Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act is a complete package...
Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act is a complete package and excludes itself from the purview of the 1997 Act thereafter - The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract - Section 12 of the 1997 Act, which speaks of payment of interest from the time of taking possession until compensation is paid or deposited, has no application to a case where an agreement has been entered into between the parties under Section 7 - Once an agreement is finalized, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, and all disputes with respect to the determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself - A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes (contract and statutory remedy) after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest - The High Court committed a fundamental error in invoking Section 12 for the payment of interest from the date of the notice under Section 3(2) of the 1997 Act till the date of the impugned judgment, after giving a clear finding that the agreement was a complete package - The contract voluntarily entered into shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions which are sought to be excluded by such contract. [Paras 14-25] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332
Arbitral Award – Execution - Allegation of Fraud/Collusion (Fraud on Corporation) – Held, the maxim "fraud unravels everything" is acknowledged, an execution petition cannot be kept in abeyance based on mere allegations of fraud or collusion by the judgment-debtor's own officials, especially after the arbitral award has attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Entertaining such objections under Section 47, without a finding of fraud or even a prima facie case established, would be an abuse of process akin to a retrial, which is contrary to the object of Section 47. Courts must exercise great caution and circumspection before entertaining such allegations - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 All ER 341; Electrosteel Steel Limited v. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited 2025 LiveLaw SC 491; Para 34-35, 95-99] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279
Arbitration Agreement – Unilateral Appointment Clause – Validity and Severability - Held that a clause in a public-private contract (Clause 25) which mandates unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by an ineligible authority (Managing Director) and further stipulates that "no arbitration shall be held" if such appointment fails, is void ab initio as it violates the principle of nemo judex in causa sua and is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution - the invalidity of the appointment procedure does not destroy the core agreement to arbitrate - Applying the doctrine of severability, the offending portions, including the negative covenant, must be severed, and the substantive arbitration agreement survives, thereby enabling the court to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6). [Relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) 2025 4 SCC 641; Para 12] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 – Appeal against dismissal of a request case under Section 11 by the High Court - Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 298 – State as Model Litigant - Held that lethargy and indifference by a public authority, where contractual obligations demand prompt responsiveness, falls short of the standards of fairness required of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298 of the Constitution – The State must act as a model litigant – fair, responsive, and transparent in its dealings – Silence or procedural evasion by senior officers is inconsistent with the constitutional trust reposed in public authorities - Public Officers are custodians of public faith, not mere administrators – A stern warning was issued to the then Managing Director of the respondent company for such neglect, cautioning that any repetition may invite adverse remarks or even personal accountability. [Relied on State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (2000) 9 SCC 94; Para 11, 15-19] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(b) - Post-Award Interest is Mandatory – Held, the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) (pre-amended) is mandatory, and the only discretion vested in the Arbitral Tribunal is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded - Where the arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, the statutory rate of 18% per annum shall apply - Clause (b) is in contrast with clause (a) and is not subject to party autonomy; it does not give the parties the right to "contract out" interest for the post-award period - The phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" relates to the rate of interest and not the entitlement of interest. [Relied on Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2022 INSC 898; R.P. Garg v. The General Manager, Telecom Department & Ors. (2024 INSC 743; Paras 37, 38, 41-44] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34(2)(b)(ii) read with Explanation 1 and Section 34(2A) Proviso - Challenge to Arbitral Award - High Rate of Interest - Public Policy – Held, the imposition of an exorbitant interest rate in a purely commercial transaction, considering contemporary commercial practices, cannot be said to be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law or against the basic notions of morality or justice under the restricted meaning given to "public policy of India" post the 2015 amendments - A difference or controversy as to the rate of interest falls outside the scope of a challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India, unless it is evident that the rate awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court - The proviso to Section 34(2A) explicitly prohibits re-appreciation of evidence - Where the learned Arbitrator's findings on the genuineness of the loan agreement and the interest rate (here, 24% p.a.) have been concurrently upheld by the courts below, a contrary view would amount to re-appreciation of evidence, which is barred - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on OPG Power Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Private Limited (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2600; Paras 45-53] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 34(2)(b)(ii), 34(2A), 28(3) - Arbitral Award - Setting Aside - Patent Illegality - Rewriting of Contract – Held, an Arbitral Tribunal, being a creature of contract, cannot unilaterally alter or rewrite the terms of the contract between the parties - An Arbitral Award that grants claims by rewriting the commercial contract, substituting the express terms of the agreement and binding policy directives of a statutory authority, is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the Award and is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian Law - Noted that Arbitrator's action of substituting the contractually agreed 'combo meal' tariff with the 'regular meal' tariff for the second meal of the day, and granting reimbursement for an item ('welcome drink') contrary to the policy directives binding on the caterers, amounts to creating a new contract for the parties and is violative of Section 28(3) of the Act, which mandates the Tribunal to take into account the terms of the contract - Appeal allowed. [Relied Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highway Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131; Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa Limited v. Turbo Furguson Steel Private Limited & Ors. 2012 2 SCC 261; Paras 64-72] Indian Railways Catering and Tourism v. Brandavan Food Products, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1076 : 2025 INSC 1294
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Mother Agreement Prevails over Ancillary Contracts (Novation) - Held that the BSA, being the principal or "mother agreement", defines the long-term commercial relationship, and its arbitration clause (Benin seat) prevails over the different arbitration clauses contained in subsequent, limited-purpose Sales Contracts (with Respondent No. 2) and High Seas Sale Contracts (HSSAs with Respondent No. 3) - There was no clear and unequivocal intention to substitute the BSA with the subsequent contracts; thus, the BSA was not novated - Disputes rooted in obligations under the BSA must be resolved through the arbitration agreed therein (Benin). [Relied on Balasore Alloys Ltd. v. Medima LLC 2020 9 SCC 136; Paras 27-30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 (Appointment of Arbitrator) - Review Jurisdiction – Extent of Judicial Intervention (Section 5) - Held that once an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitral process must proceed unhindered - There is no statutory provision for review or appeal from an order under Section 11, which reflects a conscious legislative choice - held, while setting aside the Patna High Court's order allowing the review petition and recalling its earlier appointment of an arbitrator, despite the party having actively participated in the proceedings and seeking review nearly three years later - Held that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act - Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled - The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise - Noted that High Courts, as courts of record, do possess a limited power of review, such power is extremely circumscribed in matters governed by the Arbitration Act - It may be exercised only to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked. It cannot be used to revisit findings of law or reappreciate issues already decided - Appeal allowed. [Para 11, 15-18] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 & 36 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 47 - Arbitral Award – Execution - Objection under Section 47 CPC - Plea of Nullity – Scope – Held, the plea of nullity against an Arbitral Award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47 of the CPC during execution, as the Award is enforced under Section 36 of the A&C Act as if it were a decree of the Civil Court - Such a challenge lies within a very narrow compass, limited exclusively to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness - An Executing Court cannot go behind the decree - Objections regarding errors of fact and law are outside the scope of Section 47 - Objections to arbitral award execution maintainable only if decree is void or without jurisdiction. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670; Paras 16-23] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 36(3) - Stay of Arbitral Award for Payment of Money - Conditions for Unconditional Stay- Held that the mere filing of an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not render the award unenforceable; a separate application for stay must be filed- Held that Court has discretionary power under Section 36(3) to grant a stay "subject to such conditions as it may deem fit"- For an arbitral award for payment of money, the Court must have "due regard" to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)- Unconditional stay of a money award is generally governed by the Second Proviso to Section 36(3), which mandates an unconditional stay if a prima facie case is made out that the arbitration agreement, contract, or the making of the award was induced or effected by fraud or corruption- Supreme Court held that for granting the benefit of unconditional stay of execution of a money-decree (or an arbitral award in the form of a money-decree), an "exceptional case" must be established, meaning the award must be shown to be more than prima facie- i. Egregiously perverse; ii. Riddled with patent illegalities; iii. Facially untenable; iv. Or such other exceptional causes similar in nature- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting an unconditional stay because the award-debtors did not claim the award was induced by fraud or corruption, nor did their case fall into any of the exceptional categories laid down in the Lifestyle Equities case- Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Lifestyle Equities C.V. and Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 INSC 1190; Paras 26-34] Popular Caterers v. Ameet Mehta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1144 : 2025 INSC 1354
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 7 & 11(6) – Validity of Arbitration Agreement – Interpretation of Dispute Resolution Clause - The Supreme Court examined whether a three-tier dispute resolution clause, which mandated negotiation, followed by "arbitration through senior management comprising respective Chairmen of the two parties (Arbitrators)" – Held, this is not a clause does not constitute a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement must contemplate an intention to refer disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by its decision - The words used must disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration, not merely contemplate the possibility - The decision of the private tribunal must be final and binding on the parties - Noted that the penultimate sentence of Clause 8.28, which stipulates that the complaining party shall seek remedies through the courts of law if the dispute is not resolved within fifteen (15) days after the proposed "arbitration," clearly indicates that the process was an attempt at amicable resolution inter se rather than a definitive submission to arbitration - Where an agreement provides that the decision will not be final and binding, or that an unsatisfied party may file a civil suit, it cannot be termed an arbitration agreement - The mere use of the word "arbitration" multiple times is not clinching or decisive - The A&C Act acknowledges the existence of an arbitration agreement based on its substance rather than its form, and an express intention of the dispute being resolved through arbitration is necessary to meet the threshold of Section 7 - The clause did not constitute an arbitration agreement in the first place, subsequent correspondence where the respondent did not deny its existence cannot displace the original lack of intention to arbitrate, especially as the correspondence was not unequivocally clear about referring disputes to arbitration - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander 2007 5 SCC 719; Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture, (2022) 20 SCC 636; K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573; Paras 15-27] Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. ICT Health Technology Services India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1070 : 2025 INSC 1289
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 2(1)(f), 2(2), 11(6) - Maintainability of Section 11 Petition for Foreign-Seated Arbitration - Conflict of Arbitration Clauses - Juridical Seat - Held that an International Commercial Arbitration and Jurisdiction under Section 11(6) - The dispute between the Petitioner (an Indian partnership firm) and Respondent No. 1 (a company incorporated in Benin) is an international commercial arbitration as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act - Since the Buyer-Seller Agreement (BSA) provides that arbitration shall "take place in Benin" (Article 11) and shall be "governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Benin" (Article 5 of Addendum) , Benin is the juridical seat of arbitration - Consequently, Part I of the 1996 Act, which includes Section 11, is excluded by operation of Section 2(2) for arbitrations seated outside India - Held that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 11(6) for the appointment of an arbitrator - Held that Part I of the 1996 Act has no application to arbitrations seated outside India. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. 2012 9 SCC 552; Paras 23-26, 30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Arms Act, 1959; Section 13(2a) Proviso - Grant of Arms License- Held that exercise of Discretion - Where no time limit is prescribed by the rules for the police verification report, the licensing authority's discretion to grant a license without the report must be exercised within a 'reasonable time'- Issuing a license merely two days after requesting a police report constitutes an unjustified and arbitrary exercise of this discretion- Appeal allowed. [Para 20] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Bail - Cancellation of - Dowry Death - Annulment of Bail Order - Perversity of High Court Order - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the deceased's father and annulled the bail granted to the accused-husband by the High Court, holding that the High Court's order was perverse and unsustainable as it failed to consider material evidence and settled legal principles - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between the cancellation of bail (due to post-bail misconduct) and the annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity/perversity in the order) - Bail granted without due application of mind to relevant factors - such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, and statutory presumptions - may be annulled, even in the absence of post-bail misconduct - held that the High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence - the unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage - and the statutory presumption - Supreme Court held that he Court emphasized that dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime against society at large, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny and a firm deterrent judicial response to uphold the majesty of law and send an unequivocal message against this social evil - Such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R. Rathinam v. State by DSP 2000 2 SCC 391; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc. 2025 INSC 979; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC 207; Paras 17-25] Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1150 : 2025 INSC 1367
Bail - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - While elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail, an order that is dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in the grant of bail - Such an order is non-speaking and violates the principles of natural justice - Held that court must strike a balance and exercise discretion judiciously, considering factors like the nature of the allegations, severity of punishment, criminal antecedents, and a prima facie satisfaction. [Paras 19, 20] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 47 - Grounds of Arrest - Mode of Communication - Mandatory Requirement – Held, to achieve the intended objective of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without exception - The mode of communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language the arrested person understands - The constitutional safeguard would be rendered nugatory if authorities are merely permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance - The constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights and is not a mere procedural formality - It is an unexceptional duty cast upon the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of arrest to enable that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice - If the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance results in a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, rendering the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254; Suhas Chakma v. Union of India & others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031; Paras 8, 22, 34-56] Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066 : 2025 INSC 1288
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR- Constitution of India - Article 142 - Inherent Power to Quash- The Supreme Court, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed an FIR in its entirety, including the offence of Dacoity which the High Court had sustained despite an amicable settlement - Held that once the High Court accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR for the other offences there was no justification to sustain the FIR for the dacoity charge, as the factual matrix for all offences was inseparable and arose from a single transaction- Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 15] Prashant Prakash Ratnaparki v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1114 : 2025 INSC 1323
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Notice Not Mandatory - Held, issuance of a two-month notice under the Explanation to Section 10(2)(i) is not a mandatory condition precedent for a landlord to seek eviction- The Explanation merely provides an instance where default is presumed to be wilful- It does not take away the Rent Controller's discretion to determine wilfulness in the absence of such notice- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247; Paras 25-28] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Wilful Default– "Without Prejudice" Payments- Held, filing of appeal or revision against an order fixing fair rent does not operate as an automatic stay of execution – Failure to pay determined rent during the pendency of proceedings, without obtaining a specific stay order from the appellate/revisional forum, constitutes 'wilful default' warranting eviction- Mere filing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decree or order under appeal, as per the statutory ordainment in Order XLI Rule 5(1) of the CPC- Where a tenant challenges the fixation of fair rent but fails to seek or obtain a stay of its operation, the failure to pay the determined rent constitutes wilful default- The Court clarified that where a tenant pays arrears pursuant to a judicial order marked "without prejudice," such payment does not constitute a waiver of the landlord's right to seek ejectment for the prior wilful default- The payment merely saves the tenant from immediate adverse consequences during the pendency of the lis but does not erase the default committed earlier. [Paras 23, 24, 29, 30] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Kerala) – Sections 11, 12, and 18 – Eviction for Arrears of Rent – Procedure in Appeal – Held, in an appeal challenging an eviction order passed under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1965, a fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act, 1965 before the Appellate Authority is not mandatory - Section 12(1) specifically bars a tenant from contesting an eviction petition or preferring an appeal unless they have paid or deposited all arrears of rent admitted to be due - The power to evict under Section 12(3) is by operation of law, and no fresh application for eviction is required from the landlord - As the Appellate Authority only tests the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Control Court, it is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent - Appellate Authority has full discretion to pass any order in accordance with law, including dismissing the appeal, extending time for deposit, or directing the tenant to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller as a condition for hearing the appeal - The Appellate Authority is not obliged to give four weeks' time to deposit the outstanding rent as stipulated in the proviso to Section 12(2) for the Rent Control Court, as the Appellate Authority is not passing an order under Section 12(3) once again -Appeals allowed. [Relied on Manik Lal Majumdar & Ors. vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 400; Paras 28-38, 43, 44] P.U. Sidhique v. Zakariya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1130 : 2025 INSC 1340
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Distinction between 'Levy' (Section 3) and 'Measure of Tax' (Section 4)– Valuation cannot determine Excisability- Held, Section 3 creates the charge and defines the nature of the levy (manufacture of excisable goods), whereas Section 4 provides the measure (value) for the levy- The Revenue Court erred by conflating the two- The "transaction value" under Section 4 is relevant only after the taxable event (manufacture of excisable goods) is established- The measure of tax cannot be invoked to prove that what has been produced is excisable. [Relied on Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., (1984) 1 SCC 467; Paras 39-43] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts- Supreme Court set aside the invocation of the extended period of limitation (5 years)- It held that mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression- There must be a positive act with an intent to evade payment of duty. Since the assessee held a bona fide belief regarding non-inclusion and had filed returns, no suppression was established- Appeals allowed. [Relied on Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2009) 4 SCC 658; Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. CCE, (2007) 10 SCC 337; Paras 74-80] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297
Central Excise Act, 1944- Section 11D – Excess Collection of Duty – Does not confer Excisability- Rejected the Revenue's argument that because the assessee allegedly collected excise duty on the total value from the buyer, the goods are excisable- If excess duty was collected, the Revenue should have invoked Section 11D for recovery of that amount, but such collection does not render an immovable product excisable. [Paras 72-73] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(d) – Excisability – Test of Movability – Erection and Installation of Plant- Supreme Court held that a steam generating plant/boiler, assembled and erected at site using civil engineering materials (concrete, grouting, etc.), which cannot be dismantled without substantial damage, is "immovable property" and not "goods."- Therefore, it is not excisable- The mere size and weight of the boiler made it impossible to assemble before erection- The final product (steam generating plant) emerging at the site is immovable; hence, the contract price cannot be treated as the assessable value for excise purposes. [Relied on Quality Steel Tubes (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1995) 2 SCC 372; Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203; Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, (1998) 1 SCC 400; Paras 59-64] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297
Code Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 164 – Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 24 – Confession – Admissibility – Held, confession recorded under Section 164 CrPC was inadmissible as it was recorded after 60 days of uninterrupted police custody without meaningful legal aid, and the accused was under the influence/proximity of the Investigating Officer – The confession contained assertions of tutoring and torture, attracting the bar under Section 24 of the Evidence Act – A statement judicially discredited in 12 other cases cannot be treated as voluntary in the present case. [Paras 11, 17] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XLVII Rule 1 - Review Jurisdiction - Whether a subsequent reversal/modification of a legal position by another judgment can constitute a ground for review – Held, no liberty to seek review on the basis of a later judgment - Supreme Court declined to follow the observation made in Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., RP(C) No. 359/2023 in CA No. 5783/2022, which had granted liberty to aggrieved parties to seek review based on the Court's later decision - The three-judge Bench in Ganpati Dealcom failed to notice the earlier three-judge Bench decision in KL Rathi Steels (decided on 17.05.2024), held that, KL Rathi Steels—a prior co-equal Bench decision—must prevail - Liberty to seek review cannot be granted merely because another judgment has changed the law later - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-4] Union of India v. Virendra Amrutbhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1107
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXII Rule 6 — Abatement of Appeal – Held, If an appellant dies prior to the hearing of the appeal, and their legal heirs are not brought on record, and the appeal is subsequently decided, the judgment and decree passed in that appeal are a nullity - The protection offered by Order XXII Rule 6 is not applicable if the party dies prior to the appeal being heard - Where the first appellate decree is a nullity, the decree passed by the trial court is the only decree holding the field and is liable to be executed - The trial court's decree revives for being executed - If a decree is a nullity, its invalidity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced, even at the stage of execution - The executing court erred in declining to execute the trial court's decree on the ground that it had merged with and was superseded by the first appellate court's decree, because the latter was a nullity - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Amba Bai and others vs. Gopal and Others 2001 INSC 263; Rajendra Prasad & Anr. v. Khirodhar Mahoto & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 1994; Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others vs. Harkoo Gope and others 1981 INSC 100. Paras 11- 16] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1067 : 2025 INSC 1283
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 90(3) - Setting Aside Execution Sale - Bar on Raising Grounds Available Before Sale Proclamation - Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) - Duty of Executing Court to Consider Selling Only a Portion of Property- Held that Order XXI Rule 64/66(2)(a) CPC casts a duty on the executing Court to first decide whether selling the entire property is necessary to satisfy the decree or if a portion would suffice. A sale without examining this aspect would be illegal - the insertion of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC places an incumbent duty on the judgment debtor, or any other interested person, to satisfy the executing Court that the ground for setting aside the sale could not have been taken on or before the date the sale proclamation was drawn up- Held that if the judgment debtor had notice from the executing Court but acquiesced by taking no action before the date of the sale, they would be precluded by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC from assailing its legality or correctness thereafter - Held that the High Court erred in failing to give effect to the bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, assuming the obligation under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC would operate independently of the judgment debtors' lapse - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand & Rajinder Singh, (1994) 1 SCC 131; Paras 10-18] G.R. Selvaraj v. K.J. Prakash Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1141 : 2025 INSC 1353
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXXVIII Rules 5, 8, 10; Order XXI Rule 58 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P. Act) - Section 53 - Attachment Before Judgment - Pre-existing Rights - Fraudulent Transfer - Claim Petition - Supreme Court examined whether attachment before judgment ordered under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC could validly operate against a property already transferred by a registered sale deed executed prior to the institution of the suit, and whether a creditor could challenge such a transfer as fraudulent under Section 53 of the T.P. Act within the framework of a claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 CPC - Held that essential condition for invoking attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC is that the property sought to be attached must belong to the defendant on the date of institution of the suit - Property already transferred prior to the suit cannot be attached under this provision. Order XXXVIII Rule 10 CPC safeguards the rights of strangers by clarifying that attachment before judgment does not affect pre-existing rights of non-parties - Attachment before judgment is only a protective measure and does not create any charge or ownership in favour of the plaintiff - Appeal allowed. L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Scope of Claim Petition (Order XXXVIII Rule 8 r/w Order XXI Rule 58 CPC): Held that mechanism under Rule 8, being a protective procedure for third-party claimants asserting independent rights, cannot be expanded to transform the attachment procedure into a substantive enquiry under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - Determination of whether a sale deed is fraudulent is exclusively governed by Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The plaintiff's remedy, if any, for a prior fraudulent transfer lies exclusively under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The onus to establish that the transfer was made with an intent to defeat or delay creditors lies squarely upon the party alleging fraud - Mere suspicion cannot substitute legal proof - The creditor (Respondent No. 1) failed to produce cogent evidence showing that the dominant purpose of the transfer was to defeat his rights. [Relied on Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan, (1990) 3 SCC 291; Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappan Pathar, (1991) 1 SCC 715; Paras 11-20] L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Suit for Partition and Separate Possession - Validity and Effect of Release Deeds – Admissibility of Unregistered Partition Deed (Palupatti) for Collateral Purposes – Computation of Shares under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Unamended Section 6) – Held, a registered relinquishment deed releasing share of a coparcener in the joint family property, operates immediately regardless of its implementation - Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the High Court and Trial court, which refused to consider the Appellant's exclusive share in the suit property, despite there being a registered relinquishment deeds by Appellant's two brothers releasing their respective shares in Appellant's favor, and a subsequent family settlement (palupatti) in 1972, which formally recorded the separation of the remaining coparceners and delineated their respective shares, which had been independently managed ever since - A family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral use - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Elumalai v. M. Kamala [(2023) 13 SCC 27; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa [(2019) 6 SCC 409; Paras 7-9] P. Anjanappa v. A.P. Nanjundappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1074 : 2025 INSC 1286
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Advocates Act, 1961 - Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 - Civil Manual - Pursis Claiming 'No Instructions' - Withdrawal of Vakalatnama - Whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with the suit after the 'no instructions' pursis was filed by the defendants' advocate, claiming no instructions, without serving a fresh notice on the defendants - Held that the Appellate Court's finding that the Trial Court did not commit a wrong in proceeding with the matter was a plausible view based on the material on record and did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution - Held that the pursis was simply an intimation of prospective action and did not reflect a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama - The Trial Court rightly decided to ignore such pursis as it was not a valid notice/intimation to the Court about the withdrawal of the Vakalatnama as contemplated under the Advocates Act and Civil Manual - The procedure prescribed for the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama (Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960) requires the advocate to file a note requesting permission to withdraw and also file a copy of the intimation to the client along with its written acknowledgment, or a letter from the client instructing withdrawal - This procedure was not applicable as the pursis did not pray for, nor was it treated as, a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama by the Trial Court - Held that the High Court, in considering the procedure for withdrawal of Vakalatnama, clearly exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the Appellate Court - Held that power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors - The Appellate Court's order was not amenable to interference - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675; Paras 15-23] Shri Digant v. P.D.T. Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1140 : 2025 INSC 1352
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 6A – Counter Claim – Maintainability against Co-Defendant – Held, a counter-claim cannot be directed solely against a co-defendant; it must be directed against the plaintiff– While a counter-claim can be based on a different cause of action than that put forth in the suit, it should be incidental or connected with that cause of action and has necessarily to be directed against the plaintiff- Counter claim by defendants 2 & 3 against defendant No. 1 for specific performance in a suit filed by the plaintiff set aside- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohit Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2006) 12 SCC 734; Para 10, 14] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLI Rule 5 - Interim Relief Pending Appeal Against Dismissal of Suit - Held that dismissal of Suit does not preclude grant of interim relief in a pending appeal - Appellate Court has co-extensive power with the original court to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending final disposal of the appeal - The statement of law that once a suit is dismissed, no interim relief could be granted pending the appeal preferred against such judgment and order passed by the trial court is not approved - Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5 while declining to grant status quo is grossly misplaced, as the considerations laid thereunder relate to stay on the execution of a decree, which is not the case where a suit is dismissed - Grant of relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court to be exercised judicially based on prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience - The appellate court must independently consider the application for interim relief on its own merits and established legal principles, and should not just look into the final outcome of the suit - Held that an application seeking to maintain status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 20] Mohammadhanif Mohammadibrahim Patel v. Pallaviben Rajendra Kumar Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1138 : 2025 INSC 1347
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– Order XXI Rule 31– Execution of Compromise Decree– Burden of Proof– Held, in an execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has wilfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree– Where the decree-holder failed to produce cogent evidence that the judgment debtors were in possession of the suit property (idols/religious articles) or had violated the terms of the 1933 compromise decree, execution cannot be ordered based on mere presumptions– Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof– Noted that the Executing Court erred by assuming possession based on the absence of earlier disputes- Reiterated that the burden of proving a fact especially within the knowledge of a person lies upon him, and the appellants failed to discharge the burden of proving violation of the decreeAppeal dismissed. [Paras 24- 28] Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1093 : 2025 INSC 1307
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 200 (Complaint to Magistrate) — Second Complaint for Same Occurrence — Maintainability — Abuse of Process of Law - Held that a second complaint filed by the same informant for the same occurrence by invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. is not maintainable after a detailed investigation has been conducted, a negative (closure) report has been filed qua the appellants, and the informant has not challenged the negative report - Merely adding a new offence (e.g., Section 308 IPC) for the same occurrence does not make the second complaint maintainable against the same accused who were dropped from the earlier investigation - Allowing such a complaint amounts to a gross abuse and misuse of the process of law. Ranimol v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 482 (Inherent Powers of High Court) — Quashing of Proceedings — Double Jeopardy - Lodging of Two FIRs/Complaints - Held that the High Court ought to have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings initiated by the second private complaint, as the proceedings were vexatious and the issue of double jeopardy would arise, dealing with the liberty of a person - The lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident - The prohibition extends to any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of a case under the Code, for an investigation would have already commenced, and allowing further registration would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Surender Kaushik & Ors vs State Of U.P & Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 148] Ranimol v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Scope of High Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to Quash FIR/Criminal Proceedings - The power to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, in exceptional and rarest of rare cases. At the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial or embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint - The Court has only to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - If a cognizable offence is disclosed, the Court should not thwart the investigation – Held, the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings primarily on the ground that the two specific incidents of harassment/dowry demand mentioned in the subsequent FIR were absent from the earlier complaints and were thus an "afterthought" or a "counterblast" - This approach amounts to conducting a mini-trial, which is prohibited under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - A First Information Report (FIR) is not an encyclopaedia and is not required to disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh and Others, (2023) 18 SCC 399; Paras 17, 18, 20-27] Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1080 : 2025 INSC 1287
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Section 197 - Sanction to Prosecute Public Servant - Mandate for Application of Mind – Held, the order granting sanction must ex facie disclose the application of mind by the sanctioning authority, including consideration of the evidence and material placed before it - A mechanical and non-speaking sanction order vitiates the prosecution. Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Section 482 - Constitution of India; Article 21 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Right to Speedy Investigation – Held, criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed under the inherent power of the High Court when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in completing the investigation, which violates the accused's right under Article 21 of the Constitution - The cumulative effect of a vitiated sanction under Section 197 CrPC and an unexplained delay of 15 years in investigation warrants the quashing of criminal proceedings - Supreme Court issued directions - i. To file a supplementary chargesheet is a part of section 173(8) CrPC; Court is not rendered functus office having granted such permission; ii. Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law; iii. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered. [Relied on Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (1979) 4 SCC 172; Paragraph 21- 23] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(1), 378(2), 378(3), Proviso to Section 372 — Appeal against Acquittal — Cases investigated by CBI - Maintainability of State Government's Appeal in CBI-Investigated Case - Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the authority of the State Government to appeal from an order of acquittal is excluded in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI), as per Section 378(2) of the CrPC - The State of Chhattisgarh's application for leave to appeal was, therefore, not maintainable - The right of a victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC only applies to orders of acquittal passed after the provision came into effect on December 31, 2009 - Since the judgment of acquittal was rendered on May 31, 2007, the appeal filed by the de-facto-complainant (Satish Jaggi) was not maintainable - The High Court should have adopted a liberal and pragmatic approach in condoning the significant delay (1373 days) in the CBI's application seeking leave to appeal, especially in a sensitive case involving grave allegations (conspiracy to murder a rival political party member) - The delay was condoned to ensure the challenge to the acquittal is examined on merits, not rejected on technicalities - Matter was remitted to High Court for fresh consideration. [Relied on Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 1; Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through LRs v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 752; Paras 19, 20, 26-33] CBI v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1069 : 2025 INSC 1285
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(1), 378(2), 378(3), Proviso to Section 372 — Appeal against Acquittal — State Government's right to file an appeal against acquittal of the accused - Examined and deliberated in a suitable case involving the following situations - i. The complaint was lodged by the State Government or its officers; ii. Investigation was partly done by State Police; iii. Prosecution was commenced at the instance of the State Government; iv. The State Government has a stake in the criminal proceedings and; v. the jurisdiction of the CBI had been invoked at the instance of the State Government. CBI v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1069 : 2025 INSC 1285
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Locus Standi to Lodge FIR - General Principle - Sections 67 and 136 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 – Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the cognizance taken by the Special Judge on the ground that the Gram Pradhan had no locus standi to lodge the First Information Report (FIR) - It is a well-recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set out or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has no provision which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence - The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ('the 1984 Act'), which was invoked in the charge sheet, does not have any specific provision limiting the eligibility of the person making the complaint - The other Acts referred to in the charge sheet also do not indicate anything contrary to the general principle - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64; Paras 6-10] Lal Chandra Ram v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1134
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 389 – Suspension of Sentence – Life Imprisonment – Held, the appellate court, while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment, must ensure that the convict is in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted - The High Court failed to follow well-settled principles. It should have given a fair idea of the prosecution case, the type of evidence led, and the nature of evidence against each accused before exercising discretion - The High Court committed a serious error by suspending the sentence of life convicts via a cryptic order merely by recording that allegations were general and omnibus, without discussing the nature of evidence or the role of the accused as members of an unlawful assembly - Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-28] Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1087
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 – Bail - Principle of Parity - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - Parity as a Sole Ground for Bail - Held that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted - This is the correct position in law - Parity, when considered, must focus on the 'position' of the accused, which is not met only by involvement in the same offence, but on their role in the crime - In the case of co-accused, considering bail on parity with accused was misplaced because their roles at the time of the shooting were not the same - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana(Koli) and Anr. [(2021) 6 SCC 230; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. [2025 SCC Online SC 1690; Paras 10-15] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, 156 (3) - Quashing of FIR - Scope of High Court's Power - Investigation by Police – Held, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and is in the nature of a pre-emptory reminder to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation - The Magistrate is justified in adopting this course if the allegations disclose a cognizable offense, and forwarding the complaint for investigation "will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate” - Direction under Section 156(3) is issued when on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation - When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made, the High Court only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offense and must permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR - When facts are hazy and investigation has just begun, the High Court should be circumspect and allow the police to proceed - Order of High Court set aside and FIR restored, Police were directed to investigate the case expeditiously - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439; Madhao v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615; Paras 34-43] Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1064 : 2025 INSC 1282
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973– Sections 53 and 53A– Medical Examination of Accused– Held that these provisions allow medical examination (including DNA profiling) only when it affords evidence as to the commission of the offence- Where the paternity of a child is not a fact in issue for the alleged offences (Cheating/Harassment), invoking these sections to order a DNA test is a misconstruction of the statute. [Paras 55-57, 59] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Interpretation of Section 13(1A) Proviso – Held, Section 13(1A) consists of two parts - The main provision allows appeals against judgments and orders - The proviso acts as an exception only for interlocutory orders, restricting appeals to those specifically enumerated in Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Orders rejecting a plaint (Decrees) fall under the main provision, not the restrictive proviso - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-18, 21] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 13(1A) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 2(2) – Appeal against Rejection of Plaint – Maintainability – Held, an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC constitutes a "decree" as defined under Section 2(2) CPC as it conclusively determines the rights of the parties – Such an order is appealable under the main provision of Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – The High Court erred in treating it as an interlocutory order restricted by the proviso to Section 13(1A) – The proviso cannot be invoked to curtail the scope of the main provision regarding final judgments and decrees. MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 13(1A) – Distinction between 'Rejection of Plaint' and 'Rejection of Application for Rejection of Plaint' - Supreme Court clarified that while an order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 11 is not appealable under Section 13(1A) as it is not enumerated in Order XLIII CPC, an order actually rejecting the plaint results in a decree and is appealable. [Relied on Bank of India v. Maruti Civil Works 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2667; Paras 18-19] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300
Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Date of Death - Decree of Civil Court - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 108 - Presumption of Death (Civil Death) – Held, in cases of civil death, a person is presumed to be dead only if their whereabouts are not heard of for seven years from the date the person went missing - The death will be presumed to be on the expiry of seven years from the date the person disappeared, unless a contrary or specific date of death is proved by adducing cogent evidence - A decree of a Civil Court declaring a person to be dead, pursuant to the seven-year statutory period having elapsed, does not, by itself, fix a precise date or time of death - The decree is silent on the specific date of death unless direct or circumstantial evidence is provided - The burden to prove the date or time of the death lies upon the person who makes such an assertion. [Relied on LIC v. Anuradha, (2004) 10 SCC 131; Paras 6, 7] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280
Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Retirement and Acceptance of Retiral Dues: Where the missing employee was treated to be in continuous service and duly retired during the period he was missing, and his family members accepted all the retiral dues and are receiving monthly pension, the family has accepted the father's retirement. In these circumstances, the son (Respondent No. 2) cannot claim compassionate appointment, as the father is deemed to have died a civil death after his retirement date - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal - The Court left it open to the appellants to consider the case of the respondent for appointment for any suitable post independent of the claim for compassionate appointment, if otherwise permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4,9, 10-12] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280
Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Article 14) – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness- Held even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Constitutional Law - Separation of Powers - Judicial Independence - Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 - Legislative Override - The Supreme Court reiterated that an executive or legislative action that frustrates or overturns a mandatory direction or a finding of unconstitutionality previously issued by the Court, without remedying the underlying basis for the declaration of invalidity, amounts to an impermissible legislative override and violates the basic structure doctrine, specifically the principle of judicial independence- held that the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which contains provisions identical to the previously struck-down Ordinance and sections of the Finance Act, 2017- including the minimum age requirement of fifty years, the truncated four-year tenure for members, and the mandate for the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) to recommend a panel of two names- is invalid as it constitutes a direct attempt to negate binding judicial directions and encroach upon the judicial sphere- clarified that all appointments of Members and Chairpersons whose selection or recommendation by the Search-cum-Selection Committee was completed before the commencement of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, shall be protected- Such appointments will continue to be governed by their respective parent statutes and the conditions of service as laid down in the previous binding judgments, rather than by the truncated tenure and altered service conditions introduced by the 2021 Act. [Relied on Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (2021) 7 SCC 369; S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124; Paras 84-86, 87-89, 90, 117, 118, 136-141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330
Constitution of Independent Committee Indispensable for Complex Housing Disputes - Article 136 Jurisdiction Inadequate - The Supreme Court has directed the constitution of a one-member committee headed by Justice Pankaj Naqvi (Retd.), former Judge of the Allahabad High Court - i. to conduct an independent inquiry into the long-pending housing dispute involving the Shiv Kala Charms Project in Greater Noida; ii. List those willing to jointly develop and complete the remaining towers; iii. Formulate a fair mechanism to apportion GNIDA's dues among verified allottees; iv. Prepare a comprehensive plan for completion of the project in a time-bound manner; v. Explore the auction of unclaimed or unverifiable flats in Towers 3 and 4 to recover construction and land costs, if necessary - The case, pending for nearly two decades, involves hundreds of defrauded homebuyers who had invested in the project developed under the Golf Course Sahkari Awas Samiti (GCSAS), in collaboration with M/s Shiv Kala Developers Pvt. Ltd. - The Supreme Court, observed that the matter had acquired considerable administrative magnitude and intricacy, and that the resolution of overlapping issues concerning restoration of lease, identification of genuine allottees, determination of dues, and completion of stalled construction was "unlikely if not impossible in the proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India" - held that the constitution of an independent Committee was indispensable to ensure an expeditious and efficacious resolution of the controversy. [Paras 33-45] Ravi Prakash Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1075 : 2025 INSC 1291
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Constitution of India, 1950– Article 129, 137, 142 and Curative Jurisdiction– Supreme Court Rules, 2013– Order XLVIII– Nithari Killings– Supreme Court allows curative petition and acquits accused-petitioner, setting aside the death sentence (commuted to life) affirmed in 2011– Held, allowing a conviction to stand on an evidentiary foundation that the Court has subsequently rejected as involuntary or inadmissible in companion cases arising from the same facts violates Articles 14 and 21 – To preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory process, the Court must intervene ex debito justitiae when two sets of outcomes rest on an identical evidentiary foundation but are irreconcilable. [Relied on Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra 2002 4 SCC 388; Paras 1, 10, 15, 22] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 141 and 144 - Judicial Discipline - Stare Decisis - Duty of Courts – Held, law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on every court and authority in the country - Judicial discipline is a constitutional duty and requires courts to apply precedent as it stands and give full and faithful effect to appellate directions - A judgment that minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent, undermining the unity of law and credibility of the courts. [Paras 14] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296
Constitution of India; Article 21 – Investigation – Fair Trial – Supreme Court criticized the investigation for negligence, delay, and failure to probe material angles like organ trade – Failure to secure the crime scene, lack of independent medical documentation during custody, and botched forensic collection undermined the prosecution's case– Held that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubtPetition allowed. [Paras 15, 18, 21] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Constitution of India; Article 300A (Right to Property) - Freedom to Sell Property - Immovable Property Transactions - The constitutionally protected right to own immovable property inherently includes the freedom to freely acquire, possess, and dispose of it at will - Courts must balance the freedom to buy and sell property with the Governmental duty to ensure integrity in transactions - A requirement in rules/regulations that impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property is illegal, as it has the direct effect of 'depriving of property' and such delays impinge on the right to hold and dispose of property. [Paras 29, 30] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to Privacy – DNA Profiling – Held that compelling an individual to undergo DNA testing is a grave intrusion into their bodily autonomy and privacy- Such a direction must satisfy the threefold requirement of (i) legality, (ii) legitimate State aim, and (iii) proportionality- In a case alleging cheating and harassment, proving biological paternity is collateral and lacks a direct nexus to the offence, thereby failing the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2019 1 SCC 1; Paras 46-48, 53] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Constitution of India - Governor's Power To Assent To Bills– Discretion – Timelines– Judicial Review– The Supreme Court, exercising its Advisory Jurisdiction under Article 143(1), provided its opinion on the scope and contours of the powers of the Governor under Article 200 and the President under Article 201 regarding the assent, withholding, or reservation of Bills passed by the State Legislature- The Governor has three constitutional options when a Bill is presented: (i) assent, (ii) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or (iii) withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments- The power to 'withhold' assent simpliciter under the substantive part of Article 200 is qualified by the first proviso, requiring the Governor to return the Bill for reconsideration (unless it is a Money Bill)- The first proviso qualifies "withholds assent" in the substantive part of Article 200, mandating return with comments rather than creating a fourth option of withholding simpliciter, as withholding without return defies constitutional logic especially for Money Bills- Held that timelines can't be fixed for Governors/President for bills' assent, there is no concept of deemed assent- held that the concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" to the Bills if the timelines are breached was antithetical to the spirit of the Constitution and against the doctrine of separation of powers- The concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" is virtually a take-over of the functions reserved for the Governor- Held that held that Governors and President cannot be subjected to judicially prescribed timelines for their decisions on Bills under Articles 200/201- Supreme Court warned that allowing the Governor to simply withhold the Bill, without returning it to the Assembly, will negate the principles of federalism which hold that federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. [Paras 38-40, 44-50] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Constitution of India - Governor Not Bound by Aid and Advice- Held that the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising his function under Article 200- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- The Governor's decisions under Article 200 are not justiciable on merits, but Courts may issue limited mandamus for prolonged inaction without merits review; no judicial timelines or deemed assent permissible, as Article 142 cannot supplant constitutional functions. [Relied on In Re: Special Courts Bill 1978 1979 1 SCC 380; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh 1952 INSC 28, para 235; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary 1979 INSC 93, para 19; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1983 INSC 61, Paras 85-99, 103-114, 154-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Constitution of India - Opinion on Tamil Nadu Governor judgment- The Tamil Nadu judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, in which the Court held that the Tamil Nadu Governor acted mala fide in reserving the Bills for the President after they were re-enacted by the State Assembly. It therefore held that those Bills were "deemed assented" using Article 142 and consequently laid down timelines for the President and the Governor to follow- Supreme Court held that prescribing timelines were wrong- The bench also held that there was no occasion for the two-judge bench to having laid down timelines for the President- Held that the paragraphs 260-261 of the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu, pertaining to the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 are erroneous- Supreme Court also pointed out that there was no occasion for the issue of setting a timeline for disposal of Bills referred to the President under Article 201, to arise before this Court, while considering State of Tamil Nadu- Held that any observations on the aspect of timelines applicable to the President under Article 201, or conclusions thereof on this aspect, are merely obiter, and ought to be treated as such- Held that the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. [Paras 153-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d)— 'Consumer'— 'Commercial Purpose'— Exclusion from definition - Held, for an activity or transaction to be considered for a "commercial purpose," it should have a close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity- What must be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction—whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser - "commercial purpose" is understood to include business-to-business transactions between commercial entities - Where an established company buys a product license (software) to automate its business processes, the object is to reduce costs and maximise profits- Such a transaction has a nexus with the generation of profits and is therefore for a commercial purpose - The 'Explanation' to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, which excludes use for earning a livelihood by means of self-employment, does not apply to a company - Held that there is a difference between a self-employed individual and a corporation. [Relied on: Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and Ors. 2020 2 SCC 265; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors and Ors. ((2023) 8 SCC 362; Para 15-18, 20-27] Poly Medicure Ltd. v. Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1102 : 2025 INSC 1314
Court of Records - The Supreme Court has reiterated that High Courts are Courts of Record and that whatever is recorded in their proceedings is presumed to be correct and cannot be contradicted later by parties or counsel- Petition disposed of petition with liberty to file an appropriate application before High Court to address the grievance regarding the unauthorized concession. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr. 1982 2 SCC 463; Para 2-4] Savita v. Satyabhan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1096
Delhi Ridge– Morphological Ridge– Protection and Identification– Supreme Court reiterated that areas possessing the morphological features of the Ridge (Geological Ridge), even if not notified as "Reserved Forest," require equal protection – Directed the DRMB to ensure the identification process of the Morphological Ridge is completed and to remove encroachments from both the notified Ridge and Morphological Ridge – Criticized the GNCTD for the 30-year delay in issuing the final Section 20 notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Kenneth Builders & Developers (P) Ltd., (2016) 13 SCC 561; Paras 11-13, 34-37, 57(iii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090
Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate – Estoppel – Held, the private respondents, having agreed to the compensation by negotiation, are totally estopped from seeking any relief beyond the terms of the contract. Seeking interest after agreeing to the determined amount is a clear case of approbation and reprobation - The doctrine means that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing; one cannot "blow hot and cold" - A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25; Paras 18, 21, 23] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Limits on Legislative Power- Held that Parliament cannot nullify binding judicial declarations under Article 141 by legislative restatement of previously-struck provisions. A legislature may neutralise a judgment only by curing the identified defect, not by repeating what was invalidated- explained that a Legislature may remove the substratum of a judgment, but cannot directly override it. [Relied on NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 INSC 810, where the Court; Paras 118–119, 136–141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330
Employees' Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF&MP Act) - Order of Payment from Sale Proceeds: From the proceeds of the sale of the assets by the secured creditor - i. The first charge would be for the dues under the EPF&MP Act (including contribution, interest, penalty, and damages); ii. The remaining proceeds are then applied in satisfaction of the secured debt of the appellant-bank; iii. Workmen are granted liberty to approach the appropriate authority under the MRTU & PULP Act to determine their dues, which would only be satisfied if any amount remains after satisfaction of the provident fund dues and the secured creditor's debt. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Paras 17-27] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Employees' Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF&MP Act) - Section 11(2) - Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Priority of Dues - First Charge Vs. Priority to Secured Creditors – Held, the statutory first charge created under Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act in respect of provident fund dues has precedence over the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act - While Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act (introduced later in 2020) provides an overriding non-obstante clause conferring priority to a secured creditor's debts over all other debts and government dues, this priority cannot be equated with a "first charge" - Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act expressly creates a statutory first charge on the establishment's assets for the amount due, and this first charge prevails over the priority given under Section 26E of the SARFAESI. [Paras 22 - 24] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Section 3(3)– Constitution of Statutory Delhi Ridge Management Board (DRMB)– The Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to constitute the DRMB as a statutory body under Section 3(3) of the EP Act– Held, the Board effectively functioned without statutory backing for decades, merely on Court orders; giving it statutory status ensures accountability, transparency, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) and Constitutional Courts– The Board shall act as a “single-window” authority for all issues concerning the Delhi Ridge to avoid conflicting orders from multiple committees. [Paras 40-42, 45, 57(i)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090
Environment & Mining – Aravali Hills and Ranges – Conservation and Regulation of Mining – Importance of Aravalis as a "green barrier" against desertification – Uniform Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges – Prohibition of Mining in Core/Inviolate Areas – Need for a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) on the lines of the Saranda Forest Plan- Supreme Court directed the Centre to prepare a comprehensive Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) before any new mining activity is permitted in the ecologically fragile region of “Aravali Hills and Ranges” spread across the states of Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat- Supreme Court accepted the operational definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges recommended by the Committee constituted on May 9, 2024, for the purpose of regulating mining- i. Aravali Hills: Any landform in Aravali districts having an elevation of 100 metres or more from the local relief- The entire landform within the area enclosed by the lowest contour is part of the Aravali Hills; ii. Aravali Range- Two or more Aravali Hills located within a proximity of 500m from each other. [Para 40, 42-48] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Environmental Law - Correct systemic weaknesses in tiger governance, the Supreme Court issued several pan-India directions- i. All States must notify core and buffer areas within 6 months; ii. All States must prepare or revise Tiger Conservation Plans within 3 months; iii. Steering Committees for each Tiger Reserve must be constituted within 2 months and meet twice annually; iii. NTCA must monitor whether TCPs and Steering Committees are effectively functioning; iv. Community-based tourism models must replace mass tourism- The Court further held that Critical Tiger Habitats under the Wildlife Protection Act must be treated at par with Critical Wildlife Habitats under the Forest Rights Act, ensuring consistency in recognition of ecological value and rights of forest dwellers. [Paras 47, 48 - 50] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112
Environmental Law– Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006– Judicial Discipline and Precedent– Review– Per Incuriam- Supreme Court in Review Petition recalls its earlier judgment (JUR: Vanashakti v. Union of India) which had struck down the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum providing for ex post facto Environmental Clearance (EC) in certain circumstances- Held that a Bench of two-Judges is bound by an earlier view taken by another Bench of co-equal strength- If a subsequent Bench considers that the law laid down earlier by a co-equal Bench requires reconsideration, the only available option is to refer the matter to a larger Bench- The judgment delivered by a subsequent Bench of two Judges in ignorance of the earlier binding judgment of a Bench of co-equal strength is per incuriam in law- The earlier judgment (JUR), being a two-Judge Bench, failed to notice the binding co-ordinate Bench judgments in D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others and Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others on the issue of ex post facto EC, rendering it per incuriam- The failure to consider binding co-ordinate precedents constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, making the review warranted and imperative- Writ Petition and Appeal are restored. [Relied on Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1; Paras 80-101, 115-127] Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1116 : 2025 INSC 1326
Environmental Law - Nationwide mandate to notify Eco-Sensitive Zones for all Tiger Reserves - The Court has directed that all Tiger Reserves must have notified Eco-Sensitive Zones (ESZs) within one year - Supreme Court endorsed the MoEF&CC's 2018 advisory stating that the minimum extent of ESZs must cover the entire buffer and fringe areas, with at least a one-kilometre radial cushion around critical habitat where the buffer is missing - Held that ESZs, traditionally notified around National Parks and Sanctuaries, must apply equally to Tiger Reserves, reinforcing the ecological shield around these landscapes - Once notified, the same restrictions as those under the 9 February 2011 ESZ Notification will apply - This includes a complete ban on mining within one kilometre of tiger habitats, buffer areas or ESZ boundaries, whichever is larger. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112
Environmental Law - Principle of Commencement of Limitation ('First Accrual') - Project Proponent's Obligation to Advertise - When the duty to communicate the EC vests in multiple authorities, the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 16(h) will commence from the earliest of the date on which the communication is carried out by any of the duty bearers. This is based on the principle of "first accrual," where, if a legal challenge is based on multiple grounds, the period of limitation runs from the date when the right to sue first accrues - The communication must be clear and complete. Once this condition is satisfied by one duty bearer, the person aggrieved cannot "pick and choose later communications from other duty bearers for reckoning the period of limitation" - It is not a legal requirement that the entirety of the environmental clearance is published in the newspaper - It is sufficient compliance if the project proponent publishes the grant of the EC and indicates the substance of the conditions and safeguards - The advertisement is sufficient if it notifies the public of the EC grant and where the complete and comprehensive information is available (e.g., the website of MoEF&CC/SEIAA or with the SPCB) - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Medha Patkar & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests, UOI and Ors. 2013 SCC Online NGT 63; V. Sundar Proprietor Chemicals, India v. Union of India & Ors. 2015 SCC Online NGT 145; Paras 15-21] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331
Environmental Law - Prohibited activities in buffer and fringe areas - The Supreme Court approved the Expert Committee's list of prohibited activities, including - i. commercial mining; ii. Sawmills; iii. polluting industries; iv. commercial firewood use; v. major hydroelectric projects; vi. introduction of exotic species; vii. hazardous substance production; viii. low-flying aircraft and tourism aircraft; ix. waste discharge into natural ecosystems; x. tree felling without approval- Held that regulated activities, such as hotels, water use, road widening and night vehicular movement, will require adherence to strict wildlife safeguards and must be consistent with Tiger Conservation Plans. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112
Environmental Law - Prohibition in Core/Inviolate Areas - Supreme Court accepted the recommendation for prohibition of mining in core/inviolate areas - These areas include - i. Protected Areas (including tiger reserves and all identified tiger corridors); ii. Areas covered under Draft or Final Eco Sensitive Zone (ESZ)/Eco Sensitive Area (ESA) or the default ESZ as per Supreme Court orders; iii. Areas within 1.0 km of the boundary of a Protected Area; iv. Areas where plantations have been raised with government/agency funds; v. Areas within 500 m from the boundary of Ramsar sites and Wetlands. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Environmental Law - Regulation of Existing Mining – Held, mining activities already in operation are permitted to continue strictly in compliance with the recommendations made by the Committee in paragraph 8 of its report - Supreme Court declined to impose a complete ban on ongoing legal mining, citing the ill consequences, such as the rise of illegal mining and criminalisation. [Relied on State of Bihar and Others v. Pawan Kumar and Others 2022 2 SCC 348; Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Environmental Law - Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - Restoration Ecology - Corbett Tiger Reserve - Ecological Damage – Restoration - The Supreme Court accepted the recommendations of the Expert Committee regarding the ecological damage caused in the Corbett Tiger Reserve (CTR) - The State of Uttarakhand is directed to restore the ecological damage caused to the CTR under the supervision, guidance, and control of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - Restoration Principle – Ecocentrism - The principle of restoration requires the State to take steps for the identification and effective implementation of active restoration measures that are localized to the particular ecosystem that was damaged - The focus must be on restoration of the ecosystem as close and similar as possible to the specific one that was damaged - Reiterated that the approach for Tiger Safaris and conservation must be of ecocentrism and not of anthropocentrism, and the precautionary principle must be applied - Reaffirmed the directions from the earlier judgment in T.N. Godavarman case concerning the sourcing of animals for Tiger Safaris - i. Animals sourced for Safaris shall not be from outside the Tiger Reserve; ii. Only injured, conflicted, or orphaned tigers may be exhibited as per the 2016 Guidelines; iii. The contrary provisions in the 2019 Guidelines, which permitted the sourcing of animals from zoos, were quashed - Noted that despite earlier directions, Uttarakhand has not completed the departmental proceedings against delinquent Indian Forest Service officers - The State has been given three further months to conclude the process. [Paras 43 - 46] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Circumstantial Evidence - Recovery of Weapon – Held, conviction cannot be solely based on the recovery of a pistol and an FSL Report when the alleged eye-witnesses turn hostile, the motive is unproved, and the recovery is made from a place accessible to other family members; the prosecution must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of cogent material and evidence- For a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to be relevant, the information received from the accused must "relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” - The disclosure statement must make it clear that the recovered pistol was the one used in the commission of the offence - Mere recovery of a weapon, even with a supporting FSL report, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of other corroborative evidence connecting the accused to the crime - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manjunath & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 15-25] Govind v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1106 : 2025 INSC 1318
Evidence Act, 1872– Section 112– Presumption of Legitimacy– DNA Test– Held that presumption under Section 112 is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage- It can only be displaced by strong, cogent, and unambiguous evidence of “non-access” between the spouses- Mere assertions of adultery, simultaneous access, or the wife's willingness to undergo a test are insufficient to rebut this presumption- A DNA test cannot be ordered as a matter of course to rove into paternity when the presumption remains unrebutted. [Paras 23-26, 37] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114 – Adverse Inference – Held that an adverse inference for refusal to undergo a DNA test can only be drawn if the court first validly orders the test after finding an “eminent need.”- If the prerequisites for ordering the test (rebuttal of Section 112 presumption) are not met, the question of drawing an adverse inference does not arise- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia 2023 INSC 146; Paras 50] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Discovery – Recoveries made at the instance of the accused rejected- Supreme Court noted that no contemporaneous disclosure memo was proved, remand papers were contradictory, and the recovery site (open drain/strip) was accessible to the public and police before the accused's arrival – Once prior knowledge is established and disclosure is not contemporaneously proved, Section 27 ceases to operate – Recoveries of skulls/bones treated as seizure from an already known place rather than discovery. [Paras 12, 18] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 45, 73 - Comparison of Signature/Handwriting - Suit for Declaration and Injunction – Held, power under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Act, which allows the court to compare disputed signatures or handwriting with admitted ones, can only be invoked for an admitted document for the purpose of comparison of signatures or handwriting - The High Court erred in allowing an application under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, at the revisional stage, after the trial had already concluded - Appeal allowed. Hussain Bin Awaz v. Mittapally Venkataramulu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1083
Evidence Law - Dock Identification After Long Delay – Unreliable - Held, identification of the accused for the first time in Court after 8½ years, that too through video-conferencing, by an elderly witness with weak distant vision, is inherently unsafe to rely - The witness was not wearing spectacles despite admitting weak eyesight; no prior TIP was conducted with her presence; improvement regarding clothes (black shirt) introduced for first time during deposition - all cumulatively render dock identification unreliable. [Paras 52 - 56] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322
Finance Act, 1994– Section 65(88) read with Section 65(105)(v)– Real Estate Agent– Service Tax Liability– Held, the definition of 'Real Estate Agent' is service-centric and requires a contract of agency– Where a developer acquires land and transfers title to a corporate entity based on a 'fixed average rate' as per an MOU, acting on a principal-to-principal basis, the activity constitutes trading in land/transfer of title and not a taxable service– The profit or loss arising from the difference between the negotiated land price and the fixed rate is not a commission or consultancy charge – Transfer of title in immovable property is expressly excluded from the definition of 'Service' under Section 65B(44)(a)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994. [Para 34, 38-44] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299
Finance Act, 1994– Section 73(1) Proviso– Extended Period of Limitation– Suppression of Facts– Mere non-payment of service tax or failure to file returns without an element of intent or deliberate suppression is insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation– Where transactions are conducted through valid banking channels and duly recorded in books of account, no wilful suppression can be inferred- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE & ST, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1412; Para 48-53, 49] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299
Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 - Section 15 - Principles of Natural Justice - Opportunity of Hearing - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that directed the closure of civil suits and action against unauthorized construction and commercial use of residential property in Gurugram, on the ground that the directions were issued without joining the affected parties (appellants) and affording them an opportunity of hearing - Observed that while unauthorized construction or commercial use of residential property cannot be protected, the determination of such fact must be made by the authorities affording due opportunity to the owners and occupiers - Held that opportunity of hearing is a sine qua non for fair administration of justice and a Court's observations should not adjudicate the rights of any unheard party - Set aside order of High Court. [Paras 9 - 12] Gaurav Kohli v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1061
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13 - Divorce – Cruelty – Desertion – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Duty of Court: Supreme Court directed that before concluding that a marriage has broken down irretrievably, it is imperative upon the Family Court or the High Court to determine which party is responsible for breaking the marital tie and forcing the other to live separately- A finding of irretrievable breakdown is likely to have devastating effects, especially on children, unless there is cogent evidence for wilful desertion or refusal to cohabit and/or look after the other spouse- The conclusion regarding irretrievable breakdown puts the Courts under an onerous duty to deeply analyse the entire evidence, consider social circumstances, and the background of the parties- The Supreme Court found that the High Court, in granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, failed to advert to the wife's plea that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home and did not undertake the necessary exercise to determine the essential issues- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law- Appeal allowed in part. [Paras 4-7] A v. I, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1143
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245HA – Revival of Appellate Proceedings – Held, Appellate proceedings will stand revived and Section 245HA of the 1961 Act will be applicable only if the application for settlement is rejected without providing for terms of settlement - The stand of the Revenue that the assessee must give up his right to contest the assessment order on merits, if the settlement application is rejected without providing for terms of settlement, is misconceived and must be rejected - Where an application is pending before the Settlement Commission, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) should keep the appellate proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the application by the Settlement Commission in terms of the 1961 Act - Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was Justified in condoning delay and setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and restoring the first appeal, considering the peculiar facts of the case - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 3 - 7] Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 Surat v. M. D. Industries Pvt Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1111
Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 3(27), 14, and 60(5) - Development Agreement - Corporate Debtor – Assets – Moratorium – Termination - Right of Corporate Debtor/Developer in a redevelopment project - Held that Development rights arising from a Development Agreement do not constitute "assets" or "property" of the Corporate Debtor under Section 3(27) of the IBC if the agreement was validly terminated by the owner (Housing Society) for non-performance prior to the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - The moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is intended to preserve existing assets and does not revive terminated contracts or protect rights that have ceased to exist prior to insolvency - Held that the National Company Law Tribunal's (NCLT) jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) cannot be invoked to set aside a legitimate termination of a contract based on breaches unrelated to the corporate debtor's insolvency - The IBC is not designed to serve as a refuge for corporate debtors who, by their persistent default, abandon performance, or frustrate urban welfare projects involving human rehabilitation - held that a contract which has been lawfully terminated before the initiation of insolvency proceedings cannot be treated as an “asset” or “property” of the corporate debtor, and therefore does not enjoy the protection of the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15, 16] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7(5)(b) Proviso - Application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by a financial creditor -Rejection for incompleteness - Mandatory requirement of notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within seven days of receipt of such notice prior to rejection - Held that Notice issued by the Joint Registrar of the NCLT under Rule 28 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 (general scrutiny/defect removal provision) is insufficient and cannot substitute the specific, mandatory notice required under the proviso to Section 7(5)(b) of the IBC - The notice under the IBC must be given to the applicant itself to rectify the defect in the application within seven days of the receipt of such notice - Service on an authorised representative, while permissible under Rule 38(5) of the NCLT Rules, was held insufficient to satisfy the mandate of the IBC in this context, as the IBC is the substantive legislation. [Relied on Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy and another, (2021) 10 SCC 330; Paras 11-16] Livein Aqua Solutions v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1135 : 2025 INSC 1349
Institutional Framework– Inclusion of Central Empowered Committee (CEC)– Held that to prevent duplication of work and two separate levels of scrutiny, directed that a representative of the CEC be made a formal member of the DRMB– Further directed the constitution of a "Standing Committee" headed by the CEC member to handle day-to-day functioning and conservation efforts, as the full DRMB (chaired by the Chief Secretary) cannot meet daily- Relying on the principle of restoration, the Supreme Court held that the State cannot merely penalize culprits but must actively restore damaged ecosystems– The DRMB's core function is defined as the preservation, scientific management, and ecological restoration of the Ridge. [Paras 48-50, 55-56, 57(ii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090
Insurance Law - Contract of Insurance is a contract of uberrima fides (utmost good faith) – Held, the proposer is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time - An exclusion clause in the policy is to be construed in a manner that it does not defeat the main purpose of the contract and could even be read down to serve the main purpose of the policy that is to indemnify the policy holder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 455; Para 24, 25-30] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315
Insurance Law - Exclusion Clause - Boiler & Pressure Plant Insurance Policy - Burden of Proof – Held, a subsequent discovery of damage or corrosion cannot be used to repudiate the claim as it would defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract - In the absence of a stand that the boiler and its parts had a prescribed life and had outlived it, or that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making full and complete disclosure, making the contract voidable, exclusion clause 5 could not have been pressed into service to repudiate the claim of the insured - The burden of proof to bring the case within the exclusionary clause lies on the insurance company - When an insurer accepts the risk, it can repudiate the claim on limited grounds such as: (a) by pleading and proving that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making disclosure of a material fact which renders the contract voidable at the instance of the insurer; and (b) by demonstrating that the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance exclude such claims. [Paras 20-25, 33-39] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315
Issue Estoppel - Held that the Petitioner is barred by issue estoppel from re-agitating the same issues of the operative agreement, the seat of arbitration, and the scope of the arbitration clauses, which were already decided by the High Court in its judgment when it dismissed the Petitioner's Anti-Arbitration Injunction Suit by allowing Respondent No. 1's application under Section 45 - The High Court's findings that the BSA constituted the principal agreement, the agreements were distinct, and the arbitration clause in the BSA remained binding are findings of jurisdictional fact that cannot be reopened - Held that arbitration petition is dismissed as it is fundamentally misconceived, legally untenable and foreclosed both in law and by issue estoppel. [Relied on Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board Peermade & Anr. 1999 5 SCC 590; Paras 35, 38] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Judicial Custody - Habeas Corpus petition for release of accused in judicial custody - When bail applications have been rejected - Scope of Writ Petition against Judicial Custody – Held, the custody of an accused person in a criminal case, where a First Information Report (FIR) is registered, a chargesheet is filed, and multiple bail applications have been dismissed by the High Court, cannot be held to be unlawful in a writ petition for habeas corpus - High Court's decision to allow a habeas corpus petition filed by the daughter of the accused, directing his release on bond, after the High Court itself had rejected four prior bail applications filed by the accused, is a "totally without jurisdiction" exercise of power and a "novel method" adopted to scuttle the due process of law - The process followed is "totally unknown to law" - The High Court, in the guise of hearing a habeas corpus petition, cannot examine the merits of the criminal case and direct release, effectively sitting as an appellate court over its own orders rejecting bail. Such action "shocks the conscience" of the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15 - 17] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kusum Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1110
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Compensation vs. Job in Lieu of Acquired Land - Held, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on land being acquired, the family is entitled only to the compensation which has already been paid - There is no provision under the Act for the grant of a job in lieu of the acquired land - A policy decision for giving a job in lieu of acquired land cannot prevail over the statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court found no error or illegality in the authorities and the High Court dismissing the claim for a job, which was filed more than 18 years after the framing of the policy - Petition dismissed. [Para 3] Sanjeev Kumar v State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1079
Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction Suit – Bona Fide Need – Challenge to Title of Landlord - Eviction suit – Held, a tenant who came into possession of rented premises through a rent deed executed by a landlord cannot subsequently challenge the landlord's ownership, especially after having paid rent for decades - The bona fide need was projected as the plaintiff joining her husband's sweets and savouries business, which operates in an adjacent shop, to expand it into the rented premises - The bona fide need stands established in this case - The concurring decisions of the three courts had "not considered the material evidence and entered into findings in a perverse manner based on mere surmises and conjectures" - The tenant having come into possession of the tenanted premises by a rent deed executed by the earlier landlord, cannot turn around and challenge his ownership - Directed the recovery of rent arrears from January 2000 till the handing over of possession - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Jyoti Sharma v. Vishnu Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1081 : 2025 INSC 1099
Legal Maxims & Judicial Precedents – Finality of Judicial Verdicts – Judicial Discipline- Bail Cancellation – Section 439 Cr. PC- Article 141 of the Constitution- Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts for the rule of law and public confidence- Held that the conclusive nature of judicial orders ensures the resolution of disputes and prevents endless litigation- The pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court- Allowing a verdict to be reopened because a later different view appears better would defeat the purpose of Article 141 and undermine the Court's authority- A subsequent bench of a different combination should defer to the view expressed by the earlier bench, unless there is a patent reason to interfere- Held that overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict does not necessarily mean that justice is better served.”, adding that any modification to the bail condition would violate the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution to give finality to the decision of the Supreme Court- Application dismissed. [Relied on Brown v. Allen and referenced Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388; Paras 48-51] Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1146 : 2025 INSC 1360
Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 (Odisha) - Rule 27(4)(iv) - Interpretation of 'Previous Financial Year' - Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters - Natural Resources Allocation - Maximization of Public Revenue – Held, a public tender is an instrument of governance to maximize public value, not a private bargain - The obligation of the Tendering Authority is to interpret its terms consistently and to ensure the interpretation advances the object of the tender - The Court must intervene when an interpretation is a demonstrable misconstruction of a tender condition or is irrational, especially when it narrows competition and excludes the highest bidder on a ground unsupported by law, thereby vitiating the decision-making process - The interpretation must serve the purpose of the tender, which is mainly to maximize the revenue to the State when dealing with a natural resource - The constitutional duty to interfere is beyond question when an authority misinterprets a condition that diminishes competition and deprives the State of its legitimate revenue - The successful bidder was held entitled to a refund of the deposited amount along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of deposit on the principle of restitution - Appeal allowed. [Relied on TATA Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651; Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others (2012) 8 SCC 216; Paras 9-16] Shanti Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1077 : 2025 INSC 1295
Motor Accident Compensation - Enhancement - Minor Victim (77.1% Disability) - The Supreme Court enhanced the compensation awarded to a minor victim from Rs. 7.48 Lakhs to Rs. 15.13 Lakhs - Held, compensation must be favourably addressed considering the severity of injuries and disability - Awarded Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Pain and Suffering' and Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Loss of Marriage Prospects'- Supreme Court added 40% for future prospects, a multiplier of 15 and calculating for 77.1 % disability, loss of future earnings was calculated at Rs. 7, 03,337/-; lumpsum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded for medical expenses; attendant charges at Rs. 40,000/- and loss of amenities at Rs. 80,000/-; Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sona (minor) vs. Manual C.M. (Civil Appeal No. 002316 of 2025); Paras 5, National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & Others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413; K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr. (2024 SCC Online SC 3385); Paras 4-6] Riyas v. P.N. Shinosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1094 : 2025 INSC 1303
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Inter-State Stage Carriage Permits on Notified Intra-State Routes – Override of Chapter VI over Chapter V (Section 98) – Validity of Permits on Overlapping Routes – Judicial Precedents – Issue - Whether a stage carriage permit can be granted to a private operator on an inter-State route, in terms of an InterState Reciprocal Transport (IS-RT) Agreement executed under Section 88 of the 1988 MV Act, when a portion of that inter-State route is common to an intra-State route which has been notified in terms of a scheme approved under Chapter VI of the Act – Held, Chapter VI of the 1988 MV Act, containing special provisions for state transport undertakings, has an overriding effect on Chapter V (which includes Section 88 concerning IS-RT Agreements) and any other inconsistent law or instrument, by virtue of Section 98 - An IS-RT Agreement, being merely an agreement between two States and not a law under the relevant MV Act, cannot override the provisions of an approved scheme and notified routes under Chapter VI - If there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes (under an approved scheme), no permits can be granted to any private operator whose route traverses or overlaps any part or whole of that notified route - Substantial question of law is no longer res integra in view of the decisions of larger/Constitution Benches, which are equally binding - The grant of relief to private operators becomes "well-nigh impossible" - Supreme Court directed the Principal Secretaries of the Transport Departments of the States of Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) to meet within 3 months to discuss modalities for fully working out the IS-RT Agreement - The States may explore whether partial exclusion of interState routes from the approved scheme can be permitted to further public interest - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Adarsh Travels Bus Services v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1985) 4 SCC 557; Paras 23, 26, 40-42, 45, 49, 50] U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kashmiri Lal Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1062 : 2025 INSC 1281
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Pay and Recover Principle – Breach of Policy Conditions – Held, even where there is a breach of insurance conditions (such as overloading or carrying gratuitous passengers), the insurer can be directed to satisfy the award with liberty to recover the same from the vehicle owner– Insurance companies cannot evade their obligation to compensate victims in motor accident cases, even when there is a breach of a policy condition- Insurers retain the right to recover the compensation amount from the vehicle owner thereafter - Appeal allowed to the extent of applying the 'pay and recover' principle. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh 2004 3 SCC 297; Rama Bai v. Amit Minerals 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2067; Para 8-12] Akula Narayana v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1095 : 2025 INSC 1301
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988— Section 166— Compensation— Multiplier— Application of Split Multiplier – Held, the practice of applying a split multiplier for calculating compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is generally foreign to the Act and is not to be used by Tribunals and/or Courts in the calculation of compensation - A split multiplier is only to be used in exceptional circumstances, and such circumstances must be recorded - The deceased's superannuation from service hardly qualifies as an 'out of the ordinary,' 'exceptional,' and 'cogent' reason to justify the use of a split multiplier, as retirement is a natural progression - The age of the deceased is the criterion to be utilized for the multiplier - The Supreme Court noted the divergent opinions on the application of the split multiplier, both intracourt and inter-court, which deprives Tribunals of guidance and creates a concerning situation for judicial discipline - The Supreme Court calculated the compensation based on the principles in Pranay Sethi Case, applying a multiplier of 11 for the age of 51 years, 15% future prospects, and conventional heads with 10% enhancement every three years - Appeal allowed. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC 2009 6 SCC 121; Paras 12-19] Preetha Krishnan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1073 : 2025 INSC 1293
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi MC Act) – Section 347A Building Plans – Deemed Sanction– Mixed Use Regulations– Mandatory Commercial Use - Appeal against an order of the High Court affirming the grant of deemed sanction to building plans for the construction of a residential house by the Appellate Authority - MCD/Tribunal and the District Judge - The original house was 85 years old and in a dilapidated condition - The Corporation did not take a decision on the plans, leading to the Tribunal granting deemed sanction - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the owner of a residential property in an area notified for mixed land use cannot be compelled to develop the property with a commercial unit on the ground floor, especially when the owner wants to use the property only for residential purpose - Held that a bare perusal of the relevant Circular dated 27.05.2009 makes it clear that the High Court correctly held that owners cannot be compelled to convert the ground floor of their residential accommodation to a commercial unit; they may choose to do so - Clause 1 of the Circular states that Building Plans on notified commercial streets/roads can be sanctioned for commercial use/partly commercial/partly residential/fully residential as per the choice of the applicant - The MPD-2021 provision permitting shops on the ground floor in notified areas does not imply that owners are compelled to develop the property in that manner - The new provision is an enabling provision for those who want to use it for mixed purpose - Considering the arbitrary and high-handed manner in which the appellant harassed the respondents over the past 15 years, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the appellant, payable to the respondents- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors; Paras 7, 10-14, 19, 20] South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Bharat Bhushan Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1121 : 2025 INSC 1324
Municipalities Act, 1961 (Madhya Pradesh) - Section 22(1)(d)(iii) - The Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & (iv) - Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(a) & Article 136 – Held, candidate convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment - Failed to disclose this conviction in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form as mandated by Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) mandates every candidate to furnish information regarding "any disposed criminal case in which he has been convicted" - The format of the affidavit requires disclosure of conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year or more - Failure to furnish such information results in non-compliance with the Rules - The requirement to furnish information, including criminal antecedents, is in furtherance of the electorate's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India - Non-disclosure or suppression of material information deprives voters of making an informed and advised choice - By failing to disclose the conviction, the candidate furnished false and incorrect information, making the acceptance of the nomination form improper - This constitutes a breach of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 and attracts the ground under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Act of 1961 for declaring the election void - When there is non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, the question of whether the election was materially affected does not arise, as such non-disclosure amounts to undue influence - The wrongful acceptance of the nomination form of the returned candidate renders the election void and, by itself, indicates the result was materially affected - In the absence of a provision in the Rules to condone such non-compliance, adopting such a course would do violence to the Act of 1961 and the Rules of 1994 - The eligibility of a candidate is determined as on the date of submission of the nomination form; thus, the subsequent acquittal in appeal after the election was of no consequence - Petition dismissed. [Relied on Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar and others 2015 INSC 960; Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & Others 2014 INSC 384; Paras 22-25] Poonam v. Dule Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1068 : 2025 INSC 1284
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37(1)(b) – Grant of Bail in Offences Involving Commercial Quantity – Twin Conditions – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders granting bail, holding that the High Court failed to properly apply the statutory bar under Section 37 - The twin conditions—recording a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—must be demonstrably complied with - Held that the High Court's conclusion that there was no material to show knowledge was arrived at without discussion of the respondent's statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, such as the respondent placing orders, controlling logistics, coordinating with the overseas supplier, and being present when the consignment was opened - Noted that High Court did not examine whether the circumstances, taken at face value, could prima facie indicate conscious control or involvement sufficient to attract the presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35 of the NDPS Act - Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer for bail, requiring a complete and fair appraisal of the rival contentions based on the material, and adhering to the parameters of Section 37. [Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Vigin K Varghese, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1101 : 2025 INSC 1316
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37 - Mandatory Conditions for Bail - Release on bail for offences involving commercial quantity is the exception, and negation of bail is the rule – Held, the provisions of the NDPS Act must be interpreted literally and not liberally to prevent frustrating the object, purpose, and preamble of the Act - The issue of long incarceration or delay in trial (accused in custody for 1 year and 4 months and charges not framed) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 in a case involving a commercial quantity and prima facie evidence of organized drug trafficking - Since the accused was charged with offenses punishable with ten to twenty years rigorous imprisonment, it could not be said that the Respondent has been incarcerated for an unreasonably long time - An undertaking given by the accused's brother (a Sepoy in the Indian Army) to ensure compliance with bail conditions is of no relevance because the brother cannot be imprisoned if the accused absconds - Despite long custody and delayed framing of charges, the allegations are serious, as the recovery was much in excess of the commercial quantity and the accused allegedly got cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848; Paras 11-15] Union Of India V. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1109
National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (NCLT Rules) - Rule 34(4) - Verification of Petition/Application by Affidavit - Defective Affidavit (Affidavit deposed to on 17.07.2023 but application verified on 26.07.2023) - Effect on Section 7 application - Held that a mere filing of a 'defective' affidavit in support of a Section 7 application does not render the application non est (non-existent) or liable to be rejected at the threshold - The defect in the affidavit is curable and is neither an incurable nor a fundamental defect - Rules of procedure are a handmaiden to justice and should not be used to defeat substantive rights; procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the statute or rule mandates it. [Relied on: Vidyawati Gupta and others vs. Bhakti Hari Nayak and others (2006) 2 SCC 777; Uday Shankar Triyar vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, (2006) 1 SCC 75; Paras 18- 20] Livein Aqua Solutions v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1135 : 2025 INSC 1349
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 16(h) - Limitation for Appeal against Environmental Clearance (EC) - Commencement of Period of Limitation - Duty to Communicate EC - "Earliest of the Date" Principle – Held, Section 16(h) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 provides a period of thirty days from the date on which the order granting Environmental Clearance (EC) is "communicated" to an "any person aggrieved" to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal - The Proviso allows for a further period not exceeding sixty days for filing the appeal if the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause - The maximum condonable period is 90 days (30 days + 60 days) - The communication contemplated under Section 16(h) is intended to be in rem and not in personam, as environmental issues operate as public law concerns, and the expression "any person aggrieved" must receive a liberal construction - The obligation to "communicate" the EC order vests in a plurality of duty holders, including: (i) the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC), (ii) the Project Proponent, and (iii) the Pollution Control Board(s) (SPCB/SEIAA). This obligation flows from the Environment Protection Act, 1986, read with the Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2006 (specifically Paragraph 10) and the conditions of the EC. [Relied on Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC 126] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee shall operate with the following broad Terms of Reference- i. The Committee shall oversee and ensure full, faithful and time-bound implementation of the directions contained in the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, including those issued based on the recommendations of the Justice P.C. Tatia Committee; ii. The Committee shall prepare a scientifically grounded, time-bound River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the river system that includes Rivers Jojari, Luni and Bandi and formulate a comprehensive plan for its execution in coordination with the State Government and concerned authorities/agencies- This plan shall incorporate scientific, technical and administrative measures for remediation of contaminated topsoil, rejuvenation of groundwater aquifers, restoration of river ecology, revival of flora and fauna, prevention of future contamination, and long-term environmental monitoring. iii. In order to accurately map the sources of pollution, the Committee may conduct a comprehensive on ground survey of every discharge point, pipeline, drain, channel or outlet that leads into the Jojari, Bandi or Luni rivers or any of their tributaries- The Committee shall identify all legal and illegal discharge points, determine the nature of effluents released through each of them, and ascertain whether such discharges comply with statutory standards. iv. The Committee may, with the assistance of suitable expert bodies, examine the feasibility of making all existing SCADA meters fully online and integrated into a common monitoring dashboard to enable effective and continuous oversight and real time data monitoring of discharge of industrial effluents- The Committee shall also assess the feasibility of installing SCADA meters, or any other compatible monitoring devices, at all Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) so that the quantity and quality of effluent discharged from such plants can be monitored on a real-time basis- v. The Committee may schedule and conduct audits including surprise checks of the CETPs, STPs, oxidation ponds, drainage systems, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) units and industrial primary treatment plants at appropriate intervals- The Committee shall specify compliance benchmarks and ensure that non-compliance is addressed promptly- vi. The performance audits of Common Effluents Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) undertaken by educational institutions engaged by the State of Rajasthan shall be submitted to the Committee, which shall examine the findings, direct remedial measures and ensure that deficiencies identified in the audits are rectified without delay; vii. All action plans, technical reports, feasibility studies and remedial proposals prepared by IIT Jodhpur, MNIT Jaipur, MBM Engineering College, BITS Pilani or any other institution engaged by the State shall be placed before the Committee- The Committee shall evaluate the scientific soundness, feasibility and environmental efficacy of each recommendation and give its suggestions on their implementation; viii. The Committee shall assess the existing treatment capacity vis-à-vis actual industrial and municipal discharge and prepare a timebound infrastructural augmentation plan- This may include, wherever necessary, the installation of new CETPs or STPs, enhancement of existing capacity, creation of additional conveyance pipelines, adoption of 56 Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) technologies, and establishment of integrated waste management systems- ix. The Committee shall identify officials, authorities or industries/industrial units responsible for non-compliance or dereliction of their obligations- Upon identification of such individuals and/or industries/industrial units, the Committee shall recommend appropriate disciplinary action, prosecution under applicable statutes, and/or recovery of environmental compensation, as the facts may justify- It shall ensure that the principle of “Polluter Pays” is applied effectively and that no violator is permitted to escape liability; xi. The Committee shall have full authority to call for records, issue directions to State and local bodies, seek technical assistance from national institutions including but not limited to National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (CISR-NEERI) and ensure strict implementation of all environmental safeguards; xii. The Committee shall also be at liberty to examine and address all such matters as may be incidental, ancillary or consequential to the aforesaid Terms of Reference- This shall include any issue which, in the considered view of the Committee, bears a nexus with the prevention of pollution, restoration of the river ecosystem, augmentation of treatment infrastructure, or enforcement of environmental norms- The Committee shall have full authority to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to secure the objectives of the directions issued by this Court and to ensure that the environmental and constitutional rights of the affected communities are effectively safeguarded. [Para 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) – Held, recognizing the Aravalis' ecological fragility, rich biodiversity (including 22 wildlife sanctuaries, 4 tiger reserves, and wetlands), and water recharging function, the Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to prepare a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) through ICFRE (Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education) for the entire continuous geological ridge extending from Gujarat to Delhi, on the lines of the MPSM for Saranda- i. No new mining leases are to be granted until the MPSM is finalised by the MoEF&CC through ICFRE; ii. The MPSM must- Identify permissible, ecologically sensitive, conservation-critical, and restoration priority areas where mining shall be strictly prohibited or permitted only under exceptional/scientifically justified circumstances; Incorporate an analysis of cumulative environmental impacts and the ecological carrying capacity of the region; Include detailed post-mining restoration and rehabilitation measures. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
National Tribunals Commission – Mandatory Direction- Reiterating earlier constitutional directives, Supreme Court ordered the Union of India to establish a National Tribunals Commission within four months—a structural safeguard for ensuring independence, transparent recruitment, and uniform administration of tribunals. [Paras 151–153] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Settlement at Revisional Stage – Acquittal subject to condition of depositing cost with Legal Services Authority – Held, the direction imposing costs on the appellant, to be paid to the Legal Services Authority, cannot be sustained in the eye of law, particularly when the complainant does not want any further amount, and the appellant has expressed inability to comply with the same, which is not in dispute - Held that the case Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [(2010) 5 SCC 663 which provide for imposition of costs in NI Act depending on at which stage the case was compounded, could not be treated as binding. [Para 5-7] Rajeev Khandelwal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1103
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Distinction between 'delivery' and 'presentation' illustrated - Supreme Court distinguished delivery (Section 46 NI Act) from presentment (Section 64 NI Act) - Held that delivery involves the drawer handing the cheque to the payee, and, in case of account-payee cheques, the payee delivering it to his own bank - This stage is covered by Section 142(2)(a) - Presentment is the act of presenting the cheque to the drawee bank for payment; this stage is relevant for Section 142(2)(b). [Relied on Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3833; Paras 42-50] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, 142(2) & 142A — Territorial Jurisdiction — Transfer of Pending Cases — Effect of Amendment Act, 2015 - Jurisdiction Post-2015 Amendment - Held that Supreme Court reiterates that the jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account (and where the cheque is delivered for collection) is situated. [Para 76] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Transfer of Cases where Evidence Commenced (Section 145(2) Stage) - Held that a complaint which was originally filed in a court (MM, Kolkata) that later lacked jurisdiction due to the 2015 Amendment, but had already reached the stage of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of the Act before it was returned, should be transferred back to that original court - Allowing the parties to contest the complaint afresh in the court of proper jurisdiction (JMFC, Bhopal) would amount to a procedural impropriety detrimental to the accused - The Supreme Court applies the exception carved out in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Case; principle laid down in paragraph 22 of this judgment, which allowed cases that had reached the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond to continue in the court where they were pending, is applied to meet the ends of justice - Held that cases where the trial had reached the stage of summoning, appearance of the accused, and the recording of evidence had commenced as per Section 145(2) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, should continue in the same court where the trial was ongoing - Petition is allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 12; Paras 76-82] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
One Time Settlement (OTS) - Quashing of Criminal and Civil Proceedings upon Full and Final Settlement with Lender Banks – Peculiar Facts of the Case – OTS Amount Higher than FIR Allegation – Issue - Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to quash multiple criminal and civil proceedings arising from alleged loan defalcation and money laundering, in a scenario where the petitioners have agreed to deposit a substantial sum towards full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies - The Supreme Court allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed all criminal and civil proceedings against the petitioners, subject to the deposit of Rs. 5100 crores as a full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies on or before December 17, 2025 - This order was based on a consensus reached, where the petitioners agreed to deposit the amount demanded by the investigating agencies to put a quietus to the entire litigation - Held that if public money, settled in the One Time Settlement (OTS), was returned to the banks, the continuation of criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose - Held that the petitioners voluntarily agreed to deposit the full amount demanded to settle the matter and protect public money, the discretion to quash all related proceedings (CBI, ED, PMLA, Fugitive Act, SFIO, Black Money, and Income Tax) was deemed deserving of exercise - Held that the directions issued are strictly in the peculiar facts of this case and shall not be treated as precedent. Hemant S. Hathi v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1139
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Consensual Relationship vs. Rape – Held, mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings - What was a consensual relationship at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage - Misuse of the criminal justice machinery to convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation - The case is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious - High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings under Section 528 of BNSS was unsustainable - The continuation of the prosecution would be an abuse of the court machinery - The FIR and Charge-sheet were quashed - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, 2024 11 SCC 398; Paras 28-32, 34, 40] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 507 - Rape on promise of marriage - Quashing of FIR and Charge-sheet - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), Section 528 - Held that a relationship that continued for three years and involved multiple physical acts, with the woman being well-educated, married (with the marriage still subsisting), and voluntarily meeting the man on each occasion, cannot be retrospectively branded as rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage - The physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of the offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. [Relied on Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 4 SCC 197] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Vitiation of Consent (Section 90 IPC/Section 19 Indian Contract Act, 1872) – Held, for consent to be vitiated by a false promise of marriage, it must be established that the promise was made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman solely to persuade her to have a physical relationship - The law must remain sensitive to genuine cases where the promise was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment. [Relied on Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 5 SCC 764] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 149 – Unlawful Assembly – When Section 149 IPC is made applicable, the Court should be mindful that all that is required to be looked into is whether the accused was one of the members of the unlawful assembly or not - Even if a particular accused has not participated in the actual assault, he could still be held guilty. Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1087
Pleadings and Documents – Supreme Court Practice and Procedure – Paper-Books – Photographs – Directions to Registry and Advocates-on-Record (AORs)- The Supreme Court directed its Registry not to clear any paper-book for listing where the photographs appended are black-and-white - Supreme Court further issued directions, to be circulated amongst all Advocates-on-Record (AORs), stating that unless proper coloured photographs, along with distance dimensions and supported by a conceptual plan, are appended, the material shall not be allowed to be placed on record, and the matter will remain in the list of 'defects not cured' till further orders - For photographs filed through e-mail or e-filed, the AORs were directed to simultaneously submit hard copies of the coloured photographs also. [Paras 1-3] Dinamati Gomes v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1136
Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act of 1994 (the 1994 Act) – Issue - A Writ Petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, questioning the age criterion of 35 years and above imposed on pregnant women seeking pre-natal diagnostic/screening under the 1994 Act - Supreme Court noted that while the petitioner may not have made out a case of discriminatory treatment or violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21, the issues raised warrant consideration by the expert body - Held that the right to reproductive autonomy is a graded right (under Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act) and right of access to diagnostic facilities a regulated one (under PC-PNDT Act) - Noted that upto certain weeks, you have full autonomy - Then you have a guided autonomy - And in certain other cases beyond 24 weeks, it is the judicial intervention which has permitted the autonomy to be preserved - This is a completely different area. Here is an interface between prevention of a crime, which is rampant, because sex-selection / sex-determination becomes intrinsically connected with certain diagnostic procedures - right to access to diagnostic facilities, which is a part of Article 21 rights, is regulated to a certain extent - The Supreme Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to the Central Supervisory Board, constituted under the 1994 Act, to treat the entire pleadings, including the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit, as a representation-cum-material for their consideration - The Competent Authority may consider making any amendment/modification/clarification of the existing Rules or Form 'F' in public interest if the petitioner has made out a comprehensive case for the same. [Para 5-7] Meera Kaura Patel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1152
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) - Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act – Competence and Jurisdictional Validity - Held that Under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, where the appointing authority of the accused is the State Government, the sanction for prosecution must be accorded by the State Government and by none other - The Explanation to Section 19(4), which includes the "competency of the authority to grant sanction" as an error, becomes relevant only when the question of the validity of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate or revisional forum, as provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 19 - The earlier decisions relied upon by the State were distinguished on this basis - The trial Court was given liberty to summon original records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to the appointment to decide the validity of the sanction - If the sanction is found valid, the trial shall proceed - If found otherwise, the chargesheet is to be returned to the investigating agency for procuring fresh sanction from the appropriate authority. [Relied on Refer Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186; Paras 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) - Section 19 – Validity of Sanction – Effect of Exoneration in Departmental Proceedings on Criminal Trial - Supreme Court rejected the argument that exoneration of the accused-appellant in the departmental proceedings should lead to automatic discharge in the criminal case - The standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings (preponderance of possibilities) is significantly lower than that required in a criminal trial (proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt) - Held that Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not, ipso facto, furnish a ground for dropping the criminal charges, particularly in Trap Cases - The conclusion of the disciplinary authority that the guilt could not be proved merely on the testimony of the trap laying officer was held to be premature and unfounded - Held that Conviction in a trap case can be based even on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found reliable and trustworthy, and the mere fact that a decoy/complainant turns hostile would not adversely affect the case of the prosecution - The possibility of the criminal case still resulting in conviction, irrespective of the fact that the witnesses turned hostile in the departmental inquiry, is a realistic possibility. [Relied on N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Paras 27- 32, 41] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356
Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 (MPFA) (Maharashtra) — Section 3(1) read with Section 2(f)(iii) (Vesting of Private Forest) — Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) — Section 35(3) (Notice) — Mandatory Preconditions – Held, vesting of private land in the State as 'private forest' under the MPFA, based on a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, requires strict adherence to the statutory sequence - The expression "issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA comprehends due service of the notice on the owner as contemplated by Section 35(5) of the IFA - The requirement of service is mandatory because it alone triggers the owner's right to object, which the State is obliged to consider - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2014 3 SCC 430; Para 13-15] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Sections 9(m) and 10 - Aggravated Sexual Assault - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man found guilty of aggravated sexual assault on a 4-year-old girl, rejecting his plea for acquittal based on the absence of medical evidence and eyewitness testimony, holding that the consistent and credible evidence of the child's parents was sufficient to sustain the conviction - The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle that medical evidence will take a backseat and even if it does not corroborate with the ocular evidence, the latter would be allowed to prevail where it is consistent and cogent- Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Dinesh Kumar Jaldhari v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1105 : 2025 INSC 1317
Public Interest and Directions - Held that in projects of public importance, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) for vulnerable citizens, the State's decision to cancel a tender or restart the process is itself an aspect of public interest- While upholding the cancellation and setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court directed the Appellant-State to- i. Hold a Fact-Finding Enquiry to ascertain the details of ePoS machines, components, or allied services produced or supplied under the cancelled LoI and their utilisation by the Department during the pilot or demonstration stages; ii. Assess the value and costs of installation of such verified tangible assets or work and reimburse the Respondent-company on the principle of quantum meruit (equitable reimbursement) to make good the losses suffered; iii. Clarified that no claim for loss of profit, expectation, or consequential damages shall survive; iv. Granted liberty to the Appellant-State to issue a fresh tender forthwith- Appeal allowed. [Paras 20-56] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987; Section 124A - Compensation for Death in Railway Accident - Bona Fide Passenger - Contributory Negligence – Held, merely because a deceased passenger, who had a valid ticket, boarded a wrong express train that passed through his destination, it cannot be construed that he was not a bona fide passenger - The railway authorities' contention that he was not a bona fide passenger was rejected- The Supreme Court rejected the Railways' plea under Section 124A Proviso Clause (b) that the death was caused by the deceased's self-negligence (jumping from a running train) - No sane person would attempt to deboard or alight from a running express train, and the plea of the deceased having jumped off the train was a plea without proof - It was incumbent upon the railway authorities to prove this plea, and the DRM Report was silent on this aspect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Shrikumar Gupta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1115
Registration Act, 1908 - Presumptive Titling System - Future Reforms – Held, Indian property law sustains a dichotomy between registration and ownership - The Registration Act, 1908, mandates the registration of documents, not titles, forming the cornerstone of India's presumptive titling system. Registration creates a public record with presumptive evidentiary value, but it is never a conclusive proof of ownership - This presumption is rebuttable - Supreme Court noted the promise in emerging technologies such as Blockchain for transforming land registration into a more secure, transparent, and tamper-proof system - The Law Commission is requested to examine the issue of integrating the property registration regime with conclusive titling and restructuring existing laws, considering technological advancement. [Paras 32-34, 37, 38; K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar and Others 2025 INSC 462] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292
Registration Act, 1908 — Section 17(1)(e) — Deed Assigning Decree for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale of Immovable Property — Whether such a deed requires compulsory registration - A deed assigning a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act, 1908 - The assignment deed in this case did not require registration because the decree itself, which is for specific performance, does not create or purport to create any right, title, or interest in any immovable property. [Relied on Babu Lal vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others [(1982) 1 SCC 525; Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Limited (2) through Director vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC 656; Paras 21, 25-28] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329
Registration Rules, 2008 (Bihar) - Section 69, Rule 19 (xvii) and (xviii) - Constitutional Law - Right to Property - Subordinate Legislation - Ultra Vires - Dichotomy between Registration and Title – Held, the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 - Section 69, or any other provision of the Act, does not enable the Inspector General to make rules requiring the declaration or enclosure of proof of mutation in favor of the vendor as a condition precedent for registration - The existing grounds for refusal under Rule 19 (i) to (xv) relate to the identity of the property or the executant, or legal requirements (like fee/POA), and have no relation to proof of title - The impugned sub-rules are "qualitatively distinct" as they introduce 'mentioning' with 'proof' of a transaction under another statute (Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011) as a precondition - The impugned sub-rules are arbitrary and illegal because they unduly restrict the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and dispose of immovable property - The interlinking of registration with mutation is illegal given the nascent stage of the mutation, survey, and settlement processes in Bihar (as acknowledged in the Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act, 2011), where land records/Jamabandi are nowhere near completion. [Paras 11,12, 16, 17, 25, 29, 38] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292
Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu) – Challenge to Public Auction Sale – Non-compliance with statutory remedy and limitation period - Sections 37-A and 38 - Noted that Sections 37-A and 38 provide a complete mechanism for setting aside a sale of immovable property, either by depositing the due amount or by challenging material irregularity, mistake, or fraud. Both provisions prescribe a mandatory limitation period of 30 days from the date of sale- Supreme Court found that the appellant admittedly failed to file any application under these sections within the prescribed 30-day limitation period, despite the auction sale occurring on July 29, 2005- The belated challenge, raised after more than four years, was held to be impermissible- Supreme Court clarified that there was no order staying the conduct of the auction itself, only the confirmation- The stay on confirmation does not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress within 30 days as per Sections 37A or 38 of the Act- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2000 6 SCC 224; Paras 16-18, 22-25] Kolanjiammal v. Revenue Divisional Officer Perambalur District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1108 : 2025 INSC 1319
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Section 23 (2) - National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) - Notification dated August 23, 2010 - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Held, teachers who obtained the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) qualification within the extended time prescribed under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be terminated merely because they did not possess the qualification at the time of their initial appointment - The High Court's non-interference with the termination was erroneous - The respondents were directed to forthwith reinstate the appellants to the post of Assistant Teacher with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including seniority. The appellants were not entitled to back-wages - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-14] Uma Kant v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1078 : 2025 INSC 1273
Right to Life (Article 21) - Right to a Healthy Environment - River Pollution - Sustained Administrative apathy- Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the grave environmental catastrophe in the Jojari, Bandi, and Luni river system in Rajasthan, noting the pollution affects 2 million lives and is a fallout of "sustained, systemic collapse of regulatory vigilance and utter administrative apathy stretching over nearly two decades"- Held that when environmental degradation reaches such proportions, the injury transcends the ecological realm and becomes a "direct constitutional injury" requiring immediate judicial redress- The belated flurry of administrative activity, triggered solely by judicial intervention, underscores a prolonged period of regulatory apathy and institutional neglect- The installed capacities of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) and Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) are grossly inadequate, resulting in the discharge of untreated/partially treated effluents, which is emblematic of a systemic failure- The interim stay previously operating on the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, is modified, clarified, and lifted to allow the implementation of the substantive remedial, regulatory and preventive directions contained therein- he interim stay shall continue to operate only in respect of (i) the remarks made against RIICO and other authorities/Corporations, and (ii) the direction imposing environmental compensation of Rs. 2 Crores upon them- Directed the constitution of a High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee, headed by a retired High Court Judge, to supervise the remedial measures- The Committee is mandated to oversee the full implementation of NGT directions, prepare a comprehensive River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the entire river system, map all discharge points, and conduct recurring audits of all treatment and monitoring infrastructure. [Relied on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598; Paras 9, 11, 22, 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
Scheduled Tribe Claim – Dismissal of claim after completing medical education – Petitioner admitted to MBBS course against a Scheduled Tribe seat on the basis of a 'Mannervarlu' Tribe claim – Scrutiny Committee dismissed the claim while proceedings were pending and education was completed – Whether the completed education should be protected - Held that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly taking into account that the precious medical education would go waste if protection is not granted, the Supreme Court was inclined to protect the education undertaken by the petitioner - The education undertaken for the MBBS Degree shall stand protected as he had already completed course during pendency of proceedings - It was clarified that the petitioner shall not hereinafter claim any benefit on the basis of him belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category. [Paras 4, 5] Vedkumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1133
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Secured Creditor's Priority - Workmen's Dues - Workmen's Dues (Unquantified): The workmen's dues which have not been quantified as of now cannot have any priority over the secured creditor's claim, which is conferred priority under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, if the proceeds can only satisfy the secured debt - Appeals allowed. [Para 28] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Service Law - Alteration of Selection Criteria - Weightage of Qualifications - Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (Board) - Recruitment of Foresters - Academic Qualification for Forester - Held that the minimum academic qualification for the post of Forester was or equivalent with Science - Stress was primarily on physical attributes and viva voce, not solely academic criteria - The Board initially provided 25 points for a B.Sc. Forestry degree out of a total of 100 points - After conducting interviews, the Board changed the evaluation criteria, differentiating between a 4-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 25 points) and a 3-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 20 points) - Altering the evaluation procedure after the interviews were held, when candidates had completed their participation in the selection process, was found to be arbitrary and lacking a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved - Held that the change in the evaluation criteria was made at the stage of preparation of the select list and was deemed arbitrary by the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (2025) 2 SCC 1; Paras 10, 11] J and K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1156
Service Law - Biometric Attendance System - Introduction without Prior Consultation – Issue - Challenge to the introduction of a Biometric Attendance System in the Office of Principal Accountant General (A&E), Odisha, via Circulars dated 01.07.2013, 22.10.2023, and 06.11.2013 - Supreme Court noted that the employees were not opposed to the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System, which was accepted by their counsel - Since the employees had no reservation, no controversy survived for adjudication, and the department could proceed with implementation - Held that the exercise undertaken by the High Court was "totally unnecessary" - The court ruled that when the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System is for the benefit of all stakeholders, the mere fact that the employees were not consulted before implementation does not render the introduction of the system to be illegal - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Union of India v. Dilip Kumar Rout, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1063
Service Law – Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 – Misappropriation of Public Funds – Judicial Review of Disciplinary Authority's Decision – Held, the High Court misdirected itself and travelled beyond the scope of jurisdiction exercisable in a matter of judicial review - Judicial review only permits scrutiny of the process of inquiry and not the case on merits, especially when no defect in the inquiry process was pointed out - The High Court erred by going into the merits of the controversy, examining the admission of guilt by the respondent, and setting aside the punishment - The Court noted that the documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement, evidenced by the passbooks being stamped with receipt of the amount but having no corresponding entries in the post office's books of accounts - Mere deposit of the embezzled amount subsequent to being caught will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - The respondent's explanation of having stamped the passbooks due to "ignorance of the Rules" after 12 years of service was rejected as "farfetched" and unacceptable - Supreme Court set aside the reinstatement of the Post Master who was removed from the service for embezzling the depositors amount for its personal use. The Court said mere deposit of the embezzled money will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 11] Union of India v. Indraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1104 : 2025 INSC 1313
Service Law - Guidelines on seniority - Supreme Court issued certain guidelines for the filling up of the DJ posts invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution - i. The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR; ii. Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated; iii. If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made; iv. After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre; v. The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented - Clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute - The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services - The guidelines will not reopen any decided issues related to inter-se seniority disputes. [Paras 97-100] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328
Service Law – Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Inter Se Seniority – Direct Recruits (DR) - Regular Promotees (RP) - LDCE Promotees (LDCE) – Held, previous service in the lower rungs of the judiciary (Junior Division/Senior Division) cannot be reckoned for granting weightage, preferential treatment, or a separate quota for determining inter se seniority, fixation in higher grades (Selection Grade/Super Time Scale), or assignment of administrative duties within the common cadre of the HJS - Once appointed to the common cadre of the Higher Judicial Service, all members lose the 'birthmark' of the source from which they were recruited (RP, LDCE, or DR), and the service rendered in the feeder category pales into insignificance - The theory of classifying District Judges within the HJS based on their length of service in the lower rungs subverts the guarantee of equality available to members of the common cadre - Further advancement within the HJS, including promotion to higher grades, must be based on merit-cum-seniority, evaluated on the basis of performance and service rendered within the HJS cadre and not the lower feeder cadre - Supreme Court ruled out any special quota/weightage for promotee judges in the posts of District Judges, observing that there is no nationwide pattern of disproportionate representation of direct recruits in the Higher Judicial Service. [Relied on State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 19; Paras 54-65, 94] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328
Service Law - Police Service — Dismissal — Appointment based on Forged Degree/Certificate - The respondent, appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police in 1988, was dismissed from service in 1997 after a complaint in 1996 alleged his appointment was based on a forged and fabricated degree/certificate - The Central Administrative Tribunal ("CAT") and the High Court of Delhi set aside the dismissal and remanded the matter for a full-fledged departmental inquiry - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the orders passed by the CAT and the High Court were unsustainable – Held, the act of getting an appointment in a uniformed service like the police, which is supposed to uphold the rule of law, on the basis of a forged degree/certificate is un-condonable - In the particular facts and circumstances of the case, where the forgery was established, the absence of a full departmental inquiry may not be a factor to vitiate the final order of dismissal from service - Appeal allowed. [Para 8] Commissioner of Police v. Ex. Ct. Vinod Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1117
Specific Performance — Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Subsequent Purchaser — Deemed Notice — Section 19(b) – Held, a subsequent purchaser cannot claim the protection of a 'bona fide purchaser for value without notice' under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if they had prior knowledge of the earlier Agreement to Sell (ATS) and were aware that the original vendees were still litigating to protect their rights under the Agreement to sell, even after the vendor claimed to have terminated the agreement - A subsequent purchaser who chooses to remain content with the unilateral assertions of the vendor regarding the termination of the ATS, and consciously abstains from making further inquiry into the subsisting interest of the original vendee, cannot escape the consequences of deemed notice - To invoke section 19(b) protection, a purchaser must establish - i. purchase for value; ii. Payment made in good faith; iii. Absence of notice of the earlier contract. [Relied on Manjit Singh v. Darshana Devi 2024 SCC OnLine 3431; Ram Niwas v. Bano 2000 6 SCC 685; Para 73-80] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298
Specific Performance – Limitation – Impleadment – Where defendants sought to raise a counter-claim for specific performance regarding an agreement dated 02.12.2002 in an impleading application filed only in the year 2006, Supreme Court held the claim was grossly delayed and hit by limitation – No liberty granted to file a separate suit as the claim could not survive. [Para 13, 15] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310
Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Failure to Seek Declaration of Invalidity — Maintainability – Held, where the vendor's notice of termination is based on their own inability and inconvenience rather than any breach by the vendee, and the vendee immediately replies challenging the termination and asserting the continuance of the contract, the subsequent suit for specific performance is not rendered non-maintainable solely because the plaintiff/vendee failed to include a specific prayer for a declaration that the termination notice is bad in law. The failure to specifically frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit for want of such declaration does not preclude an Appellate Court from examining whether the jurisdictional fact necessary for granting the relief of specific performance exists - A party cannot unilaterally terminate a non-determinable agreement to sell, except where the contract itself is expressly determinable in nature under Section 14 of the Act - Such invalid termination does not oblige the aggrieved party to first seek a separate declaration challenging the termination before pursuing a claim for specific performance -Appeal dismissed. [Relied on R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3377); Para 54-70] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Nature of a Decree for Specific Performance — Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Interest in Immovable Property- Held, a decree for specific performance merely recognizes a claim for specific performance of a contract and does not elevate the status of a decree-holder to that of the owner of the property in question - Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance gives any right or title to the decree-holder; the right and title passes only on the execution of the deed of sale (conveyance) and its registration - A contract for the sale of immovable property, by itself, does not create any interest in or charge on such property - The personal obligation created by an agreement of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of a contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein - The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of the decree for specific performance, and it subsists notwithstanding the decree - The suit is deemed to be pending even after such a decree, and the Court passing the decree continues to retain control - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Amol and others vs. Deorao and others 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 11; Paras 16-21, 27] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329
Stray Dog - Directions issued to all States and UTs - i. Identification - Identify all Government and private educational institutions, hospitals, public sports complexes/stadia, bus stands/depots, and railway stations within two weeks; ii. Securing Premises: Administrative heads, under the supervision of the District Magistrate, must secure premises using adequate fencing, boundary walls, and gates to prevent the ingress of stray dogs within eight weeks; iii. Nodal Officer: Management of each institution shall designate a Nodal Officer responsible for cleanliness and preventing the entry/habitation of stray dogs; iv. Inspections: Local municipal authorities/panchayats shall carry out regular inspections (at least once in three months) to ensure no stray dog habitats exist; v. Removal and Non-Release: Jurisdictional municipal bodies shall forthwith remove every stray dog found within these institutional premises and shift the animal(s) to a designated shelter after sterilisation and vaccination; The stray dogs so picked up shall not be released back to the same location from which they were picked up; vi. Medical Stock: All Government and private hospitals must maintain a mandatory stock of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin; vii. Waste Management and Security: Railway authorities and State transport corporations/municipal authorities over bus stands/depots must ensure premises are effectively secured, implement proper waste-management systems to eliminate food sources, and conduct regular inspections; viii. SOPs: Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) shall issue detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within four weeks for the management of stray dogs in institutional premises, to be uniformly adopted. [Para 25] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072
Stray Dog Menace in Institutional Areas (Educational Institutions, Hospitals, Sports Complexes, Bus Stands/Depots, Railway Stations) — Directions for Securing Premises and Management of Stray Dogs - The Supreme Court, acknowledging the alarming rise in dog-bite incidents in institutional areas and the systemic failure to secure these premises, observed that the persistence of dog bites constitutes not merely a public-health challenge but a matter of human safety, compromising the constitutional mandate of safeguarding the right to life under Article 21 - noted that despite the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, the implementation has been ineffective, and the high frequency of incidents in places like schools and hospitals reflects deficiencies in institutional responsibility and municipal oversight. [Para 14 - 24] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072
Tender – Letter of Intent (LoI) – Cancellation of LoI – Arbitrariness in State Action – Judicial Review in Contractual Matters – Public Interest – Quantum Meruit- Held that an LoI is, in the ordinary course, a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself- A Letter of Intent merely conveys the Government's intention to enter into an agreement and creates no enforceable obligation until a Letter of Acceptance (LoA) or contract is executed- It is a provisional communication signifying the State's intent to enter into a formal arrangement upon the fulfilment of certain technical and procedural conditions- The acceptance of a tender and the consequential formation of a binding contract are contingent upon the satisfaction of these prerequisites- An LoI creates no vested right until it passes the threshold of final and unconditional acceptance; it is but a "promise in embryo". [Relied on resser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. [(2006) 1 SCC 751; Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service (P) Ltd. [(1996) 10 SCC 405] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Adverse Inference Not Justified - Courts below erred in drawing adverse inference from the accused's refusal to participate in TIP when - i. Prosecution failed to establish that accused was kept baparda post-arrest; arrest memo showed no such entry; ii. Witness never attended any TIP proceedings; prosecution produced no document proving her presence; iii. TIP proceedings fundamentally flawed; identifying witness's signature absent on TIP documents - Supreme Court issues mandatory directions - When a witness is examined through video-conferencing, and the defence wishes to contradict the witness using previous written statements, the statement/document must be electronically transmitted to the witness and Sections 147–148 BSA (144–145 Evidence Act) procedure must be strictly followed - This ensures fair trial and effective cross-examination - Supreme Court reiterates that although it generally does not interfere with concurrent findings, it will do so when such findings are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or result in grave miscarriage of justice, held that interference is warranted when material evidence is ignored or misappreciated. [Relied upon Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253; Paras 31-33, 42-49, 57–65] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322
Valuation – Inclusion of Bought-out Items – bought-out items delivered directly to site not includable- Held that the final product (erected boiler) is immovable and not excisable, the Court held that the value of duty-paid bought-out items (delivered directly to the buyer's site and not brought to the assessee's factory) cannot be included in the assessable value of the boiler parts cleared in CKD condition- The base value for duty cannot be equated with the total contract price. [Paras 64, 82] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297
Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (WP Act)—Section 24(2)(c)—Continuance of Rights—Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA)—Section 3, 4(1)—Protection of Tribal/Forest Dweller Rights—State's apprehension that declaration of a Wildlife Sanctuary would adversely affect the rights of tribals and traditional forest dwellers rejected—Held, the contention that existing rights, including those relating to public infrastructure like roads and schools, would be lost is a "bogey" and a "figment of imagination"- Provisions contained in Section 24(2)(c) of the WP Act (allowing for continuance of rights) read with Section 3 and 4(1) of the FRA amply protect the rights of forest dwellers and Scheduled Tribes, as the FRA is a non-obstante clause- The necessity to strike a balance between environmental protection and the need for development emphasized- Supreme Court directs the State Government of Jharkhand to notify the area comprising of 126 compartments as notified in the 1968 notification, excluding six compartments as a Wildlife Sanctuary within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others (1996) 5 SCC 1; Centre for Environmental Law, World Wide Fund-India v. Union of India and Others 2013 8 SCC 234; Paras 68-104] In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Translocation of Captive Animals - IUCN Guidelines - Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - A.N. Jha Deer Park - Supreme Court acknowledged that the Deer Park suffered from chronic managerial deficiencies and persistent non-compliance with statutory standards, leading to an exponential increase in the deer population, far exceeding the carrying capacity of the 10.97-acre enclosure- The DDA's lack of requisite capacity and the risks of overcrowding (stress, weakened immunity, disease) made scientific population management through regulated translocation "indispensable" for the welfare of the deer- noted the serious and prima facie credible allegations made by the petitioner-Society regarding gross irregularities in the translocation of 261 deer already undertaken to Rajasthan- These violations included- i. Transporting vulnerable categories (pregnant females, juveniles, antlered males); ii. Severe overcrowding in vehicles, such as 40 deer and a fawn in one truck; iii. Absence of veterinary assistance, sedation, food, or water during long journeys; iv. Lack of pre-translocation genetic screening, tagging/identification, tranquilisation protocols, veterinary fitness certification, or behavioural acclimatisation; v. No scientific assessment of the recipient sanctuaries' carrying capacity, predator-prey dynamics (the reserves are tiger-bearing), or habitat suitability; vi. No post-release tracking mechanisms (telemetry collars/radio chips) were used. [Paras 17-21] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Principles of environmental protection and humane treatment of wildlife- Directions- Articles 48A, 51A(g), and 21 of the Constitution- Supreme Court gave following directions- i. Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), working under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, to conduct two comprehensive, on-ground surveys and file detailed reports within eight weeks; ii. To enumerate the present deer population, ecological carrying capacity, veterinary infrastructure, and the maximum number of deer that can be sustainably and humanely maintained; iii. To inspect Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve and Mukundra Hills Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, and report on the number of deer surviving, habitat suitability, predation risks, and compliance with CZA and IUCN Guidelines; iv. The CEC shall prepare a comprehensive roadmap for any future translocation, ensuring strict conformity with statutory and IUCN Guidelines, covering methodology, tagging, transportation, and post-release monitoring; v. Directed DDA to refrain from organising or permitting any commercial events, private parties, or non-conservation-related gatherings within the Deer Park premises or its surrounding buffer zones, and instead develop educational outreach programmes; vi. The DDA must place a report on record detailing the past and present status of the land formerly designated for deer enclosures, including the "unexplained reduction of more than 20 acres". [Para 18-23] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358
Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972—Section 26A—Declaration of Sanctuary in Reserve Forest—Delay by State Government in notifying the Saranda Game Sanctuary (31,468.25 hectares, notified in 1968) as a Wildlife Sanctuary under the WP Act—Held, the State of Jharkhand's "totally unfair" and "dilly dallying tactics" over a period of time, especially after giving multiple assurances to the Court about its intent to notify the area- that the declaration of the area as a Wildlife Sanctuary will not affect ancillary activities permissible under Sections 3 and 4 of the FRA- The Supreme Court issued a Mandamus directing the State to proceed with the notification of the 31,468.25 hectares as the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary- Directed that no mining activities shall take place within national parks and wildlife sanctuaries and within an area of 1 kilometre from such national park or wildlife sanctuary. In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311
Writ Petition - Alternative Remedy of Appeal to High Court - Dismissal - Rule of Self-Imposed Restriction - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition filed under Article 226, primarily due to the appellant's failure to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal provided under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, to the High Court itself - When the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the High Court itself (and not an ordinary functionary/tribunal), refusal to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 should be the rule, and entertaining it an exception - Where a remedy is available to a party before the High Court in another jurisdiction (like a reference/appeal provided by statute), the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not normally be exercised, as that would allow the machinery set up by the statute to be bypassed – Held, If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing the statutory remedy by his own fault, he cannot use that as a ground for the High Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - The appellant approached the High Court in writ jurisdiction well after the 180-day limitation period prescribed for an appeal under Section 130 - The High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari, especially since the appellant had an equally efficacious remedy before the High Court in a separate jurisdiction which he failed to avail - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419; Paras 9-16] Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1129