARC) in connection with allegations of cheating, criminal breach of trust and criminal conspiracy arising out of financing arrangements involving Raheja Developers Limited.
"Since entrustment is absent, Sections 406 and 409 IPC are not attracted. The additional ingredient of Section 409, entrustment 'in the way of [the accused's] business as a banker', is a fortiori absent," the Court held.
Explaining the distinction, the judgment observed:
"A lender advancing a loan against security does not receive the security 'in trust'. The relationship between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor and debtor, not of trustee and beneficiary."
The Court added that property placed with a banker in the capacity contemplated under Section 409 would ordinarily include a deposit or property held on behalf of a customer. A lender accepting a mortgage to secure repayment of its own loan, however, does not receive the mortgaged property in that capacity.
Background
The complainants are landowners of a 24.15-acre parcel in Sector 99A, Gurugram, which Raheja Developers Limited (RDL) was developing as a group housing project under a collaboration arrangement. L&T sanctioned RDL a loan facility of Rs 450 crore in 2016, later enhanced to Rs 620 crore in 2018, secured by mortgages over four project lands, including the landowners' licensed land. In 2019, the loan account and securities were assigned to EARC.
The complainants alleged that their land was used as cross-collateral for the loan without their consent, that the loan was enhanced behind their back, and that no-objection certificates (NOCs) for sale of units were issued in breach of their agreements with RDL and of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). A complaint was filed before the EOW subsequent to which a preliminary enquiry was made. Finding that no cognizable offence was made out, the complaint was closed. Thereafter, the landowners approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. Before the Magistrate, an Action Taken Report (ATR) was filed which reiterated that no cognizable offence was made out. Despite the ATR, the Magistrate directed registration of an FIR. The appellants sought quashing the case before the High Court which refused to do so.
Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the companies argued that the complaint attributed no specific act to them, and that EARC had entered the picture only in December 2019, long after the transactions complained of. It was also contended that the Magistrate had not given reasons for differing from the ATR and that the dispute was purely contractual. Reliance was placed on an email of 2022 in which the complainants had offered to withdraw all cases for Rs 80 crore.
Per contra, the complainants argued that L&T had accepted their land as cross-collateral knowing that RDL had no right to use it for other projects, and that their consent had been obtained through false assurances. It was also argued that the lenders had continued to fund a defaulting builder. It was submitted that a Magistrate directing investigation need not give detailed reasons, and that civil or insolvency proceedings do not bar a criminal case. Additionally, the prosecution submitted that the investigation was at a nascent stage.
Issues before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed three questions as under:
“(i) Whether the order of the Magistrate dated 15th January, 2025 directing registration of the FIR reflects the application of judicial mind required of a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) CrPC, particularly when the police, after a preliminary enquiry, had reported that no cognizable offence was made out.
(ii) Whether the allegations in the complaint and the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120B IPC against L&T and EARC.
(iii) Whether the alleged breaches of the MoU and the BSA, and the alleged non-compliance with RERA, can by themselves furnish a foundation for criminal prosecution of the lenders, and whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.”
No application of mind by the Magistrate
With regards to (i), the Court noted that an ATR is not a report under Section 173 CrPC (now Section 193 of the BNSS) and does not bind the Magistrate, but is not an empty formality either. Reference was made to Lalita Kumari v Government of UP, to observe that commercial offences and cases of abnormal delay are categories in which a preliminary enquiry is permissible, and held that the present case falls within both categories.
“If the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential order must speak why he does not accept it. The duty to give reasons is at its highest where a judicial authority reaches a conclusion contrary to the material collected by the agency charged by law with the investigation of offences, and where the final order will trigger criminal investigation against the persons concerned. Such reasons need not be elaborate. But they must exist, and they must relate to the material,” the bench observed.
The bench disagreed with the High Court's view that reasons for not concurring with the ATR are merely desirable and observed as under:
“An order that rejects the conclusion of the police on a mere ipse dixit cannot be tested. It is, in substance, an order without application of mind.”
Noting paragraph 6 of the Magistrate's order that referred only to 'builders and developers' and said nothing about the role of L&T or EARC, the bench held that the High Court could not substitute reasons the Magistrate had not recorded, and its summary of the allegations merely reproduced the complainants' case.
“At the stage of directing registration of an FIR against multiple accused persons, it would be unreasonable to expect the Magistrate to undertake a hair splitting exercise of carving out the individual roles of the accused. Thus, though finding the order of the Magistrate as not satisfying all parameters required under Section 156(3) CrPC, we are not drawing our conclusions on the legality of the subsequent proceedings as the same would by implication affect the proceedings against the other accused who are not before us.” the bench added a caution.
No entrustment of the property to attract S.409
With regards to (ii), the bench made reference to Prof RK Vijayasarathy v Sudha Seetharam and Delhi Race Club Ltd v State of UP, to reiterate that entrustment of property, or of dominion over property, is a sine qua non for criminal breach of trust. It held that the complaint did not allege that the licensed land, or any interest in it, was placed in the possession or under the dominion of L&T.
“A lender advancing a loan against security does not receive the security “in trust”. The relationship between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor and debtor, not of trustee and beneficiary,” the bench held.
On Section 409, the Court observed that the aggravated form requires entrustment in the way of his business as a banker, which means property placed with the banker in that capacity, such as a deposit. A lender that takes a mortgage to secure its own loan holds the security for itself. It also noted that the complaint did not identify any officer of L&T or EARC to whom any property was entrusted, and that it charged Section 409 against two corporate lenders based on a generic allegation of collusion.
For Section 420, the bench relied upon Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v State of Bihar, that a mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a prosecution for cheating unless a fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction.
It held that the complaint attributed no representation to L&T. Even if L&T had suggested changes to the draft MoU, that would show at best its awareness of the arrangement between RDL and the landowners, not a representation to them. It also noted that the loan was sanctioned before the MoU between the landowners and RDL was executed, and that the FIR itself attributed the procurement of consent based on false guarantees and assurances to RDL.
With regards to the allegation that L&T lent against prudential norms and kept lending despite defaults, the Court said as under:
“Imprudent lending, even if assumed, may expose the lender to financial loss or regulatory consequences; it does not, without anything more, constitute cheating of a third party who was neither the borrower nor induced by the lender to part with any property or alter his position.”
Furthermore, the bench observed that invoking Sections 406/409 and Section 420 on the same facts is problematic, since cheating requires dishonest intention at inception while criminal breach of trust presupposes a lawful entrustment. While it did not rest its conclusion on this ground alone, it held that the indiscriminate invocation of mutually inconsistent offences itself indicated an attempt to give criminal colour to a commercial grievance.
RERA Violations not basis for criminal case
With regards to (iii), the Court held that RERA is a regulatory statute whose obligations, including the requirement to deposit seventy per cent of allottee receipts in a separate account, fall on the promoter. It also noted that Section 80 of RERA permits cognizance of offences under the Act only on a written complaint by the Authority.
It held that the alleged RERA contraventions by themselves neither give rise to nor can they sustain prosecution for offences under the IPC, and cannot be made the foundation of a prosecution of a lender who is not the regulated entity, in the absence of the specific ingredients of IPC offences.
The bench also distinguished Himanshu Singh v Union of India, where it had directed the CBI to conduct preliminary enquiries into the nexus between certain builders and banks, and said that nothing in those orders lays down that every lender to a real estate developer is exposed to criminal prosecution because of the developer's default.
Referring to Indian Oil Corporation v NEPC India Ltd. and G Sagar Suri v. State of UP, the Court said that “the criminal process cannot be permitted to become a means of giving a criminal colour to a dispute which, in substance, is civil or commercial in nature.”
With respect to the email, the bench observed that there was nothing improper in parties to a commercial dispute attempting to settle, but added that “the proposal to withdraw the criminal complaint upon payment of a specified sum depicts a conduct which bears upon the true nature of the grievance.”
The bench also took note of the delay, observing that the transactions dated back to 2016-2019, while the complaint was lodged only in 2022, after the EOW had closed it and after enforcement proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had begun. While delay by itself cannot furnish a ground for quashing, unexplained delay assumes relevance where the allegations are otherwise predominantly civil in character, the bench observed.
Clarifying the stance on parallel proceedings, the Court said that the existence of civil remedies cannot by itself justify quashing, as held in SN Vijayalakshmi v State of Karnataka, but where there is no tangible element of criminality, criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue.
Applying the aforesaid, the bench held that the dispute was of commercial nature between landowners and their developer in which the lenders were sought to be implicated with the objective of exerting pressure to settle the monetary demands of the complainants.
The Court held that continuing the FIR against the appellants amounted to abusing the process of the court.
“Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, and we direct as follows:
(a) The common judgment and order dated 4th August, 2025 passed by the High Court of Delhi in CRL.M.C. No. 371 of 2025 and CRL.M.C. No. 426 of 2025 is set aside.
(b) The order dated 15th January, 2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in CT Case No. 322 of 2024 is set aside, insofar as it directs registration of an FIR and investigation against the appellants, namely L&T and EARC.
(c) FIR No. 0005 of 2025 dated 16th January, 2025 registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, New Delhi, under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120B IPC, and all proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed insofar as they relate to the appellants, their officers and employees.”
Appearances:
For Appellant: Mr. Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Amit Kumar Mishra, Adv.; Ms. Mitakshara Goyal, Adv.; Mr. Chandramauli Dwivedi, Adv.; Ms. Shambhavi Kashyap, Adv.; Mr. Himanshu Tyagi, Adv.; Ms. Stuti Singh Sisodia, Adv.; Mr. Siddhartha Sinha, AOR; Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Jaiveer Shergill, Adv.; Mr. Ananya Kumar, Adv.; Mr. Ishan Gaur, Adv.; Mr. Utkarsh Khandelwal, Adv.; Mr. Vaibhav Khanna, Adv.; Mr. Divyam Agarwal, AOR
For Respondents: Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G.; Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR; Mr. Rajan Kumar Choursia, Adv.; Mr. Anmol Chandan, Adv.; Ms. Aashana Gill, Adv.; Ms. Shambhavi Sharma, Adv.; Mr. Amit Rawal, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Tanvir Nayar, AOR; Ms. Archana Singh, Adv.; Mr. Samar Khan, Adv.; Mr. Abhishek Bakshi, Adv.; Mr. Yagyesh Kumar, Adv.; Ms. Rishika, Adv.