“Recovery Evidence” Under Section 27 Of The Evidence Act- Questions & Answers By Justice V Ramkumar [Part-VI]

Q.26 Whether a “confession” made while in “police custody” is admissible in evidence and is there any exception ?

Ans. No. A mere confession made by an accused person to a police officer cannot be proved against such accused person in view of the bar under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Likewise, a confession made while in the custody of a police officer also cannot be proved against the accused person in view of Section 26 of the Evidence Act. But, if any such “confession” results in the discovery of a fact, the same is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Section 27 is an exception to the aforesaid rule. (Vide para 27 of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 – P. Venkatarama Reddy, P. P. Naolekar - JJ.)

Q.27 Whether a self-incriminatory statement given by an accused person to a Police Officer resulting in a recovery and made admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, offends the protection against “testimonial compulsion” guaranteed by Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India ?

Ans. No. The information given by an accused person to a police officer leading to the discovery of a fact which may or may not prove to be incriminatory, has been made admissible in evidence by section 27. If it is not incriminatory of the person giving the information, the question does not arise. It can arise only when it is inculpatory in character so far as the giver of the information is concerned. If the self-incriminatory information has been given by an accused person without any threat, such information will be admissible in evidence and that will not be hit by the provisions of clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India for the reason that there has been no “compulsion”. It must, therefore, be held that the provisions of S.27 of the Evidence Act are not within the prohibition of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, unless compulsion had been used in obtaining the information. (Vide para 13 of State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 - B. P. Sinha – CJI, Imam, S. K. Das, Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo, Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal, Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar - JJ.)

Q.28 What is the meaning of the word “corpus delicti” ?

Ans. The phrase “corpus delicti” is a Latin word which means “the body of the crime” or “the subject-matter of the crime”. This word does not mean “dead body” but means “the body or subject-matter of the crime” or the “fact of a transgression” which will be there in “actus reus”.

In a murder case, “corpus delicti” consists of proof of the death of a person alleged to have been murdered and that such death has been caused by commission of crime by someone. (Vide para 6 of Prithi v. State of Haryana (2010) 8 SCC 536 - R. M. Lodha, A. K. Patnaik - JJ.)

In a charge of murder “corpus delicti” means proof of the factum of murder. (Vide para 9 of Prithi (Supra).

(Vide para 4 of Sevaka Perumal v. State of T. N. AIR 1991 SC 1463 = (1991) 3 SCC 471 - B. C. Ray, K. Ramaswamy – JJ. Held that in a trial for murder, it is not an absolute necessity or essential ingredient to prove “corpus delicti” i.e. the subject-matter of crime. Here the dead body was in a highly decomposed condition and difficult to identify); Para 11 of Prithi (Supra).

Q.29 Whether the “disclosure statement” of the accused would be rendered inadmissible in evidence because the “signature” of the accused has been taken in violation of Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C ?

Ans. No. It was so held in para 207 of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 = 2005 Cri.L.J. 3950 – P. Venkatarama Reddy, P. P. Naolekar – JJ.

NOTES BY THE AUTHOR:- In Jackaran Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1995 SC 2345 = 1995 Cri.L.J. 3992 - Dr. A. S. Anand, M. K. Mukharjee – JJ, it was observed that the disclosure statement of the accused could not be relied on in the absence of the signature of the accused and the punch witnesses in the recovery memo. The above observation was made without noticing that the statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C and was subject to the prohibitions under Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. Noticing their mistake, the Judges of the Supreme Court, suo motu, reviewed and deleted the objectionable part of the original judgment.

In paras 37 to 40 of Sunil Clifford Daniel v. State of Punjab (2012) 11 SCC 205 = 2012 Cri.L.J. 4657 – Dr. B. S. Chauhan, F. M. Ibrahim Kalifulla – JJ, it was held that the investigating officer is not obliged to obtain the signature of an accused in any statement attributed to him while preparing seizure memo for recovery of any article covered by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 and Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State of A. P. (2003) 9 SCC 277 applied.

Q.30 Whether the recovery of “explosives”, “police uniforms”, “mobile phones” etc. on the strength of the “disclosure statements” of other accused persons, can be attributed to A3 who only revealed the “names” of the other accused persons ?.

Ans. No. Merely because A3 disclosed the names of other accused persons, it cannot be concluded that the recoveries made on the strength of the statements of other accused persons could be attributed to A3 and falling under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This is because there was lack of proximity of causation between the information supplied by A3 and the physical objects recovered. (Vide para 330 of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 = 2005 Cri.L.J. 3950 – P. Venkatarama Reddy, P. P. Naolekar – JJ.