Supreme Court Quarterly Digest July - September 2026

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Civil Law – Dedication vs. Adverse Possession – Mutually Destructive / Inconsistent Pleas - A party asserting title cannot simultaneously claim ownership on the contradictory doctrines of completed dedication and adverse possession - If property has already vested by dedication, adverse possession cannot arise, as adverse possession necessarily proceeds on the premise that title originally vested in another and was subsequently extinguished by hostile possession for the statutory limitation period - Long and continuous possession, by itself, cannot be equated with adverse possession in the absence of pleading and proving the specific time when possession became hostile (animus possidendi) to the knowledge of the true owner. [Paras 26–31] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing of Issues & Appellate Power — Adequacy of Existing Issues - Where existing issues framed by the Trial Court are sufficiently broad and comprehensive to cover the core disputes between the parties (e.g., validity/binding nature of a registered sale deed and legal necessity), and the parties went to trial knowing the controversy and leading evidence accordingly, an appellate court cannot routinely remand the matter merely on the premise that specific distinct issues (such as limitation, possession, or whether the deed is sham/nominal) were not explicitly framed - The First Appellate Court possesses full jurisdiction to evaluate the available evidence and return findings on questions of fact and law. [Relied on Ashwini Kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel & Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 161; P. Purushottam Reddy & Anr. v. Pratap Steels Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 686; Zarif Ahmad (Dead) Through LRs. & Anr. v. Mohd. Farooq, (2015) 13 SCC 673; Paras 14-17] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Evidence Act, 1872, Section 60 – Admissibility and Redaction of Evidence Affidavit in Lieu of Examination-in-Chief – Oral Evidence qua Inadmissible/Irrelevant Internal Documents – Permissibility – Principles on Res Judicata at Interlocutory Stages - Where internal documents, internal emails, and inter-se correspondence unilaterally prepared by a party have been consistently held irrelevant and inadmissible by the court, and such orders have attained finality, a party cannot be permitted to adduce oral evidence as to the contents of those very documents or what transpired in internal meetings by an indirect method - The earlier orders operate as res judicata and are binding during the trial - An interlocutory order ruling on the relevance and non-production of such documents cannot be circumvented by invoking Section 60 of the Evidence Act under the guise of oral testimony of a witness who was party to internal discussions – Held that the High Court was fully justified in meticulously scrutinizing and redacting the yellow-marked portions of the evidence affidavits of the defendant's witness (DW-1) that sought to introduce the contents of excluded internal communications and meetings, while retaining portions that pertained strictly to the witness's personal perception/state of mind or inter-party correspondence. [Paras 13–20] Reliance Industries v. NTPC Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 806 : 2026 INSC 862

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Prima Facie Case — Standard & Meaning - Balance of Convenience & Irreparable Injury - A prima facie case does not require full-proof title or a case proved to the hilt - It only requires the demonstration of a substantial question raised bona fide which is not frivolous or vexatious and needs investigation and decision on merits at trial - The court must weigh the injury apprehended by the plaintiff against the prejudice likely to be caused to the defendant - The loss of controlling shareholding in family companies or the creation of third-party rights over properties traceable to disputed transfers cannot be compensated in money or damages and constitutes irreparable injury in equity. [Paras 24 – 35] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Disapproval of Mini-Trials at Interlocutory Stage: The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the recurring practice of writing lengthy, merits-laden orders at the interlocutory stage or in appeal by conducting "mini-trials" upon affidavits - The courts must strictly confine their enquiry to the three cardinal tests (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury) without embarking upon an examination of the final merits or the probable outcome of issues properly triable upon evidence. [Relied on Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors., (2024) 11 SCC 351; Seema Arshad Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 282; Shyam Sel and Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC 634; Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. & Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 545; Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719; Paras 37-40] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Object of Interlocutory Injunction — Principle of Minimisation of Irremediable Prejudice - An interlocutory injunction decides nothing on final merits; it is purely a holding operation designed to preserve the status quo of the subject-matter so that the trial is not rendered a barren or meaningless exercise - The fundamental principle guiding the court is to adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice and causes the least irremediable injury. [Paras 20 - 23] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

Civil Procedure & Practise – Doctrine of Withdrawal – Effect of Substantive Interim Orders - Withdrawal of Writ Petition with Liberty to Approach High Court – The doctrine of withdrawal cannot be weaponized to erase a prior, conscious, and substantive judicial determination by the Court declining a specific prayer. When a specific prayer challenging finalized appointments is dismissed by the Supreme Court, the subsequent withdrawal of the surviving petition (e.g., academic challenge to the vires of a rule) does not resurrect the challenge against selected candidates or wipe away the finality attained by those appointments. [Paras 25-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Civil Procedure & Jurisprudence — Interim Orders — Stay Of Operation Vs. Quashing Of An Order - There is a distinct legal difference between the quashing of an order and staying its operation - While quashing restores the original position before the order was passed, a stay merely makes the order inoperative from the date of the stay without wiping it out from existence - Where the High Court's judgment striking down a recruitment Act was stayed by the Supreme Court, it created a legal vacuum where neither the original Act nor the transitional notifications could operate independently - Any public employment appointment made by managing committees after the date of the stay order (14th March 2016) without seeking express permission or leave from the Supreme Court is ex-facie illegal and invalid. [Relied On Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1; Paras 40 - 42] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Section 9 - Courts to try all civil suits unless barred

Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Andhra Pradesh, Act 19 of 1972) – Sections 1(3), 2(a), 3 – Constitution of India – Fifth Schedule, Article 14, Article 244(1) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 9 – Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 – Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Scheduled Areas – Civil disputes exclusively between Non-Tribal parties - The Supreme Court held that the ordinary Civil Courts have the requisite jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to entertain and adjudicate civil disputes (such as partition and succession) concerning properties located in Scheduled Areas, provided that the dispute is exclusively between non-tribal parties and involves no tribal interest or fetters - The salutary purpose and constitutional objective of establishing Scheduled Areas under the Fifth Schedule and continuing Agency Courts under the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 is to safeguard indigenous tribal communities, protect their lands from exploitation, and preserve their age-old customs and autonomy - Subjecting non-tribal persons to special agency procedures for disputes solely amongst themselves bears no rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Merely because a parcel of land falls within a geographically notified 'Scheduled Area', it cannot attract the blanket exclusion of Civil Courts if all parties involved are non-tribals - If even one party to the dispute is a tribal residing in the Scheduled Area, the Agency Courts alone will retain jurisdiction - The restoration of Civil Court jurisdiction for disputes involving exclusively non-tribal parties applies to pending cases and those arising in the future. [Paras 10-15] Mukkera Venkata Ratnam v. Vantasala China Venkateswarlu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2026 INSC 810

Section 11 - Res judicata

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11 — Res Judicata in Continuous Service Claims - Prior rounds of litigation concerning claims for regularization do not operate as res judicata against subsequent claims claiming pensionary consequences and retiral benefits flowing from regularizations voluntarily effected thereafter - The causes of action and reliefs are distinct, and hyper technical bars cannot foreclose consideration of statutory retiral rights arising out of a continuing service relationship. [Relied on Harbans Lal v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 8181 (affirmed in SLP (C) No. 23578 of 2012); Paras 20-32] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 11 — Res Judicata qua Common Judgment in Consolidated Suits - Where two suits filed by the same plaintiff are consolidated, tried together on common evidence, and disposed of by a single common judgment, a composite appeal challenging the common judgment and both decrees is not barred by the principle of res judicata - Res judicata applies qua a judgment and not a decree; where there is one trial, one finding, and one decision, two decrees drawn are in substance one. [Relied on Charan Singh v. Ram Saroop, Civil Appeal Nos. 1585–1586 of 2025; Narhari and others v. Shankar and others, 1950 INSC 24; P.A. Oommen v. Moran Mar Baselius Marthoma, 1992 INSC 175; Paras 14-18] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 11 & Explanation IV – Res Judicata – Interlocutory Orders – Erroneous Findings of Fact - The doctrine of res judicata applies to subsequent stages of the same proceeding if a question or issue has been decided at an earlier stage - An judicial decision, whether right or wrong, binds the parties unless it relates to a matter of jurisdiction - Where an earlier application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC was adjudicated and dismissed on merits, the findings carry binding effect upon the parties even if based upon an erroneous consideration of facts. [Relied on Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613; State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 319; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao, (2024) 17 SCC 361; Dr. Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1; Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; Distinguished on Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman, (1996) 6 SCC 424] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

Section 20 - Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166(2) read with Section 168(1) and Section 169 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 20 & Section 21(1) — Motor Accident Claims — Territorial Jurisdiction — Forum Convenience — Meaning of "Defendant Resides" vis-à-vis Insurance Company - Scope of Territorial Options under Section 166(2) - Under Section 166(2) of the Act of 1988, an application for compensation can be instituted at the option of the claimant before the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over: (i) the area where the accident occurred; (ii) the local limits where the claimant resides; (iii) the local limits where the claimant carries on business; or (iv) the local limits where the defendant resides - The legislature has consciously omitted the phrase "or carries on business" with respect to the defendant, which departs from the broader terminology used in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [Paras 7-10] K. Rashik v. National Insurance Company Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 940 : 2026 INSC 996

Section 60 - Property liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 60(1)(ccc) [as applicable to Delhi, Punjab, and Haryana via Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934] – Exemption of main residential house from attachment and sale – Exemption is personal to the Judgment-Debtor and not available to Legal Representatives - The protection under Section 60(1)(ccc) of the CPC exempting one main residential house belonging to and occupied by a judgment-debtor (other than an agriculturist) is personal to the judgment-debtor - A legal representative is a distinct juridical concept, and the liability devolving upon them is limited to the estate in their hands - A legal representative cannot, merely by virtue of residing in a house that belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor, claim the personal exemption provided to the judgment-debtor alone. [Relied on Yogesh Sharma & Ors. v. Devi Dayal & Ors., AIR 1977 Delhi 270; K.L. Bawa v. Basant Textiles, AIR 1982 P&H 275; Pargat Singh & Anr. v. Gurmail Kaur & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 23436; Paras 41–44] Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2026 INSC 863

Section 92 - Public charities

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92 — Urgent Interim Relief — Dispensation of Notice Prior to Grant of Leave — Ex Parte Leave - Where compelling circumstances and extreme urgency exist to prevent waste or damage to trust property, the Court is empowered to dispense with prior notice to the defendants and grant leave to sue ex parte, recording reasons in writing - Once leave is granted, the suit stands instituted, and the court acquires full jurisdiction to pass interim orders (including temporary injunctions or receiver appointments) - The defendants retain the right to apply for revocation/recall of leave on merits. [Relied on Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, (2026) 1 SCC 569; Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R, (2008) 4 SCC 115; Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378; Paras 57–60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 92, Section 94, Section 141, Section 151, and Order XL Rule 1 — Public Charities — Application for Leave to Institute Suit — Power of Civil Court to Grant Protective/Preservatory Interim Orders (Receiver) Pending Leave Application — Jurisdiction Excluded - Obtaining leave of the court under Section 92(1) CPC is a mandatory condition precedent and a "threshold gateway" to the institution of a suit against public charities - In the absence of leave, there is no validly instituted suit or substantive lis pending before the court - A Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain applications for interim, preservatory, or protective relief including the appointment of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 prior to the grant of leave - Supplemental powers under Section 94 presuppose an underlying, validly instituted proceeding and cannot be invoked at the pre-leave stage - Section 141 applies purely to procedural matters and cannot dilute substantive statutory safeguards, nor can inherent powers under Section 151 override express statutory bars (generalia specialibus non derogant). [Paras 28–31, 35, 38–41, 44– 60] S. Panchalingu v. People's Education Trust (R), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 955 : 2026 INSC 1010

Section 96 - Appeal from original decree

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 96, Section 11, Section 151, Order XLI Rule 1 — Maintainability of Composite First Appeal against Common Judgment dismissing two consolidated suits filed by the same plaintiff — Procedural defect vs. Substantive right — Defect of Form - A single/composite appeal filed under Section 96 CPC challenging a common judgment of the trial court dismissing two consolidated suits instituted by the same plaintiff is maintainable, provided certified copies of both decrees are filed, requisite court fees payable for both appeals are paid, and a specific prayer challenging the dismissal of both suits is made - The absence of a separate memorandum of appeal for each suit is merely a defect of form and not of substance, which is curable in nature and not fatal - The right of appeal is a substantive right, and rules of procedure under the CPC, being the handmaid of justice, cannot be utilized as a sword to deprive a party of an adjudication on merits. [Paras 12-20] Bassanna v. Bhimanna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 800 : 2026 INSC 838

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 96 & Order XLI Rule 31 — Scope and Powers of First Appellate Court — Necessity of Reasoned Judgment — Reversal of Trial Court Judgment - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact and is vested with a valuable right to re-hear the entire case on both questions of law and fact - When reversing a judgment of the Trial Court, the Appellate Court is bound to apply its mind, evaluate the evidence independently, and record clear, cogent, and succinct reasons for its disagreement rather than passing a cryptic order - A judgment that merely extracts the Trial Court's reasoning and brushes it aside by asserting that the lower court failed to understand the dispute violates the well-established principles governing first appeals - Reason is the lifeblood and heartbeat of every judicial conclusion, serving as a deterrent against arbitrary actions and ensuring public confidence in the justice delivery system. [Paras 5-10] Lakshmi v. Gopi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2026 INSC 709

Section 100 - Second appeal

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are not immune from interference under Section 100 CPC where such findings are vitiated by an erroneous application of settled legal principles, ignore material legal requirements, or equate long possession with adverse possession without establishing hostile animus – Held that a plaintiff in a suit for declaration must succeed on the strength of their own title and not merely on the weakness of the defendant's title – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186; Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 815; Government of Kerala v. Joseph, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 961; Dharampal v. Punjab Wakf Board, (2018) 11 SCC 449; A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 969; Paras 37–41] Bhag Singh v. Basant Kaur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 923 : 2026 INSC 983

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Section 100 confers a restricted jurisdiction upon the High Court, and a second appeal can be entertained only where it involves a substantial question of law - Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are demonstrated to be perverse or vitiated by an error of law - The existence of power to interfere where findings are demonstrably perverse cannot become a license to reappreciate evidence merely because another view of it is possible, or because the High Court considers a different inference preferable - Interference is warranted solely when there is a demonstrable error in the approach to the evidence, reliance on inadmissible material, omission of vital evidence, or a conclusion that no reasonable judicial mind could arrive at on the record - The High Court erred in overturning concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-execution of a relinquishment document and the date of knowledge by reappreciating evidence and mischaracterizing a non-attesting witness. [Relied on Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414; Kulwant Kaur and Others v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 262; P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar, (2024) 13 SCC 553; Paras 16-30] Jamnabai v. Vasudev, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 843 : 2026 INSC 900

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of interference in Second Appeal – Concurrent findings of fact - The High Court displaced the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court regarding the genuineness of the transaction and execution of the contract by drawing fresh inferences from surrounding circumstances, without recording any finding of perversity - Held: The High Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact. The High Court in a Second Appeal cannot interfere with findings of fact merely because it would have arrived at a different conclusion on the appreciation of the same evidence - Interference is permissible only where the findings are recorded without evidence, ignore material evidence, or are otherwise vitiated by perversity - Findings on the execution of the agreement, readiness and willingness, and the falsity of a defence are pure findings of fact unassailable in a second appeal unless characterized as perverse. [Relied On: Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons, Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314; Paras 15 – 27] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Jurisdictional Error and Perversity – The High Court commits a manifest jurisdictional error and its findings are rendered perverse when, under Section 100 of the CPC, it fails to test the legality of a reversal by the First Appellate Court and instead builds a new legal edifice by suo motu invoking statutory provisions (like Section 43 of the ToP Act) or factual premises (like interchange of boundaries) that were never pleaded, proved, or advanced by the parties, while simultaneously ignoring material admissions made by the plaintiff. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41] Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2026 INSC 705

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 & Order XLII Rule 2 — Mandate to Formulate Substantial Questions of Law — The formulation of a substantial question of law is a mandatory condition precedent for admitting, maintaining, and entertaining a second appeal on merits under Section 100 of the CPC - The High Court cannot hear and decide a second appeal on merits or reverse the judgment of the First Appellate Court without expressly formulating such question(s) of law - A judgment delivered without satisfying this mandatory requirement stands vitiated in law. [Paras 23-27] R. Veronica v. Rudrayani Devaki, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : 2026 INSC 703

Customary Law (Oraon Tribe) – Succession and Inheritance – Right of Daughter and Son-in-law (Ghardamad) – Scope of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact - Facts: The dispute pertained to ownership claims over the landed property of one Sukhu Oraon (grandfather), who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula - The Plaintiff (Sukhu, second son of Dhungru) claimed ownership over the entire ancestral land - The claim was resisted by Defendant No. 1 (Budhain, daughter of Bhoula) and Defendant No. 2 (Punai, husband of Budhain) on the ground that Ledura (who died issueless) had adopted Punai as his ghardamad (resident son-in-law) and that the properties were partitioned via a deed dated February 27, 1975 - The Munsif Court, First Appellate Court, and the High Court of Jharkhand concurrently dismissed the plaintiff's suit, accepting the ghardamad relationship - Held, concurrent findings of fact are not generally interfered with unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as the finding being perverse, based on no evidence, built on inadmissible evidence, ignoring material circumstances, or resulting in a miscarriage of justice - Held, the party alleging a custom must strictly prove its existence, long usage, certainty, and reasonableness - General observations cannot replace strict proof required under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872 - Held, under the prevalent customary law of the Oraon community, daughters do not have a right of inheritance and are only entitled to maintenance if there is no son - While the custom of a ghardamad acquiring rights in the property of his father-in-law is established, it must be duly adopted by the last male owner or his widow - In the present case, Punai was the husband of Bhoula's daughter (Budhain) but was allegedly adopted as a ghardamad by the uncle-in-law (Ledura) - Customary law does not recognize or permit an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as a ghardamad - Held, relying upon authoritative scholarly works (The Oraons of Chotanagpur by S.C. Roy), in the absence of a son, an appropriately adopted ghardamad, or other direct male descendants, the property of an issueless Oraon male devolves upon the nearest male agnate - the plaintiff (nephew) is entitled to succeed to the property - The partition/lease deed executed between the niece and the uncle-in-law is non-est and irrelevant to the title - The High Court erred in failing to answer the formulated substantial question of law regarding the uncle-in-law's capacity to adopt a ghardamad merely on the count of concurrent findings below - Merely observing that there is no established bar against such adoption does not satisfy the requirements of Section 100 CPC - The onus was on the defendants to prove such a custom existed. [Relied on Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136; Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95; Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3384; Paras 6-13] Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 657 : 2026 INSC 672

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of Second Appeal – Interference with Findings on Will The question of whether suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will and whether they have been satisfactorily explained is essentially a question of fact - The phrase "satisfying the conscience of the Court" does not convert a question of fact into a question of law. Where the final court of fact (First Appellate Court) evaluates real and germane suspicious circumstances to discard a Will, the High Court exceeds its jurisdiction under Section 100 by interfering with such well-reasoned findings of fact. [Relied on H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors. (AIR 1959 SC 443); Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb & Anr. ((1962) 3 SCR 195); Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur ((1977) 1 SCC 369); Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti and Ors. ((1990) 1 SCC 266); Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasappa & Ors. ((2021) 11 SCC 277); Mansinghrao Yeshwant Rao Patil & Ors. v. Ramchandra Govindrao Patil & Ors. (1954 SCC OnLine SC 96); Paras 32 – 70] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Section 107 - Powers of Appellate Court

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 107, Order XLI Rule 23, Order XLI Rule 24 & Order XLI Rule 27 — Scope and exercise of power of remand by the First Appellate Court — Remand is not a matter of routine course - An order of remand should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course - The First Appellate Court is required not only to determine the legality and tenability of the Trial Court's judgment, but it also exercises all the jurisdiction that the Trial Court had to decide the issues - When the necessary pleadings and evidence (both oral and documentary) are already available on record, the First Appellate Court ought to decide the appeal itself on merits rather than remitting the matter to the Trial Court to re-frame issues and record further evidence, which only serves to cause unnecessary delay, uncertainty, and avoidable prolonged litigation - The discretion to remand is to be exercised only when imminently warranted by the specific circumstances of a given case (such as where a suit was disposed of strictly on a preliminary issue without evidence on other issues). [Paras 14 - 16] Shivappa v. Shantavva, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 812 : 2026 INSC 857

Section 115 - Revision

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 — Routine Grant of Stay of Trial disapproved - The Supreme Court deprecated the routine practice adopted by High Courts of granting stay of trial while issuing notice in revision petitions challenging interlocutory orders - Stay of trial ought to be eschewed unless the High Court, upon an examination deeper than prima facie, arrives at a finding that continuation of the trial would seriously and irreparably prejudice the outcome of the revision or adversely affect the parties. [Relied on Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 65; High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 6 SCC 267; Paras 20–24]. Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115 & Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction against Interlocutory Orders — Rejection of Plaint - Jurisdiction and Limitations under Section 115 CPC — Revisional Court cannot sit as an Original Court or examine extrinsic evidence - Section 115 CPC provides for revision against an order of a subordinate court against which no appeal lies and is essentially supervisory in nature to control the functioning of subordinate courts - Revisional jurisdiction is not a substantive right and is confined to: (a) exercise of jurisdiction not vested by law; (b) failure to exercise jurisdiction so vested; or (c) exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity - High Courts cannot treat a revision on par with an appeal or review evidence - While examining an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint and documents annexed thereto must be looked into - Held, the High Court committed a jurisdictional illegality by donning the hat of the Trial Court, failing to point out any jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court, and exceeding the permissible scope of inquiry under Order VII Rule 11 by rejecting the plaint on the basis of facts and documents not forming part of the plaint. [Paras 11–21] Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2026 INSC 925

Section 151 - Saving of inherent powers of Court

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 151 — Inherent Powers — Recall of Fraudulent Compromise Decree — Delay and Limitation — The law of limitation cannot be utilized as a shield to defeat substantive rights or to perpetuate an illegality that is contrary to law - Where a compromise decree is obtained by fraud and without the signature or authorization of an affected party, the Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC to set aside the decree for the ends of justice. While a delay of 28 years (1994 to 2022) is egregiously large, the strict rule of limitation may be given a go-by based on the specific facts of a case, especially where basic facts are heavily contested and the affected party's rights are directly compromised without due process. Issues in such a partition suit require adjudication through a full trial. [Relied on Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, (1988) 1 SCC 270; Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (2006) 10 SCC 788; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 373; Para 6] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116

ORDER I - Parties to Suits

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Impleadment vs. Devolution of Interest – Constructive Res Judicata - Although Order I Rule 10 CPC (joinder of proper/necessary parties ab initio) and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC (devolution of interest pendente lite) govern distinct situations, their procedural scope overlaps when determining whether a transferee pendente lite should be brought on record - Once an application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC filed by a transferee pendente lite is conclusively decided on merits against them, a subsequent application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC predicated upon the exact same registered sale deed and interest is barred by the principles of res judicata - Litigants cannot re-agitate a settled issue merely by switching the specific statutory provision. [Relied on Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218; B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 860] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order I Rule 8 — Inapplicability of Representative Suit / Class Action Principles to Inter Se Title and Apportionment Disputes Before Lok Adalat - Order I Rule 8 of the CPC presupposes a "community of interest" among the persons represented, wherein the interest of all is common and adequately protected by the representatives - It cannot be applied to proceedings where the very subject matter is an adverse, conflicting claim between the claimants themselves - The High Court erred in characterizing Lok Adalat awards as akin to a settlement in a class action suit under Order I Rule 8 - Treating rival claimants as a single class elides the very title dispute referred under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as rival claimants do not share a common adversary or a representative common interest. [Paras 47-50] Singapogu Babu Rao v. Special Deputy Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 831 : 2026 INSC 888

ORDER VIII - Written Statement, Set-off and Counter Claim

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order VIII Rules 6A to 6G, Order XX Rules 6A & 19, Order XLI Rule 1, Section 96 & Section 11 – Suit and Counterclaim decided by a single common judgment – Maintainability of a Single/Composite Appeal – Requirement of filing two separate appeals – Held - A suit and a counterclaim, when adjudicated and disposed of by a single common judgment, can be challenged by way of a single composite appeal - The requirement to file two separate appeals or the necessity of whether one or two decrees are drawn up pales into insignificance, particularly in view of the post-2002 amendment to Order XLI Rule 1 CPC, which permits an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment - Conditions for Composite Appeal - The appellant preferring a composite appeal must - Show and formulate the grounds of challenge raised against the decree in the suit and the decree in the counterclaim separately, irrespective of whether one composite decree or two separate decrees have been drawn up; and Value the composite appeal as two separate appeals and pay the requisite court fees on the valuation of both the suit and the counterclaim - Bar of Res Judicata & Estoppel Inapplicable - A single composite appeal satisfying these conditions cannot be dismissed on the grounds of waiver, estoppel, or res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC merely because two separate appeals were not preferred - Rules of procedure are intended to subserve the cause of justice and avoid procedural rigmarole and multiplicity of litigation. [Relied on Rajni Rani & Anr. v. Khairati Lal, (2015) 2 SCC 682; Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez & Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 671; Abdul Nazer v. Lakshmana Das, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41103; Paras 25-30] Basudev v. Sanjay Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2026 INSC 831

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 6A(3), Order VIII Rule 6G, Order VIII Rule 10 — Filing of Written Statement to Counter-Claim in Commercial Suits — Mandatory Outer Time Limit of 120 Days Applicable to Plaintiff - The Supreme Court held that the mandatory time frame of 120 days prescribed under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) applies mutatis mutandis to the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff in response to a counter-claim raised by a defendant in a commercial suit. AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Interplay between Order VIII Rule 6A(3) and Rule 6G CPC - While Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC enables the Court to fix a time frame for the plaintiff to respond to a counter-claim, the absence of such a direction does not leave the plaintiff free to file it at any time - By virtue of Order VIII Rule 6G CPC, the rules relating to a written statement filed by a defendant are made applicable to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim - the temporal outer limit of 120 days applies strictly to the plaintiff's reply to a counter-claim. On the expiry of 120 days, the right to file the written statement to the counter-claim stands forfeited - Denying the application of the 120-day outer limit to a counter-claim response would defeat the very object of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which is aimed at the speedy and timely resolution of high-value commercial disputes. [Paras 27- 33] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Section 13(1A) and Section 13(2) — Maintainability of Appeal — Orders under Order VIII CPC - An appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, lies only against those orders that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC, or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Since an order passed under Order VIII CPC (such as refusing leave to file a belated written statement) is not appealable under Order XLIII CPC, an appeal against such an order is not maintainable. [Relied on SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and others, (2019) 12 SCC 210; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234; Kandla Export Corporation and another v. OCI Corporation and another, (2018) 14 SCC 715; Paras 34-37] AK Ghosh & Company v. Biman Bose, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 663 : 2026 INSC 684

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 5 & Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 58 – Doctrine of Non-Traverse – Non-examination of Plaintiff - Where the plaintiff sues on the basis of intestate succession, and the primary facts regarding her status as the legally wedded wife and sole surviving Class I heir are not traversed or specifically denied by the defendants in the written statement, they stand admitted - Facts admitted need not be proved, and the non-examination of the plaintiff or any witness of fact on her behalf cannot be a ground to dismiss the suit. Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2026 INSC 669

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order VIII Rules 6A to 6G, Order XX Rules 6A & 19, Order XLI Rule 1, Section 96 & Section 11 – Suit and Counterclaim decided by a single common judgment – Maintainability of a Single/Composite Appeal – Requirement of filing two separate appeals – Held - A suit and a counterclaim, when adjudicated and disposed of by a single common judgment, can be challenged by way of a single composite appeal - The requirement to file two separate appeals or the necessity of whether one or two decrees are drawn up pales into insignificance, particularly in view of the post-2002 amendment to Order XLI Rule 1 CPC, which permits an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the judgment - Conditions for Composite Appeal - The appellant preferring a composite appeal must - Show and formulate the grounds of challenge raised against the decree in the suit and the decree in the counterclaim separately, irrespective of whether one composite decree or two separate decrees have been drawn up; and Value the composite appeal as two separate appeals and pay the requisite court fees on the valuation of both the suit and the counterclaim - Bar of Res Judicata & Estoppel Inapplicable - A single composite appeal satisfying these conditions cannot be dismissed on the grounds of waiver, estoppel, or res judicata under Section 11 of the CPC merely because two separate appeals were not preferred - Rules of procedure are intended to subserve the cause of justice and avoid procedural rigmarole and multiplicity of litigation. [Relied on Rajni Rani & Anr. v. Khairati Lal, (2015) 2 SCC 682; Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez & Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 671; Abdul Nazer v. Lakshmana Das, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41103; Paras 25-30] Basudev v. Sanjay Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 792 : 2026 INSC 831

ORDER XIV - Settlement of Issues and Determination of Suit on Issues of Law or on Issues Agreed upon

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XIV Rule 2, Order XX Rule 5, Order VII Rule 11(d), and Section 151 — Framing of Issues vs. Trying an Issue — Trial of Preliminary Issue — Stage at which Power to Try an Issue First under Order XIV Rule 2(2) Ceases — Ongoing Composite Trial Cannot Be Severed Retrospectively - Scheme and Cumulative Requirements of Order XIV Rule 2(2) - Under the post-1976 amended scheme of Order XIV Rule 2, the general rule under sub-rule (1) is that the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues - The exception carved out under sub-rule (2) is discretionary and strictly conditional upon three cumulative criteria - (i) it must be an issue of law only; (ii) it must relate either to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force; (iii) the Court must form an opinion that the suit or any part thereof may be disposed of on that issue alone - A mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. [Paras 16-19] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Framing All Issues Does Not Exhaust Rule 2(2), but Embarking upon General Trial Does - The statutory words 'may try that issue first' are distinct from the optional power that the Court 'may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues' - The four procedural operating settings are – i. Court frames only the qualifying issue of law and postpones settlement of other issues; ii. Court frames all issues and contemporaneously directs that the qualifying issue be tried first; iii. Court frames all issues and fixes a date for evidence, but before the court actually embarks upon the trial and evidentiary recording generally, an application under Rule 2(2) is made (mere fixation of a date does not bar exercise of discretion); iv. Court has already embarked upon the trial of the issues generally (e.g., plaintiff has closed evidence and defendants have entered upon evidence) - Once the trial on the issues generally has commenced, the statutory occasion to direct that an issue be 'tried first' has irrevocably passed - The word 'first' is relational and authorizes only a prospective ordering of the trial, not a retrospective reordering or severance of an ongoing composite trial. Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to bypass this temporal bar. [Paras 21-47] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

ORDER XVIII - Hearing of the Suit and Examination of Witnesses

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XVIII Rule 17 & Section 151 — Scope, Object, and Parameters for Recalling Witness / Reopening Evidence - Nature of Power - Power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is a discretionary, facilitator power-cum-discretion exclusively vested in the Court to enable it to clarify any doubt that may have arisen during the examination of a witness - Cannot be used to Fill Gaps or Lacunae: The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be invoked by a party or by the Court to fill up gaps, omissions, or lacunae in evidence already led and closed, nor to allow a party to embellish, refine, or improve its case at a later stage - Exclusivity of Examination - Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC enables the Court to put questions to a recalled witness - it does not empower the Court to recall a witness for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination by either party - "No Prejudice" Is Not a Valid Ground - Reopening evidence or recalling a witness cannot be permitted merely on the specious ground that doing so would not cause prejudice to the opposing side - Absence of prejudice is not a valid yardstick - an independent justification must exist before invoking Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC - Frequent resort to Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, especially at the fag end of a suit when final arguments are underway, leads to an abuse of the court process, delays litigation, and cannot be allowed routinely or for the mere asking - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court and Trial Court erred in law - Noted that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is exclusively a discretionary tool for the Court to clarify doubts and cannot be invoked to permit a party to cure lacunae or fill gaps in evidence at the argument stage - held that the "lack of prejudice to the other side" is not a legal ground to grant such recall, and ordering cross-examination of a recalled witness under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is completely beyond the scope of the provision. [Relied on Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) through LRs v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate, (2009) 4 SCC 410; Paras 5-8] K. Bharathamma v. Bandaru Sakku Bai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2026 INSC 795

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Order XI Rule 1 and Rule 5 (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) read with Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Production of additional documents at the stage of plaintiff's evidence – Application of the 'Reasonable Cause' test – Held: The strict timelines and rigours prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) cannot be watered down on the ground of evidence being voluminous or because certain facts allegedly emerged during cross-examination - A stop-and-go or piecemeal approach to the production of documents in commercial suits cannot be countenanced - When leading evidence, a plaintiff is expected not only to produce all relevant documents in their possession but also to properly anticipate the questions that may be put to its witnesses by the opposite side - If a party fails to establish a 'reasonable cause' or justifiable explanation for the subsequent discovery and non-disclosure of documents that were already within its possession at the time of filing the suit or during a previous round of additional evidence, leave to file such additional documents cannot be granted. [Paras 12, 13] Levitate Mobile Technologies v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 658 : 2026 INSC 674

ORDER XX - Judgment and Decree

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Harmonious Reading with Order XX Rule 5 - Limitation Involving Mixed Questions of Law and Fact - Order XX Rule 5 obligates the Court to render findings on each separate issue unless a finding on one or more issues is sufficient for disposal of the suit - This exception applies where a preliminary issue was validly isolated and tried first - where issues have entered a composite general trial, findings must be rendered on all issues to avoid unnecessary remands and piecemeal adjudications - Where limitation depends on determining whether a registered alienation was void ab initio for want of authority under a General Power of Attorney (attracting Article 65 of the Limitation Act) or voidable requiring cancellation (attracting Article 59), it involves mixed questions of fact and law requiring adduction of evidence and cannot be severed for summary dismissal under Order XIV Rule 2(2) or rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Relied on Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, (2022) 7 SCC 644; Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557; Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322; Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 INSC 465; Paras 19 – 26, 41-46] John Mathew v Santha Paul, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2026 INSC 1020

ORDER XXI - Execution of Decrees and Orders

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 36 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXI Rules 1 & 4, Order XLI Rules 5 & 6 — Enforcement of Arbitral Award — Conditional Court Deposit vs. Satisfaction of Decree — Cessation of Post-Award Interest - Deposit in Court Not Synonymous with Payment - A deposit is not payment; placing money beyond the debtor's reach neither extinguishes liability nor places it at the creditor's disposal - Under Section 36(1) of the Arbitration Act, an award is enforced as a decree under the CPC - For a deposit in court to arrest the accrual of interest under Order XXI Rule 1, it must be made unconditionally, accompanied by notice under Rule 1(2), and be freely and immediately available for withdrawal by the award-holder. [Paras 21-25] National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 958 : 2026 INSC 1017

Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 19(1) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B & Section 28A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 10 – Execution of Consent Decree – Interpretation of Compromise/Settlement Clauses - The dispute pertained to the construction of Clauses 8, 9, and 10 of a Settlement Petition incorporated into a mutual consent divorce decree - Clause 8 specified a lump-sum maintenance of ₹2.20 Crores for the minor son payable in installments - Clause 9 linked maintenance to 20% of the husband's annual income - Clause 10 explicitly declared that upon payment of the first ₹1 Crore out of the Clause 8 amount, the husband "need not pay any further amount towards maintenance" - The appellant-wife filed an execution petition approximately five years after the final lump-sum payment, seeking enforcement of the income-linked maintenance under Clause 9. Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731

ORDER XXII - Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXII Rule 10 & Section 146 – Transferee Pendente Lite – Impleadment in Cross-Objections – Fresh Cause of Action - The bar of res judicata does not extend to proceedings/cross-objections where no prior application for impleadment was instituted - Where the main appeal is dismissed for non-prosecution and the transferors fail/refuse to seek its restoration while the opposing party restores the cross-objections concerning the assigned suit property, a material change in circumstances and a fresh cause of action arises - Since the transferor loses interest and the threat of collusion exists, the transferee pendente lite is entitled to be impleaded under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC to safeguard their acquired rights in the cross-objections. [Relied on: Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 397; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403; Paras 27-38] Sanjiv Kumar v. Shakuntla Devi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : 2026 INSC 747

ORDER XXIII - Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXIII Rule 3 — Compromise of Suit — Absence of Express Authorisation to Counsel — Validity of Consent Decree — Mandate of Law post 1976 Amendment — A compromise decree must strictly adhere to the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC - Post the 1976 Amendment, a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties to prevent false and frivolous pleas - While a counsel or duly authorized representative is permitted to sign a compromise decree on behalf of the client, such an act requires an express authorization or the existence of exigent circumstances - An advocate should not act on implied authority to conclude or surrender the substantial legal rights of a client without clear instructions - In the absence of express authorization in the Vakalatnama or evidence of exigent circumstances, the "voluntary" aspect mandated by Order XXIII Rule 3 cannot be established, rendering the resulting compromise contrary to law. [Paras 4, 5] Krishna Kumar Ojha v. Jitendra Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2026 INSC 662 : AIR 2026 SC 3116

ORDER XXXVIII - Arrest and Attachment Before Judgment

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9, Section 9(1)(ii)(e), Section 34 and Section 36 – Maintainability of Section 9 Petition at Post-Award Stage by an Unsuccessful Party / Award Debtor – Threshold and Guiding Principles for Grant of Interim Relief – Securing Amount in Dispute / Deposit of Monies – Rare and Compelling Cases - A petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 at the post-award stage by an unsuccessful party (award debtor) is maintainable in law - the threshold for granting interim relief to an unsuccessful party is significantly higher - The Supreme Court may grant interim measures in rare and compelling cases to balance equities, prevent irreparable prejudice, and preserve the efficacy of the challenge proceedings under Section 34 - The exercise of power under the "just and convenient" residuary clause under Section 9(1)(ii)(e) must be guided by settled principles namely, existence of a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury, and reasonable expedition and must promote the efficacy of arbitration without being rigidly bound by the strict procedural technicalities of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 or Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - In the present case, bank guarantees furnished against mobilisation advance were encashed by the appellant prior to the pronouncement of the arbitral award - The Arbitrator dismissed the respondent's claims in toto without the appellant having filed any counter-claim or the Arbitrator recording any finding regarding non-utilisation of the mobilisation advance - Sustaining the High Court's direction directing the appellant to deposit Rs. 3.5 crores in the Registry to be placed in an interest-bearing Fixed Deposit pending adjudication of the Section 34 petition, the Supreme Court held that permitting the appellant to retain the encashed funds in the absence of an executable award or counter-claim in its favour would result in unjust enrichment and defeat earlier interim undertakings - The case presented rare and compelling circumstances warranting interim deposit to prevent irreparable prejudice and preserve the subject matter of the dispute. [Relied on Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N. Sanghavi, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 670; Essar House Private Limited v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel India Limited, (2022) 20 SCC 178; Paras 18–27]. National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Ishvakoo (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 791 : 2026 INSC 828

ORDER XXXIX - Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Order XLIII Rule 1(r), Section 94(c), and Section 151 — Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Sections 36 & 37(1) — Temporary Injunction — Interlocutory Jurisdiction — Nature and Scope of Relief — Trinity Test — Appellate Interference and Standard of Review — Mini-Trial at Interlocutory Stage deprecated - Scope of Appellate Interference under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - An order passed on an application for a temporary injunction is purely discretionary - The appellate court does not ordinarily substitute its own discretion or view for that of the court of first instance merely because it might have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material - Interference is warranted only where the court of first instance has exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, mala fide, upon irrelevant or extraneous considerations, or contrary to settled legal principles - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own appreciation of the Will, parties' conduct, and statutory provisions for that of the Single Judge, which was squarely impermissible under the settled legal principles. [Paras 17- 39] Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : 2026 INSC 843

ORDER XLI - Appeals from Original Decrees

Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 69(2) – Effect of non-registration – Proof of registration of firm – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 27 – Additional Evidence – A memorandum issued by the Registrar of Firms acknowledging the filing/registration of documents and allotting a specific Registration Number conclusively proves the registration of the partnership firm - Production of a certified copy of Form-VIII under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is permissible to further the cause of justice and corroborate the registration status. Mageba Bridge Products v. Trade Centre, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 795 : 2026 INSC 839

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 22 — Challenge to Adverse Findings without Cross-Objections - A respondent who supports the ultimate decree passed by the trial court is entitled to impugn an adverse finding recorded against him by the trial court without filing cross-objections or a separate appeal under Order XLI Rule 22 CPC, provided he does not seek any additional relief beyond sustaining the decree. [Paras 31-35] V.N.A.S. Chandran v. S. Venilla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 758 : 2026 INSC 776

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XLI Rule 27 – Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court – Duty of Appellate Court to consider pending application along with main appeal – Jurisdictional error in failing to adjudicate application - An Appellate Court has a statutory duty to deal with an application for additional evidence on its merits, and such an application cannot be ignored while the Court proceeds to pronounce the final judgment - The application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC must be considered simultaneously with the hearing of the main appeal on its merits to determine whether the Court "requires" the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The Appellate Court is obligated to pass a specific order either allowing or rejecting the application, recording reasons if admitted - Before evaluating additional evidence, the Court must first examine the party's pleadings to ensure that the foundational case supports the introduction of the proposed evidence - Dismissing an appeal without deciding a pending application for additional evidence constitutes a jurisdictional error and results in a severe miscarriage of justice. [Relied on Jatinder Singh and another v. Mehar Singh and others, (2009) 17 SCC 465; North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur v. Bhagwan Das (Dead) By LRs., (2008) 8 SCC 511; Iqbal Ahmed (Dead) by LRs. and another v. Abdul Shukoor, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1787; G. Shashikala (dead) Thr. LRs v. G. Kalawati Bai (dead) Thr. LRs and others, (2019) 15 SCC 201; Paras 11- 13] Chowdappa v. Hanumantharayappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 785 : 2026 INSC 816

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) read with Sections 168 & 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Beneficial Legislation - Under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, the Appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence if it requires the documents to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause - The MV Act is a beneficial, welfare-oriented legislation requiring summary procedure to determine "just compensation" - Where a newly married claimant (widowed within three months of marriage) could not immediately gather bank inquiry records and commercial IT invoices due to shock, trauma, and systemic banking delays, the High Court erred in rejecting the additional evidence application (I.A. No. 1 of 2024) solely on grounds of delay. Rejection overlooks substantial cause and prolongs 21 years of pending litigation - Additional evidence received on record. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Reena v. Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2026 INSC 889