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The Supreme Court on Thursday (29 October) dismissed appeals claiming title over lands in Miyapur, Telangana, and upheld the declaration that the government is the rightful owner. It also held that a jagirdar is not a title holder, that the lands vested in the State government when jagirs were abolished in 1949, and that the revenue entries relied on by one set of claimants were bogus and not genuine and a case of fraud “orchestrated by persons in collusion with the revenue officials.”

A bench of Justice MM Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma ruled so while dismissing the appeals against the 2003 Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment. The Court described the facts as “a sorry state of affairs” and said an attempt was being made by the appellants “to usurp the lands vested in the State of Telangana.”

The lands, spreading over 550 acres and 39 guntas, were classified as Sarkari poramboke (public land) after the survey of Miyapur Village in 1912. The appellants traced their title through three different sources. Some claimed it through Nawab Mohammad Khaisaruddin Khan, son of Rafi-un-nisa Begum, to whom the Reilly Commission had recommended that Miyapur and other villages be restored in 1927. Others claimed through Raheemunnisa Begum, wife of Abdul Salam, whose name appeared as pattedar in the pahanies of 1950-51 to 1952-53. A third individual claimed through Raheemunnisa Begum, wife of Nawab Moinuddowla Bahadur, relying on the 1929 Firman (official order).

The Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, 1949 came into force on 15 August 1949, and the administration of the jagirs was transferred to the government of Hyderabad from 15 September 1949. Khaisaruddin Khan later pursued proceedings under the Hyderabad Atiyat Inquiries Act, 1952, and received provisional and revised commutation awards in 1957 and 1958. A Muntakhib was granted for four villages, including Miyapur, by the Board of Revenue in 1976. His claimant's son's later application seeking release of the villages, was rejected in 1995.

Pursuant to this, the Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 decided two land grabbing cases, without impleading the State government, and the respondents were declared land grabbers. In other cases, where the State government was a party, the lands were held to be poramboke (belonging to the State) and the parties were declared land grabbers. Later, the High Court upheld the latter findings, set aside the former, and declared the State government as the rightful owner.

Aggrieved by the High Court's findings, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court referred to the provisions of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and explained its effect, clarifying that “the grant of paigah, would mean an estate granted for the maintenance of the army. A jagir would mean a grant of the estate qua the right in respect of land revenue. Therefore, a grant of jagir is not to be misconstrued as one of title over the property.”

It held that a jagirdar “is not a title holder, however, he enjoys the said position as per the wishes of the Nizam,” and that under Regulation 4, succession to a deceased jagirdar is not automatic, as the status of jagirdar was completely removed from the date of commencement. Under Regulation 6, jagirs were included in the Diwani, and the powers, rights and liabilities of the jagirdar ceased.

With regards to the exceptions in Regulations 17 and 18 for home farms and personal property, the Court held that “the onus to prove that the property is a home farm or a personal property lies on the person who asserts the same, as the said regulation is only an exception.”

Reading the Regulation with the Atiyat Inquiries Act and the Jagirs Commutation Rules, the Court concluded that the entitlement of an erstwhile jagirdar or a muntakhib holder “would be confined only to the payment of the amount of commutation,” which is “a one-time payment in the nature of compensation, for abolition of such jagirdari rights which, by their own nature, are both restrictive and limited.”

The bench held that the Firman itself restricted the rights of a jagirdar and the nature of the grant was restrictive, so “there cannot be any claim to the title on that basis.” Even the limited rights under the firman were statutorily removed by the Regulation.

It held that these appellants were “estopped and barred from raising any plea towards title over the subject lands, in view of the concluded proceedings which were initiated at his instance before the Nazim Atiyat” and the appeal before the Board of Revenue. The determination and receipt of the commutation amount disentitles Khaisaruddin Khan and his successors from claiming any title or interest. The Court added, “the final nail in the coffin is the unchallenged dismissal of the application preferred by the son of Nawab Khaisaruddin Khan, seeking restoration of the subject lands.” The Court found it strange that her name was included as pattedar despite the land being recorded as “dongala gutta kancha poramboke” in the khasra pahanies of 1954-55, noting that the revenue entries, and the proceedings in land grabbing cases decided without impleading the State government, were in total ignorance of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and the Atiyat Inquiries Act.

The bench held that the entries were made after the lands had vested in the State government, without the knowledge of the Jagir Administrator, and that the discrepancies in the pahanies, along with the evidence of the Mandal Revenue Officer, established suspicious circumstances.

“The mystery gets compounded further by the absence of any order of transfer or mutation, facilitating such an entry in favour of Raheemunissa Begum, wife of Abdul Salam. There is no corresponding entry regarding transfer of the land or change of mutation from the Government in the faisal patti and pucca book for Survey Nos. 100 and 101, a practice which is mandatory, as per the evidence available through the statement of the Mandal Revenue Officer, who was examined as RW-8 in LGC No. 131/1995, before the Special Court. These entries have been made without any authority or jurisdiction. They constitute an act of nullity,” it observed.

The bench also noted that an inspection in October 1995 by the Mandal Revenue Officer found the land to be wasteland covered by boulders, with no visible agricultural operations or possession in favour of any party. “In view of the same, we find that the revenue entries in her favour are bogus and not genuine, as it is a case of fraud orchestrated by persons in collusion with the revenue officials,” it thus held.

It added that “there is absolutely no power to record the name of an individual as a pattedar, through a mere entry, sans any proceedings.” The plea of adverse possession, it said, was neither proved nor otherwise available.

The tehsildar's permission to alienate 140 acres under the Hyderabad Tenancy Act was held to be invalid and a nullity, being without jurisdiction, since it made no reference to the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation or the Atiyat proceedings, and the Administrator and Khaisaruddin Khan were not heard. The Court held that the acquisition proceedings, later quashed by the High Court, which treated the land as her private property, do not estop the State government as title was neither disputed nor determined there, and that the Report of the House Committee does not create any right nor convey any benefit.

It was for the first time before the Supreme Court that the appellants pleaded that the property was purchased in an auction by one Basith Khan in 1918 and bequeathed to her by a Will between 1943 and 1944. The Court refused to rely on this, noting that the plea was not raised before the Special Court or the High Court, and that the documents had not gone through the process of admissibility, relevancy and proof.

“Merely because the documents have been produced, it would, ipso facto, not mean that they are genuine. We are dealing with proceedings emanating from the designated Special Court. These documents have not gone through the process of admissibility, relevancy and proof. Thus, we find it rather strange that there is absolutely no reference to the alleged auction or the will in any one of the earlier proceedings, including the Report of the Reilley Commission, and even thereafter,” it, thus, held.

Further, the bench held “even assuming that the land was settled in favour of their predecessor-ininterest in Firman Isfandar 1338 Fasli, it would be of no avail to them, as no title was transferred by the firman and any interest that stood transferred was also extinguished by virtue of the operation of A.P. Abolition of Jagirs Regulation.”

With regards to the plea that the lands were Zat Jagir and hence unaffected by the Regulation, the Court explained that Zat Jagir means property personally granted to an individual, which is different from home farms or personal property under Regulations 17 and 18. It also held that the High Court rightly rejected the plea, since it was neither taken nor was evidence led before the Special Court. The High Court had also examined it on merits and found that “what could be granted is only the revenue of lands.” The Court added that, in any case, this is a question of fact that was not proved, and that since the claimant herself had no valid title, the lands could not have been validly alienated to those claiming through her.

In the light of above, the Supreme Court observed that one act of fraud vitiates all solemn acts, and that the present appeals “depict a clear case of fraud committed to usurp the lands vested in the State.” It held that the Special Court and High Court had considered all submissions and documents, and that the only lapse, the non-impleadment of the State government in the first set of land grabbing cases, was rectified by the High Court.

The bench further clarified that since the State government was not a party in LGC Nos. 21 and 22 of 1994, that decision “will not have any bearing.” It took note of the lands being transferred to the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA).

“As discussed above, it is a clear-cut case of attempts being made to grab valuable lands vested in the State. As the very title of the appellants itself is lacking, there is no question of granting any equitable reliefs,” it further held.

The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

Appearance:

For Appellants: Mr. K. Shivraj Choudhuri, AOR; Mr. T. V. Ratnam, AOR; M/S Lawyer S Knit & Co, AOR; Mr. MA Chinnasamy, AOR; Mr. Saurabh Gupta, Adv.; Mr. Amit Kumar, Adv.; Mr. V Senthil Kumar, Adv.; Mr. Devansh Tyagi, Adv.; Mr. C Raghavendren, Adv.; Mr. Ch. Leela Sarveswar, Adv.; Mr. K. Ram Kumar, AOR; Mr. Ankolekar Gurudatta, AOR; Mr. Mesala Venu Gopal, Adv.; Mr. Sorokhaibam Shantii Jyoti Singh, Adv.; Mr. Amith J, Adv.; Mr. Mukesh Kumar Singh, Adv.; Mr. S Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv.; Mr. P.B. Suresh Kumar, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Pawanshree Agrawal, AOR; Ms. Kamana Divya Sree, Adv.; Ms. Kriti Jain, Adv.; Ms. Hari Sreedhar, Adv.; Ms. Solanki Das, Adv.; Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari, AOR; Mr. K.Sriram, Adv.; Ms. Vandana Khanorkar, Adv.; Mr. B Adinarayana Rao, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Byrapaneni Suyodhan, Adv.; Ms. Tatini Basu, AOR; Ms. Obulapuram Keerthi, Adv.; Mr. Kumar Shashank, Adv.; Mr. Manu Shanker Mishra, AOR; Mr. Vaibhav Kumar, Adv.; Mr. Nishant Kumar, Adv.

For Respondents: Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, AOR; Mr. Raavi Yogesh Venkata, AOR; Ms. Sahana Sathiya Narayanan, Adv.; Mr. Syed Ahmed Saud, Adv.; Mr. Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Adv.; Mr. Daanish Ahmed Syed, Adv.; Mr. Uzmi Jameel Husain, Adv.; Mr. Mohd Shahib, Adv.; Mr. Mohd. Shahib, Adv.; For M/s Shakil Ahmad Syed, AOR; Mr. B Adinarayana Rao, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Byrapaneni Suyodhan, Adv.; Ms. Tatini Basu, AOR; Ms. Obulapuram Keerthi, Adv.; Mr. Kumar Shashank, Adv.; Mr. Manu Shanker Mishra, AOR; Mr. Anirudh Ray, Adv.; Mr. S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Pawanshree Agrawal, AOR; Ms. Kamana Divya Sreee, Adv.; Ms. Kriti Jain, Adv.; Ms. Solanki Das, Adv.; Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR; Mr. Ch Leela Sarveswar, Adv.; Mr. T Meikandan, Adv.; Mr. C Raghavendren, Adv.; Mr. M Vishnu Venkatesh, Adv.; Mr. C Raghavendren, Adv.; Mr. Devendra Pratap Singh, Adv.; Mrs. C Rubavathi, Adv.; Mr. V Senthil Kumar, Adv.; Mr. Ch. Leela Sarveswar, Adv.; Mr. Rajesh Kumar, AOR; Mr. Vishnu Shankar Jain, AOR; Mr. C.S Vaidyanathan, Sr. Adv.; Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv.; Ms. Devina Sehgal, AOR; Mr. S.uday Bhanu, Adv.; Mr. Srikanth Varma Mudunuru, Adv.; Mr. Yatharth Kansal, Adv.; Mr. Ronak Shankar Agarwal, Adv.; Mr. Akash Singh Rana, Adv.; Mr. Manish Awasthi, Adv.; Mr. Kunal Malik, AOR; Mr. Nagender Singh, Adv.; Mr. Saurabh Mishra, AOR; Mr. Abhinav Pandey, Adv.; Mr. Shrimay Mishra, Adv.; Mr. Ravinder Singh, Adv.; Ms. Praseena Elizabeth Joseph, AOR; M/S. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, AOR; Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Adv.; Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv.; Ms. Devina Sehgal, AOR; Mr. S. Uday Bhanu, Adv.; Mr. Srikanth Varma Mudunuru, Adv.; Mr. Yatharth Kansal, Adv.; Mr. Ronak Shankar Agarwal, Adv.; Ms. Sindoora Vnl, AOR

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