While reiterating that paying the deficit stamp duty could not automatically cure the defect of non-registration, Rajasthan High Court opined that to burden a civil court to impound an insufficiently stamped document, which was already judicially pronounced as inadmissible for being un-registered, was a futile academic exercise and merely a dilatory tactic.
The bench of Justice Sameer Jain observed that it could not remain a mute spectator to dilatory tactics adopted by litigants in civil proceedings, neither permit its supervisory jurisdiction to be exploited to revive legally inadmissible documents.
For context, respondent had filed a civil suit for cancellation of a sale deed, declaration, partition and permanent injunction. The petitioner filed a written statement, claiming exclusive title and possession over the disputed property, based on a Relinquishment Deed which was allegedly executed by the respondent's father.
The respondent filed an application contending that the Deed was unregistered and hence, inadmissible in law, which was allowed by the civil court.
Thereafter, an application was moved by the petitioner, volunteering to pay the deficit stamp duty and praying for impounding of the document. This application was dismissed by the civil court on the ground that since the document was already inadmissible due to non-registration, sending it for impounding was a futile academic exercise.
These 2 orders by the civil court were challenged by the petitioner. It was contended that non-payment of stamp duty was a curable defect, and if an insufficiently stamped document was presented before the court, it was bound to impound the same.
Further, the petitioner argued that an unregistered document could be looked into for “collateral purposes” under proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (the “Act”), for showing the severity and nature of possession, if it was duly stamped.
Proviso to Section 49 of the Act provides that unregistered document remained admissible for limited purposes like proving collateral transactions not requiring registration, provided stamp duty was paid.
On the contrary, the respondent argued that paying the stamp duty did not automatically cure the defect of non-registration.
Further, since the petitioner was claiming exclusive possession and title over disputed property, based on the Relinquishment Deed, the nature of possession was the primary lis between the parties, and hence, could not be seen as “collateral purpose”.
After hearing the contentions, the Court firstly opined that there was a fundamental fallacy in petitioner's argument,
“…conflating the provisions enshrined under the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 with the Registration Act, 1908. While the defect of insufficient stamping may be a curable irregularity, the non-registration of a compulsorily registrable document is a fatal and incurable defect. Curing the stamp defect will not resurrect a document that is dead in the eyes of the law for want of registration.”
Further, while holding that petitioner's reliance on proviso to Section 49 was also misconceived, the Court referred to the Supreme Court case of M/s Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited to hold that when the nature and character of possession was the primacy dispute, the unregistered deed did not form a “collateral purpose”.
In this light, the Court held that, “in the case at hand, the petitioner is using the deed to claim exclusive title and possession against the plaintiff, and the same is the core lis inter se the parties and not a collateral incident.”
The Court further observed that the application by the petitioner for impounding of the deed was a vexatious attempt to derail the proceedings, and if the petitioner was genuinely interested in curing the stamp duty defect, he had the independent statutory liberty to do so by depositing the deficit stamp duty.
“…burdening the learned Civil Court to impound a document that has already been judicially pronounced inadmissible is a futile academic exercise and that the reasoning adopted by the learned Civil Court in the impugned order dated 25.02.2026 (Annexure-6) is impeccable and warrants no supervisory interference.”
Accordingly, the petitions were dismissed.