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Ban On Trade Of Cattle For Slaughter, Does The Centre Have The Power?

Slaughtering the law, prevention of cruelty to animals, cruelty to humans.

The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules, 2017 were notified by the Central Government. Ostensibly to regulate animal markets all over India.

The term ‘animal market’ is defined in Rule 2(b) as “a market place or sale-yard or any other premises or place to which animals are brought from other places and exposed for sale or auction and includes any lairage adjoining a market or a slaughterhouse and used in connection with it and any place adjoining a market used as a parking area by visitors to the market for parking vehicles and includes animal fair and cattle pound where animals are offered or displayed for sale or auction.”

The owner of cattle has to provide a written declaration furnishing his/her details, with photo ID proof, the identification details of the cattle, as well as an undertaking that the cattle has not been brought to market for sale for slaughter [Rule 22(b)]. A similar obligation is placed on the purchaser, wherein she is barred from selling the cattle for slaughter, and has to follow the State cattle protection or preservation laws under Rule 22(e).

In this context, Rule 2(e) defines ‘cattle’ as “a bovine animal including bulls, bullocks, cows, buffaloes, steers, heifers and calves and includes camels.”

In effect, the Regulation of Livestock Markets Rules prohibit the buying and/or selling of all cattle, including buffaloes, in the animal markets for the purpose of slaughter. It is argued that mostly unfit or diseased animals are brought to the animal market for slaughter, resulting in the risk of spread of infectious diseases amongst healthy animals. Thus, the Rules ensure that only healthy animals are traded for agricultural purposes, while animals for slaughter can be bought directly from the farms/farmers, in order to ensure traceability. So these Rules do not prohibit slaughter of cattle per se, but only regulate the animal markets to ensure that cattle are not traded for slaughter.

The question is whether the Central Government under the PCA, 1960 is empowered to do this?

Outside Legislative Competence

Regulation of marker Committees including market committees for cattle are State Subjects, hence the Central Government has no power to legislate on the subject, much less through the PCAA! These Rules were enacted under Sections 38(1) and (2) of the PCA, 1960, though there is no specific rule making power vested in the Central Government to regulate animal markets.

It appears that the current Rules have been framed under the directions of the Supreme Court in Gauri Maulekhi vs. Union of India. The Petition in any event sought only the prevention of export or trafficking to Nepal for slaughter of all animals for slaughter; hence that Petition cannot be used as a justification for these rules. There is no mention of prevention of export of animals in these rules.

Laws on cattle slaughter are outside the legislative competence of Parliament, since it is covered under Entry 15 of List II (preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice). The rules are ultra vires the powers of the Central Government, as the subject matter of the rules in pith and substance, to the extent that it seeks to regulates markets, is not a legislation, what can only be done by a law, namely restrict the fundamental right to trade in cattle. matter relating to cruelly to animals but one relating to trade and commerce. That apart, the Central Government has sought to do by delegated legislation what it can do only by a law dealing with trade and commerce, namely restrict the fundamental right to business and trade.

Many States in India do not have any prohibition on slaughter of cattle, including cows, bulls and bullocks, such as Kerala, Tripura, Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, etc, while some States have restrictions on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks under 16 years of age, or without a certificate of ‘fit for slaughter’. Many States do not have any restrictions on the slaughter of buffaloes, irrespective of age/health.

The Rules themselves require compliance with the State cattle Protection or Preservation laws [Rule 22(e)(ii)] implying thereby that those laws continue in force and do not stand amended by these rules.

Once it is recognized that several states do not have laws preventing slaughter of cattle, by what authority can the Centre prevent trading in cattle for the purpose of slaughter in cattle markets and fairs? If a State does not prohibit the either slaughter of cattle or the slaughter of buffalo, then can the Rule prohibit trading in something, which is otherwise legal in the State? The obvious answer is no.

As stated above, the Central Government has no power to regulate animal markets. Entry 28 of List II (Markets and Fairs) gives the power to State Governments to make laws/relating to local markets and fair and this would include cattle markers and fairs.

Ultra vires the PCA, 1960

The PCA does not prohibit slaughter of animals for human consumption. In fact, Section 11(3) (e) makes an explicit exemption by stating;

nothing in this section (treating animals cruelly) will apply to the commission or omission of any act in the course of destruction or the preparation for destruction of any animal as food for mankind unless such destruction or preparation was accompanied by the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.”

Thus, the Act clearly provides that the slaughter of animals is permitted for the purpose of food for human consumption, provided it does not cause unnecessary pain or suffering. Accordingly, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Slaughter House) Rules, 2001 has been framed, which lays down detailed guidelines on how animal slaughter should take place, with minimum pain or suffering, and the operation of slaughter house.

Thus, the Rule 22(b)(iii) and 22(e)(i) which prohibit the seller from bringing a cattle to then animal market for slaughter and the buyer to purchase the same for the purpose of slaughter is in conflict with and totally contrary to Section 11(3)(e) of the PCA, 1961.

It is clear that the Centre has chosen a back door method of preventing the slaughter of cattle on an all India basis, bypassing local and state laws.

Even if one were to give the benefit of but to promote animal welfare, by regulating animal doubt to the government that the intent was animal welfare, why welfare only of cattle? The PCA is meant for all animals, defined in Section 2(a), PCA as “any living creature other than a human being.”

If the idea is to regulate animal markets by prohibiting diseased animals from being sold there for the purpose of slaughter, then the same principle can be applied to other animals too, like pigs, sheep, poultry, etc. That selective approach gives away the story and makes it clear that this is noting more than the universalisation of Hindutva agenda through the back door.

The argument is that for the purpose of slaughter, cattle can be sourced directly from the farms/farmers for slaughter, resulting in better tracking and adherence of safety standards. However, this fails to take into account that rural farming economy is substantially dependent on the local animal markets, where buying and selling of animals is fundamental to the trade. In an animal market, buyers and/or sellers have the freedom to negotiate the prices, to have a wide range of options to choose from, as well as impose other conditions, if needed. By removing the animal markets from the supply chain from where cattle can be sourced for slaughter, including buffalo, one is severely limiting the options before both farmers and buyers, who could then for economic reasons, stop engaging in cattle breeding altogether. Further, it will deal a body blow to the beef industries as well as to other ancillary trades, which are heavily dependent on buffalo.

If the intention of these Rules is to protect animals from cruelty, then they ought to regulate the diary industry first, wherein the maximum exploitation of cattle exists.

The Rules have come in the backdrop of lynching of bona fide traders of cattle by cow vigilantes, gau rakshaks since no trader can bring her cattle to animal markets for the purpose of slaughter. Similarly, no buyer can purchase cattle for slaughter from animal fairs. It is argued that now rules will Rules will provide for mandatory registration of animal markets as well as proper documentation of cattle traders and the cattle itself, it can be contended that these will result in less violence and harassment of cattle traders by the vigilante groups. However, that may not be the case, as was evident in Pehlu Khan’s case in Alwar, a dairy farmer who was lynched for ‘smuggling cows’ on 1st April, 2017 and died two days later, despite having valid purchase documents. The issue is even if sellers and/or buyers have documents showing that they are transporting cattle for agricultural purposes, there is no guarantee that this will satisfy the cow vigilantes.

Violation of fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g)

These Rules constitute a direct interference with the farmers and non-farmers’ fundamental right to trade, as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g), and not protected under the reasonable restriction of ‘in the interests of general public’ under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

The Invisible Lawyer is a magazine managed by The Lawyers Collective. It features cutting edge articles, opinions and interviews on issues which are invisible until acknowledged by the law. 

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  • Arul Selvan says:

    A similar case of violation of law by the executive, without resorting to a law is brought out below :

    In 2001, the Govt decided to turn around sick and loss making Public Sector Units (PSU) by offering VRS on a massive scale. Budgetary support was provided to offer “Golden Handshake” and reduce the manpower in PSU’s. Lakhs of employees opted to take VRS.

    One of the conditions for obtaining VRS contained in the below circular 2(32)/97/ DPE(WC) /GL-LVI dated 6-11-2001 in para 1(d)

    “Once an employee avails himself of VRS from a PSU, he shall not be allowed to take up employment in another PSU. If he desires to do so, he shall have to return the VRS Compensation received by him”

    This first part of condition was violation of Contract act 27 and violation of fundamental right as per article 19(1)g of the constitution. The second part is violative of Contract act section 73.

    Contract act section 27 : Agreement in restraint of trade, void.—Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void

    Article 19(1)g : to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business

    Contract act section 73 : Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.—When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him

    A number of courts have struck conditions imposed by the employers on employers which restrict the employees after termination of employment. Despite such a legal position, the Department of Public Enterprises have issued such an illegal circular.

    This circular has adversely affected the professional life of lakhs of workmen who were not able to work in other PSU units by using the skills learned in their present companies.

    Following judgements are relied : Maganlal Rambhai Gandhi Vs. Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad AIR1964 Guj 215; (1963)IILLJ522Guj
    13. In my opinion, under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, every citizen has the right which is unqualified except by Clauses (2) to (6) of that Article, to practice any profession or to carry any occupation, trade or business in any manner he likes in any part of India. The issue of an injunction restraining a person from serving any person or any firm except that of the plaintiff during a certain period would clearly offend the right given by Article 19 of the Constitution. Sodan Singh Etc. Etc vs New Delhi Municipal Committee & … on 30 August, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 1988, 1989 SCR (3)1038
    25….. The guarantee under Article 19(1)(g) extends to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. ‘Profession’ means an occupation carried on by a person by virtue of his personal and specialised qualifications, training or skill. The word ‘Occupation’ has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job, principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged.
    As per the above two verdicts, the condition mentioned in the VRS application stating “I also understand that I will not be allowed to take up employment in any other PSU or Govt organisation in future” violates the constitution.

    Supreme Court of India Olga Tellis & Ors vs Bombay Municipal Corporation & … on 10 July, 1985 , 1986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 51,, a seven judge constitutional bench held

    “No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding, whether under a mistake of law or otherwise, that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceeding. Such a concession, if enforced, would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Were the argument of estoppel valid, an all-powerful state could easily tempt an individual to forego his precious personal freedoms on promise of transitory, immediate benefits.”

    The above verdict makes it clear that the undertaking obtained by a PSU from workmen on the garb of giving Ex-gratia is void as it is violating the fundamental right as per article 19(1)g of the constitution.

    No Rights to PSU after separation on VRS as per Contract act section 27
    The condition of ban of future employment in another PSU after VRS coupled with undertaking to refund the VRS Ex-gratia have been repeatedly quashed by various courts. Only some important verdicts are mentioned below
    Verdicts specific to VRS
    Supreme Court : In Transfer Petition (civil) 8 of 2000 A.K. Bindal & Anr. Vs Union of India & Ors. On 25/04/2003, Bench: S. Rajendra Babu & G.P. Mathur, it was held :
    Page 16 : ….. a considerable amount is to be paid to an employee ex-gratia besides the terminal benefits in case he opts for voluntary retirement under the Scheme and his option is accepted. The amount is paid not for doing any work or rendering any service. It is paid in lieu of the employee himself leaving the services of the company or the industrial establishment and forgoing all his claims or rights in the same. It is a package deal of give and take. That is why in business world it is known as ’Golden Handshake’. The main purpose of paying this amount is to bring about a complete cessation of the jural relationship between the employer and the employee. After the amount is paid and the employee ceases to be under the employment of the company or the undertaking, he leaves with all his rights and there is no question of his again agitating for any kind of his past rights, with his erstwhile employer including making any claim with regard to enhancement of pay scale for an earlier period. If the employee is still permitted to raise a grievance regarding enhancement of pay scale from a retrospective date, even after he has opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme and has accepted the amount paid to him, the whole purpose of introducing the Scheme would be totally frustrated.
    The above judgment makes it clear that no claim whatsoever can be entertained after the employee-employer relationship has come to an end. This is applicable for employee as well as employer.
    Gauhati – Oil India Ltd Vs Dilip Kumar Goswami, (2000)IILLJ415 Gau.
    “The employer cannot prescribe any term and condition in order to restrict future avocation of an employee after retirement.
    ” 13. The clarification given by the Department of Public Enterprises in Column-5 shows that the Management of Public Enterprises have been asked to exercise its own managerial discretion and prudence while disposing of the cases of voluntary retirement. The clarification further requires the Management to invoke the powers of office memorandum dated December 14, 1982, January 25, 1998 and June 23, 1998 (sic) issued by Department of Public Enterprises if they find that an employee seeking voluntary retirement has opted for a job in any other Public Sector Undertaking. This condition also appears to be contrary to the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. An employee going on voluntary retirement and not taking any job in any Public Sector Undertaking will be entitled to full benefits under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, but the said benefits will be restricted to certain amounts only if such employee takes fresh employment after retirement. The clarification given to this effect cannot be said to be in keeping with the spirit of the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act. The Company while disposing of a request for voluntary retirement cannot discriminate in respect of benefits to which an employee is entitled to on such retirement on consideration that the employee concerned was going to take over a job in some other company. A bare reading of the guideline/circular shows that this was issued without any authority of law and against the basic principles behind ‘voluntary retirement’.”
    Hydrabad division bench– S.Rami Reddy Vs Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, Andra Pradesh State Irrigation Development Corporation Limited, 2003(4)ALD609. There is no ban on VRS optees to join any other PSU in open competition
    “31. According to the learned counsel, Clause 8 of G.O. Ms. No. 16, dated 22-3-2001, which requires the identified employee to give an undertaking to the effect that he would not seek re-employment in other Government undertakings, is arbitrary and illegal for it violates the provisions of Articles 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and in support of this submission, he placed reliance on the judgement of the Gauhati High Court reported in Oil India Ltd. v. Dilip Kumar Goswami, 1999 (7) SLR 494.
    76. The effect of the other contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the condition in the impugned notice insofar as it mandates the identified employee who opts for VRS to give an undertaking that he shall not be eligible for re-employment in any Government Departments and Public Sector Undertakings, which is in consonance with sub-clause (8) of Clause 8 of G.O. Ms. No. 16, dated 22-3-2001, is arbitrary inasmuch as it takes away their right to livelihood enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is also liable to be rejected, inasmuch, the learned single Judge of this Court, having considered this contention, in the above judgement, held thus: In the considered view of this Court, Clause 8(8) of G.O. Ms. No. 16, dated 22-3-2001 suffers from no infirmity. It does not deprive persons, who have opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme from competing by way of direct recruitment to any Public Office.
    77. It should be noted that the impugned condition only prohibits the petitioners from taking re-employment in Government Departments/Public Sector Undertakings. They are not precluded from taking employment in private organizations or compete by way of direct recruitment to public offices. The apprehension of the petitioners that if they give an undertaking in terms of Clause 8(8) of G.O. Ms. No. 16, dated 22-3-2001, they would be barred from seeking employment in any organization, is misplaced inasmuch as even if they give such an undertaking, they would not waive their fundamental right to equality enshrined under Article 14 and the other fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. If at any future point of time, the petitioners apply for employment and their cases for employment is rejected on the ground of they having undertook not to claim re-employment, are not entitled to claim employment, then they would be at liberty to assail the same.”
    Supreme court – Gouri Shankar Ghosh Hazara Vs Hindustan Copper, 8-5-2001, A VRS optee can join another PSU, he will be eligible for all VRS benefits
    “It is clear that there was as such no embargo on an employee of a public sector undertaking being employed by another public sector undertaking”
    Cases where ban on future employment (by whatever name it is called like confidentiality, non compete, non disclosure, secret formula, special training, undertaking, bond, affidavit, promise etc) were quashed
    Wipro Limited vs Beckman Coulter International … on 11 July, 2006 Equivalent citations: 2006 (3) ARBLR 118 Delhi, 2006 (2) CTLJ 57 Del, 131 (2006) DLT 681
    2) Negative covenants between employer and employee contracts pertaining to the period post termination and restricting an employee’s right to seek employment and/or to do business in the same field as the employer would be in restraint of trade and, therefore, a stipulation to this effect in the contract would be void. In other words, no employee can be confronted with the situation where he has to either work for the present employer or be forced to idleness;
    4) The question of reasonableness as also the question of whether the restraint is partial or complete is not required to be considered at all whenever an issue arises as to whether a particular term of a contract is or is not in restraint of trade, business or profession. M/S Stellar Information … vs Mr Rakesh Kumar & Ors

    11. Mr Santhalia further submitted that the Defendants could not be restrained from carrying on their business or approaching the customers as any such restrictive covenant in the Agreements would be void by virtue of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In support of its contention, he relied on the following decisions:
    (i) The decision of the Madras High Court in Lister Technologies Private Limited v Mukundhan Dakshinamurthi & Ors.: 215(5) CTC 830.
    (ii) The decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ambiance India Pvt. Ltd. V. Shri Naveen Jain: 122 (2005) DLT 421.
    (iii) The decision of the Bombay High Court in VFS Global Services Private Limited v. Mr Suprit Roy: 2008 (118) FLR 419.
    (iv) American Express Bank Ltd. v. Ms. Priya Puri: 2006 (110) FLR 1061.

    Gujarat – Lalbhai Dalpatbhai & Co Vs Chittaranjan Chandulal Pandya, AIR 1996 Guj Restriction on employee after termination of employment is not valid. Employee does not have any bargaining power and has to sign on dotted line.
    “9….If it is not going to benefit the employer in any legitimate manner, the court would not injunct the employee from exercising his skill, training and knowledge merely because the employee has agreed to it”
    Gujarat – Sandhya Organic Chemicals P Ltd Vs United Phosphorous Ltd, AIR 1997 Guj 177. as per contract act, service covenant beyond service period is not valid.
    “16….The supreme court has also ruled that under section 27 of the contract act, a service covenant beyond the termination of the service is void”
    Supreme court – Superintendence Company of India Vs Krishnan Murgai, AIR 1980 SC 1717. Post service conditions are not valid. Even partial condition is not valid. Inequality of bargaining power with employees and harsh and oppressive conditions make the contract invalid.
    “29.A contract, which has for its object a restraint of trade, is prima facie void….whether the restraint was general or partial, unqualified or qualified, if it was in the nature of a restraint of trade, it was void.
    32…..If the agreement puts a restraint even though partial, it was void and therefore, the contract must be treated as one which can not be enforced.
    53….Not a Indian Decision has been brought to our notice where an injunction has been granted against an employee after the termination of his employment.
    58….If the covenant is to operate after the termination of services, or it is too widely worded, the court may refuse to enforce it.
    59….there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties, indeed no bargaining may occur because the employee is presented with a standard form of contract to accept or reject… ”
    Supreme court – Moti Ram Deka Vs East Frontier Railways, AIR 1964 SC 600. If a contract is not valid as per contract act, the fact that it was signed by the employee is of no avail as decided by 7 judge constitutional bench.
    “31….it is well known that if the contract is void, as for instance, under section 23 of the Indian contract act, the plea that it was executed by the party would be to no avail….”
    Supreme court – Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs Century Spinning, AIR 1967 SC 1098, negative covenant in a service agreement is void. Negative covenant after termination of contract is not valid.
    “This was a case of a negative covenant not to serve elsewhere for three years after the termination of the contract. In this case the court applied the test of what was reasonable for the protection of the plaintiffs’ interest. It was also not a case of the employee possessing any special talent but that of a mere canvasser. This decision, however, cannot assist us as the negative covenant therein was to operate after the termination of the contract. Herbert Morris v. Saxelby(3) and Attwood v. Lamont(4) are also cases where the restrictive covenants were to apply after the termination of the employment. In Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent(5) also the negative covenant was to operate for a year after the employee left the employment and the court held that the restriction was void inasmuch as it went beyond what was reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer’s legitimate interests.
    The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract. “
    Supreme court – Percept D Mark (India) Ltd Vs Zaheer Khan, AIR 2006 SC 3426, any condition after termination of contract will be invalid.
    “55. On the pleading contained in the arbitration petition, there can be no escape from the conclusion that what the appellant sought to enforce was a negative covenant which, according to the appellant, survived the expiry of the agreement. This, the High Court has rightly held is impermissible as such clause which is sought to be enforced after the term of the contract is prima facie void under section 27 of the contract Act”
    Supreme Court of India : Bank Of India & Ors vs O.P. Swarnakar Etc on 17 December, 2002, Bench: H Sema, S Sinha on the topic of VRS
    ….. It is difficult to accept the contention raised in the Bar that a contract of employment would not be governed by the Indian Contract Act. A contract of employment is also a subject matter of contract. Unless governed by a statute or statutory rules, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act would be only applicable at the formulation of the contract as also the determination thereof.
    The above judgement makes it clear that the provisions of contract act are applicable in VRS.
    Supreme Court of India L.I.C. Of India & Anr vs Consumer Education & Research … on 10 May, 1995 ; 1995 AIR 1811, 1995 SCC (5) 482
    58. …. Imposition of conditions including the one struck down by the High Court are, therefore, unconstitutional and Impermissible.
    Therefore, the imposition of condition of refund of VRS ex-gratia is liable to be struck down.
    In Madras High Court, in R.Babu vs Ttk Lig Ltd on 1 March, 2004, The Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.GOVINDARAJAN and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.KANNADASAN O.S.A.No.6 of 2003 and CMP No.693 of 2003, it was held
    “6. ….. submission viz., violation of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act with regard to the negative covenants of the agreement dated 1.5.1990. Even though the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the relevant portion in Krishan Murgai’s case relating to the violation of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act was delivered by the learned single Judge, viz., His Lordship A.P.SEN, J., who according to him dissented with the majority of the two other learned Judges of the Bench and as such, the same is not applicable, we do not agree with the said argument. A perusal of the said judgment discloses that no injunction can be granted against an employee after the termination of his employment, restraining him from carrying on a competitive trade. In fact, even though the above proposition of law was laid down by the learned Judge, finally all the three learned Judges held that the judgment of the Delhi Bench was correct and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the judgment of His Lordship A.P.SEN, J., cannot be construed as a dissenting judgment. It is a case in which two learned Judges of the Bench did not dealt with the question while the third learned Judge dealt with and also declared the law. The dictum of His Lordship A.P.SEN, J., is undoubtedly the law declared by the Supreme Court as contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution of India and it shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India and there is no escape from that conclusion.”
    In Madras High Court Unknown vs M/S.Secan Invescast (India) … on 1 February, 2013, the division bench has dealt with restrictive covenants extensively citing more than 5 judgements of the SC. As per this judgement, the condition not to serve any other PSU for life time in any part of the world is absolutely not permitted as it is not reasonable.
    “20. As per various judicial pronouncements, the reasonable restraint is permitted and does not render the contract void ab initio. Reasonable restrictions can be placed in the following ways:- 1.Distance: suitable restrictions can be placed on employee to not practice the same profession within a stipulated distance, the stipulation being reasonable. 2.Time limit: if there is a reasonable time provided in this clause then it will fall under reasonable restrictions. 3.Trade secrets: The employer can put reasonable restrictions on the letting out of trade secrets. 4.Goodwill: There is an exception under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act on the distribution of goodwill.Reasonableness of restraint depends upon various factors, and the restraint in order to prevent divulgence of trade secrets or business connections has to be reasonable in the interest of the parties to ensure adequate protection to the covenantee.
    45. Referring to the decisions of ((1895) 2 Q.B. 315 Robb. Vs. Green, AIR 1967 SC 1098 Niranjan Shankar Golikari case and AIR 1995 SC 2372 – M/s.Gujarat Bottling Co.Ltd. Vs. Coca Cola Co. and others, the learned single Judge rightly held that the negative covenant of the agreement can be enforced only during the period of contract and that the same cannot be enforced after the expiry of the agreement period. We do not find any error or illegality warranting interference with the order of the learned single Judge and this appeal is liable to be dismissed.”

    The “refund of ex-gratia” is illegal as per the Kerala High court which held in State of Kerala Vs United Shippers and Dredgers Ltd, 1982KLJ430.
    “7…If the breach has not resulted in any harm, loss or damage to the other party, the question of recompensating him or restoring to him something he has lost would not arise.
    8…..section 75 would necessarily indicate that the party who complains of a breach must have really suffered some loss or damage apart from being faced with the mere act of breach of contract….If in any case the breach has not resulted in or caused any loss or damage to a party, he cannot claim compensation”

    When a workman joins another PSU, there is no loss incurred by the first PSU. Therefore such a condition of refund is completely illegal.

  • anas says:

    Dnt stop buffaloes wat u wil do india had huge income from beef export… Stupid idiots u can stop only cow bug dnt dare to touch beef

  • Guest says:

    is it effort to find justification for slaughter and somehow link it to hindutva as if it is sin to protect live stock from being treated as food? please read what Constituent Assembly discussed on this issue and why protecting cattle from slaughter is inherent in Constitution. although the absolute on trade and transport is not justified.

  • Yogananda says:

    They are in clear understanding that the existence of the word “secular” in the preamble of the Constitution of India will never permit them to make India into a Hindu Nation. Nevertheless, undoubtedly, they are absolutely busy not in Make in India, but in Making Hindu India… This is not the becoming of Great Democratic Nation. This is against the spirit of Constitution. The People’s Mandate at large was taken for granted…

  • K. MOHANDAS RAO says:

    What about the Article 48 of the Constitution of India? The Central Government has to implement what the Constitution says. Please do not misguide people.