As the Indian economy attempted to move from an agrarian economy and adopted economic plan to foster industrialization, major policies of the government, including legislative provisions, were directed to achieve rapid industrialization. With focus on industry and to provide basic legislative support for the development and regulation of industries, the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act was enacted in 1951. Formation and liquidation of business entities continued to be governed by the Companies Act/Partnership Act and other Insolvency Acts. However, in view of growing inadequacy of the then prevailing mechanism to deal with sickness and insolvency, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (SICA) of 1985 was enacted to expedite revival of potentially viable companies and close unviable units to release investment locked up in them for productive use elsewhere.
The 1990s saw the rise of service sector in India, which was termed as “services-led industrialization/ services revolution”. There was sharp increase in the share of services in GDP, which grew from 37 percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 2002, whereas the share of manufacturing came down to 16 percent. There was also greater flow of FDI in various sectors. This, along with economic reforms at world stage and economic liberalization within the country, also required a shift in legislative outlook from 'protectionism' to 'open competition'. The era was characterized with radical changes in the legal framework, including the SEBI Act, MRTP Act, Capital Issues (Control) Act, Depository Act, FEMA, Consumer Protection Act, Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Companies Act, Information Technology Act, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Payment and Settlement Systems Act, Limited Liability Partnership Act, Factoring Regulation Act and Companies Act 2013, which ushered in more liberalized approach of the government in the respective fields with focus on ease of doing business.
With major changes in place, the concept of 'industry' gave way to 'enterprise' and 'protection' to 'self-sustaining competitive entities'. This also necessitated basic shift in looking at business failures from a 'stigmatic outlook' to 'a normal economic action'. This shift in approach also needed to be adopted in legislations. After a long journey, which started in 1964 and continued upto 2013, through various committees, the modern law to deal with insolvency was passed in the form of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC), based on the recommendations of TK Vishwanathan Committee Report.
Evolution Of The Law In Other Jurisdiction: The law relating to voluntary bankruptcy is not a new law, in England, the Bankrupts (England) Act 1825 allowed people to start proceedings for their own bankruptcy, in agreement with creditors. Later, the Bankruptcy Act 1869 was passed, allowing all people, rather than just traders to file for bankruptcy.
In the US, voluntary bankruptcy was first allowed by the Acts of 1841 and 1867. The Bankruptcy Act of 1938, known as the Chandler Act expanded voluntary access to the bankruptcy system and voluntary petitions were made more attractive to debtors. The Chandler Act gave authority to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the administration of bankruptcy filings. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 brought about major change in the bankruptcy system, however, the most important changes to bankruptcy law was under the 1978 Act, in the form of specialized insolvency court and judges.
Indian Landscape: The Indian insolvency landscape was governed by number of legislations such as the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, which covered the insolvency of individuals and of partnerships and associations of individuals in the three erstwhile Presidency towns of Madras, Kolkata and Mumbai. The Provincial Insolvency Act 1920, for individuals in areas other than the Presidency towns. Corporate insolvency was governed by the Companies Act, 1956 and SICA. Limited liability partnerships were governed by the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008. For partnership firms registered under the Indian Partnerships Act, 1932, insolvency and bankruptcy resolution was under individual insolvency and bankruptcy law. Thus, system presented a complex picture and non specialized forums and was marked by failure of BIFR.
The Shift In Approach: The Code ushered in a complete shift in our approach to bankruptcy. It recognized that failure of some business plans is integral to the process of the market economy. When business failure takes place, the best outcome for society is to have a rapid renegotiation between the financiers, to finance the going concern using a new arrangement of liabilities and with a new management team. If this cannot be done, the best outcome for society is a rapid liquidation. When such arrangements can be put into place, the market process of creative destruction will work smoothly, with greater competitive vigor and greater competition.
Weaknesses/Conflict In The Old Regime: The Code recognized weakness and failure of the existing system and also various conflicts that arise because the asymmetry of information between the creditor and also which were responsible for failure of the then prevailing system.
The first conflict which was sought to be addressed was the " asymmetry of information between the creditor and debtor". It meant that a debtor will always have more information about the enterprise than the creditor and as such they tend to have the upper-hand in the negotiation.
Secondly, it also recognized that creditor has the incentive to close out its investment quickly so as to avail of alternative investment opportunities. The debtor, on the other hand, has the incentive to hold on to the assets, either to benefit from potentially higher returns by deploying the assets in more risky ventures or to benefit by stripping asset value.
The IBC has attempted to resolve these conflicts with introduction to three new institutions of Information Utilities (IUs) which are expected to have all financial information of the entities and Creditors’ Committee, a decision making body to decide on the viability and resolution of the entity and Resolution Professionals to handle resolution and liquidation process.
It lays down strict time frame for each and every process for resolution process right from admission of application, appointment of Interim Resolution Professional, lodging of claim, formation of Creditors Committee, consideration of resolution plan and submission of plant to adjudicating authority and its approval thereof. To effectively address the issues of participation of various stake holders, the Code has divided creditors into two categories of 'Financial Creditors' and 'Operational Creditors'. Operational creditors do not get any voting right in creditors’ committee which consists of only financial creditors. The Code also lays down waterfall mechanism for distribution of liquidation value of the enterprise. It recognizes priority of secured creditors over sovereign debt.
The Code also settles the issue of sickness, which was a contentious issue under the old regime and was usually decided after a long drawn battle between lenders and debtor, by linking it with default and proof of default registered with IU being admitted as prima facie evidence.
Collective Mechanism For Resolution: The IBC lays down a collective mechanism for resolving insolvency within a framework of equity and fairness to all stakeholders to preserve economic value in the process. A time-bound process either ends in keeping the entity as a going enterprise, or liquidates and distributes the assets to the various stakeholders.
Since, viability of the enterprise is a matter of business, the IBC recognizes that matters of business can only be negotiated between creditors and debtor, as such creditors’ committee is the authority to deal with this aspect of business. The role of the courts is limited to the supervisions of process of resolution, and it is not supposed to make any business decisions.
Moratorium: The IBC sets up a calm period (moratorium period) for insolvency resolution where the debtor can negotiate in the assessment of viability without fear of debt recovery enforcement by creditors. The moratorium will be for a period of 180 days.
However, with a view to ensure smooth operations of the entity IBC requires that supply of essential goods or services to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during moratorium period.
However, the most critical change is divesting of management function from existing management to professionals. Triggering of the IBC results in the appointment of a resolution professional as the manager of the resolution period, so that the creditors can negotiate the assessment of viability with the confidence that the creditor will not take any action to erode the value of the enterprise. The professional have the power and responsibility to monitor and manage the operations and assets of the enterprise. This is also done to ensure reduction of asymmetry of information between creditors and debtor in the resolution process. It also enables access information to third parties who can participate in the resolution process, through the regulated professional.
Insolvency Resolution Process: The insolvency resolution process (IRP) for individuals varies from that of companies. These processes may be initiated by either the debtor or the creditors. The resolution process has to be completed within a maximum period of 180 days from the date of admission of the application by the adjudicating authority. This period may be extended only once by 90 days if 75 percent of the financial creditors agree.
The process will involve negotiations between the debtor and creditors to draft a resolution plan. The process will end under two circumstances, (i) when a resolution plan is agreed upon by a majority of the creditors and submitted to the adjudicating authority, or (ii) the time period for negotiation has come to an end. In case a plan cannot be negotiated upon, the company will go into liquidation.
The IBC also provides for a fast track insolvency resolution process for companies with smaller operations. The process will have to be completed within 90 days, which may be extended if 75% of financial creditors agree.
For resolution process for individuals and partnership, there are provisions where debtor may apply for forgiveness of a specified amount of debt, provided that his assets are below a limit set by the central government. This process will have to be completed within six months. In case of insolvency resolution, negotiations between the debtor and creditors will be supervised by an insolvency professional. If negotiations succeed, a repayment plan, agreed upon by a majority of the creditors, will be submitted to the adjudicator. If they fail, the matter will proceed to bankruptcy resolution.
Insolvency Regulaltor: The Code has established Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, to oversee insolvency resolution in the country. The Board has 10 members, including representatives from the Central government and Reserve Bank of India. It will register information utilities, insolvency professionals and insolvency professional agencies under it, and regulate their functioning.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund: The Code creates an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund. Deposits to the Fund will include: (i) grants made by the central government, (ii) amount deposited by persons, and (iii) interest earned on investments made from the Fund. Any person who has contributed to the Fund may apply for withdrawal, in case of proceedings against him.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Adjudicators: The Code proposes two separate tribunals to adjudicate grievances related to insolvency, bankruptcy and liquidation of different entities under the law:
Appeals against orders of these tribunals may be challenged before their respective appellate tribunals, and further before the Supreme Court.
Offences and penalties: The Code specifies that for most offences committed by a debtor under corporate insolvency (like concealing property, defrauding creditors, etc.), the penalty will be imprisonment of up to five years, with a fine of up to Rs. 1 crore. For offences committed by an individual (like providing false information), the imprisonment will vary based on the offence. For most of these offences, the fine will not exceed Rs. 5 lakh.
The Code provides for punishment for various wrongdoing, with a view to ensure serious and meaningful process. Any action of debtor for concealment of property, entering into any transactions defrauding creditors, for misconduct in course of corporate insolvency resolution process, falsification of books of accounts, willful and material omissions from statements relating to affairs of corporate debtor, any false representations to creditors, contravention of moratorium or the resolution plan etc.
Further, with a view to instill discipline in the action by creditors, IBC provides for punishment for false information furnished in application and for nondisclosure of dispute or repayment of debt by operational creditor and for providing false information in application made by corporate debtor. Further, if the debtor or creditor furnishes information which is false in any material particulars to the resolution professional, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to Rs. 5 lakh, or with both. Thus, the Code has brought into effect an effective and serious mechanism for addressing insolvency and tried to plug in all loose ends which were the main cause of failure of the old regime.
The Road Ahead: The Code is just completing one year and a number of applications are still at resolution stage and very few cases have reached liquidation stage. However, still the stakeholders are trying to come to terms with the complexities of the process. Some distance has been traversed, but still there is a long way to go. The issues which have arisen so far mainly relate to preliminary stage of development of law and are hovering around admission and procedure only. The Code will have to cross many challenges which would be thrown open by the system and cultural and legal issues under the Indian conditions.
The process first started with ICICI Bank triggering insolvency process against Innoventive Industries Ltd of Pune. The first resolution case was in the form of Synergy Dooray. Both the cases have checkered route.
Innoventive Industries Ltd Vs ICICI Bank went upto the apex court. Whilst discussing and determining the above issues, the Supreme Court laid down one of the most important points, i.e. after defaults on its debts and after admission of proceedings under the IBC, the management is no longer allowed to continue. The scope of enquiry before the adjudicating authority is limited to assessing the records provided by the financial creditor to satisfy itself that the default has occurred. It is of no matter that the debt is disputed so long as the debt is “due” i.e. payable unless interdicted by some law or has not yet become due in the sense that it is payable at some future date. The court further observed that the speed, within which the adjudicating authority is to ascertain the existence of a default from the records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial creditor, is important. This, it must do within 14 days of the receipt of the application. The apex court also touched upon the issue of payability of debt and held that a debt may not be due if it is not payable in law or in fact. The moment the adjudicating authority is satisfied that a default has occurred, the application must be admitted unless it is incomplete, in which case it may give notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within 7 days of receipt of a notice from the adjudicating authority.
On the issue of whether the Maharashtra Relief Undertaking Act (MRU Act) will prevail over the provisions of the Insolvency Code, the apex court held that the MRU Act operates in the same field as the Insolvency Code and is repugnant to Insolvency Code and that the later non-obstante clause (Section 238) of the Parliamentary enactment (Insolvency Code) will also prevail over the limited non-obstante clause contained in Section 4 of the Maharashtra Act.
The judgment of the Supreme Court in above matter cleared the road for faster and meaningful resolution under IBC.
First Resolution Case: Synergies Dooray Automotive Ltd leased its assets in 2005 to a special purpose vehicle Synergies Castings Ltd (SCL). Soon thereafter, lenders also assigned their debts to this SPV. But two years later, just before Dooray filed for insolvency (under the Sick Industrial Companies Act), Synergies Castings transferred that debt to Millennium Finance, a non-banking financial company, which, it was argued, was to ensure control over the insolvency process. Amongst the three Resolution plans, the plan of Synergy Castings Ltd. (“SCL”) was selected by a vote of 90.16 % (majority) during the second CoC meeting. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC) abstained from voting in this meeting.
The total cost of this scheme was Rs. 5,408.21 lakh and was to be paid by way of long term funds and accruals of SCL over a period of five years. A merger between SDAL and SCL was set to take place, and the state government exempted this merged entity from paying stamp duty. SCL also agreed to finance any shortfalls in making timely payments to the tax authorities or any other debtors and to induce funds for all other obligations under the Resolution Plan. But it raised serious issues about role of related party. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company, a secured creditor, objected to the resolution plan on the ground that the transfer of debt from Synergies Castings to Millennium Finance was questionable as it was done with the intention of influencing voting power in the committee of creditors. It was also argued that Synergies Castings was Dooray’s SPV, and hence a related party, the law did not allow for it to be included in the committee of creditors set up under the insolvency process.
Edelweiss has filed a complaint at the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India against resolution professional alleging that she conducted herself in a partisan manner and acted without taking approval from the committee of creditors. They have also challenged order of NCLT, Hyderabad before NCLAT. We can expect a lot of clarity on the issue.
However, in the meantime, IBBI, on November 7, 2017, came out with an amendment to the IBC (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulation 2017, and amended Regulation 38 requiring mandatory due diligence and mandatory disclosures by resolution applicant and connected parties.
Mandatory Requirement Of 14-Day Time Limit: Strict time line under the IBC is one of its USP and quite critical for success of the system. However, NCLAT in May 2017 in a case of JK Jute Ltd has held that to admit or reject a petition “is procedural in nature, a tool of aid in expeditious dispensation of justice and is directory”. The tribunal is performing a judicial role and the sections of the Companies Act 2013 do not prescribe a timeline for NCLT to pass orders. The NCLT ignored the creditor's argument that the provisions of the IBC do not allow the tribunal to embark upon a balance sheet analysis, has in some cases also extended the scope of its inquiry to the balance sheet of the debtor and held that since the debtor had sufficient assets on its balance sheet, it would be unfair and inconvenient for the debtor if the petition were admitted.
A study by National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, shows the new specialized tribunal (and its benches) had a disposal rate of 6,620 cases annually. Based on these numbers, the report said the NCLT would accumulate a backlog of 130,250 cases in five years. While one can understand difficulties faced by an entity going through a temporary financial crunch which is quite natural in a business cycle therefore, bankers and creditors do have schemes to take care of such situation and support business entity. The industry also understands to adopt a flexible approach to take care of default which are of temporary nature and would not and do not take legal recourse in such situation. Banks/creditors do have their own internal policies which guide them in matters of chronic nature. The system under IBC is also directed to address the culture of financial indiscipline in the economy. Business entities are interlinked in business circle(s) and rampant financial indiscipline affects financial health of all related ancillary/supply chain which triggers chain of default and business failure. Financial indiscipline in the industry is one of the main reasons for rise of NPA in the banking industry. Therefore, any misplaced sympathy to deal with default could undo the systematic changes proposed to be brought out in the system through IBC. NCLAT /IBBI would need to have a relook into the issue of timely admission of cases.
Faster Decision-Making Process: Time-bound resolution is the basic premise on which the IBC is built. It has also set up institutions and bodies that are intended to support this timeline. Information Utilities (IUs) are basically set up to save time on collection and proving of information. It should be in a position to take care of all the financial details of a debtor including lender, creditors, operational creditors their dues, proof of default, charges on assets, all preferential type transactions. The idea is that efforts need not be wasted on proving of any such information which otherwise could be accessed though authentic source and the Committee of Creditors should only concentrate on deciding the resolution plan. Advancements in technology and system have paved way of conclusion of transaction in few seconds which used to take months. Sahoo, Chairman of IBBI, quotes example of introduction of settlement period for security market transactions and says that people objected to 60 days’ limit as too short time for settlement, but now even 60 second is considered to be a long period. The IBC is also intended to reduce the decision making process and time.
Pre-packaged insolvency, which is well-recognized form of bankruptcy procedure in the US and the UK, could also be one of the mode of faster resolution process. In pre-pack arrangements, resolution/ restructure plan is agreed by the parties in advance of a company declaring its insolvency. This form is used under Chapter 11 of US Insolvency Law.
Status Of Flat Buyers Under Assured Return Plan: In Nikhil Mehta vs. AMR Infrastructure, on 23.01.2017, deciding the petition filed by flat buyers under an assured return program, the NCLT principal bench held that the flat buyers didn't fall in the definition of either financial or operational creditors and dismissed the petition. However, the appellate tribunal held the flat buyers under the assured return program, to be financial creditors and directed the NCLT bench to admit the petition if complete otherwise. This shows that status of such parties would depend upon the terms of the agreement between the parties and if default /breach result in one of the parties being getting status of creditor it would have role in resolution process. Again, IUs would be bridging these gaps and hopefully, precious time being wasted in proceedings could be saved.
Status Of Guarantors: In law, the liability of a guarantor is coextensive with that of principal debtor. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bank of Bihar Ltd vs Damodar Prasad & Another, laid down the law that a "creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against the principal debtor before suing the surety and that when a decree is obtained against a surety, it may be enforced in the same manner as a decree for any other debt".
While dealing with the issue of enforcement of guarantee before DRT proceedings, during moratorium period under Section 22 of the SICA, the Supreme Court, in the case of Inderjeet Arya And Anr vs ICICI Bank Ltd, observed that "In Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited (supra) this Court reiterated the term ‘suit’ have to be confined in the context of sub- section (1) of Section 22 of SICA to those actions which are dealt with under the Code and not in the comprehensive over-arching proceedings so as to apply to any original proceedings before any legal forum. The term ‘suit’ would apply only to proceedings in civil court and not actions or recovery proceedings filed by banks and financial institutions before a tribunal such as DRT".
Under the Scheme of IBC, a resolution plan approved by the Adjudicating Authority shall be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan. However, it does not envisage any role for such guarantor during resolution phase. The Code is also silent on effect of moratorium period on legal actions against guarantors. However, in the case of Schweitzer Systemtek vs. Phoenix ARC Limited, NCLT Mumbai has held that the moratorium in terms of Section 14 of the Code applies only to the proceeding against the corporate debtor and not to the proceedings initiated against its directors and other guarantors. But the High Court of Allahabad, while deciding the matter of Sanjeev Shriya vs. State Bank of India & Ors, has held that the moratorium would extend to the proceedings against the guarantors of the corporate debtors as well. In lpha & Omega Diagnostics (India) Ltd. v Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. & Ors., NCLT (Mumbai) observed that the term “its” under Section 14(1)(c) of the Code refers to the property of the corporate debtor. Accordingly, the property not owned by the corporate debtor would not fall within the ambits of the moratorium under the Code. The NCLAT confirmed the order.
In Steel Konnect vs. Hero Fincorp, decided on 29.08.2017, NCLAT held that despite the board being suspended after the moratorium coming in place, the Board of Directors can initiate an appeal on behalf of the Corporate Debtor, against the insolvency petition being admitted. But this appears to be contrary to the view taken by the apex court in Innoventive Industries Ltd vs. ICICI Bank, where it was held that an appeal by the Board of directors, on behalf of the corporate debtor, against the order admitting the insolvency application, would not be maintainable after admission of the application. One hope this issue gets resolved in near future.
Ultra Technical Approach Not Warranted: In ICICI Bank v. Palogix Infrastructure, on 12.04.2017, the NCLT Kolkata, while dealing with authority of bank officials to file application under the Code, observed that specific power of attorney to initiate insolvency proceedings is required to be executed and a general power of attorney will not suffice. However, on 20.09.2017, while deciding on the appeal, the NCLAT held that power of attorney itself is not required to initiate insolvency petition and a mere authorization is good enough.
Status Of Time Barred Debts: In Deem Roll-Tech vs. RS Steel & Energy, on 31.03.2017, the NCLT principal bench held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the provisions of the Code. However, on 11.08.2017, in Neelkanth Township Vs Urban Infrastructure Trustees the NCLAT  held that nothing in the Code seems to suggest that the provision of the Limitation Act are applicable to initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution process.
The US Supreme court in May 2017, in Midland Funding LLC Vs Johnson held that a debtor’s filing of facially time barred claim in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceedings was not violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, by holding that “enforceability” appeared nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of the term ‘claim’ and the congress indented to adopt broadest definition of the term and held that for Bankruptcy claim include both enforceable and non enforceable claim. This is in tune with bankruptcy process which basically deals with insolvency and resolution rather than intricacies of law.
Conclusion: The IBC is expected to usher in a new financial culture which is responsive and vibrant. It covers entire circle of financial and economic system – demand-supply-payment default- timely payment of statutory/workmen/operational and financial dues. To succeed, problem and issue will have to be identified and resolved. The IBBI has done very professional work in this regards and sent clear message by amending regulations. Once successfully implemented, the IBC could set in a new era of financial discipline and financial management in the economy. Since, the IBC could be triggered against an enterprise on default, and because of its distinct nature (a debtor is not allowed to settle the dues with one particular creditor in isolation and outside insolvency mechanism) and time-bound decision-making process, it is a big threat for any enterprise who does not follow financial discipline and indulges in defaults/delayed payments in routine manner.
 Submitted its interim report in February 2015 and final report in November 2015.
 Ministry of Finance, vide a notification dated 25th November 2016, repealed the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) with effect from 1 December 2016.
 [Section 2 (7) of the Code defines "financial creditor" means any person to whom a financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred to].
 [Section 3 (20) "operational creditor" means a person to whom an operational debt is owed and includes any person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred].
 Section 21 of IBC.
 Section 53 of IBC.
 Section 7 of IBC.
 Sections 13 & 14 of IBC.
 Section 14(2) of IBC.
 Sections 13 and 16 of IBC.
 Section 18 of IBC lay down duties of interim resolution professional.
 Part-III Section 79
 Chapter IV Section 55
 Section 80 IBC
 Section 188 of IBC
 Section 224 of IBC
 Section 5 of IBC.
 Section 179 of IBC.
 Sections 61 and 62 of IBC.
 Sections 181 and 182 of IBC.
 Section 68 of IBC.
 Section 69 of IBC.
 Section 70 of IBC.
 Section 71 of IBC.
 Section 72 of IBC.
 Section 73 of IBC
 Section 74 of IBC
 Sections 75 and 76 of IBC
 Section 77 of IBC.
 Section 184 of IBC.
 Civil Appeal no 8337-8338 decided on 30.08.2017.
Amendment in Regulation. Notification dated November 07, 2017 of IBBI
 Company Appeal (AT) no 9 of 2017 decided on May 01, 2017
 Watching India’s insolvency reforms: a new dataset of insolvency cases.
 CP No (ISB)-03(PB)/2017 decided on January 23, 2017.
 Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad & Another (1969) 1 SCR 620
 Civil Appeal No. 11029 Of 2013 decided on December 12, 2913.
 Section 31 of IBC.
 Company Appeal (AT)(Insolvency)No 129/2017 decided on August 09, 2017.
 Writ C No. 3085 of 2017 Decided on September 06, 2017
 Company Appeal (AT) (Insol.) No. 116 of 2017 decided on July 23, 2017
 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 51 of 2017
 C P No. 37 of 2017 before NCLT Kolkata
 Company Appeal (AT) (InsoL) No. 30 of 2017
 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 44 of 2017
 No. 16–348. Argued January 17, 2017—Decided May 15, 2017