Mere Apprehension Of Bias Not Enough To Reconstitute PoSH Committee: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court has held that a mere apprehension of bias is insufficient to invalidate the constitution of an Internal Committee under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (PoSH Act), and that cogent material must demonstrate a real likelihood of bias.

Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma observed that dissatisfaction with past administrative decisions cannot, by itself, establish that the authority constituting the committee has a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the inquiry.

“The mere apprehension of bias is not enough and there must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion,” the Court observed, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in ABP (P) Ltd. v. Union of India.

The Court made these observations while dismissing a petition filed by two Associate Professors of Delhi University's Kalindi College seeking reconstitution of the Internal Committee constituted to inquire into their sexual harassment complaint.

The professors had challenged the Vice-Chancellor's order setting aside the earlier inquiry and directing a fresh investigation, as well as the subsequent constitution of a new Internal Committee by the college Principal.

Their complaint, filed in July 2025, alleged harassment, intimidation and derogatory and sexually coloured remarks by certain faculty members, including in a Staff Association WhatsApp group and during a meeting held on July 03, 2025.

The earlier Internal Complaints Committee had concluded that the allegations were not sexual in nature, and its report was accepted by the college's Governing Body in January this year.

The Vice-Chancellor subsequently set aside the earlier inquiry after finding that a member named in the events forming the subject matter of the complaint had participated in the proceedings, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Vice-Chancellor also found that the requirement of an external member under the applicable UGC Regulations had not been duly complied with.

The professors, however, challenged the fresh committee's constitution, arguing that the Principal herself had been involved in administrative decisions against which they had raised grievances.

They also objected to the inclusion of a faculty member who had attended the Staff Association meeting in question and a non-teaching employee working under the Principal.

Rejecting the challenge, the Court held that the Principal was the statutory Executive Authority empowered to nominate members of the Internal Committee under the UGC Regulations.

It noted that she was not a respondent in the complaint and that none of the members of the earlier committee had been included in the newly constituted body.

The Court observed that the Principal's earlier administrative decisions did not establish any personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the fresh inquiry. It added that the adjudicatory function rested with the Internal Committee, which was required to function autonomously.

On the objection to the faculty member's inclusion, the Court held that mere attendance at the Staff Association meeting did not establish that she was connected with or interested in the subject matter of the complaint. Accepting such a contention, it observed, would disqualify every faculty member who had attended the meeting.

The Court also rejected the objection to the inclusion of the Principal's Senior Personal Assistant, noting that the UGC Regulations themselves mandate the inclusion of two non-teaching employees in the committee. Administrative subordination to the Principal, by itself, could not be a ground for disqualification.

The Court further held that the Vice-Chancellor had rightly directed a fresh inquiry instead of deciding the complaint on merits, since the earlier inquiry had been rendered unsustainable by defects in the committee's constitution.

It observed that the statutory scheme did not contemplate the Vice-Chancellor constituting a separate University-level committee to inquire into a complaint arising within a constituent college.

Finding no infirmity in the Vice-Chancellor's order or the constitution of the fresh committee, the Court dismissed the plea.

However, noting that the complaint had remained pending for more than 15 months, the Court directed the new Internal Committee to endeavour to conclude the inquiry within 90 days of receiving a copy of the judgment, in accordance with the PoSH Act, the applicable Rules and UGC Regulations, and the principles of natural justice.