Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025: Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012

Application in Consensual Adolescent Relationships - The Supreme Court emphasized a nuanced application of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual romantic relationships between adolescents, prioritizing the best interests of the victim and her dependents. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Life Imprisonment - While conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act may be justified, the High Court erred in enhancing the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court to "imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" in an appeal against conviction. Courts have discretion to award life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, but it is not mandatory that it extend to the remainder of the convict's natural life. In cases where life imprisonment is deemed appropriate but a fixed term is considered insufficient, courts may impose a modified sentence specifying a fixed period beyond 14 years. In this case the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reinstated, but without the addition that it will enure till the natural life of the appellant, along with a fine of 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim. (Para 28 & 31) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Proof of Minority – Held, the victim's 8th standard marksheet, showing her date of birth, corroborated by testimony of her parents, was cogent and reliable evidence to establish her minority at the time of the incident, thereby attracting the provisions of the POCSO Act - Supreme Court focused on need of a sensitive approach in dealing with sexual assault charges, noting that an unmerited acquittal encourages offenders and that rape causes severe psychological and physical harm. [Para 5] Deepak Kumar Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : 2025 INSC 929

Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272

Real-Time Data Collection - The Court supported proposals for a structured mechanism to track POCSO cases, sex education implementation, counseling services, and child marriage monitoring to enhance institutional accountability and transparency. A notice was issued to the Union of India to form a committee to address these suggestions. States and Union Territories were directed to ensure compliance with POCSO and Juvenile Justice Act provisions, with compliance reports to be submitted to the Ministry of Women and Child Development. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Section 4, 6 - Misjoinder of charges/trial - Acquittal by High Court on Procedural grounds - Reinstatement of Trial Court's conviction - Held, High Court erred in its reasoning, acknowledging that there were minor variations in the evidence, Supreme Court found these natural and inconsequential, especially given in the socio-economic circumstances of the victim from a rural region - The victim's testimony was consistent across police and magisterial statements and during the trial - The evidence presented, including School TC and medical reports, conclusively proved the victim was a minor (aged 12-13 at the time of incident) and pregnant - Mere irregularities in the framing of charges or the conduct of a joint trial do not automatically invalidate the proceedings - Defective charge regarding the date of the offence did not mislead the accused, as the time frame was well-known to them throughout the trial - Joint trial, even if considered a procedural irregularity under Section 223 CrPC, did not cause any prejudice to the accused or result in a failure of justice - The principle of 'beyond reasonable doubt' should not be misapplied to allow culprits to walk free based on minor inconsistencies - A reasonable doubt must be serious and backed by reason, making the prosecution's version improbable - High Court's acquittal was a 'misapplication of procedure' - Appeal allowed. [Paras 26-33, 35-38] Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 864 : 2025 INSC 1061

Section 6 - Conviction and Sentence - Judicial Caution against Re-Traumatization – Held, appellant was convicted and sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act - The prosecutrix's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to be detailed, coherent, and free from exaggeration or inconsistency - Her testimony was reiterated before the Trial Court and corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence, which confirmed signs of recent forcible sexual intercourse - The victim's age was established through her birth certificate, placing her unambiguously below 12 years at the time of the incident - Courts must remain vigilant against procedural submissions being used as harassment tactics, particularly in cases involving child sexual abuse - Reiterated that requests to recall a child victim after trial conclusion and concurrent findings of guilt raise serious concerns about secondary victimization - Such attempts must be discouraged to protect the integrity of the victim's testimony and public confidence in justice delivery - the Supreme Court expressed anguish that no compensation had been awarded to the victim by either the Trial Court or the High Court - In exercise of its constitutional duty to provide meaningful redress Supreme Court directed the State of Arunachal Pradesh to pay Rs. 10,50,000 as compensation. [Paras 7-12] Arjun Sonar v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 935

Section 6 – Held, merely touching the private parts of a minor girl will not constitute the offence of rape under Section 375, 376 AB of IPC or penetrative sexual assault under Section 6 of the POCSO Act - Such conduct would instead amount to offence of 'aggravated sexual assault' as defined under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act as well as the offence of 'outraging the modesty of a woman' under Section 354 IPC - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Laxman Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 928

Section 6 – Held, retrospective application of enhanced punishment violates Article 20(1) - Amended provision of Section 6 of POCSO Act, which came into effect on August 16, 2019, could not be applied to the appellant's case since the offence was committed on May 20, 2019 - Retrospective imposition of a harsher penalty is barred by Article 20 (1) of the Constitution of India, which states that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence - Sentence of “imprisonment for life, meaning remainder of natural life” did not exist on the date of the incident under the unamended Section 6 - Maximum punishment then permissible was imprisonment for life in its conventional sense - Supreme Court upheld the conviction of appellant under section 6 of POCSO Act, and modified the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life as understood under unamended statute, and set aside the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life - Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 9-12] Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 744 : 2025 INSC 892

Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376(3), 376(2)(n) - Victim, now married to the accused and living with him and their child, did not perceive the incident as a crime. The victim's trauma resulted more from the legal process, societal judgment, and family abandonment than the incident itself. A committee report confirmed that the legal and social consequences caused greater harm than the act. The Court criticized deficiencies in the legal system and societal attitudes, acknowledging the victim's emotional attachment to the accused and her desire to protect her family. Previously, the Court had set aside controversial High Court remarks on adolescent sexuality, restored the conviction, and issued guidelines on judgment writing and compliance with the POCSO Act and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court directed the government to provide educational and financial support to the victim and her child, with assistance from the State Legal Services Authority. Invoking Article 142, the Court refrained from sentencing the accused due to the unique circumstances, as the victim opposed punishment to preserve her family. (Paras 23, 24) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

Section 6 r/w 5(m), 8 r/w 7 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 207, 366 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27- Constitutional Right to Fair Trial & Legal Aid - Violation of Articles 21 & 22(1) - CrPC Section 207 – Held that the trial was vitiated due to a denial of effective opportunity for defence - The mandatory requirement of providing copies of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC was not complied with before charges were framed - The legal aid counsel was appointed only four days before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, giving insufficient time to prepare the matter and conduct effective cross-examination. [Relied on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Para 35, 38] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Sections 6, 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 506 - Aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Presumption of Guilt - Criminal Intimidation – Held, incestuous sexual violence committed by parent requires severest punishment, upheld fathers POCSO conviction - Crimes of sexual abuse, especially against children and by a parent, constitute an unspeakable betrayal of trust and assume a “demonic character”, deserving the “severest condemnation and deterrent punishment” - Incestuous sexual violence by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest condemnation in both language and sentence, with no mitigation in sentencing for such crimes - A father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child's bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but institutional - The home, which should be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will be met with an equally unsparing judicial response - Directed Rs. 10,50,000/- to be paid as compensation to the victim by State. [Paras 9-16] Bhanei Prasad @ Raju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 781 : 2025 INSC 934

Section 7 - Sexual Harassment of Students - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Insensitive Approach - Restoration of Criminal Proceedings - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing an FIR against a computer teacher accused of sexually harassing students, predominantly female, in a government-aided school. The Court criticized the High Court for conducting a "mini-trial" and erroneously concluding that the accused's actions lacked sexual intent under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The allegations, including inappropriate physical contact, invasive questions, and sending vulgar images, prima facie constituted offenses under the POCSO Act, necessitating a trial. The Court noted the High Court's insensitive approach, particularly as many victims belonged to minority communities, and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously, treating victims as protected witnesses. The accused was ordered to remain suspended during the trial and prohibited from contacting victims or witnesses. The High Court's interpretation that Section 7 requires physical contact with sexual intent was incorrect, as the teacher's actions, given their position of authority, provided sufficient grounds to infer sexual intent. The Court expressed concern over the accused's influence, including a purported settlement with one victim and the police's initial failure to record all victims' statements. The school was directed to maintain the accused's suspension and permitted to conduct an independent domestic inquiry. (Paras 2, 3, 4) X v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2025 INSC 579

Section 8 - Penal Code, Section 363, 376(2), 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 - Rape and Murder of a Three-Year-Old Girl - The prosecution's case, relying on an alleged extra-judicial confession and last seen evidence, was found deficient. The extra-judicial confession, based on the accused's statement of being “tensed up,” lacked corroboration and was omitted from the witness's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, rendering it unreliable. Witness testimonies on last seen circumstances were inconsistent, delayed, and tainted by ulterior motives and trial-stage improvements. Gross negligence by Investigating Officers, including delayed recording of witness statements despite early identification in the spot panchnama and withholding of critical FSL reports comparing samples from other suspects, warranted an adverse inference. The prosecution's evidence, based on conjectures, failed to meet the burden of proof. Emphasizing the weak nature of extra-judicial confessions and the need for robust investigations in heinous crimes, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the accused after nearly 12 years of incarceration, including 6 years under a death sentence. (Paras 59, 60, 75 & 76) Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : AIR 2025 SC 3186 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3027 : 2025 INSC 702

Sections 9(m) and 10 - Aggravated Sexual Assault - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man found guilty of aggravated sexual assault on a 4-year-old girl, rejecting his plea for acquittal based on the absence of medical evidence and eyewitness testimony, holding that the consistent and credible evidence of the child's parents was sufficient to sustain the conviction - The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle that medical evidence will take a backseat and even if it does not corroborate with the ocular evidence, the latter would be allowed to prevail where it is consistent and cogent- Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Dinesh Kumar Jaldhari v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1105 : 2025 INSC 1317

Section 42A - No plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law. (Para 22) Sentencing – Enhancement of - High Court erred in enhancing sentence in absence of appeal for enhancement by state The High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. While the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State. (Para 27) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Section 42A - Overriding effect - Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which gives overriding effect to the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws, pertains to procedural aspects and does not override the substantive provision of Section 42 regarding punishment. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Section 42 - Sentencing - Overlapping Offences - Where acts constitute offences under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the law providing for the greater degree of punishment applies. (Para 19 & 21) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972

Sex Education Reforms - The Court endorsed amici curiae suggestions for comprehensive sexuality education to address adolescent health, misinformation, and stigma, referencing UNESCO's 2021 Global Status Report on the need for systematic policy reforms and inclusive curricula. The Union Ministry of Women and Child Development was directed to constitute an expert committee to evaluate these suggestions, with a report due by 25 July 2025. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778

The Supreme Court directed the Union and State Governments to prioritize establishing Special POCSO Courts and ensure compliance with statutory timelines for investigation and trial. The Court emphasized sensitizing officials involved in POCSO cases and mandated timely filing of chargesheets and completion of trials as per the Act. While acknowledging compliance by several States with Central Government funding, the Court noted deficiencies in Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha, and Maharashtra, where high case pendency necessitates additional POCSO Courts. Previous orders from July 2019 mandated exclusive POCSO Courts in districts with over 100 pending cases, appointment of Special Public Prosecutors, and adherence to investigation and trial timelines. The Court also proposed exploring a National Scheme for victim compensation under the POCSO Act. (Para 6) In Re Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2025 INSC 695