Click the Play button to listen to article

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has dismissed an appeal seeking bail by Younis Mushtaq Bhat, accused of facilitating a terrorist attack at Kakapora Railway Station in April 2022, observing that the material collected during investigation and the evidence recorded during trial provide reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against him under Sections 18 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) are prima facie true.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Mohd Yousuf Wani held that the statutory restriction on bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA was attracted in the case. The Court noted that the appellant had already been charged under the relevant provisions and that statements of prosecution witnesses examined during trial supported the prosecution's case against him.

The Court observed, “The words 'prima facie true' cannot be read and understood to mean 'proved' as used in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.” It clarified that the expression requires something more than mere suspicion, but does not call for proof beyond reasonable doubt or a mini-trial at the bail stage.

Background

The appeal was filed under Section 21(3) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, challenging an order passed by the Special Court (Additional Sessions Judge), Pulwama, rejecting Bhat's bail application in connection with FIR registered at Police Station Kakapora.

The FIR was registered after police received information that terrorists had opened indiscriminate fire at Kakapora Railway Station, resulting in the death of Head Constable Surinder Singh and injuries to other police personnel. Sub-Inspector Dev Raj, who had sustained injuries in the incident, subsequently died on April 23, 2022.

During investigation, police obtained CCTV footage from the railway authorities, which allegedly led to the identification of suspects, including the appellant. According to the prosecution, Bhat initially denied involvement but admitted his role when confronted with the footage.

The prosecution alleged that Bhat had accompanied co-accused Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat to the railway station on a motorcycle on the day of the incident. As per the disclosure attributed to him, Mukhtar had concealed the motorcycle's number plate and was carrying a pistol. The appellant allegedly kept the motorcycle running near the entry point while Mukhtar proceeded towards the railway station and opened fire.

The investigation culminated in a chargesheet against four accused persons. The appellant and co-accused Tawheed Bashir Bhat were charged under Sections 18 and 39 of the UAPA, while proceedings under Section 299 of the Code were initiated against two other accused who were stated to have joined terrorist organisations and could not be arrested.

The Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 18 and 39 of the UAPA on December 27, 2022. By the time the bail application was rejected on November 17, 2025, the prosecution had examined 17 of the 42 listed witnesses.

Before the High Court, the appellant argued that there was no substantive material connecting him with the alleged offences of conspiracy and raising funds or support for terrorist activity. He contended that no recovery had been effected from him or at his instance and that the prosecution case rested substantially on an alleged extra-judicial confession. He also relied on his prolonged incarceration, the progress of the trial and his right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The appellant further relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, contending that prolonged detention without an immediate prospect of conclusion of trial could justify bail notwithstanding the statutory restrictions under the UAPA.

The Union Territory represented by Mr. Mohsin Qadri, Sr. AAG opposed the appeal, submitting that the appellant's involvement was supported by CCTV footage and the statements of witnesses, including PWs 5, 31 and 34. Qadri also argued that the appellant's disclosure had been corroborated through the evidence led during trial.

Court's Observation

The Bench explained that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA imposes an additional restriction on the grant of bail to a person accused of offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Where, upon perusal of the case diary or the police report, the Court finds reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, the accused cannot be released on bail.

It clarified that the expression “prima facie true” occupies a position between mere suspicion and proof of guilt. The assessment must be made on the material available at the relevant stage and cannot be converted into an exercise of determining whether the accused is ultimately guilty.

“Each case would have to be dealt with and examined on its own facts and decided,” the Court observed while explaining that the expression cannot be placed in a straightjacket.

The Bench further emphasised that a Court considering bail under a special statute imposing restrictions cannot embark upon a preliminary trial or undertake a detailed evaluation of the evidence. The question is whether the prosecution material provides reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true, not whether the charge has already been proved.

In this regard, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, which reiterated the principles governing the application of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. Referring to the law laid down in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali and other decisions, the Bench noted that the prosecution material must be considered as a whole rather than by examining individual pieces of evidence in isolation.

The Court also referred to the principle that, once charges have been framed, the accused faces the task of demonstrating that the material accompanying the chargesheet nevertheless does not provide reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true.

Applying these principles, the Bench found that the statements of PWs 5, 31 and 34 provided sufficient material, at this stage, to support the appellant's alleged involvement. It accordingly held that the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) stood attracted.

“Having regard to the evidence collected during investigation and as adduced at the trial so far, the Court is of the opinion that the bar in terms of provisions of Section 43D(5) of ULA(P) Act stands justifiably attracted in the case,” the bench stated.

The Court also rejected the contention that the appellant's prolonged incarceration, by itself, warranted his release. It acknowledged that the right to speedy trial is guaranteed under Article 21 but held that a balance must be maintained between the liberty of an individual and the larger interests of the State and society.

Distinguishing the appellant's reliance on K.A. Najeeb, the Bench found no fault with the Trial Court's decision to deny bail in the facts of the present case. It further noted that the offence under Section 18 of the UAPA carries punishment extending to imprisonment for life and that the appellant had not completed even one-half or two-thirds of the maximum punishment, as contemplated under Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The Bench reiterated that rejection of bail does not affect the presumption of innocence and that the prosecution remains under an obligation to establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt at trial.

Finding no merit in the appeal, the Division Bench dismissed it and upheld the Special Court's order rejecting bail. However, it clarified that its observations were confined to consideration of the bail appeal and would not prejudice the merits of the case at the conclusion of trial.

The Trial Court was also requested to expedite the proceedings in the main case.



Tags: