Citations 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 to 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Administrative Law

Compliance with Court Orders - Delay and Obstination - Harassment of Daily Wage Workers - The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union Territory, observing that the case presented a "glaring and textbook example of obstination" by state officials who took 16 years to comply with a High Court order. The Court expressed shock at the delay and the repeated harassment of poor daily wage workers through cryptic orders that disregarded the spirit of the 2007 High Court order. While the Court considered imposing exemplary costs and recommending disciplinary action against the delinquent officers, it refrained from doing so as contempt proceedings were pending before the Single Judge. The Court directed the Single Judge to expedite the contempt proceedings on a weekly basis to uphold the majesty and sanctity of law. (Para 2 – 4) Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Abdul Rehman Khanday, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 303

Bail

Parameters for granting and setting aside bail –The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, setting aside the High Court's order granting bail to the accused in a case involving alleged compromise of a public recruitment examination. The Court distinguished between setting aside an order of bail and cancellation of bail, emphasizing that setting aside challenges the legality of the grant order itself, while cancellation addresses misuse of bail or supervening circumstances. The Court reiterated that while granting bail, factors like the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and prima facie involvement of the accused are crucial. The Court stressed the importance of maintaining the sanctity of public examinations and the impact of such offenses on society's faith in public administration. The High Court erred in granting bail based on factors like lack of criminal antecedents and period of custody, without adequately considering the gravity of the offense and its societal implications. The Court directed the accused to surrender and clarified that its observations were limited to the bail matter and should not be construed as remarks on the merits of the case. The court allowed the accused to reapply for bail before the trial court after the examination of material witnesses. [Referred: Ansar Ahmad v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 974; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118; Ajwar v. Waseem, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 392 and Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278] (Para 8, 11 & 14) State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 300

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of Plaint - Cancellation of Power of Attorney - Commencement of Limitation - Where a plaintiff seeks to challenge sale deeds executed under a power of attorney, limitation for such a challenge commences from the date of knowledge of the sale deeds, not from the date of cancellation of the power of attorney. Cancellation of a power of attorney does not affect prior conveyances made under the valid power conferred, nor does it create a new cause of action to challenge those conveyances. The High Court erred in holding that limitation commenced from the cancellation of the power of attorney, which was executed long after the sale deeds in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's rejection of the plaint, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. (Para 8 & 9) V. Ravikumar v. S. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 301

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 227 – Penal Code, 1860; Section 304 Part II - Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder - Accidental Death due to Electrocution - Absence of Intention or Knowledge - Appeal against rejection of discharge applications - Where two employees, engaged in decorating a shop, died due to electrocution and a fall from a height while working on a signboard using an iron ladder, and the appellants, who were the contractor and store operation manager, were charged under Section 304 Part II IPC for not providing safety equipment, held, no prima facie case of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC was made out. There was no intention to cause death or knowledge that the act would likely cause death. The absence of intention and knowledge, crucial ingredients of Section 304 Part II IPC, warranted the discharge of the appellants under Section 227 CrPC. At the stage of discharge, the focus is on whether there are sufficient grounds to initiate a criminal trial, not on a threadbare analysis of evidence. Consequently, the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court rejecting the discharge applications were set aside, and the appellants were discharged. [Distinguished: Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P. (1996) 6 SCC 129] (Para 16 - 18) Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 304

Disability

Education Law - Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Appointment of Special Teachers - Non-compliance with prior judicial orders - Directions issued. Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Employment

Public Employment - Interview-Based Selection - Presumption of Favouritism -Arbitrariness and Judicial Review - When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government's decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Recruitment Process - Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government - Judicial Review - Proportionality Test - Scope of Interference - Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government's decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government's decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government's decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates - The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority's decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Rights of Empanelled Candidates - Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Recruitment Process - Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) - Political Change and Cancellation- The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307

Family

Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Lease

Agreement to Lease - An agreement to lease does not automatically confer leasehold rights until a formal lease deed is executed. Where the Delhi Development Authority ("DDA") executed an agreement to lease in 1957 but a formal lease deed was never executed, and the property was subsequently sold through liquidation proceedings, the auction purchaser acquired only those rights, if any, held under the agreement to lease. The auction sale, conducted on an "as is where is" basis, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights upon the auction purchaser. The DDA retained the right to pursue remedies for possession and unearned income, and that any regularization of the transaction would require the auction purchaser to apply to the DDA and for the DDA to consider such application in accordance with law. Funds held in liquidation proceedings could not be appropriated for unearned income payments without considering the claims of other creditors, particularly where the liquidation was still ongoing. (Para 10 - 16) Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

A legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. The term 'legal representative' under the Motor Vehicle Act should not be given a narrow interpretation to exclude those persons as claimants who were dependent on the deceased's income. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Act entitling them to compensation. [Relied on: Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 & N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. (2022) 14 SCC 712, (Para 13 – 15)] Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Motor Vehicle Accidents Claims - Determination of compensation – Monthly income of deceased fruit seller – Multiplier – Deduction for personal expenses – Inclusion of father and sister as dependents – Liability of insurer to pay and recover from driver and owner - Deceased, aged 24, died in a motor vehicle accident. Tribunal awarded compensation based on a notional income of Rs. 4,500 per month, deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses, and excluding the deceased's father and sister as dependents - High Court affirmed - Whether the Tribunal and High Court correctly assessed the monthly income, applied the appropriate multiplier, made the correct deduction for personal expenses, and rightly excluded the father and sister as dependents – Held, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' assessment of the deceased's monthly income. Considering the deceased's occupation as a fruit seller, the Court adopted the minimum wage for an unskilled worker (Rs. 6,500 per month) as a basis. The multiplier of 18, as applied by the High Court, was upheld as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, entitling them to compensation. Therefore, the deduction for personal expenses was reduced to 1/4th. The insurance company must first pay the award and then recover from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, as the driver lacked a valid license. The total compensation was enhanced from Rs. 9,77,200 to Rs. 17,52,500. The appeals was allowed, and the tribunals order was modified. (Para 16 & 17) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Section 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Trap Case - Inconsistencies in Complainant's Testimony - Hostile Independent Witnesses - Reasonable Doubt – Acquittal - Where a trap was laid based on a complaint alleging demand and acceptance of bribe by public servants for processing a license application, and the complainant's testimony regarding the amount demanded was inconsistent and contradictory to the written complaint, and the independent witnesses turned hostile and contradicted the prosecution's version of the trap proceedings, and the evidence raised reasonable doubt as to the actual acceptance of the bribe, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside. The prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt, precluding the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. (Para 16) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Preventive Detention

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Grounds for Detention - Non-application of Mind - Grant of Bail - Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Effect - Where a person is detained under the COFEPOSA Act based on allegations that are the same as those in a criminal prosecution where the person has been granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must consider the efficacy of those bail conditions. Failure of the detaining authority to examine whether the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional magistrate are sufficient to curb the alleged activities, which form the basis of the preventive detention, amounts to a non-application of mind. While courts cannot scrutinize the reasonableness of the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, they must ensure that the authority has indeed applied its mind to relevant factors, including existing bail conditions. When there is a grant of bail with conditions, the detaining authority has to consider if those conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in the activities that the preventive detention is trying to prevent. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order, directing the detenu's release, due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the bail conditions. (Para 16 - 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Preventive Detention - A mere reference to a past narcotics case, not forming the basis of the present detention order, does not vitiate the order, especially when used only to highlight the detenu's propensity to engage in illegal activities. (Para 10) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Preventive Detention - Non-supply of an application for cancellation of bail, which was filed after the detention order was passed and not pursued by the department, does not render the detention order illegal. (Para 12) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Preventive detention should not be used merely to circumvent bail granted by a competent court when the ordinary criminal law is sufficient to address the situation. (Para 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Life Imprisonment - While conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act may be justified, the High Court erred in enhancing the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court to "imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" in an appeal against conviction. Courts have discretion to award life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, but it is not mandatory that it extend to the remainder of the convict's natural life. In cases where life imprisonment is deemed appropriate but a fixed term is considered insufficient, courts may impose a modified sentence specifying a fixed period beyond 14 years. In this case the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reinstated, but without the addition that it will enure till the natural life of the appellant, along with a fine of 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim. (Para 28 & 31) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42 - Sentencing - Overlapping Offences - Where acts constitute offences under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the law providing for the greater degree of punishment applies. (Para 19 & 21) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42A - Overriding effect - Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which gives overriding effect to the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws, pertains to procedural aspects and does not override the substantive provision of Section 42 regarding punishment. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Section 42A - No plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Sentencing – Enhancement of - High Court erred in enhancing sentence in absence of appeal for enhancement by state The High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. While the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State. (Para 27) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh V. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299

Slum Areas

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 - Once a slum area is declared as 'censused slum' i.e., the slums located on land belonging to government or municipal undertaking, then such slums are automatically eligible for redevelopment under the Slum Act without the need for a separate notification. (Para 16) Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali v. Tahsildar-I, Special Cell, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 308