CPC Second Appeal | Can't Interfere With Orders Solely On Ground Of Sympathy, Substantial Question Of Law Must: Delhi High Court

Nupur Thapliyal

29 March 2022 9:00 AM GMT

  • CPC Second Appeal | Cant Interfere With Orders Solely On Ground Of Sympathy, Substantial Question Of Law Must: Delhi High Court

    The Delhi High Court has observed that a High Court cannot interfere with an order in second appeal under sec. 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, solely on the ground of sympathy in the absence of any substantial question of law. Sec. 100 of the CPC gives a procedural right of second appeal to either of the parties to a civil suit who had been adversely affected by the decree passed by a...

    The Delhi High Court has observed that a High Court cannot interfere with an order in second appeal under sec. 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, solely on the ground of sympathy in the absence of any substantial question of law.

    Sec. 100 of the CPC gives a procedural right of second appeal to either of the parties to a civil suit who had been adversely affected by the decree passed by a civil court. The second appeal lies to the High Court only if the court is satisfied that it involves a substantial question of law.

    "Section 100 of the CPC permits the Court to interfere only if there is a substantial question of law, which arises from the orders of the courts below. Absence the existence of any SQL, the Section 100 Court cannot interfere with the order under challenge solely on the ground of sympathy," Justice C Hari Shankar observed.

    The Court was dealing with a second appeal filed under sec. 100 of CPC impugning an order dated 10th February, 2022, passed by the Additional District Judge of Karkardooma Courts who had dismissed the first appeal of the appellant on the ground of delay.

    The application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant cited "lack of resources" as the only ground, which prevented the appellant from obtaining legal advice and filing the appeal within limitation and also "heavy works", as a result of which the appeal could not be prepared by the counsel within time.

    "The application does not disclose the resources of the appellant or explain as to why they were insufficient to enable the appellant to file the appeal within time. Similarly, "heavy works" could hardly be said to be a sufficient ground to seek condonation of delay," the Court noted.

    In the second appeal, the Court noted that the appellant had sought to advance an entirely new ground involving the illness of his mother, who expired on 26th March, 2021.

    The Court also noted that the impugned order of the trial court against which the first appeal and second appeal were filed, was passed on 4th April, 2019. The limitation for filing the appeal expired on 4th May, 2019. The appeal came to be filed on 19th July, 2019.

    "As per the averments in the present appeal, the appellant's mother expired on 26th March, 2021, nearly two years after the date for filing the appeal before the First Appellate Court. No material to indicate that the appellant was unable to file the appeal within time in April, 2019, as he was involved in tending to his ailing mother, has been placed on record," the Court observed.

    The Court therefore concluded that it cannot revisit the grounds taken by the appellant for condonation of delay.

    "I am constrained, therefore, to dismiss the present appeal in limine as no substantial question of law arises therefrom. All miscellaneous applications are also disposed of," the Court ordered.

    Case Title: BHAGWAN SINGH v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.

    Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 247

    Click Here To Read Order


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