AMU Statute Requiring Two-Third Majority Of Executive Council To Terminate Teacher Not Arbitrary: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that Statute 40(3)(b) framed under the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920, which requires a two-third majority of the members of the Executive Council present and voting to determine a teacher's employment, is not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. It held that Statute 40 read as a whole gives a teacher a hearing and the benefit of a due inquiry...
The Allahabad High Court has held that Statute 40(3)(b) framed under the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920, which requires a two-third majority of the members of the Executive Council present and voting to determine a teacher's employment, is not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
It held that Statute 40 read as a whole gives a teacher a hearing and the benefit of a due inquiry before the question of her removal is placed before the Council for vote.
Statute 40(3)(b) provides that the determination of a teacher's employment shall require a two-third majority of the members of the Executive Council present and voting. The provision was challenged on the ground that it is silent on giving the delinquent teacher a hearing before the Council resolves to punish her, and that it does not oblige the Council to give reasons.
The bench of Justice Arindam Sinha and Justice Satya Veer Singh held,
“We have already elaborated on entirety of statute 40, for us to appreciate that a teacher is afforded reasonable opportunity of defending allegation against her conduct and only after the procedure of inquiry is duly completed can the matter of her removal be placed before the EC for vote, requiring 2/3rd majority. There appears to be sufficient check to prevent arbitrariness as opposed to the provision itself being arbitrary as contended.”
Petitioner, a member of the faculty of the Aligarh Muslim University, challenged her termination of service both on facts and on the ground that Statute 40(3)(b) was ultra vires Article 14.
Disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against her, beginning with a show cause notice, followed by a memorandum of charges and inquiry. The Executive Council accepted the inquiry reports and a second show cause notice was issued, after which it voted to terminate her. An earlier decision of the Council was set aside by the writ Court and the matter restored. On the restoration, the Council by resolution dated 19th May, 2014 reiterated its decision to terminate.
Petitioner submitted that the members of the Council had gone through the motions of a show cause notice only to deny her a hearing, and that her dismissal on a two-third majority vote, without agenda or discussion, was the consequence of an arbitrarily framed provision.
The University argued that the statute stood created by an Act of Parliament. It was submitted that the petitioner was given every opportunity to defend herself, and that it was only after that exercise was complete that the question of her removal was placed before the Council for vote as required by Statute 40(3)(a).
It relied on State of A.P. v. Mcdowell and Co., where the Supreme Court held that a vires challenge can be upheld only on two grounds, lack of legislative competence and violation of the fundamental rights or another constitutional provision, and on no third ground.
Petitioner relied on Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, where the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of arbitrariness under Article 14 applies to the legislature and not merely to executive action.
Referring to Statute 40, the Court observed that clause 3(a) prevails over sub-clause (b). It held that under clause 3(a) the Council may dismiss a teacher on grounds of misconduct only after following the procedure in clause (c).
It observed that clause(c) requires that the teacher be informed of the allegations, be given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation to the Council or a committee appointed for the purpose, and be given the benefit of a due enquiry with full opportunity to inspect the evidence, cross-examine witnesses and lead her own evidence.
The Court held that the saving in clause 3(a) for termination on three months' notice or salary in lieu did not apply to petitioner, as she had not been dismissed on notice with severance pay.
The Court noted that in Mcdowell the Supreme Court had said that merely alleging unconstitutionality on arbitrariness cannot be the basis for a challenge to a legislative Act. It held that Anurag Krishna Sinha supported the arguments of the University.
“We are minded to think Anurag Krishna Sinha (supra) supports contention of Mr. Yadav inasmuch as it was said that the action of the legislature, violative of article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary. This we have not found as manifest in statute 40.”
On the grievance that the provision does not require reasons, the bench had recorded its prima facie view in an earlier order dated 1st April, 2026, wherein it was held,
“when an issue is to be decided by them who can vote, such a decision necessarily will not carry reasons. It will carry the result of whether the motion is carried or rejected.”
Holding that the challenge to the vires of Statute 40(3)(b) could not be upheld, the Court disposed of the writ petition.
Case Title: Dr Tanzeem Fatima v. Aligarh Muslim University Thru Vice Chancellor And 2 Others 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 474
Case citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 474
Counsel for Petitioner :- Arvind Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent :- Ikram Ahmad, S.C., Shashank Shekhar Singh