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The Supreme Court on Monday (October 12) held that where an arbitration clause mentions two places for arbitration without clearly designating one as the juridical seat, the governing law clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at a particular place becomes relevant in determining the parties' intention to identify the seat of an arbitration. “that mere expression “place...

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The Supreme Court on Monday (October 12) held that where an arbitration clause mentions two places for arbitration without clearly designating one as the juridical seat, the governing law clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts at a particular place becomes relevant in determining the parties' intention to identify the seat of an arbitration.

“that mere expression “place of arbitration” cannot be the basis to determine the intention of the parties that they have intended that place as the “seat” of arbitration. The intention of the parties as to the “seat” should be determined from other clauses in the agreement, including the conduct of the parties.”, a bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Vijay Bishnoi quoted from Mankastu Impex (P) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd. to hold that the seat of the arbitration would be determined upon a holistic reading of various clauses of the Agreement, especially the governing law of the arbitration.

The appeal was filed against the Delhi High Court's decision to allow the Respondent's plea for an appointment of an arbitrator, where the arbitration clause mentions two venues, i.e., Delhi and Goa; however, the governing law clause conferred exclusive jurisdiction with the Courts in Goa.

The Appellant contended that a mere mention of the two venues in an arbitration clause would not grant an exclusive jurisdiction to the Delhi High Court, when the law governing the arbitration conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts in Goa.

Finding force in the Appellant's contention, the judgment authored by Justice Misra said that the intention of the parties to ascertain the seat of an arbitration could be evinced from a holistic reading of various clauses of the Agreement.

“...venue for arbitral proceeding would not automatically be the seat of arbitration. In such a situation, the Governing Law clause i.e., Clause 38 of the Agreement would be helpful in determining the juridical seat. Since Clause 38 of the Agreement confers exclusive jurisdiction to the courts at Goa and Clause 32.5 provides that arbitration proceedings will be held in Goa, it is clear that the parties have agreed that Goa shall be the juridical seat, Delhi is just a venue.”, The Court observed, relying on BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC LTD. (2020), later affirmed in Arif Azim Company Limited v. Micromax Informatics FZE, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 871.

“Upon reading the Agreement in its entirety, we find that the juridical seat of arbitration was at Goa, therefore, we are of the view that the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act.”, the Court held.

As a result, the appeal was allowed.

Headnote

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11(6) – Juridical "Seat" vs. "Venue" of Arbitration – Harmonious Construction of Conflicting Place Clauses and Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause - Franchise Agreement containing Clause 32.4 specifying "precise location of the arbitration shall be within Delhi", Clause 32.5 stating "arbitration proceedings will be held in Goa", and Clause 38 (Governing Law and Jurisdiction) conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon competent courts in Goa – Delhi High Court entertained Section 11(6) petition and appointed an arbitrator treating Delhi as the seat – Reversed by Supreme Court – Held that under the three-condition test laid down in BGS SGS SOMA JV and affirmed in Arif Azim Company Limited, a place designated as "venue" can be construed as the juridical "seat" of arbitration only when: (i) the arbitration agreement designates or mentions only one place; (ii) such place anchors the arbitral proceedings without scope of change; and (iii) there is no significant contrary indicium - Where the arbitration clause itself specifies two different places for holding arbitration, Delhi under Clause 32.4 and Goa under Clause 32.5 - the location in Delhi does not automatically become the juridical seat - In such a scenario, the arbitration clause cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the contract; a holistic reading and harmonious construction of Clauses 32.4, 32.5, and the Governing Law & Exclusive Jurisdiction clause (Clause 38), which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts at Goa, establishes that the parties intended Goa to be the juridical seat of arbitration and Delhi merely as a convenient venue - the Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Relied on Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited and Others, (2017) 7 SCC 678; Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32; Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 462; Activitas Management Advisor Private Limited v. Mind Plus Healthcare Private Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3069; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited, (2020) 4 SCC 234; Paras 20 - 24].

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Salvador Santosh Rebello, AOR Mr. Raghav Sharma, Adv. Ms. Moulishree Pathak, Adv. Mr. Nishant Kumar, Adv. Mr. Devesh Khandelwal, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Varun Singh, Adv. Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Adv. Ms. Alankriti Dwivedi, Adv. Ms. Somesa Gupta, Adv. Ms. Arushi Vig, Adv. Mr. Mudit Gupta, AOR

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