Supreme Court Clause Saying Arbitration "May Be Sought" Doesn't Constitute A Binding Arbitration Agreement : Supreme Court Cause Title: Bgm And M-Rpl-Jmct (Jv) Versus Eastern Coalfields Limited Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731 The Supreme Court held that a clause in an agreement that arbitration "may be sought" to resolve disputes between the parties will not...
Supreme Court
Clause Saying Arbitration "May Be Sought" Doesn't Constitute A Binding Arbitration Agreement : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Bgm And M-Rpl-Jmct (Jv) Versus Eastern Coalfields Limited
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 731
The Supreme Court held that a clause in an agreement that arbitration "may be sought" to resolve disputes between the parties will not constitute a binding arbitration agreement.
Approving the refusal of the High Court to refer the parties to arbitration, the Supreme Court observed that the phraseology of the clause did not indicate that the parties were bound to go for arbitration.
"...clause 13 does not bind parties to use arbitration for settlement of the disputes. Use of the words “may be sought”, imply that there is no subsisting agreement between parties that they, or any one of them, would have to seek settlement of dispute(s) through arbitration. It is just an enabling clause whereunder, if parties agree, they could resolve their dispute(s) through arbitration. In our view, the phraseology of clause 13 is not indicative of a binding agreement that any of the parties on its own could seek redressal of inter se dispute(s) through arbitration," the Court observed.
The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra heard the case where the dispute occurred due to a different interpretation of clause 13 in a contract entered into between the parties. Clause 13 provides an arbitration to be a permissive (or optional) mode of dispute settlement rather than a mandatory one, as it says that the parties 'may' opt for arbitration.
Sec 34(3) Arbitration Act | Application Filed On Next Working Day After 90 Day Period Is Within Limitation : Supreme Court
Case Title: M/S R. K. Transport Company Versus M/S Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (Balco)
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 391
A bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Prashant Kumar Mishra held that the three-month limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) for challenging an arbitral award should not be rigidly interpreted as exactly 90 days, rather it should be interpreted as three calendar months. The Court upheld the filing of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 11.07.2022 to set aside an arbitral award passed on 09.04.2022, despite it being beyond the 90-day period. It noted that the limitation period ended on 09.07.2022, which was a court holiday (second Saturday), followed by Sunday. Therefore, the application filed on the next working day, Monday (11.07.2022), was held to be within limitation.
Relying on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 and applying Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Court reiterated that for calculating limitation under Section 34(3), the date on which the arbitral award is passed must be excluded. Accordingly, the limitation period begins from the day following the date of the award.
Supreme Court Holds Chandigarh Authorities Liable For Delay In Film City Project, Directs Refund Of 47.75 Crores To Successful Bidder
Case Title: M/S. Parsvnath Film City Ltd. Versus Chandigarh Administration & Others, Civil Appeal No.6162 Of 2016 (And Connected Case)
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 422
The Supreme Court upheld an arbitral award passed in favor of a company engaged by the Chandigarh Administration to establish a Multimedia-cum-Film City in the Union Territory, holding the authorities liable to refund a forfeited bid amount of Rs.47.75 crores. A bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma delivered the verdict, being of the view that the Punjab and Haryana High Court wrongly set aside the arbitral award. It opined that though time was of the essence to the project sought to be developed, there was a clear and unreasonable delay (of over 16 months) attributable to the authorities in handing over encumbrance-free land to the appellant-Company.
Arbitral Tribunal Can Proceed Against Party Though They Weren't Served With S.21 Notice Or Made Party In S.11 Application : Supreme Court
Case Title: Adavya Projects Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/S Vishal Structurals Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5297 Of 2025
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 439
The Supreme Court observed that not being served with the notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and not being made a party in the Section 11 application (for appointment of arbitrator), are not sufficient grounds to hold that a person cannot be made party to arbitral proceedings.
"A notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the ACA is mandatory...and it is a prerequisite to filing an application under Section 11. However, merely because such a notice was not issued to certain persons who are parties to the arbitration agreement does not denude the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to implead them as parties during the arbitral proceedings...merely because a court does not refer a certain party to arbitration in its order does not denude the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal from impleading them during the arbitral proceedings as the referral court's view does not finally determine this issue. The relevant consideration to determine whether a person can be made a party before the arbitral tribunal is if such a person is a party to the arbitration agreement", said a bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra.
Supreme Court Flags Long Submissions In S.34/37 Arbitration Act Proceedings, Says Timelimit Needs To Be Imposed
Case Title: Larsen And Toubro Ltd. Versus Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 449
The Supreme Court expressed its displeasure over the prolonged arguments and submissions made by members of the Bar in arbitration proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and noted that excessively long oral submissions force judges to invest significant time in reviewing extended arguments, often supported by a large volume of case law, regardless of their relevance. This practice, particularly in high-stakes matters, leads to unnecessarily lengthy judgments and ultimately undermines the efficiency and growth of arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism in India.
“We have noticed that there is a tendency on the part of senior members of the bar to argue as if these proceedings were regular appeals under Section 96 of CPC. In this case, while making submissions, we learned counsels for both the parties have gone into minute and factual details…”, the bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Pankaj Mithal said.
Arbitral Award For Claims Not Included In IBC Resolution Plan Can't Be Enforced: Supreme Court
Case Title – Electrosteel Steel Limited (Now M/S ESL Steel Limited) vs Ispat Carrier Private Limited
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 491
The Supreme Court allowed an appeal challenging the enforcement of an arbitral award passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) against Electrosteel Steels Ltd., holding that the award was non-executable in view of the resolution plan approved under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016.
“we have no hesitation to hold that upon approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT, the claim of the respondent being outside the purview of the resolution plan stood extinguished. Therefore, the award dated 06.07.2018 is incapable of being executed”, the Court said.
A bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan reiterated that once a resolution plan is approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 31(1) of the IBC, any claim that is not part of the plan stands extinguished and cannot be pursued further.
S.34 Arbitration Act | Respect Arbitral Autonomy; Judicial Interference Should Be Minimal : Supreme Court
Case Title: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited Versus Software Technology Parks Of India
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 501
The Supreme Court reiterated that the courts cannot go beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) while deciding an application for setting aside of an award.
"the role of the court under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is clearly demarcated. It is a restrictive jurisdiction and has to be invoked in a conservative manner. The reason is that arbitral autonomy must be respected and judicial interference should remain minimal otherwise it will defeat the very object of the 1996 Act.”, the court added.
Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan upheld the Madras High Court Division Bench's ruling, which had overturned the Single Judge's interference with the tribunal's decision based on a re-evaluation of the evidence.
Case Details : Gayatri Balasamy Versus M/S Isg Novasoft Technologies Limited| Slp(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508
Answering a reference, a Constitution Bench (by 4:1) of the Supreme Court held that Appellate Courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards while exercising powers under either Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The majority judgment by Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna held that the Courts have a limited power under Section 34/37 to modify arbitral awards. This limited power can be exercised in the following circumstances :
1. When the award is severable by separating the invalid portion from the valid portion of the award.
2. To correct any clerical, computation or typographical errors which appear erroneous on the face of the record.
3. To modify post-award interest in some circumstances.
4. The special powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be applied to modify awards. But this power must be exercised with great caution within the limits of the Constitution.
Disputes Arising Out Of 'Work Contract' With MP Govt Instrumentality Shall Be Referred To MP Arbitration Tribunal : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. Versus M.P. Road Development Corporation And Another
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 752
The Supreme Court reiterated that the disputes related to 'work contract' must be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal under the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (“1983 Act”).
Holding thus, the bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan refused to interfere with the Madhya Pradesh High Court's ruling, which set aside the arbitration proceedings initiated by the Appellant, for settlement of the dispute arising out of the 'Work Contract' signed with the Respondent-MPRDC (a state-owned venture).
“we find no infirmity in the reasoning or conclusion of the High Court in quashing the private arbitration proceedings and reaffirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal established under the 1983 Act to adjudicate disputes arising from works contract involving the State or its instrumentalities.”, the court said.
The Court clarified that regardless of the presence of the arbitration clause in the 'work contract', disputes arising out of the work contract shall be referred to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, because of the overriding nature of the 1983 Act.
Mere Pendency Of Criminal Cases Alleging Simple Fraud No Bar To Arbitration : Supreme Court
Cause Title: The Managing Director Bihar State Food And Civil Supply Corporation Limited & Anr. Versus Sanjay Kumar
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 778
The Supreme Court has allowed the arbitration proceedings to continue in multi-crore Bihar Public Distribution System (“PDS”) Scam, stating that mere pendency of the criminal proceedings in offences involving simple fraud like cheating, criminal breach of trust doesn't bar a dispute from being referred to an arbitration.
“The mere fact that criminal proceedings can or have been instituted in respect of the same incident(s) would not per se lead to the conclusion that the dispute which is otherwise arbitrable ceases to be so.”, the court said.
The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra dismissed the batch of petitions filed by Bihar State Food and Supply Corporation (“BSFSC”) against the High Court's decision to allow application for appointment of an arbitrator in 1,500-crore Bihar Public Distribution System (PDS) scam.
Relying on a seven-judge bench decision in In Re: Interplay, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha approved the arbitration, noting that since there existed a valid arbitration agreement, it would be impermissible at the referral stage to dive deeper into the dispute; instead referred the same to the arbitration for its adjudication.
Place Of Exclusive Jurisdiction Deemed As 'Seat' Of Arbitration : Supreme Court
Cause Title: M/S Activitas Management Advisor Private Limited Versus Mind Plus Healthcare Private Limited
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 795
The Supreme Court observed that in the absence of a seat or venue of arbitration in the arbitration agreement, the place where the exclusive jurisdiction has been vested as per the agreement would be regarded as the 'seat' of the arbitration.
The bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar set aside the Punjab & Haryana High Court's order allowing an application for the appointment of an arbitrator in a dispute where the arbitration agreement conferred exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication upon the Bombay High Court.
Relying on Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. (2020), the Court held that the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction as the “seat” of arbitration, even in the absence of an expressly specified seat in the agreement.
“Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts…”, the court said in Brahmani River Pellets Ltd.
Non-Signatories Have No Right To Attend Arbitration Proceedings, Their Presence Breaches Confidentiality : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Kamal Gupta & Anr. Versus M/S L.R. Builders Pvt. Ltd & Anr. Etc. (And Connected Matter)
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 799
The Supreme Court observed that a party non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot participate in the arbitration proceedings, as the signatories to an arbitration agreement are only entitled to remain present in the arbitration proceedings.
The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and AS Chandurkar set aside the Delhi High Court's decision, which allowed the non-signatories to an arbitration agreement to attend the arbitration proceedings in the presence of their counsels.
Thus, the Court considered the issue of “Whether it is permissible for a non-signatory to an agreement leading to arbitration proceedings to remain present in such arbitration proceedings?”
Answering in the negative, the judgment authored by Justice Chandurkar observed:
“Once it is clear that the arbitral award would not bind non-parties to the said MoU/FSD as such parties were not signatories to the said documents, there would be no legal basis whatsoever to permit a non-signatory to the MoU/FSD to remain present in the proceedings before the sole arbitrator. When the arbitration proceedings can take place only between parties to an arbitration agreement and Section 35 of the Act does not make the arbitral award to be passed binding on non-signatories to such agreement, we do not find any legal right conferred by the Act that would enable a non-party to the agreement to remain present in arbitration proceedings between signatories to the agreement.”, the court observed.
Cause Title: Glencore International AG Versus M/s. Shree Ganesh Metals and another
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 839
The Supreme Court observed that merely because an arbitration agreement was not signed, there is no bar to refer the dispute to arbitration, if the parties have otherwise consented to arbitration.
The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma set aside the Delhi High Court's decision which declined reference to arbitration merely because Respondent No.1 didn't sign the arbitration agreement. Since the Respondent No.1 consented to the contractual terms via email, the Court held that the High Court's refusal to refer to an arbitration on the ground of non-signing of the arbitration agreement cannot be sustained.
“Noting the fact that the requirement of the arbitration agreement being in writing has been continued in Section 7(3) of the Act of 1996, it was observed that Section 7(4) only added that an arbitration agreement could be found in the circumstances mentioned in the three sub-clauses that make up Section 7(4) but that did not mean that, in all cases, an arbitration agreement needs to be signed. It was held that the only pre-requisite is that it should be in writing, as pointed out in Section 7(3). This legal principle would hold good equally for an arbitration agreement covered by Sections 44 and 45 of the Act of 1996.”, the Court said.
Arbitration | Delivery Of Award To Govt Official Not Connected With Case Doesn't Amount To Valid Service On State : Supreme Court
Cause Title: M/S. Motilal Agarwala Versus State Of West Bengal & Anr.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 867
The Supreme Court has clarified that when the government or one of its departments is a party to arbitration, delivery of an arbitral award to an official who is not connected with or aware of the proceedings cannot be treated as valid service for commencing the limitation period to challenge the award.
Citing its ruling of Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005), the Court said that the delivery of the copy of the arbitral award should be made to the “party to the proceedings”, and if government is part to the proceedings than the delivery should be made to an individual who has the knowledge and is the best person to understand and appreciate an award and more particularly, to take decision for its challenge.
“This Court has held that the award should be received in the context of huge organisations by the person who has knowledge of the proceedings and who would be the best person to understand and appreciate the arbitral award as also to take a decision in the matter of moving appropriate applications.”, the court said.
S. 37(1)(a) Arbitration Act | Clause Restricting Interest On Delayed Payments By Itself Won't Bar Pendente Lite Interest : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Versus M/S G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 868
The Supreme Court observed that an Arbitral Tribunal can grant pendente lite interest unless expressly or impliedly barred in the contract. It added that a contractual clause barring interest on delayed payments does not prevent an arbitral tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest, i.e., the interest for the period during which the arbitration is pending.
“…arbitral tribunal can be denuded of its power to award pendente lite interest only if the agreement/ contract between the parties is so worded that the award of pendente lite interest is either explicitly or by necessary implication (such as in the case of Sayeed & Co. (supra) and THDC First (supra)) barred. A clause merely barring award of interest on delayed payment by itself will not be readily inferred as a bar to award pendente-lite interest by the arbitral tribunal.”, the court observed.
A bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra dismissed the ONGC's appeal, affirming the Gauhati High Court's decision, which justified the grant of pendente lite interest as there was no clause barring the award of pendente lite interest.
Arbitration | Execution Of Award Cannot Be Stalled Merely Due To Pendency Of Section 37 Appeal : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Chakardhari Sureka Versus Prem Lata Sureka Through Spa & Ors.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 919
The Supreme Court held that the execution of an arbitral award cannot be stalled merely on the ground that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is pending.
A bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan heard the case where the appellant (award-holder/decree-holder) sought execution of the arbitral award. The respondents (judgment-debtors) argued that since a Section 37 appeal was pending against the dismissal of their Section 34 objections, the execution should be deferred.
“In our view, the question of executability of the award can be gone into by the Execution Court in accordance with law while addressing objections as and when raised. However, it would not be proper for the Execution Court to defer consideration of the execution application and the objections thereto only because an appeal is pending under Section 37 when there is no interim order operating against the award against which objection under Section 34 of the Act stands rejected.”, the court observed.
S. 31(7)(b) Arbitration Act | Claim For Additional Post-Award Interest Barred When Award Fixes Rate Until Payment : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Hlv Limited (Formerly Known As Hotel Leelaventure Pvt. Ltd.) Versus Pbsamp Projects Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 944
The Supreme Court held that if an arbitral award provides a composite interest rate covering the entire period from the cause of action to payment, the award holder cannot claim additional compound interest at the post-award stage under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”).
Section 31(7)(b) of the Act provides for post-award interest at 18% from the date of the award until payment. However, if the arbitral award specifies a composite rate of interest, the award holder cannot claim additional 18% compound interest under this provision. In such cases, the interest is governed solely by the rate in the award, as Section 31(7)(b) applies “unless the award otherwise directs.” In this case, the award expressly set interest at 21% until repayment, therefore the question of awarding post-award interest would not arise, the court said.
The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the sale of land. Under Clause 6(b) of the MoU, the appellant had agreed to refund an advance paid by the respondent, along with interest at 21% per annum from the dates of disbursement until actual repayment, in case of termination.
The arbitral tribunal, respecting this contractual term, awarded a composite interest @21% per annum from the date of advance until repayment. However, during execution, the decree-holder claimed entitlement to compound interest @18% ("interest upon interest") by invoking Section 31(7)(b) of the Act and placing reliance on Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. Governor, State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189. The Executing Court rejected this claim, but the High Court remanded the matter, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Arbitral Award Must Be Within Parameters Of Agreement Between Parties : Supreme Court Dismisses Chinese Company's Appeal
Cause Title: Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation Versus Gmr Kamalanga Energy Ltd.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 963
The Supreme Court upheld the setting aside of an arbitral award of nearly ₹995 crore granted in favour of Chinese company SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corporation, holding that the arbitral tribunal had erred by re-interpreting contractual terms and departing from the agreed stipulations in violation of Section 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
“Numerous precedents laid down by this Court have often emphasised that an arbitrator lacks the power to deviate from or to reinterpret the terms of the contract while making an award. The awards must be within the parameters of the agreement entered between the parties.”, the Court said.
A bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice AG Masih heard the case where the contractual terms do not allow waiver of notice for raising claims unless the parties have agreed to it in written form. After SEPCO left the construction site in 2015, arbitration followed, and in 2020, the tribunal awarded SEPCO ₹995 crore, holding that GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd had waived notice requirements via a 2012 email. The Orissa High Court's Division Bench set aside the award, prompting SEPCO's appeal to the Supreme Co
Case Title: Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Limited & Anr. Versus Sriram City Union Finance Ltd. & Anr.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118
The Supreme court bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and KV Viswanathan held that It is well-settled that fundamental policy of Indian law does not refer to violation of any Statue but fundamental principles on which Indian law is founded. Any difference or controversy as to rate of interest clearly falls outside the scope of challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India unless it is evident that the rate of interest awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the Court sans which no interference is warranted in the award, whereby interest is awarded by the Arbitrator.
The Court, pointing that the imposition of a high interest in the background of contemporary commercial practices wouldn't be per se against the fundamental policy of Indian Law, or against the basic notions of morality or justice as per clauses (ii) and (iii) of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Cause Title: M/S Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. Vs. M/S Ict Health Technology Services India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1070
The Supreme Court comprising of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice AG Masih upheld the Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration, observing that the mere use of the term “arbitration” in a clause is not sufficient to mandate reference to arbitration unless the parties clearly intended to resolve their disputes through arbitration.
“Mere use of the word 'arbitration” is not sufficient to treat the clause as an arbitration agreement when the corresponding mandatory intent to refer the disputes to arbitration and the consequent intent to be bound by the decision of the arbitral tribunal is missing”, the Court said.
Case Title: Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Versus Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 14
The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's intervention under its Writ Jurisdiction in the Arbitral Proceedings, where it had directed the Arbitral Tribunal to grant additional time for one party to cross-examine another, despite the Tribunal already having provided ample time for cross-examination. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra observed that the High Court can interfere with the impugned order under its Writ Jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances when the impugned order suffers from perversity.
“It is evident from the above that even as per the quote hereinabove interference under Article 226/227 is 'permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.”, the court said.
Observing that the High Court failed to point out any perversity in the tribunal's order, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha deprecated the practice of interfering with the arbitral process when full opportunity was granted to the parties to present their case in the proceedings governed under Section 18 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”).
Supreme Court Sets Aside Awards Of Over Rs 46 Lakhs Passed Against UP Govt In Sham Arbitration Proceedings
Case Title : State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another Versus R.K. Pandey And Another | Civil Appeal No. 10212 Of 2014
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 45
The Supreme Court set aside two ex-parte arbitration awards on grounds of fraud played by the litigant who appointed sole arbitrators and conducted 'sham' arbitration proceedings in a service dispute against U.P. Government and Government Hospital where he was employed.
The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh challenging the veracity of the ex parte awards and the arbitration agreement relied by the respondent on the basis of which such arbitration proceedings were conducted.
The Court observed : "It was not the case of Respondent No. 1, R.K. Pandey that the Municipal and Development Board, Kanpur, or the Governor of Uttar Pradesh has invoked the arbitration clause. The unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by Respondent No. 1, R.K. Pandey is, therefore, contrary to the arbitration clause as propounded by him."
The Court placed reliance on the recent decision in Central Organisation of Railway Electrification v. ECI PIC SMO MCPL (JV), a Joint Venture Company which held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators.
Supreme Court Flags Stringent Limitation Provisions Curtailing Arbitration Appeal Remedies, Urges Parliament To Address Issue
Case Title: My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M/S Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49
The Supreme Court raised concerns about the interpretation of limitation statutes in arbitration cases and observed that the rigid application of the law could curtail the limited remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge arbitral awards.
“In our view, the above construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails a remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award. This must be addressed by the Parliament”, the Court observed.
A bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Pankaj Mithal dismissed an appeal filed by a company against a Delhi High Court judgment rejecting its challenge to an arbitral award as barred by limitation under Section 34.
While the Court concluded that the appellant's delay in filing the petition was not condonable under the prevailing legal framework, Justice Narasimha, in his opinion, with which Justice Mithal agreed, highlighted concerns with the strict interpretation of limitation provisions.
Can HC Appoint Sole Arbitrator When Arbitration Clause Provides For Unilateral Appointment Of Arbitrator ? Supreme Court To Consider
Case Title: M/S R.S. Construction Vs. Building Construction Department
SLP(C) No. 000979 - / 2025
The Supreme Court agreed to consider the issue of whether the High Court can appoint a sole arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 if the arbitration agreement between parties provides for unilateral appointment in violation of the decision in CORE v. M/S ECI SPIC SMO MCML.
The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing the challenge to the order of the Patna High Court which refused to appoint an arbitrator under S. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 in a tender-related dispute. Here, the petitioner who is a private party entered into a work contract with the Building Construction Department of Govt. of Bihar. The High Court ultimately rejected the request of appointing a sole arbitrator.
Case Title: S. Jayalakshmi Versus The Special District Revenue Officer & Ors.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 98
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle laid down in National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem & Another that the jurisdiction of the Courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act) will not extend to modifying an arbitral award.
The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra was hearing the case dealing with the land acquisition compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956. Dissatisfied with the Arbitral Tribunal's decision to award land acquisition compensation @ ₹495/sq.m, the Appellant preferred application before the District Court under Section 34, which had modified the award and enhanced the compensation to be payable @ ₹4,500/sq.m with 9% interest.
'Oral Undertaking Falls Within Scope Of Arbitration Clause' : Supreme Court Upholds Award Against Husband For Operation In Wife's Demat Account
Case Title: Ac Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited Versus Jatin Pratap Desai & Anr.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 178
The Supreme Court held that an oral contract undertaking joint and several liability falls within the scope of an arbitration clause.
Holding so , the Court affirmed an arbitral award against a husband, finding him jointly liable for the award due to a debit balance in a joint demat account registered in his wife's name.
The Court rejected the contention that the husband's liability constituted a "private transaction" beyond the scope of arbitration. Instead, it held that the arbitration clause, applicable to non-signatories, in conjunction with the husband's active participation in transactions within his wife's account, gave rise to an implied oral agreement establishing joint and several liabilities for both parties.
Arbitration Agreement Enforceable Against Legal Representatives Of Deceased Party : Supreme Court
Case : Rahul Verma and others vs Rampat Lal Verma and others
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 269
The Supreme Court has reiterated that an arbitration agreement is enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased partner of a partnership firm. The bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan also referred to the Delhi High Court's judgment in Jyoti Gupta v. Kewalsons & Ors., reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7942 which held that an arbitration agreement does not stand discharged on the death of a partner and it can be enforced by the legal heirs of the deceased-partner. The Court was deciding an appeal against a judgment of the Gauhati High Court which referred the legal heirs of a deceased partner to arbitration. The appellants contended that the arbitration clause cannot be enforced against them as they are non-signatories of the agreement.
International Commercial Arbitration | How To Determine Law Governing Arbitration Agreement? Supreme Court Discusses Tests
Case Title: Disortho S.A.S. Versus Meril Life Sciences Private Limited
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 317
In a significant judgment relating to International Commercial Arbitration, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contractus).
The bench comprising Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Sanjay Kumar, and Justice KV Viswanathan heard the case where the plea was made for an appointment of an arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration where the Petitioner was a foreign-Columbia-based entity, whereas the Respondent was an Indian-Gujarat based entity.
In this case, because there was no express choice for the law governing the arbitration agreement, the Court then applied the implied choice test and inferred that the parties intended Indian law to govern the arbitration agreement, given that Clause 16.5 designates Indian law as governing the contract. Further, the court found that Indian law had the closest connection to the arbitration agreement satisfying the third test.
Supreme Court Reiterates Narrow Scope Of Interference Under Section 37 Arbitration Act
Case Name: M/S. C & C Constructions Ltd. Vs. Ircon International Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 6657 Of 2023
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 148
The Supreme Court reiterated that in appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Court has a narrower scope to review the arbitral award if the award has already been upheld under Section 34 (application for setting aside arbitral awards). Reliance was placed on the recent decision in Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs Union of India.
At the outset, the Bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan pointed out that the appellants have challenged the validity of clause 49.5 of the Contract that barred the appellant's present claim. However, given that this issue was not raised before the High Court, the appellant could not have raised this in the present appeal for the first time.
“Careful perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the contention that the validity of clause 49.5 ought to be decided in the light of Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act was not raised before the learned Single Judge in a petition under Section 34. The said contention was not raised even before the Division Bench in appeal under Section 37. Therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise the said contention in this appeal for the first time.”
Can Arbitral Awards Be Modified Under S. 34 & S.37 Of Arbitration Act? Supreme Court Refers To 5 Judge Bench
The Supreme Court referred to a 5 judge constitution bench the issue of whether Courts have the power to modify an arbitral award under S. 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The bench of CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justices Sanjay Kumar and KV Viswanathan directed that while considering the scope of powers of the Court to modify arbitral awards, an examination of the scope and contours of S. 34 and 37 will also be needed. The Court would also need to see the extent to which modification powers can be given if such modification is allowed.
Notably, in February 2024, a bench of Justices Dipankar Dutta, K.V. Viswanathan, and Sandeep Mehta referred to the larger bench the question of whether the courts have the power to modify the arbitral award under Sections 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Case Title: M/S Vidyawati Construction Company Versus Union Of India
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 105
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after the submission of the statement of defence.
A bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing a case in which the respondent had objected to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal after submitting its statement of defence. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected the objection and subsequently passed an award. However, the District Judge set aside this award, and this decision was upheld by the Allahabad High Court. Taking reference to Section 16(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act"), the Appellant argued that the High Court erred in affirming the District Judge's decision to set aside the arbitral award. The Appellant contended that by accepting the appointment of the sole arbitrator and being allowed to modify its statement of defence, the Respondent waived its right to challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction after the statement of defence had been filed.
Arbitration Act | Appellate Courts Can't Reassess Awards, Must Limit Enquiry On Public Policy Breach : Supreme Court
Case Title: Somdatt Builders –Ncc – Nec(Jv) Versus National Highways Authority Of India & Ors.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 115
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that arbitral awards should only be interfered with in cases of perversity, violation of public policy, or patent illegality. It emphasized that appellate courts cannot reassess the merits of awards and must limit their inquiry to whether the award breaches Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act i.e., if the award is against the public policy of India.
The bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing the case where the dispute arose concerning increased quantities of geogrid required for constructing a reinforced earth (RE) wall as part of a road construction project. NHAI claimed that increased quantities beyond those stated in the Bill of Quantities (BOQ) warranted renegotiation of rates.Right To Seek Arbitration Not Lost Just Because Arbitration Clause Became Inoperable Due To Statutory Amendment: Supreme Court
Case Title: Offshore Infrastructures Limited Versus M/S Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 982
The Supreme Court, comprising of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice AG Masih, held that the invalidity or inoperability of an arbitration clause, such as one naming an ineligible arbitrator under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not nullify the underlying arbitration agreement between the parties. The Court clarified that in such cases, the Court is empowered to step in and appoint a neutral arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act to preserve the efficacy of the arbitration mechanism.
The Court emphasised that the statutory disqualification of a named arbitrator under Section 12(5), read with the Seventh Schedule, does not render the arbitration clause itself void or non-existent. Rather, the clause remains enforceable, and the power to appoint an independent arbitrator shifts to the Court.
Decision On Limitation Made On Demurrer Not Final; Party Autonomy In Arbitration Cannot Override Statute: Supreme Court
Case Title: Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028
The Supreme Court has held that when an arbitral tribunal decides a preliminary issue such as limitation on the basis of demurrer, that decision cannot preclude the tribunal from revisiting the issue at a later stage if evidence warrants it. The bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan affirmed the Bombay High Court's view that a decision on demurrer is provisional and not an adjudication on merits.
The judgment emphasised that limitation is a substantive defence which goes to the root of a claim and is rarely a pure question of law. Whether a claim is time-barred often depends on factual elements such as acknowledgments, extensions, or continuing breaches. Therefore, an arbitral tribunal deciding limitation purely on demurrer cannot permanently shut out a later factual inquiry.
The Court explained that Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 imposes a statutory duty on every adjudicating authority to reject a time-barred claim irrespective of the parties' stance. Since the section operates as a matter of law, the tribunal's procedural choices cannot override it.
Case Details: M/S. Lancor Holdings Limited v. Prem Kumar Menon and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056
The Supreme Court clarified that while mere delay in pronouncing an arbitral award does not invalidate it, an inordinate and unexplained delay making the decision ineffective or unworkable can render the award void. The Court further held that an award lacking consequential relief and forcing parties to seek redress again in court is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
Indian Courts Have No Jurisdiction To Appoint Arbitrator For Foreign-Seated Arbitration : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Balaji Steel Trade Versus Fludor Benin S.A. & Ors.
Citatiion : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 1132
The Supreme Court dismissed a plea seeking the appointment of an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration, holding that once the principal contract is governed by foreign law and provides for a foreign-seated arbitration, Indian courts lose jurisdiction, irrespective of the Indian nationality of any party.
“Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator for a foreign-seated arbitration, irrespective of the nationality or domicile of the parties.”, observed a bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Atul S Chandurkar while deciding a case where at the heart was the dispute pertaining to the Buyer–Seller Agreement (BSA) which clearly provided that arbitration “will take place in Benin” and that the agreement would be governed by Beninese law.
Arbitration | Unconditional Stay On Execution Of Award Only In Exceptional Cases: Supreme Court
Cause Title: Popular Caterers Versus Ameet Mehta & Ors.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1144
The Supreme Court declined to grant an unconditional stay on the execution of the arbitral award, holding that the requirement to deposit the security amount was justified since the award was not shown to have been induced or tainted by fraud or corruption.
The Bench noted that the case before it did not involve allegations of fraud or corruption, which are the specific grounds for an unconditional stay under the second proviso to Section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act. It found that the present case did not meet the high threshold of being "egregiously perverse" or "facially untenable" to warrant the exceptional relief of an unconditional stay.
Case Title – BPL Limited v. Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limited
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1169
The Supreme Court dismissed appeals filed by BPL Limited against an arbitral award, upholding the enforcement of a 36% annual interest rate on outstanding dues owed to Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limited. The Court ruled that corporate entities cannot claim contractual terms are "unconscionable" after voluntarily agreeing to them ..
“Once the parties by mutual consent agreed to a particular rate of interest to be charged and the same is included in the terms of the contract there is no escape thereafter. The party concerned would be bound by the rate of interest as prescribed in the agreement. The rate of interest once agreed and forms part of a written contract between the parties the borrower after availing the finance cannot turn around and question the rate on the ground of being unconscionable or opposed to Public policy”, the Court held.
When Can Court Remand Arbitral Award To Tribunal Under S.34/37 Arbitration Act ? Supreme Court Explains
Case Details : Gayatri Balasamy Versus M/S Isg Novasoft Technologies Limited| Slp(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 508
The Supreme Court Constitution Bench held that the powers of Courts to remand arbitral awards back to the Tribunal under S. 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 cannot be seen as a straight-jacket formula.The Court observed that an award should be remitted back only if there is a possibility to correct a defect in the award, but if the entire award suffers from substantial injustice and patent illegality, remittance should be avoided.
The Constitution Bench (by 4:1) held that Appellate Courts have limited powers to modify arbitral awards while exercising powers under either Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The bench led by CJI Sanjiv Khanna, comprising Justices BR Gavai,Sanjay Kumar, AG Masih and KV Viswanathan delivered the verdict. The Court held that the power of remand under S. 34(4) of the Act is of restrictive nature for the Courts. While the remand give flexibility to the tribunals to make amends in the award.
Case Title: Asf Buildtech Private Limited Versus Shapoorji Pallonji And Company Private Limited
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 521
The Supreme Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the continued absence of explicit statutory recognition for the power of arbitral tribunals to implead or join non-signatory parties. The Court noted with concern that, despite earlier omissions in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the newly proposed Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024, which seeks to overhaul the legislation, also failed to address this critical issue.
“We urge, the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice to take a serious look at the arbitration regime that is prevailing in India and bring about necessary changes while the Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 2024 is still being considered.”, the court added.
The bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan was hearing the case, which involved a question of whether the Appellant-ASF Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. (ABPL), a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, could be joined to the arbitral proceedings initiated by the Respondent-Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (SPCPL) based on the “Group of Companies” doctrine.
If Courts Can Only Set Aside Awards & Can't Modify Them, Parties Will Be Forced To Undergo Fresh Round Of Arbitration : Supreme Court
Case Details : Gayatri Balasamy Versus M/S Isg Novasoft Technologies Limited| Slp(C) No. 15336-15337/2021
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 508
The Supreme Court held that in order to ensure efficient dispute resolution and uphold the objectives of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the Court should be allowed to modify awards when parties challenge the tribunal's decision. The majority held that denying modification powers to the Court under S.34 and 37 would be contrary to the main purpose of arbitration, which is efficient dispute resolution. The Court noted that the cycle of litigation post-award takes years, especially in cases challenging the award under S.34 and appeals against the S.34 order. The Court stated :
"To deny courts the authority to modify an award—particularly when such a denial would impose significant hardships, escalate costs, and lead to unnecessary delays—would defeat the raison d'être of arbitration. This concern is particularly pronounced in India, where applications under Section 34 and appeals under Section 37 often take years to resolve."
Dispute Over Full & Final Settlement Is Arbitrable Despite Parties Discharging Contract : Supreme Court
Case Title: Arabian Exports Private Limited Versus National Insurance Company Ltd.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 539
The Supreme Court observed that if the insured alleges coercion in arriving at a settlement with the insurer, then the dispute over the validity of the settlement remains arbitrable.
“Any dispute pertaining to the full and final settlement itself by necessary implication being a dispute arising out of or in relation to or under the substantive contract would not be precluded from reference to arbitration as the arbitration agreement contained in the original contract continues to be in existence even after the parties have discharged the original contract by 'accord and satisfaction'.”, the court said.
The bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing the case where the Appellant-Insured, who was engaged in the meat processing business, had suffered loss due to flooding. The Appellant alleged that a voucher was signed with the insurer out of coercion to arrive at a settlement, however, immediately after signing of the settlement voucher, the Appellant invoked Arbitration clause.
High Court May Grant Article 227 Interim Relief In Arbitration Proceedings In Exceptional Cases : Supreme Court
Case Title: M/S Jindal Steel And Power Ltd. & Anr. Versus M/S Bansal Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Others
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 544
The Supreme Court held that while the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) mandates minimal judicial interference, a High Court may, in exceptional cases, exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to grant interim relief, particularly where denial of such protection would result in irreparable harm.
“We are aware of the established legal principle that the Courts should refrain from interfering with the invocation of a bank guarantee except in cases of fraud of an egregious nature or in cases where allowing encashment would result in irretrievable injustice.”, the court said.
The bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan refused to interfere with the High Court's order granting interim protection from encashing the bank guarantees furnished by the Appellant for the construction of the residential units by the Respondent-Real Estate Company.
Private Arbitration Clauses Cannot Override Statutory Mandates Under MSMED Act : Supreme Court
Case Title: M/S Harcharan Dass Gupta Versus Union Of India
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 567
Reaffirming that the MSMED Act prevails over the Arbitration Act, as held in Gujarat State Civil Supplies v. Mahakali Foods, the Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's interference with MSMED proceedings in Delhi, despite the contract naming Bengaluru as the arbitration seat.
The Court clarified that private contractual clauses cannot override the statutory mandate of the MSMED Act. Since the appellant-supplier was registered in Delhi, the Court noted that the Delhi Arbitration Centre had jurisdiction under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, regardless of the contract's designation of Bengaluru as the seat of arbitration due to the overriding nature of the MSMED Act. The bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi was hearing the case where a tender was issued by ISRO for construction work in New Delhi.
Case Title: South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. SMS Limited, SLP (C) No. 16913/2017
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 568
Delivering a significant judgment on arbitration law, the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of arbitration clauses being deliberately phrased "ambiguously" by members of legal fraternity and urged judicial forums across the country to throw out cases involving "shoddily drafted arbitration clauses" at the threshold.
The Court said that such "malafide cases" are a "criminal wastage of judicial time" and have been allowed to go on for long. It called on the judicial forums to take stringent actions in this regard by invoking their suo motu powers.
A bench of Justices Surya Kant and N Kotiswar Singh delivered the judgment, wherein it was observed that India has made considerable strides in the field of arbitration, but challenges, chiefly in terms of poor drafting of arbitration clauses, remain. Calling for arbitration clauses to be framed with precision, the Court stated,
Case Title: M/S. Interstate Construction Versus National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 585
The Supreme Court held that under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an Arbitral Tribunal has the power to award different rates of interest for different phases.
A bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan overturned the Delhi High Court's ruling, which had invalidated the tribunal's grant of interest on interest, deeming it impermissible under Section 31(7) of the Act.
The bench heard the case where the dispute originated from a 1984 contract for the Thermal Power Project in Andhra Pradesh. After the completion of work in 1987, the Appellant-Interstate Construction claimed unpaid dues from NPCC, leading to arbitration proceedings that began in 1993 and continued for nearly three decades through multiple arbitrators.
All Trademark Disputes Aren't Outside Arbitration; In Personam Issues Relating To License Agreement Arbitrable : Supreme Court
Case Title: K. Mangayarkarasi & Anr. Versus N.J. Sundaresan & Anr.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 597
The Supreme Court held that a mere allegation of fraud or misconduct does not divest an arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction to adjudicate in personam disputes stemming from contractual relationships governed by an arbitration agreement.
“The law is well settled that allegations of fraud or criminal wrongdoing or of statutory violation would not detract from the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to resolve a dispute arising out of a civil or contractual relationship on the basis of the jurisdiction conferred by the arbitration agreement.”, the court observed.
The bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan made these observations while dismissing a plea challenging the referral of a trademark dispute to arbitration, reaffirming that contractual disagreements involving intellectual property rights (IPRs) can be resolved through arbitration unless they involve sovereign or public (in rem) rights.
S. 11 SARFAESI Act | DRT Can't Decide Disputes Between Banks Over Secured Assets; Must Be Referred To Arbitration : Supreme Court
Case Title: Bank Of India Versus M/S Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616
In a significant ruling under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 (“Act”), the Supreme Court held that inter-creditor disputes (between secured creditors) must be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the Act read with the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).
Unlike the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which requires a written agreement for reference, Section 11 of the Act creates a statutory mandate for arbitration, eliminating the need for any such agreement, the court said.
“Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act, provides for a statutory arbitration for any dispute mentioned therein between any of the parties enumerated thereunder. There is no need for an explicit written agreement to arbitrate between such parties in order to attract Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act. The said provision creates a legal fiction as regards the existence of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding whether such agreement exists or not in actuality.”, the court added.
S. 11 SARFAESI Act | DRT Can't Decide Disputes Between Banks Over Secured Assets; Must Be Referred To Arbitration : Supreme Court
Case Title: Bank Of India Versus M/S Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 616
A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Pankaj Mithal held that inter-creditor disputes (between secured creditors) must be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the Act read with the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).
Unlike the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which requires a written agreement for reference, Section 11 of the Act creates a statutory mandate for arbitration, eliminating the need for any such agreement, the court said.
Cause Title: Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corp. Ltd. versus M/s. Brandavan Food Products (and connected cases)
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1076
The Supreme Court, comprising of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma set aside a multi-crore arbitral award against IRCTC, holding that the arbitrator had impermissibly rewritten the contract between IRCTC and private caterers. The Court ruled that the caterers were not entitled to parity in tariff or apportionment charges for a second regular meal and could not claim reimbursement for a welcome drink, as both issues were clearly governed by the Master License Agreement (MLA) and Railway Board policy circulars. It held that the Railways acted within its contractual authority under Clause 8.1 of the MLA. By granting reimbursement contrary to the contract and policy framework, the arbitrator ignored binding policy decisions and misinterpreted the contractual terms. The Court reiterated that arbitrators cannot override policy-compliant contracts.
Case Title : Mohan Lal Fatehpuria Versus M/S Bharat Textiles & Ors. (And Connected Case)
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1190
The Supreme Court, comprising of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe held that once the statutory 18-month period for delivering an arbitral award expires, the arbitrator's mandate automatically comes to an end as per Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, when no application for extension is made. Therefore, when an extension of time is granted by the Court after the mandate of the arbitrator is terminated, then the substitution of the arbitrator is mandatory under Section 29A(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In essence, the Court held that once the maximum 18-month period for delivering an arbitral award has expired, only a substituted arbitrator can continue the proceedings when any further extension of time is granted.Non-Signatory Which Isn't A Veritable Party Cannot Invoke Arbitration Clause : Supreme Court
Case Title: Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Versus BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184
The Supreme Court held that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot invoke the arbitration clause against a party with whom it shares no legal relationship and where there is no indication of any intention to bind the non-signatory to the main contract.
A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan heard the matter, where the Respondent, admittedly a non-signatory to the primary contract between HPCL and AGC Networks Ltd., sought to invoke the arbitration clause against HPCL on the ground that AGC had assigned its work contract received from the Appellant to the Respondent, thereby allegedly binding it to the main agreement.
"Where the Referral Court finds prima facie a party is not a veritable party still the matter is left to the Arbitral Tribunal. To hold so, would relegate the Referral Court to the status of a monotonous automation. Further, to countenance such an extreme proposition would lead to disastrous consequences, where absolute strangers could walk into the Referral Court and contend that the matter has to perforce go to the Arbitral Tribunal for a decision on the veritable nature of the party. We are not prepared to accept such an extreme proposition," the Court stated.
High Courts
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Case Title: Alliance Enterprises v. Andhra Pradesh State Fiber Net Limited (APSFL)
Case Number: Arbitration Application No. 48 of 2023
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Chief Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur has held that the limitation period for filing an application seeking appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, commences only after a notice invoking arbitration has been issued by one of the parties and there has been either a failure or refusal on the part of the opposite party to make an appointment as per the procedure agreed upon between the parties. The Court referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd.wherein the court had observed that the “limitation period for making an application seeking appointment of arbitrator must not be conflated with the limitation period for raising the substantive claims which are sought to be referred to an arbitral tribunal.”
Applying the law laid down in these precedents to the facts of the present case, the Court observed that the notice invoking arbitration clause was issued by the Applicant only on 17.10.2022. Assuming that three years were to be calculated from the said date itself, the present application which was filed on 31.08.2023 was well within the period of limitation of three years as prescribed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Named Arbitrator Cannot Be Replaced Unless There Is Evidence Of Partiality Or Bias Against Them: Andhra Pradesh HC
Case Title: M/s. Kranthi Grand DKNV Hospitalities and another Vs. M/s. Manasa Estates and Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and 2 others
Case Number: Arbitration Application No: 62 Of 2023
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur has held that the request for seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator other than the named arbitrator cannot be entertained if there is no evidence to show that the named arbitrator would act in a partial or biased manner. The court observed that the explanation given by the applicant as to why the arbitrator other than the nominated arbitrator is required to be appointed is very casual. No reasons have been furnished whether the named arbitrator falls any of the ineligibilities prescribed under section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.
The Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Limited and others vs. Raja Transport Private Limited (2009) held that the appointment of the named arbitrator in the agreement is a rule and appointment of the arbitrator other than the named arbitrator should be treated as an exception.
[A&C Act] Non-Payment Of Part Of Mutually Agreed Amount After Settlement Of Dispute Not An Arbitrable Issue Under Arbitration Agreement: Andhra Pradesh HC
Case Name: M/s.Brothers Engineering and Erectors Ltd. Vs. M/s. Zorin Infrastructure, LLP
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld the dismissal of an application filed under section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, holding that once an amount has been mutually decided by the parties, the dispute itself is resolved and no arbitrable issue remains for consideration.
A Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice V. Srinivas pointed out that non-payment of part amount of the mutually agreed amount cannot be said to give rise to an arbitrable dispute. When an arbitration clause stipulates that 'any dispute' is arbitrable, it should be understood in line with section 8 of the Act, to mean 'any dispute' arising out of a contractual agreement. Giving credence to the judgement rendered in Emaar India Ltd. v. Tarun Aggarwal Projects LLP, the Bench noted that ideally, jurisdiction lies with the Tribunal to decide whether a matter is arbitrable or not and the High Court is only granted the power to have a 'second look'. However, the bench pointed out, that there is one exception to this rule. When the issues are manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, the Court may interfere and reject the application at the threshold.
While Deciding Petition U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act, Court Cannot Ignore Basic Principles Of CPC: Andhra Pradesh HC
Case Title: Tuf Metallurgical Private Limited Vs. Bst Hk Limited and Others
Case Number: ICOMAA. No.2 of 2024
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justices Ninala Jayasurya and Nayapathy Vijay observed that in deciding a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court cannot ignore the basic principles of the CPC. At the same time, the power of the Court to grant relief is not curtailed by the rigours of every procedural provision in the CPC. In exercise of its powers to grant interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court is not strictly bound by the provisions of the CPC.
The court observed that the Order 38 Rule 5 CPC contemplates a notice to the defendant to furnish security within a specified time, either to furnish security in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or value of the same, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree, or to appear and show cause why he should not furnish security.
It also noted that the Order 38 Rule 5 CPC does not debar the Court to pass ex parte order of attachment if the Court is of the opinion that there is a requirement of doing so as the defendant might dispose of the property in the interregnum. On attachment, the defendant can appear before the Court and show cause as to why attachment should be removed.
Proceedings Before Registrar U/S 62 Of AP Cooperative Societies Act Not Arbitration, Provisions Of A&C Act Will Not Apply: Andhra Pradesh HC
Case Title: Lakshmi Agencies v. Aryapuram Coop Bank Ltd.
Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal 620/2016
The division bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of Justices R Raghunandan Rao and Maheswara Rao Kuncheam has observed that when proceedings are held before the Registrar under A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, such proceedings cannot be termed as arbitral proceedings. Accordingly, it was held that no provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 including Section 34 would be applicable to them. The appropriate remedy in such a case would be an appeal before the A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, under Section 76 of the APCS Act, 1964. The fact that Section 76 of the APCS Act, 1964 itself provides a remedy of appeal, against the order under Section 62 of the APCS Act, 1964, would make it amply clear that the order passed by the Assistant Registrar cannot be treated to be an award in arbitration proceedings. The Court referred the decision of the Apex Court in Greater Bombay Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. M/s United Yarn Tex. Pvt. Ltd and Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1584 in this regard.
Second Execution Petition Cannot Be Entertained When First Petition Seeking Execution Of Arbitral Award Was Dismissed On Merits: Andhra Pradesh HC
Case Title: M/s. Real Fab India Pvt.Ltd. Versus M/s. Rashtriya Ispath Nigam Limited
Case Title: Civil Revision Petition No.2936 Of 2024
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari has held that a second execution petition for enforcing an award is not maintainable if the first was rejected on the ground that the award had not been set aside, solely because a signed copy was not filed with the application to set it aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
Allahabad High Court
Section 36 Of Arbitration Act As Amended Applies To Pre-Amendment S.34 Applications: Allahabad High Court Reiterates
Case Title: U.P. Jal Nigam (Urban) And Another vs. Spml Infra Ltd.
Neutral Citation No.: 2025:AHC:20224
The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Piyush Agrawal, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Private Limited & Others (2018), held that the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies prospectively to court proceedings initiated on or after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act.
[S.16 Arbitration Act] Jurisdiction Of Tribunal Cannot Be Challenged After Submission Of Defence: Allahabad High Court
Case Title: M/S. Arya Rice Mill v. State Of U.P. And 6 Others 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42 [WRIT - C No. - 41517 of 2024]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 42
The Allahabad High Court has held that as per Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal cannot be challenged after submission of defence and that the arbitral tribunal is empowered to adjudicate on its own jurisdiction.
The bench of Justice Siddhartha Varma and Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava held
“Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for challenge to the jurisdictional authority of the Arbitral Tribunal. In terms of sub-section (2) thereof, a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction should be raised not later than the submission of the defence. If the excess of jurisdiction crops up during the proceedings, the objection should be made at that very time. In any case, objection on the question of jurisdiction has to be made before the arbitral tribunal itself, and the arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.”
No Automatic Stay On Award Upon Filing Of Appeal U/S 34 Within Time: Allahabad High Court Reiterates
Case Title: M/s LR Print Solutions v. M/s Exflo Sanitation Pvt Ltd. And 2 Others
Case Number: Matters Under Article 227 No. - 8387 Of 2024
Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India Vs. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. and others and Hindustan Construction Company Limited and others Vs. Union of India and others, the Allahabad High Court has reiterated that automatic stay on the operation of arbitral award is not granted merely by filing appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2016.
Venue Is Construed As Seat In Absence Of Contrary Indicia, If Arbitration Agreement Only Mentions 'Venue': Allahabad HC
Case Title: Devi Prasad Mishra V. M/S Nayara Energy Limited (Earlier Essar Oil Limited) Thru Auth. Signatory/ Managing Director [Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. - 2 Of 2024
The Allahabad High Court has held that when only one place is mentioned in the arbitration agreement and is termed as “venue”, the same is to be treated as the “seat” also, unless something contrary is mentioned in the agreement.
“If the arbitration agreement mentions only one place and even if it is termed as the 'venue', then unless there is a contrary indicia the 'venue' is construed as the 'seat',” held Justice Jaspreet Singh.
The Court observed that in Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. & others the Apex Court held that where 'seat' of the arbitration is, the Court there will have exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. Further, in B.G.S. S.G.S. Soma JV v. NHPC Limited the Supreme Court held that, in absence of contrary intentions, the venue chosen by the parties will also be the seat of the arbitration.
Justice Singh held that the parties had agreed for arbitration to be held in Mumbai and exclusive jurisdiction was vested with the Courts at Mumbai. Since no contrary clause was present in the arbitration agreement, the Court held that Mumbai was chosen as the 'seat' of arbitration by the parties.
Case Title: State Of U.P. and 2 Others v. M/S Satish Chandra Shiv Hare-Brothers
Case No. Matters Under Article 227 No. - 11680 Of 2023
Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Sudhir Tyagi, the Allahabad High Court has held that under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Executing Court is empowered to grant statutory interest which may not have been mentioned in the arbitral award.
In Union of India and Anr. v. Sudhir Tyagi, it was held that
“..the interpretation of Clause (b) of Section 31(7) of the Act is no more res-integra. The grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) is mandatory. The only discretion which the Arbitral Tribunal has is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded. Where the Arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, then statutory rate, as provided in Section 31(7)(b), shall apply…”
Writ Petition Can Be Converted To Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act If It Does Not Prejudice Respondents: Allahabad High Court
Case Title – Union of India v Bhular Construction Company & Others
Case No. – Matters under Article 227 No. – 8841 of 2023
The Allahabad High Court Bench of Justice Manish Kumar Nigam allowed the conversion of a writ petition under Article 227, Constitution of India (“COI”) into an appeal under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) noting that where a particular kind of proceeding is not maintainable and a different kind of proceeding lies in respect thereof before the Court, the Court has jurisdiction to convert one into other subject to law relating to limitation and court fees.
The Court relied on its previous judgment in Kailash Chandra v. Ram Naresh Gupta wherein it was held that conversion of a revision into a writ petition under Article 226/227 was permissible. In view of the same, the Court observed that there was no impediment in conversion where a particular kind of proceeding is not maintainable and a different kind of proceeding lies in respect thereof.
S.11 A&C Act | Respondent's Letter Seeking Petitioner To Give Up Interest On Outstanding Amount Indicates Ongoing Dispute: Allahabad HC
Case Name: M/S Assam Dental Supply Co. Through Its Proprietor Sr Manoj Jhingren v. Director General, Medical And Health Services, Uttar Pradesh Swasthya Bhawan, Lucknow And Another
Case Number: Civil Misc. Arbitration Application No. - 17 Of 2025
The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Jaspreet Singh, while hearing a Section 11 petition under the Arbitration Act, observed that the letter of the Respondent addressed to the Petitioner, requiring them to give up their interest claim on the outstanding amount, showed that the claims were still under consideration. Therefore, the Claims cannot be termed dead, and the Section 11 petition is well within the limitation period.
The parties had exchanged multiple letters concerning the release of the payment. The correspondence continued till June 2023, after which the Petitioner issued the notice dated 14.11.2024 invoking arbitration. The present Petition u/s 11(6) of the A&C was filed on 13.02.2025. Since August 2008, when a part payment was made to the Petitioner, till 2021, there has not been much communication between the parties. However, since October 2021, the Respondent has required the Petitioner to furnish an affidavit to give up the interim claim on the outstanding amount. The letter indicates that the Petitioner's claim is still under consideration.
The bench observed that the Section 11 petition is within the limitation period. The objection concerning the claims being time-barred relates to the case's merits, and the Section 11 Court is not required to examine the same. In light of the above discussion, the Court allowed the Section 11 petition and appointed HMJ O.P. Srivastava (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute.
Rejecting Appeal U/S 34 A&C Act On Grounds Of Jurisdiction Without Indicating Alternate Remedy Amounts To Refusal To Set Aside Award: Allahabad HC
Case Title: Jaiprakash Associates Limited Versus High Tech Tyre Retreaders Pvt. Ltd. and another [APPEAL UNDER SECTION 37 OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 DEFECTIVE No. - 112 of 2025]
The Allahabad High Court has held that rejecting an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on grounds of lack of jurisdiction without providing alternate remedy amounts to refusing to set aside award, making such order appealable under Section 37 of the Act.
Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for appeals against orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act.
In Chintels India Limited Vs. Bhayana Builders Private Limited, the Apex Court had held that order refusing condonation of delay was an order refusing to set aside the award and was appealable under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act and discussed the 'effect doctrine' by referring to its earlier judgment in ESSAR Constructions Vs. N.P. Rama Krishna Reddy.
Relying on the aforesaid, the bench lead by Chief Justice Bhansali held that
“it would be seen that the effect of the order passed by the Court under Section 34 of the Act is required to be seen for the purpose of examining the maintainability of the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act as to whether the order passed leaves any other avenue for the applicant to seek redressal against the award or the order passed puts an end to the challenge laid to the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, which in the present case is the Council.”
It held that order of dismissal refusing to condone delay was not on the same footing as a order returning appeal to be presented before appropriate forum and the effect of the order needs to be seen for maintainability of the appeal.
Compensation U/S 3G National Highways Act Can Be Challenged Under Arbitration Act, Writ Petition Not Maintainable: Allahabad High Court
Case Title : Ramashankar Yadav And Another V. Union Of India And 3 Others
Case No: Writ - C No. - 26529 Of 2025
The Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Anish Kumar Gupta held that compensation awarded under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 can be challenged under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and writ petitions for the same will not be maintainable.
The court held that Section 3G(6) of the 1956 Act makes the Arbitration Act, 1996 applicable to compensation disputes, which must therefore be resolved through arbitration and challenged only under Section 34. The Court held that the dispute regarding determination of compensation by applying correct rates for the land are matters of facts and evidence which falls within the domain of Section 34 proceedings under the 1996 Act. Allowing landowners to directly approach the High Court under Article 226 would bypass this framework and defeat the legislative intent.
Case Title : Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi through its Registrar Versus M/s Umang Cure Pvt. Ltd. and 3 others
The Allahabad High Court held that when an agreement is extended by the conduct of the parties, though it may have expired on paper, the applicability of the arbitration clause is also extended.
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd., the bench of Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice KshitijShailendra observed “A perusal of the above determination made by Hon'ble Supreme Court reveals that though the agreement may have come to an end on expiry of its term, the arbitration clause operated and for the purpose of determination of the disputes, the arbitration clause could be invoked and that the agreement had not come to an end by efflux time and the same got extended on account of conduct of the parties.”
Bombay High Court
Substantive Objections On Validity Or Existence Of Arbitration Agreement Can Be Adjudicated By Tribunal U/S 16 Of Act: Bombay HC
Case Title: Shreegopal Barasia Versus M/s. Creative Homes & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 17
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that substantive objections concerning the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement can be adjudicated by the Arbitral Tribunal and not by the court under section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
It further added that towards such purpose of ruling on its own jurisdiction, and dealing with objections as to existence and validity, two specific sub-clauses have been inserted in Section 16(1) of the Act. The arbitration clause in a contract is treated as an independent agreement that is distinct from the other terms of the contract. Besides, a decision that the contract containing the arbitration clause is void, would not entail the legal outcome that the arbitration clause is invalid.
Serving Signed Copy Of Award To Employee Of Party Does Not Constitute Valid Service U/S 31(5) Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Health Care, Medical & General Stores Versus Amulya Investment,Through Proprietor Mr. Sameer G. Narvekar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 23
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh S. Patil has held that service of a signed copy of an award on an employee of a party to an arbitration agreement is not a valid service under section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. The court at the outset noted that section 2(h) of the Arbitration Act defines the term party as a party to an arbitration agreement and referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors. Vs. Karmyogi Shelters Pvt. Ltd.(2012) where it was held that a party under section 2(h) means only party to an arbitration agreement and not any agent or advocate acting on behalf of the party.
Court Cannot Assume Jurisdiction To Appoint Arbitrator Unless Request For Reference Of Dispute Is Received By Respondent: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Sri Sathe Infracon Private Limited V. M/S Rudranee Infrastructure Ltd. & Another (Arbitration Application No. 9 Of 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 36
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice R. M. Joshi has held that compliance with Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is mandatory and that the court cannot assume jurisdiction to appoint an Arbitrator under Section 11 unless a request for a reference of dispute is received by the respondent.
Here in this case, parties have agreed that before referring the dispute to arbitration, an amicable settlement must be attempted. In light of the agreement between parties, it is necessary to see whether there is compliance with this provision. Additionally, the court noted that it was specifically stated in the notice dated 28.03.2023 that the applicant had no intention of going into uncalled arbitration and had asked for an amicable settlement. It was also stated that if the date for amicable settlement is not communicated in 15 days, it shall be presumed that there is no possibility of settlement and in this situation, the Arbitrator came to be appointed. After this communication, there were settlement talks between the parties to resolve disputes between them amicably.
While Commercial Speech Falls Within Free Speech, Contract Prohibit Adverse Remarks: Bombay HC Imposes 90-Day Injunction On Wonderchef's Distributor
Case Title: Wonderchef Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. vs Shree Swaminarayanan Pty Ltd. (Commercial Arbitration Petition 791 of 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 40
Observing that commercial speech is a part of 'free speech' guaranteed by the Constitution of India, the Bombay High Court imposed a 90-day injunction against an Australia-based distributor of Wonderchef Home Appliances, owned by Celebrity Chef Sanjeev Kapoor, from making any comments or communications which could harm the reputation of the company, due to a contractual clause preventing them from doing so.
Single-judge Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while imposing the injunction, also ordered Wonderchef to invoke Arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
"It would be necessary for me to record that commercial speech is eminently part of free speech. It is not easy for a Court to prohibit a party from expressing itself about its grievances about a product acquired in the course of commerce, since the factors to be borne in mind when considering a request for a gag order, is to see if such expression is truthful and warranted. Merely because speech is made in a commercial context, it would not cease to have the ingredients of free expression," the judge said in the order passed on January 27.
Tenants Occupying Premises Which Fall Under Development Agreement Cannot Be Evicted U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Ambit Urbanspace Versus Poddar Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited & Ors (COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.38696 OF 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 127
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that Eviction of tenants governed by the Rent Control Act cannot be sought under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), particularly when they are not parties to the Development Agreement executed between the Developer and the Landlords and are not being provided upgraded premises in the redeveloped building compared to what they currently occupy under the tenancy agreements.
The Court further added that only jurisdictional forums under the Rent Control Act have the authority to determine issues related to tenancy. It rejected the Landlords' assertions of violations by the Tenants and held that proceedings under section 9 of the Arbitration Act should not be used as a backdoor method for eviction especially when no eviction action was taken over two decades that too on facts within the knowledge of the Landlords. The court also observed that a measure taken under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act ought not to conflict with special protective provisions in ameliorative legislation such as the Rent Act.
Case Title:Santanu Sengupta & Ors. Versus Macrotech Developers Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 132
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan the developer of Lodha World Towers in a petition filed under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) has been directed to charge the Federation Common Area Maintenance (FCAM) Charges at the rate agreed upon in the agreement executed between the parties, until the arbitral proceedings are completed.
The court observed that it is unclear how Macrotech could assert that the rate of Rs. 4.5 per square foot as contracted at the launch of the project could escalate to Rs. 9.92 per square foot, applying even the highest inflation of 10% per annum, when the FCAM Charges were made applicable only from October 2017. It further added that at the rate of 10% per annum, the escalation would come to Rs. 0.45 per annum and at that simple rate for eight years (although eight years would be completed only in October 2025) the aggregate increase would come to Rs. 3.6 per square foot, which would add up to Rs. 8.10 per square foot.
Limitation Cannot Be Decided As Preliminary Issue Without Recording Whether It Is A Mixed Question Of Law And Fact: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund Versus Neelkanth Realty Private Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 134
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice M.S. Karnik has held that an arbitrator is not permitted to decide the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue without first recording a finding as to whether it is a mixed question of law and fact that requires evidence to be led. It further held that if such a finding is not recorded and the issue is nonetheless decided as a preliminary issue, the award can be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on the ground of violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law.
Case Title: Central Depositories Services (India) Limited. Vs. Ketan Lalit Shah and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 144
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices Revati Mohite Dere and Dr. Neela Gokhale has held that the arbitrator can allow the parties to withdraw their claims to initiate fresh arbitration proceedings by issuing a new notice of arbitration, provided that the legitimate interests of the other party are not prejudiced.
The court noted that the Delhi High Court in IDFC First Bank Limited v. Hitachi MGRM Net Limited (2023) held that an arbitral tribunal is subject to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution; however, the exercise of such powers is limited to exceptional circumstances. The non-obstante clause in Section 5 of the Arbitration Act does not override the constitutional powers under Article 227.
The court in the above case also held that interference is warranted only when the order is patently perverse or lacks inherent jurisdiction. Courts must discourage unnecessary interference in the arbitral process, as excessive judicial intervention undermines its efficiency. Therefore, the exercise of writ jurisdiction should be reserved for rare cases, particularly where bad faith is evident.
Based on the above, the court observed that the claims were that of the Respondents. When the Arbitral Tribunal declined to allow an amendment to the claims on the ground that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was nearing expiry in May 2024 it offered the claimants two options.
Statutory Protection Under Maharashtra Rent Control Act Can't Be Circumvented By Invoking Arbitration Petition To Seek 'Speedy Eviction': High Court
Case Title: SJK Buildcon LLP vs. Kusum Pandurang Keni & Ors (Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 20834 of 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 148
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory protection afforded to tenants under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“Rent Act”). Interim measures under Section 9 must aid arbitral proceedings and cannot override or conflict with special statutory mechanisms under the Rent Act for eviction and redevelopment. The Court observed that issues involving protected tenants must be adjudicated by the Small Causes Court under Section 33 of the Rent Act, which is a non-obstante provision. Section 9 of the Act cannot be used to seek relief of 'speedy eviction' where tenancy rights are upheld by a binding decree.
Unless Serious Allegations Of Fraud Are Established, Parties Cannot Be Denied Reference To Arbitration U/S 8 Of A&C Act: Bombay HC
Case Title: Bholashankar Ramsuresh Dubey Versus Dinesh Narayan Tiwari and Ors. Case No: W.P NO. 17174 OF 2024
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 149
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice N. J. Jamadar has held that the dispute cannot be refused referral to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) based solely on mere allegations of fraud simpliciter, unless serious allegations of fraud that go to the root of the partnership deed containing the arbitration clause are established.
The Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. V/s. Cherian Varkey Construction Co. (P) Ltd (2011) held that the following categories of cases are generally considered unsuitable for the ADR process due to their nature.Cases involving serious and specific allegations of fraud, fabrication of documents, forgery, impersonation, or coercion and cases involving prosecution for criminal offences.
The court also noted that the Supreme Court in A. Ayyasamy V. A. Paramasivam (2016) held that It follows that cases involving serious allegations of fraud—especially those resembling criminal offences, involving complex issues requiring detailed evidence, or challenging the validity of the contract or arbitration clause itself are non-arbitrable and should be decided by civil courts. The Apex Court cautioned that however, mere or simpliciter allegations of fraud that pertain only to internal disputes between parties and do not affect the public domain do not nullify the arbitration agreement, and such matters can be referred to arbitration.
Case Title: Elite Housing Llp Versus The Spectrum Chs Ltd. (Commercial Arbitration Petition No.155 Of 2025)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 151
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that objections related to the terms of the redevelopment agreement raised by members of the society can be decided only by the appropriate forum having jurisdiction over such issues. These matters cannot be adjudicated under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court at the outset noted that the redevelopment is stalled solely due to unresolved disputes over two flats Flat No. 6 and Flat No. 12 among family members. While objections regarding entitlements and procedural lapses have been raised, these are to be addressed by appropriate regulatory or quasi-judicial authorities. The core issue remains the absence of documentation for the two flats, which is unjustifiably halting the entire project.
Unilateral Option To Terminate Arbitration Agreement Does Not Render It Illegal: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Tata Capital Limited V. Vijay Devij Aiya (Commercial Arbitration Application No. 237 And 243 Of 2024)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 158
The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while disposing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that an arbitration clause which gives option to only one party to opt out of the arbitration agreement is not invalid per se. Such arbitration agreement can be saved by eliminating the unilateral option or by making such right bilateral.
The Court discussed the context in which the Tata Capital judgment was decided by the Delhi High Court. The context was of the borrower having filed a suit and the lender having asserted the right to file a written statement. On being denied that right, the lender appealed and secured its right to file the written statement. After securing such right, the lender argued that no civil suit would lie. It was in the context of such provocative and irreconcilable conduct that the court ruled that there was an absence of mutuality which was fatal to the agreement. The Court observed that the ruling on absence of mutuality rendering the arbitration agreement to be illegal should be read in this context and not in absolute terms.
Case Title – IMAX Corporation v. E-City Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Others (Commercial Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 38267 of 2024)
Citation – 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 162
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and M.M. Sathaye has observed that when a common arbitration petition seeking recognition, enforcement and execution of a foreign award is declined against all the respondents, the mere fact that some respondents had successfully filed chamber summons seeking deletion of their names would not render the appeal filed under Section 50(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as not maintainable.
The Court placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in M/s Fuerst Day Lawson v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 356 and Government of India v. Vedanta Limited and Others (2010) 10 SCC 1 to discuss the proposition of law that while seeking enforcement of foreign award, there is no need to take separate proceedings, one for deciding the enforceability of the foreign award to make it rule of the court and another to take up execution thereafter.
Bombay HC Dismisses Appeal Against Order U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Injuncting Owner Of Kapani Resorts From Disposing Of Interest In Properties
Case Title: Kapani Resorts Private Limited Parsha V/s. Manmohan Kapani
Case Number:2025:BHC-OS:7019
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe And Justice M. S. Karnik has upheld the order passed by the Single Judge under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act),injuncting the owner of the Kailash property and Kapani Resorts from alienating or disposing of any interest in the properties until the completion of the arbitral proceedings.
Arbitrator Cannot Be Substituted U/S 29A(6) Of A&C Act Unless Grounds Mentioned U/S 14 & 15 Are Satisfied: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Indiabulls Infraestate Ltd. Versus Imagine Realty Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number: 2025:BHC-OS:6783
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that even though the term "substitution" is mentioned under Section 29-A(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act),an arbitrator cannot be substituted in an application under this section unless the grounds specified in Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration Act are satisfied, which outline the conditions under which an arbitrator may be substituted.
Acquiescence To Termination Notice Of Agreement Bars Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Jupicos Entertainment Private Limited Versus Probability Sports (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Case Number: Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 12967 Of 2025
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice M.S. Karnik has held that when a party is aware of a termination notice issued by the other party and conducts itself on the assumption that the termination has taken effect, it cannot later seek interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on the ground that the other party is proceeding to assign the subject matter of the contract to a third party and should therefore be restrained.
The court at the outset noted that prima facie, there is merit in the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for MCA that the agreement between Jupicos and Probability Sports does not suggest an agency relationship with MCA. Instead, it appears to be an independent, principal-to-principal contract.
It further added that the Single Judge's observation that the agreement merely permitted Jupicos to operate a team—without conferring ownership or vested rights—seems plausible. The agreement also appears to be inherently determinable, as evidenced by its termination clause.
Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Must Be Sought With 'Reasonable Expedition': Bombay High Court
Case Title: Ashoka Buildcon Ltd. vs. Maha Active Engineers India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 192
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice A. S. Chandurkar and Justice Rajesh Patil have held that an applicant under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) must approach the court with reasonable expedition. Delay of several years without adequate explanation is a material factor that militates against the grant of such relief.
The court observed that relief under Section 9 of the Act is discretionary and must be guided by the settled principles of interim relief, namely the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. An appellate court can interfere with the discretionary order of the trial court only if such discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or in ignorance of settled legal principles.
[Arbitration Act] S.37 Not An Efficacious Alternate Remedy After Rejection Of Plea U/S 34 Seeking Enhanced Compensation: Bombay High Court
Case Title – Kisanlal Bairudas Jain and Ors. v. Union of India
Neutral Citation – 2025: BHC- AC:21612-DB
The Division Bench of Bombay High Court comprising Justices Jitendra Jain and M.S. Sonak allowed writ petitions seeking enhanced solatium under National Highways Act, 1956 in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v Tarsem Singh and Ors. While doing so the Court rejected the argument of the Respondent that the petitions ought to be dismissed as the Petitioners have an alternate remedy under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”)
The Court held that while exercising its powers under Section 37, ACA the Court is not empowered to modify the award and grant enhanced compensation. This would make Section 37 an inefficacious alternate remedy and in view of this fact the Court can exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 226, Constitution of India.
Contractor Cannot Be Denied Payment For Extra Work Approved By Railways Through Their Actions: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Union of India Through The General Manager Central Railway Versus PLR HC RBR JV
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Petition No.51 Of 2024
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that a contractor cannot be denied payment for extra work that, while beyond the original scope of the agreement, was clearly consented to by the other party through its conduct. When such work is accepted, measured, and not objected to contemporaneously, the benefiting party cannot later claim it was beyond the contract's scope. To allow this would amount to unjust enrichment.
The court noted that the work was executed in line with the Agreement under the active supervision of Railways officials, especially during the Covid-19 lockdown. Extensions were granted based on ground realities. Despite alleging deficiencies, the Railways made no counterclaim in arbitration. Joint measurements, approved RA Bills, and prior conduct confirmed acceptance of excess work.
It observed that the Arbitral Tribunal rightly held that the Railways' conduct indicated consensual and documented expansion of work, and it could not rely on the absence of a formal amendment to deny payment. The Tribunal's findings are reasonable, well-supported, and cannot be faulted.
Bombay High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Against BCCI, Directs Payment Of ₹538.9 Crore To Defunct IPL Franchise Kochi Tuskers Kerala
Case Title: Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited and Anr.
Case Number: Arbitration Petition No. 1752 Of 2015 And Arbitration Petition No. 1753 Of 2015
The Bombay High Court has upheld an arbitral award granting damages amounting to 538.9 crore to Kochi Cricket Private Limited ("KCPL”), the parent company of defunct IPL franchise Kochi Tuskers Kerala. It was held that the Court cannot act as a Court of First Appeal and delve into a fact-finding exercise by revisiting and re-appreciating the record and accepting competing interpretations of the various clauses of the agreements between the parties by invoking the ground of perversity.
The bench of Justice Riyaz Iqbal Chagla observed that the Arbitrator adjudicated the core issue, i.e., whether Board of Control for Cricket in India (“BCCI”) has wrongfully invoked the bank guarantee furnished by Rendezvous Sports World (“RSW”) and whether this amounted to a repudiatory breach of KCPL's Franchise Agreement (“KCPL-FA”), by considering the material facts and documents on record as well as the evidence recorded.
OPC & Its Sole Director Can't Be Treated As One For Liability Owed: Bombay HC Grants Relief To Director In Dispute Over MasterChef Production
Case Name Saravana Prasad v. Endemol India Private Limited & Anr.
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22714 Of 2024 With Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22746 Of 2024
The Bombay High Court has observed that sole director of a One Person Company (“OPC”), cannot be treated parallelly with the separate legal entity.
The court set aside the directions in the impugned order dated 10/07/2024 directing Mr. Saravana Prasad ("Prasad") to deposit Rs. 10.40 crores in a fixed deposit, and disclose all assets and all encumbrances, charges and attachments, and disclosure of all details of all companies and firms in which they are shareholder, director or partners.
The court observed that the Learned Arbitral Tribunal has taken note of the Confirmation Letter as being the core of Endemol's Arguments, and noted that Innovative has not denied the issuance of the Confirmation Letter. The court took the view that the Confirmation Letter was consciously issued in the course of audit confirmation sought by auditors of Endemol. The reasons pertaining to the absence of Confirmation Letter not being issued after 2022, and the implication of accounts reconciliation exercises that the parties engage in, are all matters that are to be dealt by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitral proceedings.
Direction Of Disclosure Or Attachment Of Assets Cannot Be Passed Against A Person Who Is Not A Party To The Arbitral Award: Bombay HC
Case Title: Ningbo Aux Imp and Exp Co. Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. [Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 29646 of 2024
The Bombay High Court has held that a foreign arbitral award cannot be enforced against a person who was not a party to the arbitration proceedings. It ruled that forcing such a person to disclose assets or face coercive enforcement would be without jurisdiction under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan passed the ruling while allowing two interim applications filed by Amstrad Consumer India Pvt. Ltd. (Respondent No. 1) and its shareholder (Respondent No. 2) in a commercial enforcement petition filed by Ningbo Aux Imp and Exp Co. Ltd., seeking enforcement of a foreign award passed under an agreement dated October 23, 2020.
The Court noted that an attempt had been made by the Petitioner to make Respondent No. 2 a party to the arbitration proceedings, and that was rejected by the case manager of the arbitral tribunal. It said:
“… not only is it a case where Respondent No.2 cannot be said to be a party who was unable to participate in the proceedings, Respondent No.2 is a person who was sought to be made a party and the very arbitral tribunal whose arbitral award is sought to be enforced, had not permitted making Respondent No.2 a party.”
Case Title: Maharashtra Public Service Commission Versus Vast India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 56
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the mandate of the MSME Facilitation Council (Council) cannot be terminated merely on the ground that it failed to render an award within 90 days under section 18(5) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSME Act”) from the date of entering reference as this time period is directory in nature.
Additionally, the court observed that although the time period under the MSME Act is directory, once the arbitration is undertaken by the Council, the timeline prescribed under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act becomes applicable. Accordingly, the award must be rendered within 12 months from the completion of pleadings. However, the court noted that in this case, a counterclaim was also filed by the MPSC, which reset the 12-month deadline as provided under Section 29A of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the award rendered by the Council was within the prescribed timeframe and could not be said to be in violation of Section 29A.
LLP Can Be Bound By Arbitration Clause Despite Not Being Signatory To LLP Agreement: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Kartik Radia Vs. M/S. Bdo India Llp And Anr.Comm. Arbitration Application No. 31 Of 2022
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 85
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the mere fact that an LLP is not a signatory to an LLP Agreement does not, by itself, preclude it from being a party to arbitration proceedings initiated between Partners under the arbitration clause of such an agreement.
The Court observed that an LLP is not a “third party” to its LLP Agreement but an entity with rights and obligations vis-à-vis its partners as per the statutory scheme of the LLP Act. The Arbitral Tribunal, and not the Section 11 Court, has the jurisdiction to determine whether a party is a necessary or proper party to the arbitration.
Arbitration Clause In Invoices Can Be Binding On Parties When They Acted Upon The Invoices And No Objections Were Raised: Bombay HC
Case Title: Sanjiv Mohan Gupta v. Sai Estate Consultants Chembur Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 94
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has observed that where the correspondence between the parties included invoices which contained an arbitration clause and the parties acted upon those invoices without protesting, then it could be deemed that the party had accepted the arbitration clause.
The Court relied on its previous judgment in Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. MAD (India) Pvt. Ltd. – 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 7807, that where the parties had acted upon the invoices and there was no denial of invoices raised by the applicant, the clause contained in the invoices which clearly stipulated a reference to arbitration, deserved to be construed as an arbitration clause. The Court observed that in view of the settled position of law with respect to the scope of inquiry under Section 11, its examination was limited to a prima facie existence of a formal arbitration agreement which was satisfied in the present case.
Setting Aside Of Arbitral Award Leaves It Open To Parties To Choose To Arbitrate Again: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Batliboi Environmental Engineering Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 100
The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somsekhar Sundaresan has observed that once an arbitral award has been set aside by the court in the exercise of its powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the parties would be restored to the original position and a fresh arbitration in such circumstances would not amount to the proverbial “second bite at the cherry”.
The court observed that the jurisdiction of limited review under Section 37 read with Section 34 could not assume the character of a full- blown appellate review. While exercising its power under Section 34 and Section 37, the Court does not have the power to consider the case on merits and substitute the judgment in the arbitral award with its own judgment. The Court noted that when the Supreme Court judgment ruled that the Section 37 Judgment was right, it was essentially exercising the same jurisdiction as flowing from Section 37 of the Act read with Section 34 of the Act.
Case Title: Manmohan Kapani Through Special Power of Attorney Chandani Sood Versus Kapani Resorts Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 106
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has injuncted the owner of Kapani Resorts and Greater Kailash Property from alienating any interest in the Resorts and the property under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), until the conclusion of arbitral proceedings
The Court noted that under section 9(1)(ii)(c) of the Arbitration Act, the court can grant interim protection for the detention or preservation of property involved in arbitration. The Greater Kailash Property and fetter on its marketable title is subject matter of the dispute. The title became available to Virendra only because the Kapani Resorts, a company controlled by Virendra and Vaibhav was funded by Manmohan to pay the debt of SIDBI while the reciprocal promise of issuing shares remained unfulfilled.
Court Must Assign Reasons For Accepting Or Rejecting Grounds Of Challenge U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court
Case Title: National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED) Versus Roj Enterprises (P) Limited and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 110
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh Patil has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be dismissed merely by stating that the scope of interference is limited; the court must address each ground of challenge and provide reasoned findings.
The Supreme Court in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. Vs. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (2024)jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration is akin to the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and is restricted to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Benefit Of S.14 Of Limitation Act Extends To Delayed Filing Of Petition U/S 34 Of A&C Act Due To Prosecution In Good Faith In Another Court: Bombay HC
Case Title: NTPC BHEL Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. Versus Shree Electricals & Engineers (India) Pvt. Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 112
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Advait M. Sethna has held that the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) can be extended to the petitioner who committed delay in filing an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) due to the prevailing legal position at the time of filing, which was subsequently changed.
After referring to relevant materials, the court observed that It clearly appears that the appellant was pursuing the writ petition considering the legal position as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Petronet Ltd. vs. Micro and Mine Enterprises Facilitation Council (2018) that the Facilitation Council would not have jurisdiction to enter
Arbitrator's Decision To Postpone Issue Of Partnership Firm's Dissolution To Stage Of Final Hearing Not Perverse: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Suresh Raithatha Adult and Anr. VERSUS Bharti Navnit Raithatha
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 114
The Bombay High Court bench of Justices A.S. Chandurkar and Rajesh S. Patil has held that the decision of the Arbitrator to postpone the issue of determining the date of dissolution of the partnership firm to the stage of final hearing cannot be considered perverse for the purpose of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), as it requires evidence to be presented, which is necessary for such an issue to be decided.
The Supreme Court in Wander Limited v Antox India Pvt Ltd. (1990) held that “Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material.” The court concluded that since the Arbitrator's view was plausible and not arbitrary, capricious, or perverse, it could not substitute its own view for that of the Arbitrator, given the limited scope of interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
Invocation Of Section 9 & Section 11 Of Arbitration Act Does Not Constitute Parallel Proceedings: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Fab Tech Works & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. vs Savvology Games Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 121
The Bombay High Court single bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan held that the mere invocation of Section 9 and Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not amount to parallel proceedings. Further, the High Court noted that Section 9 is intended to provide interim relief to safeguard the subject matter of arbitration. On the other hand, Section 11 is limited to the appointment of an arbitrator when there is a dispute regarding the arbitration agreement.
When There Is Ambiguity In Arbitration Agreement, Business Efficacy Test Can Applied To Discern Intent Of Parties To Arbitrate: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Lords Inn Hotels and Resorts Versus Pushpam Resorts LLP and 3 Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 60
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that when there is an ambiguity in the agreement with respect to arbitration related provisions, the business efficacy test can be applied to discern true intent of the parties to arbitrate.
The court observed that as per section 7(4) of the Arbitration Act, an arbitration agreement would be considered in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in exchange of letters or other means of communication which includes electronic communication. Furthermore, the court observed that under Section 7(5), a reference in a contract, to a document containing an arbitration clause would constitute an arbitration agreement, if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause a part of the contract.
Limitation For Appeal U/S 37 Of Arbitration Act Is Governed By Article 116 Of Limitation Act, Delay Not To Be Condoned In Mechanical Manner: Bombay HC
Case Title: Executive Engineer National Highway Division Versus Sanjay Shankar Surve & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 61
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the delay in filing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 (“Arbitration Act”) should not be condoned in a mechanical manner as it would defeat the very objective of the Arbitration Act which is to provide a speedy resolution of disputes.
It also held that as per judgment of the Supreme Court in Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited (2021), the limitation period under section 37 of the Arbitration Act is governed by Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”) which provides for a 90 days time period. The delay in filing the appeal beyond 90 days can be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act but only when sufficient cause is demonstrated.
Court At Designated Venue In Arbitration Agreement Can Entertain Application U/S 11 Of Arbitration Act: Bombay High Court
Case Number: Keller Ground Engineering India Private Limited Versus Archon Powerinfra India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 62
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that the court having supervisory over designated venue of the Arbitration proceedings would have jurisdiction to entertain application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) in absence of any contrary indicia indicating any other place to be the seat of arbitration.
The court rejected the submission that the court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present application under section 11 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the parties have chosen consciously in their agreement that the venue for the arbitration proceedings shall be Mumbai. It also observed that whether the document executed is a valid document is a matter to be decided by the Arbitrator and not by the court under section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, whether the work that has been carried out is with respect to one work or both requires adjudication on merits which can be decided by the Arbitrator.
Member Of Society Can Be Directed To Vacate Premises U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act For Smooth Redevelopment: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Pranav Constructions Limited Versus Priyadarshini Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others
Case Number:2025:BHC-OS:10901-DB
The Bombay High Court bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a member of a society can be directed to vacate the premises occupied by them under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act to ensure smooth redevelopment, if they act contrary to the terms of the Development Agreement
These Appeals have been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) challenging the order dated 20 June 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge disposing of Arbitration Petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act without grant of any relief in favour of the Petitioner therein.
The court noted the Bombay High Court in Girish Mulchand Mehta and another Versus Mahesh S. Mehta and another held that if a particular member of the Society is not party to the Development Agreement, Court can make interim measures against such non-co operative member by having recourse to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.
It further noted that in Ambit Urbanspace, the court dealt with the interim relief under section 9 of the Arbitration Act against occupier who was not a member of the society. In the present case, the Respondent is both a garage occupier and a Society member. Furthermore, the Developer also agreed to provide permanent alternate accomodation. Therefore, the Ambit Urbanspace is relevant to the extent that the rights of the members are subservient to the society's obligations under the Development Agreement.
Proceedings Can Be Remitted Back To Same Arbitrator U/S 33 & 34(4) Of A&C Act Only Before Passing Of Award: Bombay High Court
Case Name: Harkisandas Tulsidas Pabari and Anr. v. Rajendra Anandrao Acharya and Ors.
Case Number: Arbitration Appeal No.62 Of 2007 With Arbitration Appeal No.63 Of 2007
The Bombay High Court Division Bench, comprising Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne, observed that a Section 34 Court can only remit back to the same Arbitration following the procedure for remand u/s 33 and 34(4). The act of the Appellant not issuing a notice u/s 21 of the A&C Act to the Respondent, and approaching the same Arbitration, who initiates Arbitral proceedings, results in the Arbitral Tribunal being devoid of jurisdiction.
The bench at the outset noted that the Section 34 Court set aside the arbitral Award on three grounds. Firstly, there is a lack of authorisation to recommence the arbitral proceedings; secondly, the MoU is not a concluded contract; and thirdly, there is an impossibility of specific performance of the MoU. The Court vide order dated 28.09.1998, set aside the Award dated 01.04.1998, on the ground that sufficient opportunities were not given to the Respondents. The Arbitrator did not give the Respondents a notice of closure of proceedings. Hence, the Respondents were not provided a fair opportunity to lead evidence. The Court did not dive into remanding the proceedings back to the same Arbitration, as such power was to be exercised before setting aside the Award. The parties were at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, and by Section 43(4) of the A&C Act, the time spent in a Section 34 petition was to be excluded while calculating the limitation period.
Three-Month Deadline For Passing Arbitral Award Under NSE Byelaws Is Directory And Not Mandatory: Bombay High Court
Case Title – Bhanuchandra J Doshi v Ms Motilal Oswal Securities Ltd. & Anr.
Case No. – Arbitration Petition No. 1341 of 2015
The Bombay High Court Bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan while deciding a petition under Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) had an occasion to interpret Rule 13, National Stock Exchange (“NSE”) Byelaws. The Court held that Rule 13(b) which provided that arbitral award under the Rules must be rendered within three months from the date of entering upon reference was directory and not mandatory in nature.
The Court went on to analyse Rule 13, NSE Byelaws. The Court observed that from a plain reading of Rule 13(b) the time for completion of arbitration is set out as normally three months from the date of entering upon the reference. Under Rule 13(d), the date of entering upon a reference is defined as the date on which the arbitral tribunal has held the first hearing.
Individual Flat Owners Forming Cooperative Society Are Bound By Arbitration Clause Contained In Sale Agreement: Bombay High Court
Case Title – Shivranjan Towers Sahakari Griha Rachana v Bhujbal Constructions
Case No. – Writ Petition No. 11281 Of 2025
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice N.J. Jamadar has observed that when individual flat owners form a cooperative society to enforce rights created in favour of the individual members under the Agreements for Sale, the society cannot claim that it is not bound by the arbitration clause contained in those Agreements. The argument that it is not a signatory to the Agreements for Sale is untenable and such society is not a third party to the arbitral proceedings.
The Court held that the submission by Petitioner's Counsel that Deed of Deemed Conveyance did not contain an arbitration clause and thus arbitration proceedings could not be initiated against it, lacked merit. The Court explained that an arbitration agreement was a creature of contract, however the unilateral Deed of Deemed Conveyance by its very nature was not an instrument inter-vivos. Such a deed would not incorporate an arbitration clause which is an expression of the consensual decision to resolve the dispute by a forum of choice.
Based on the statutory provisions contained in the Maharashtra Co-operative Society Act, 1960 and judicial precedents, the Court observed that the registration of a society shall render it a body corporate with power inter aliato sue and be sued in its name.
Pendency Of Appeal U/S 37 A&C Act Against First Award Does Not Bar Fresh Arbitration Proceedings: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Rajuram Sawaji Purohit Versus The Shandar Interior Private Limited
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Application (Lodging) No.25035 Of 2024
The Bombay High Court held that pendency of an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) does not prohibit a party from initiating a fresh round of arbitration when an earlier arbitral award has already been set aside. Accordingly, the present application under section 11 of the Arbitration Act was allowed and a sole arbitrator was appointed.
Justice Gautam A. Ankhad held that “the Section 11 Court ought not to venture beyond examining the existence of an arbitration agreement. The pendency of any proceeding mentioned hereinabove cannot be an impediment to appoint an arbitrator in this Application. All other issues must be agitated before the Arbitral Tribunal”. The court further held that the court under section 11 of the Arbitration Act is not prohibited from appointing the arbitrator even if appeals under section 37 of the Arbitration Act were pending against an order by which the arbitral award was set aside.
'Higher Credence Is Given To Award Passed After Detailed Pre-Arbitral Process': Bombay High Court
Case Title : Mumbai Metro Rail Corporation Limited v. L&T-STEC JV Mumbai
Case No: Interim Application (L) No. 28857 of 2025 in Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 28855 of 2025
The Bombay High Court has held that arbitral awards passed after a detailed pre-arbitral process contractually agreed upon by the parties deserve a higher degree of credibility and judicial deference. The Court refused to grant an unconditional stay on the execution of an arbitral award in favour of the contractor, holding that mere disagreement with the arbitral tribunal's findings does not establish perversity warranting such relief.
The Bench comprising of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan also highlighted that the dissenting award did not take an extreme stand as taken by the corporation in the proceedings. It observed that when the arbitration is done after a detailed pre-arbitral process, a higher credence has to be given to the arbitral award, and finely nuanced points do not constitute grounds for interference.
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan has held that an unrelated third party to a contract cannot be treated as a “veritable party” to the arbitration agreement and hence cannot be compelled to participate in the arbitral proceedings. The Court reiterated that the doctrine enabling non-signatories to be treated as parties to an arbitration agreement applies only where there exists a close relationship, such as within a group of companies, or where there is an alter ego or composite transaction linking the entities.
The Court held that to treat a non-signatory as a veritable party, there must exist a factual basis establishing close interlinkage such as common control, ownership, or a composite transaction, none of which were present in this case.
Order Terminating Proceedings For Non-Payment Of Arbitral Fees Can Be Challenged U/S 14 A&C Act, Not Through Writ Petition: Bombay HC
Case Title: Marvel Sigma Homes Private Limited Through Its Director Vishwajeet Subhash Jhavar
Case No: W.P NO.3319 OF 2024
The Bombay High Court bench of Justice Manish Pitale held that when the arbitration proceedings are terminated under section 38(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) for non-payment of arbitral fees, the proper remedy is to file application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act and not a writ petition.
The court decided that when arbitral proceedings are terminated, the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not available, creating a legislative gap in the Act. Recognising this vacuum, both the High Court and the Supreme Court have held that an aggrieved party cannot challenge such termination under Section 34 and must instead invoke Section 14 of the Arbitration Act to raise a grievance against the order terminating the arbitral proceedings.
Order Refusing To Terminate Arbitration Is Not An Interim Award: Bombay High Court Dismisses Challenge U/S 34 A&C Act
Case Title: Master Drilling India Private Limited Versus Sarel Drill & Engineering Equipment India Private Limited
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 777 Of 2024 Alongwith Interim Application No. 3682 Of 2024
The Bombay High Court comprising of Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan held that a company's invocation of arbitration cannot be treated as non est merely because it had only one director at the time of invocation, contrary to the quorum requirement under Section 174(2) of the Companies Act. The court further that the mere absence of quorum does not mean the company lacked a corporate mind.
It held that “If the proposition that the company must necessarily be paralysed is accepted, the company (purportedly without a corporate mind) would never be able to file tax returns, enter into a contract, renew an existing contract, terminate a contract, and even employ any person or taken to its logical length, sign any cheque, whether for a routine payment (say pay cheques of employees) or a non-routine payment (say purchase of vital spare parts or of replacement machinery).”
'Denial Of Relevant Information To Party By Arbitral Tribunal Amounts To Violation Of Due Process': Bombay High Court
Case Title: Iqbal Trading Company V. Union Of India & Ors.
Case No: Arbitration Appeal No.27 Of 2012
The Bombay High Court held that an arbitral award passed without granting access to relevant documents or materials to one of the parties amounts to a violation of the principles of natural justice and due process. The Court observed that the arbitral tribunal's refusal to supply such documents deprived the party of a fair opportunity to defend its case, thereby rendering the arbitral proceedings fundamentally flawed.
Justice Somasekhar Sundaresan remarked that the Arbitral Award reads like a summary judgment without any analysis whatsoever. It was obligatory as a matter of the contract under which the Learned Arbitral Tribunal was constituted that the Arbitral Award should have been reasoned, explained and articulated in the Arbitral Award.
The Court further observed that the arbitral tribunal had failed to demonstrate a judicial approach, and was in conflict with public policy for being in conflict with fundamental principles of natural justice by denying inspection of relevant material.
Bombay High Court Upholds Arbitral Award In Favour Of TCS; Rejects UP Assembly's 'Frustration' Claim Over Cancelled Recruitment Exam
Case Title: State of Uttar Pradesh Through Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Secretariat v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Petition No.142 Of 2024. With Interim Application (L) No.9191 Of 2024
The Bombay High Court dismissed a petition filed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Secretariat under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) thereby upholding an arbitral award passed in favor of Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. (TCS) concerning the conduct of an online recruitment examinations for Review Officers and Assistant Review Officers.
Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that the cancellation of the recruitment examination by the Speaker of the UP Assembly was a self-induced act and the Secretariat could not invoke doctrine of frustration to avoid payment for the services rendered by the TCS.
Bombay High Court Rejects Mumbai Metro's Arbitration Request Application, Rules Settlement Agreement Supersedes Original Contract
Case Title: Mumbai Metro One Private Limited v. Hindustan Construction Company
Case No: Interim Application No. 1969 of 2025 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 3 of 2025
The Bombay High Court rejected the Mumbai Metro One Private Limited's (MMOPL) request to have its dispute with Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) resolved by way of arbitration. The Court deciding that the arbitration clause in the original contract no longer applies to new issues emerging from the settlement, ruled that once a "full and final" settlement agreement is executed, it supersedes the original contract. Justice Abhay Ahuja, on 18th December, 2025 stating that “the arbitration clause in the prior Contract cannot be read into the terms of the Settlement Agreement unless expressly mentioned”, dismissed an application seeking reference of a commercial summary suit to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Claimant Can Pursue Alternate Remedy For Severed Part Of Award Without Limitation Bar: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Laguna Resort Pvt Ltd vs Concept Hospitality Pvt Ltd
Case Number: Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 19 of 2024
The Bombay High Court has held that time spent in earlier arbitral proceedings can be excluded while computing limitation, even if only part of an arbitral award is set aside and fresh proceedings arise from a different agreement.
A single bench of Justice Sandeep V Marne said Section 43(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act allows exclusion of such time as long as the dispute formed part of the earlier arbitration.
“The concept of 'similarity in dispute' envisaged under Section 43(4) would apply even to a 'part of dispute'. Where the Award comprising of multiple claims is severed, and bad part of the Award is set aside, and if right to sue in respect of severed bad part of the Award continues, the Claimant can exercise alternate remedy in respect of that bad part", the court observed.
'Absence Of Arbitration Clause In Agreement Does Not Render Dispute Non-Arbitrable': Bombay High Court
Case Title: Om Swayambhu Siddhivinayak v. Harischandra Dinkar Gaikwad & Ors.
Case No: Arbitration Appeal No. 21 of 2025
The Bombay High Court held that the absence of an independent arbitration clause in a supplemental agreement, when the principal agreement contains an arbitration clause, does not render the dispute non-arbitrable. The Court ruled that a supplemental agreement, merely ancillary to the principal agreement, which seeks to record that the consideration under the Development Agreement stands discharged, is an adjectival element of the substance of the Development Agreement.
The Court noted that Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act indicates that the judicial authority before whom a proceeding is brought is required to refer the parties to arbitration, unless such authority comes to a prima facie finding that no valid arbitration agreement exists.
Bombay High Court Rejects Mumbai Metro's Arbitration Request Application, Rules Settlement Agreement Supersedes Original Contract
Case Title: Mumbai Metro One Private Limited v. Hindustan Construction Company
Case No: Interim Application No. 1969 of 2025 in Commercial Summary Suit No. 3 of 2025
The Bombay High Court rejected the Mumbai Metro One Private Limited's (MMOPL) request to have its dispute with Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) resolved by way of arbitration. The Court deciding that the arbitration clause in the original contract no longer applies to new issues emerging from the settlement, ruled that once a "full and final" settlement agreement is executed, it supersedes the original contract. Justice Abhay Ahuja, on 18th December, 2025 stating that “the arbitration clause in the prior Contract cannot be read into the terms of the Settlement Agreement unless expressly mentioned”, dismissed an application seeking reference of a commercial summary suit to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Rejecting the argument based on doctrine of separability, Justice Ahuja noted that by include a governing law and jurisdiction clause but omitting arbitration, the Settlement Agreement "intentionally departed from the dispute redressal mechanism provided under the Contract." The Court clarified that while Section 16 preserves an arbitration clause when the main contract is alleged to be invalid, it does not apply where parties “consciously enter into a subsequent agreement that finally determines their rights”.
Calcutta High Court
Section 8 Application Must Be Filed Before Or Simultaneously With Written Statement: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Smt. Gitarani Maity v. Mrs. Krishna Chakraborty and others
Case Number: FAT No. 308 of 2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Subhendu Samanta held that when no application for reference to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is made by either party, the civil court may very well entertain the suit and proceed with the adjudication of the same on merits in accordance with law.
Also, the court held that the Trial Judge committed a patent error of law on both counts: first, the suit could not have been dismissed under Section 8. And secondly, the Section 8 application, having not been filed before or even simultaneously with the written statement of the defendant, could not have been entertained at all by the trial Judge.
[Seat vs. Venue] Designated “Seat” Of Arbitration Has Exclusive Jurisdiction: Calcutta High Court Reiterates
Case Title: Versatile Construction vs. Tata Motors Finance Ltd.
Case Number: APOT/389/2024 with AP.COM/822/2024 IA No.: GA-COM/1/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that once the “seat” of arbitration is designated in an agreement, it is to be treated as the exclusive jurisdiction for all arbitration proceedings. The Court referred to the 'Shashoua Principle', which propounds that when there is an express designation of a "venue" and no alternative seat is specified, the venue is considered the juridical seat of arbitration.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (BALCO) opined that the legislature had intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as the agreement may have provided for a seat of arbitration at a place which was neutral to both the parties.
Power To Correct Computation Error U/S 33 Of Arbitration Act Can Be Exercised Suo Moto If No Application Is Filed Within 30 Days: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Haldia Development Authority Vs M/s. Konarak Enterprise
Case Number:AP-COM No.229 and 255 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya has held that power to correct computation error in the award under section 33 of the Arbitration Act can be exercised suo moto by the Arbitral Tribunal when no application is filed to this effect within 30 days. The court at the outset rejected the contention with respect to claims barred by limitation on the ground that the final bill was prepared on May 18, 2016 based on which the claim was made on November 11, 2016 which was within the limitation period.
The court also noted that clause 3(a) of the contract allowed the forfeiture of security deposit only when the contract was rescinded but in the present case there was no material on record indicating that the contract was rescinded.
Calcutta High Court Directs South Eastern Railway To Refund Additional 20% Surcharge Levied On Consignment
Case Title: Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Union of India
Case Number: F.M.A.T. No. 237 of 2017
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Uday Kumar has held that an impugned judgment passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Kolkata whereby the appellant's claim for refund of 20% surcharge was refused is erroneous in law and perverse.
Court said that the tribunal overlooked the obvious legal effect of the Circulars and Goods Tariff documents before it, which were the only documents which would have any bearing on the adjudication. Thus the court allowed the claim for relaxation regarding an additional 20% surcharge incorporated by the Circular.
[S.12A Commercial Courts Act] Pre-Institution Mediation Is Intended To Encourage Parties To Use Litigation As Last Resort: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Asa International India Microfinance Ltd. v. Northern ARC Capital Ltd. & Anr.
Case Number: Fmat 3 Of 2025 With Ia No. Can 1 Of 2025 Can 2 Of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that the clear intent of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to encourage parties to use litigation as a last resort and to resolve commercial disputes amicably, informally, cheaply and quickly under the process of mediation. Additionally, the court modified the interim relief to the effect that upon the appellant making payment of Rs.2 crores and filing an affidavit of assets and schedule of payments respectively for other creditors. The appellant shall be permitted to utilize the rest of the amounts injuncted by the impugned order.
Plaint Cannot Be Rejected Even If No Satisfaction Is Recorded By Court On Bypassing Pre-Institution Mediation U/S 12A Of Commercial Courts Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Haldibari Tea Manufacturers LLP & Anr. Versus Mahindra Tubes Limited & Ors.
Case Number: CO 204 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Raja Basu Chowdhury has held that admission of the plaint by the Commercial Court without recording satisfaction as to whether the requirement of pre-institution mediation under section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”) can be bypassed and a case for urgent relief is established, cannot be said to be fatal and the plaint cannot be rejected on this ground alone.
The court observed that accepting the plaint without recording the satisfaction as to the urgency of relief cannot be said to be fatal. The court at the time of scrutinizing the plaint has to see whether the case for the urgent relief is established. It need not go into the question whether the plaintiff will succeed in obtaining the same. Even if interim relief is denied or the case is weak, the plaint cannot be rejected on this ground alone.
Pre-Referral Jurisdiction Of Court U/S 11(6) Includes Inquiry On Whether Claims Are Ex-Facie & Hopelessly Time Barred: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/s N.C. Construction v. Union of India
Case Number: AP-COM/144/2025
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that while the scope of adjudication by referral court is limited and entails a mere examination of whether the arbitration agreement exists or not, the referral court is not precluded from examining whether the claim is deadwood or ex facie barred.
The Court referred to the decision of the Apex Court in SBI General Insurance v. Krish Spinning 2024 SCC Online SC 1754 wherein the court clarified the dictum laid down in Arif Azim to prevent any conflict between the decision in Arif Azim and Aslam Ismail. Applying the settled position of law to the facts of the case, the court found that the claim of the Petitioner is ex-facie barred. The bill was submitted on October 12, 2007 and the certificate of completion was issued in 2007. From the record it was evident that some the letters issued by the Petitioner disclosed the intention to go for arbitration yet the Petitioner waited upto 2025, to approach the Court.
Referral Court Can Reject Arbitration Only In Exceptional Cases Where Plea Of Fraud Appears To Be Ex Facie Devoid Of Merit: Calcutta HC
Case Title: SREI Equipment Finance Limited v. Whitefield Papermills Ltd.
Case Number: AP-COM/368/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar observed that unless the arbitration agreement prima facie appeared to be inoperative on account of fraud, the referral Court should not indulge in a roving inquiry as such an inquiry is within the domain of the arbitrator. The fact whether the agreement was induced by fraud would entail a detailed consideration of the evidence lead by the parties and these issues cannot be decided by the referral court.
The Court referred to the decision in A Ayyasamy, where the Apex Court had held that an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can be rejected only when the allegation of forgery and fabrication of documents in support of the plea of fraud permeated through the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement, thereby raising a serious question with regard to the validity of the contract itself. Such issues required elaborate evidence to be adduced by the parties and the civil court should reject such application and proceed with the suit. However, the reverse position was also discussed in the said decision which stated that where there were simple allegations of fraud touching upon the internal affairs of the parties, inter se and it had no implication in the public domain, the arbitration clause need not be avoided and the parties should be relegated to arbitration.
To Prove Corruption Of The Arbitrator, It Should Be Evident From The Award Itself That He Tried To Curb The Course Of Justice
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that if the subject matter of the arbitral proceedings or making of the award was affected or induced by fraud or corruption, then an unconditional stay of award can be granted. However, such corruption must be prima facie evident from the award itself and an honest mistake or erroneous application of law by the arbitrator would not amount to corruption.
The Court observed that the expression “making of the award” would mean that the award must have been obtained by a party to the arbitration upon suppressing material evidence or by making false statements before the arbitrator in order to take an unfair advantage over the other party. In the present case, the petitioners have not been able to, prima facie; establish that any of these situations had arisen in the making of the award. There was nothing on record to show that vital documents had been either concealed or that false statements had been made before the Arbitrator, which had a causative link with the facts constituting and culminating in the award.
Arbitration Agreement Valid Without Specifying 'Applicable Law', 'Seat' Or 'Venue' If Intent To Refer Dispute To Private Tribunal Is Clear: Calcutta Hc
Case Title: Ilead Foundation Vs. State Of West Bengal
Case Number: Ap-Com/152/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that for an arbitration agreement to be binding, neither the applicable law nor the seat or venue needs to be mentioned. As long as the clause indicates that the parties had agreed and there was a meeting of minds to refer any dispute to a private tribunal for adjudication of the disputes, the clause would constitute an arbitration clause.
Threshold To Prove Fraud & Corruption In Arbitral Award Is Much Higher Than Merely Criticising Findings Of Arbitrator: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Karur Vyasa Bank v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited
Case Number: AP-COM 947/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that in order to prove that the making of the award was vitiated by fraud, the petitioner would have to demonstrate that the unethical behaviour of the arbitrator surpassed all moral standards. The Court reiterated that an honest mistake or incorrect appreciation of the terms of the contract cannot be either fraud or corruption.
The Court observed that the second proviso to Section 36(3) required a primary satisfaction on the part of the court that the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. The award-debtor could seek stay of operation of the award upon discharging the burden of at least, prima facie, showing that the award was induced by fraud or corruption. The Court made reference to Venture Global Engineering LLP v. Tech Mahindra Limited (2018) 1 SCC 656 to discuss the meaning of fraud. The Court further observed that the threshold to prove fraud and corruption on the part of the learned Arbitrator in the making of the award would be much higher than a criticism of the findings of the learned Arbitrator.
Loss Of Profit In Works Contracts Can Be Awarded Upon Illegal Termination, Even In Absence Of Direct Proof: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. M/s. S.K. Maji
Case Number: FMA 573 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court division bench of Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury has held that once a contractor establishes an illegal and unjustified termination of the contract by the employer, there is no need to prove the actual loss suffered. A reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in a works contract, and compensation must be awarded accordingly. The court distinguished between claims for 'loss of profit' (resulting from unexecuted work due to illegal or premature termination) and 'loss of profitability' (arising from the reduced profit margin due to contract prolongation). The court held that while claims for 'loss of profitability' generally require evidence, 'loss of profit' from unexecuted works does not require proof of actual loss.
Writ Petition Is Not Maintainable When Effective And Efficacious Remedy In Form Of Arbitration Is Available: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Indian Oil Corporation Limited And Others Versus Saumajit Roy Chowdhury
Case Number: Mat No. 1735 Of 2023 With I.A. No. Can 1 Of 2023
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya held that it cannot entertain a writ petition if an effective and efficacious remedy, in the form of arbitration, is available. It said that the High Court would normally exercise its jurisdiction in 3 contingencies namely (i) when the writ petition was filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights, (ii) where there has been violation of principle of natural justice, or (iii) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or where the vires of an Act is challenged.
the court observed that the appellant's case doesn't not fall in any other contingencies which have been carved out in Whirlpool Corporation Versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others (1998). Also, the court noted that there was a binding arbitration agreement between the parties. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable, more particularly when the agreement provides for efficacious alternate remedy.
Tendering Authority Is Best Judge To Decide T&C Of Tender, Judicial Interference Permissible Only When Terms Are Arbitrary: Calcutta HC
Case Title: BISWAS ENTERPRISES AND ANOTHER VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS
Case Number: 2025:CHC-AS:508-DB
The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das) has held that tender issuing authority is the best judge to decide terms and conditions of a tender. Such terms and conditions cannot be tinkered with by the Judicial Authority unless they are found to be arbitrary or whimsical.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Versus State of Karnataka and Others (2002) held that fixation of value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the court hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. While applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, the court rejected the contention of the Appellant that the tender value was set above one crore to favor select bidders and encourage cartelization. The Appellant had previously participated in the tender issued by the State Fisheries Department in May 2023. Given the narrow margin between the amounts of previous tender in which the Appellant participated and the present tender, no valid case for interference is made out.
Non-Signatories To Arbitration Agreement Can Be Made Party To Dispute If Reliefs Sought Against Them Align With Those Sought Against Signatories: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/s Exchange and Others v. Pradip Kumar Ganeriwala and Another
Case Number: A.P.O.T. No.338 of 2024 arising out of GA (COM) 4 of 2024 In CS (COM) 544 of 2024 with GA (COM) 1 of 2024, GA (COM) 2 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar has observed that if the reliefs against the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement are in harmony with the reliefs sought against the signatories, particularly when the legal relationship between the signatories and non-signatories are on the same platform vis-a-vis the cause of action of the suit and the reliefs claimed, then the non-signatories could very well be brought within the purview of the arbitration agreement. The Court placed reliance on Ajay Madhusudan wherein it was observed that for determining whether non-signatory parties would be bound by the arbitration agreement, the court has to assess whether such parties or entities intended or consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract. The requirement of a written arbitration agreement did not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties if there was a defined legal relationship between the signatory and non-signatory parties.
Prescribing Pre-Qualification Criteria By Authority In Tender Document Cannot Be Considered Arbitrary If Conditions Are Reasonable: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Black Diamond Resources And Anr. Vs Indian Oil Corporation Limited And Ors.
Case Number: Mat/2470/2023x
The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee Das has held that the imposition of pre-qualification conditions by the tender-inviting authority cannot be interfered with by the courts when sufficient guidelines have been provided in the tender documents on how the authority's discretion shall be exercised.
The court noted that Rule 173(i) General Financial Rules, 2017 uses the word may granting the tendering authority discretion to relax turnover/expense criteria for startups. The Appellant cannot claim such relaxation as mandatory. Given that the tendered product is an explosive substance, IOCL had the authority to impose conditions ensuring public safety. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance's OM date September 20 2016 excludes sensitive departments from the relaxed norms.
The Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Limited (supra) held that a constitutional court will not interfere merely due to disagreement with an administrative decision or its process. The interference of the court is justified only when mala fides, favoritism, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity is established.
Calcutta High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Directing KMDA To Refund Amount Deposited By South City Projects Under MoU
Case Title: Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Vs. South City Projects (Kolkata) & Anr.
Case Number: Apo/205/2023 With Ap/351/2020 Ia No. Ga/1/2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Harish Tandon and Madhuresh Prasad has held that findings of the Arbitrator based material cannot be interfered with within the limited scope of proceedings under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court noted that as per Article XX the remedy of requiring the defaulting shareholder to sell its shares to the non-defaulting shareholder is not absolute and is without prejudice to other rights. Article XX does not contain a clause ousting remedies legally available otherwise to the parties. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the arbitrator and decided against the appellant. It further added that the submission that there was no obligation on the KMDA to create any right or obligation in favour of the claimants in respect of the immovable property was rightly rejected. It further noted that a factual finding had been recorded based on his evidence that without encroachments being removed the development of even the reduced lands measuring 83.52 Kottahs of land was not possible.
Case Title: Kalpataru Projects International Limited vs. Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (BHEL)
Case Number: AP-COM/94/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that in an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it would not be proper for the referral court to indulge in an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether the claims raised by the petitioner were time-barred or not.
“Courts, at the referral stage, can interfere only when it is manifest that the claims are expressly time barred and dead or when there are no subsisting disputes. In all other cases, the matter should be referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision on merits.”, the court observed.
The court referred to the decision in 'Aslam Isamil Khan Deshmukh vs. ASAP Fluids Private Limited and anr.' which clarified that the referral court must only conduct a limited enquiry to examine whether the application under section 11(6) had been filed within three years or not.
Govt Authority Must Furnish Security Before Getting Stay On Award U/S 36(3) Of A&C Act, No Special Treatment Can Be Given: Calcutta High Court
Case Title:The Director General, National Library, Ministry Of Culture, Government Of India Vs Expression 360 Services India Private Limited
Case Number:Ap-Com/860/2024, Ap-Com/644/2024 And Ec-Com/245/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that special treatment cannot be given to the government while hearing a petition seeking stay on the enforcement of the award under section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act. Every petitioner including the government will have to furnish security or deposit the awarded amount before a stay on the enforcement of the award can be granted.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Pam Development (Supra) held that Arbitration is essentially an alternate dispute resolution mechanism curated to provide a swift and quick resolution of disputes therefore if money decree award passed against the government is allowed to be stayed unconditionally, it would defeat the very purpose of the Arbitration Act as the award holder would be deprived of the fruits of the award on mere filming an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Case Title: M/S. Sauryajyoti Renewables Pvt.Ltd. Vs VSL Re Power Private Limited
Case Number: AP/COM- 63 Of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that a composite reference of disputes to arbitration arising out of distinct purchase and service orders can be made when the conduct of the parties demonstrates that they were all part of a single business transaction.
The court further observed that a composite invocation under 21 of the Arbitration Act for the consolidated claim of the petitioner regarding purchase and service orders as well as the challenge to their termination by the respondent was valid. The invocation clearly outlines the details of the orders and the nature of disputes. Email communications further show that both parties consistently treated the purchase and service orders as part of the same business relationship.
Court Can Decline To Refer Dispute To Arbitration When Time-Barred Claim Is Evident From Record: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Sri Swapan Paul Vs M/S. Paul Construction
Case Number: Ap No. 28 Of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when a claim is ex facie time-barred and no trial is needed to determine whether it is barred by limitation, the referral court can refuse to refer the matter to arbitration under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another vs. Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021) while observing that although the arbitration petition was not barred by limitation, yet the cause of action for the underlying claims having arisen much earlier, the claims were clearly barred by limitation on the day notice for arbitration was invoked.
Directions For Refund Of Consideration With Interest Must Be Considered Based On Conduct Of Parties During Arbitral Proceedings: Calcutta HC
Case: Deepak Bhargava & Ors. Vs. Jagrati Trade Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Case No: Ap-Com/388/2024
The Calcutta High Court has held that in arbitral proceedings, the direction for refund of the deposited consideration amount with interest has to be considered in the background of the conduct of the parties and their admissions during the proceedings.
A division bench of Justices Soumen Sen and Biswaroop Chowdury held:
The learned arbitrator rejected the claim for specific performance of the contract as claimed by the present appellants. However, the appellants were directed to refund the sum of Rs.19.90 crores (approximately) which was admittedly received by the appellants from the claimants towards consideration. Interest was also granted on the same...The direction for refund of the amount with interest has to be considered in the background of the conduct of the parties and their admissions in the proceeding. The proceeding before an arbitrator is not a proceeding before a court of law. An element of informality is attached to such proceeding and the views of the arbitrator as appear from the award is required to be considered in the said perspective and keeping in mind the immunity that an award enjoys under the Act.
Arbitration Clause Contained In Incomplete Memorandum Of Understanding Cannot Form Basis For Arbitration Proceedings: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/S GREENBILT INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS M/S A B DINESH CONCRETE PRIVATE LIMITED
Case Number:AP (COM) 421 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an arbitration clause in a memorandum of understanding that was not finalized, as indicated by the correspondences between the parties, cannot serve as the basis for initiating arbitration proceedings. The court further said that the MOU remained in draft form without essential details which made it incomplete. Even if lack of response of the petitioner to the e-mail sent through which the draft MOU was communicated is accepted, there was no agreement to confer jurisdiction to the court at Calcutta as the cause of action arose in Odisha and Raipur/Chhattisgarh.
Clause Empowering Contract Signatories To Resolve Disputes Does Not Constitute A Valid Arbitration Agreement Due To Lack Of Impartiality: Calcutta HC
Case Title:Balasore Alloys Limited vs. Flynt Mining LLP
Case Number: AP-COM/896/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that merely because a dispute resolution mechanism is provided in a clause empowering the signatories to the contract to resolve the dispute, it cannot be inferred that the parties intended to refer the dispute to arbitration. Such a clause amounts to an in-house mechanism and not a reference to an impartial arbitral tribunal, especially when impartiality is clearly lacking as the very individuals who signed the contract are themselves empowered to decide the dispute.
The court at the outset observed that the clause 16 of the Agreement, though does not mention the word "arbitration," does not become invalid solely on that ground. If the dispute resolution clause reflects a clear intention of the parties to refer disputes to a private tribunal for an impartial decision after providing both parties a fair opportunity to present their case and if they have agreed to be bound by such decision, it would constitute a valid arbitration agreement despite the absence of the word "arbitration." As held in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and ors. (2007).
MSME Council Cannot Reject Arbitrable Claims Without Providing Any Reasons When Meditation U/S 18 Of MSME Act Has Failed: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Umc Technologies P Ltd Vs Assistant Director Of Postal Services, (Recruitment)
Case Number: Ap-Com/39/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Facilitation Council cannot reject the arbitrable claims of the supplier without providing an opportunity to present evidence in support of the same, especially when mediation, as required under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act) has failed. As per law, the Council is then mandated to either adjudicate the arbitrable matter itself or refer it to an institution providing alternative dispute resolution services.
The court observed that the law mandates that once mediation fails, the Council must either handle the arbitration itself or refer the dispute to an institutional centre. Proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration Act thereafter. The Council is required to allow both parties to present evidence. It further added that the Council noted that the claimant alleged the 2016 Job Completion Certificate was withheld, yet failed to address this as a dispute. Instead, the claim was rejected due to the absence of the certificate. The respondent had not presented arguments but only requested time to file a reply.
Case Title: Tata Capital Limited Vs Krishna Kant Tiwari
Case Number: Ap-Com/1035/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that once all liabilities, rights, and obligations are transferred to an entity through a merger approved by the competent forum, the arbitration clause contained in a loan agreement executed between the parties prior to the merger can be invoked by a third party that has acquired all such rights and liabilities post-merger.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in 'Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, (2025)' held that the intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement can be gauged from the circumstances that surround the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the underlying contract containing such agreement. The Apex Court also held that the nature or standard of involvement of the non-signatory in the performance of the contract should be such that the non signatory has actively assumed obligations or performance upon itself under the contract.
Scheme Governing Auction Disputes Applies In All Auction Cases Unless Contrary Scheme Without Arbitration Clause Is Shown: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Satya Narayan Shaw Versus Sourav Ghosh
Case Number: Ap-Com/154/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when a scheme generally applicable to all auction related disputes contains an arbitration clause, that clause will govern disputes arising between the parties, unless a contrary scheme without such a clause is shown.
The court at the outset noted that the Scheme provides for sale of coal via e-auction for May 2009 and includes an arbitration clause. In this case, the e-auction took place in January 2010. The respondent failed to produce any scheme without such a clause or prove that the arbitration clause was inapplicable. It further added that disputes arose regarding change of rakes, refund of money, and non-delivery of coal. The respondent no. 3 allegedly failed to load two rakes despite advance payment. The reason for non-loading is an arbitrable issue.
Substitution Of Arbitrator Can't Be Allowed When Petitioner Voluntarily Withdraws From Arbitral Proceedings: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Ashok Kumar Bhuinya Proprietor Of A.K. Enterprise Vs State Of West Bengal
Case Number: AP/344/2022
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an application under Section 15 of theArbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), seeking substitution of the arbitrator, cannot be allowed when the petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn from the arbitral proceedings and failed to participate despite being given ample opportunities, especially after a long lapse of time.
Arbitration Clause Cannot Be Considered Binding If Mandatory Arbitration Reference Is Missing: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Sunil Kumar Samanta Vs. Smt. Sikha Mondal
Case Number: AP/15/2022
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sakar has held that if a clause in an agreement gives the parties discretion to refer the matter to arbitration after disputes have arisen, it cannot be construed as a binding arbitration agreement. Such invocation of the arbitration clause requires fresh consent of the other party before the matter can be referred to arbitration.
The court at the outset observed that the arbitration clause provides that the lessor will be bound to renew the lease for subsequent periods of the same tenure if the lessee exercises the option, and the rent and terms shall be mutually agreed upon. In case of failure to agree, it may be decided by an arbitrator appointed by the parties. It further added that the use of the expression may indicates that the parties had agreed that they may approach arbitration in future. May implies a possibility, not a binding agreement. The meeting of minds to refer disputes to arbitration is not evident from the clause. An arbitration clause must show that parties agreed they shall refer disputes to arbitration and be bound by the decision of a private tribunal.
While Disputes U/S 31 Of Specific Relief Act Are Arbitrable, Arbitral Awards Are Not Binding On Third Parties: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Jagat Singh Manot Versus The Municipal Commissioner, Kolkata Municipal Corporation And Ors.
Case Number: W.P.O. 503 OF 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Gaurang Kanth has held that although disputes relating to the cancellation of written instruments under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are arbitrable, the resulting awards are binding only on the parties involved and not on third parties who were not part of the arbitral proceedings.
The court further observed that under Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, an instrument can be cancelled only in two situations. If the instrument is void or voidable against the person concerned, or When both parties mutually agree to cancel the deed.In the first case, the concerned person must initiate a suit to have the instrument adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, at its discretion, declare it so and order its cancellation.
Although Injunction Against Invocation Of Guarantee Cannot Be Granted, Court Can Grant Interim Protection If Prima Facie Case Is Established: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Gallant Equipment Pvt Ltd Vs Rashmi Metaliks Ltd
Case Number: AP-COM/277/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that although an injunction against the invocation of a bank guarantee cannot normally be granted, if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case, the court should not hesitate to grant interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court also opined that the principles under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 38 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) are not strictly applicable to Section 9 applications under the Arbitration Act. If the petitioner establishes a case for interim protection, the Court should not hesitate to grant such relief until the arbitral proceedings are concluded.
Whether IRCTC's Revised Menu Alters Original Contract With Arbitration Clause Is For Arbitrator To Decide, Falls Outside Court's Jurisdiction: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/S Doon's Caterers Vs M/S Indian Railway Catering And Tourism Corporation Limited
Case Number :AP-COM/268/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that whether the subsequent revision of the original menu by IRCTC form part of the original contract containing an arbitration clause is a matter to be decided by the Arbitrator.
The court further opined that under the “Specification” section of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), Clause (j) states that the supply schedule, i.e., the menu, is subject to change at the sole discretion of IRCTC/Railways, and IRCTC's decision would be binding. It is undisputed that IRCTC revised the menu based on the flexibility granted by the Ministry of Railways and instructed all General Managers of the zones to implement the modified menu.
Appointment Of Arbitrator By GM Of Metro Rail In Dispute Between Railways & Contractor Is Barred U/S 12(5) Of Arbitration Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/S Krishna Construction Vs The Chief General Manager Metro Railway And Ors
Case Number:AP-COM/253/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the appointment of an arbitrator by the General Manager of Metro Railways in a dispute between Metro Railways and the contractor is barred by Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Therefore, the General Manager cannot be permitted to appoint the arbitrator.
The Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A joint Venture Company (2024) held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate the principle of equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution, compromising the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. The Apex Court further added that such clauses, allowing one party to appoint an arbitrator without the other's participation, create an unfair imbalance. The principle of express waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act allows parties to waive allegations of bias after disputes arise, but cannot justify an inherently unequal appointment process. Based on the above, the court held that regarding the objections related to the arbitrability of the issues, admissibility of the claim, the claim being barred by limitation, justification of termination, non-refund of the security deposit and bank guarantee, etc., this Court is of the view that these matters should be adjudicated by the learned arbitrator, to be appointed by the Court, independently.
No Interim Relief U/S 9 Of A&C Act Without Exceptional Circumstances After Conciliation Fails & Arbitration Starts Under MSME Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Lakhotia Metalizers Private Limited Vs Matashree Snacks Pvt. Ltd.
Case Number:AP-COM/129/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that once conciliation fails under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act), the Council may either conduct the arbitration itself or refer the matter to an arbitral institution. As per Section 18(3) of the MSME Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) apply to such arbitration proceedings.
The court at the outset noted that the present application is premature, as the petitioner has not sought interim protection from the arbitral tribunal. As per Section 9(3) of the Arbitration Act, once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court should not entertain an application for interim measures unless it finds that remedies under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act are not efficacious.
Composite Reference To Arbitration Can Be Made For Acceptance Of Offer At Consolidated Price Across Different Locations: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Johnson Controls Hitachi Air Conditioning India Ltd. Vs M/S. Shapoorji Pallonji And Company Pvt Ltd.
Case Number:AP-COM/315/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the very acceptance of an offer at a consolidated price for works to be executed at different locations proves that the work orders issued were treated as part of a single transaction by the parties through their conduct therefore under such circumstances a composite reference of all work orders can be made to arbitration.
The court at the outset discussed the impermissibility of unilateral appointment of arbitrator an noted that the Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another vs. HSCC (India) Ltd. 2019 held that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice is counter-balanced by the equal power vested in the other party. However, where only one party has the right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice carries an element of exclusivity in determining the course of dispute resolution.
Arbitrator Can Fix Fee In Consultation With Parties Without Recourse To A&C Act; Quantum Can't Be Challenged Under Article 227: Calcutta HC
Case Title: P & P Business Private Limited vs. Marco Francesco Shoes (India) Private Limited
Case Number: C.O.140 of 2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Bihas Ranjan De. has observed that an arbitrator can indeed fix his remuneration, and this can be done in a manner that may not comply with the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provided that such a decision is made in consultation with the parties involved. When parties contractually agree on a fee, the Fourth Schedule will not be applicable.
The court held that a party cannot file a revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution solely based on dissatisfaction with an arbitrator's order regarding quantum of remuneration as it does not fall within the scope of Section 37 (2) of the Act. The appropriate recourse available to the petitioner would be to challenge the final award under Section 34 of the Act.
Case Title: Sri Arun Kumar Jindal & Anr. VS. Smt. Rajni Poddar & Ors.
Case Number:C.O.441 of 2023
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Bibhas Ranjan De has held that withdrawal of an execution petition for enforcement of an arbitral award on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, when such ground is clearly stated in the withdrawal application, does not bar the petitioner from refiling before the appropriate forum, even if the court's order does not expressly grant liberty to refile. Accordingly, the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) cannot be denied.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. M/s Durga Construction Co. held that Cases of delay in re-filing differ from those of initial filing, as the party has already demonstrated intent to seek legal remedies by taking preliminary steps. Thus, it cannot be presumed that they have abandoned their right to legal recourse.
The Apex Court further held that however, if the initial filing is grossly inadequate or contains fundamental defects, it may be treated as nonest, with no legal effect. In such instances, only the date on which defects are rectified would be considered the actual date of filing.
Evaluation Of Alternative Propositions By Arbitrator For Interim Award Does Not Constitute Inherent Contradiction Or Perversity: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Star Track Agency Private Limited Vs. Efcalon Tie Up Private Limited
Case Number:F.M.A.T. No. 57 of 2021
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar has held that considering alternative propositions by the Arbitrator and proceeding on the premise that the award holder would be entitled to an interim award under either scenario does not amount to an inherent contradiction. Evaluating alternatives is a legitimate judicial exercise and does not tantamount to perversity.
The court noted that in view of the lease of the licensor itself having not been renewed at that point of time by the superior landlord, it was not possible to grant a sub-lease of the premises to the licensee, for which only a license was being granted instead of a sub-lease.
It further added that the grant of a sub-lease, even after the lease of the licensor was subsequently renewed by the superior landlord, would not be an automatic affair, since Clause 4 provided that the licensor would negotiate the grant of a sub-lease even thereafter. The expression “negotiate” denudes the prospective assurance to grant a sub-lease of certainty but leaves it to further negotiation between the parties.
Writ Against Third Party Is Maintainable Despite Arbitration Clause When There Are No Disputes Between Contracting Parties: Calcutta HC
Case Title: India And Others Versus Sunil Saha And Others
Case Number: Mat 806 Of 2024 And Fma 735 Of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam and Justice Chaitali Chatterjee (Das) has held that when there are no disputes or differences between the parties to an agreement containing an arbitration clause, a writ petition may be entertained against a third party for arbitrary deduction of demurrage amounts. The existence of an arbitration clause between the contracting parties cannot, by itself, be a ground to refuse the maintainability of such a writ petition.
It further added that the grant or refusal of the writ is at the Court's discretion and can only be issued if an existing legal right of the applicant or duty of the respondent is established. The writ is intended to enforce rights that are already established, not to create new ones.
Case Title: Virgo Softech Limited & Anr. Vs Srei Equipment Finance Ltd.
Case Number: Ap-Com/361/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that non-consideration of a judgment of the Supreme Court amounts to patent illegality, which is a valid ground for setting aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) particularly when the award is passed by an arbitrator unilaterally appointed by one party.
The Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A joint Venture Company after citing its own judgment in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another vs. HSCC (India) Ltd.(2019) held that the reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may derive by nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counter-balanced by equal power with the other party.
Execution Of Discharge Voucher Not A Bar To Claim Higher Compensation If Provided For By IRDA Circular: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: The Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. The Reliance Jute Mills (International Limited)
Case Number: AP-COM/186/2024 Old Case No. AP/322/2020
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Aniruddha Roy has held that once the liability or quantum of a claim under an insurance policy is established, the Insurance Company must not withhold the claim amount and must comply with Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Circular which entitles the Insured to claim a higher amount.
It further held that the Circular clearly provided that if an insured is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, they are entitled to approach judicial or statutory forums for higher compensation. Execution of a discharge vouche.
Interim Measures U/S 9 Of Arbitration Can't Be Sought By MSME During Conciliation Proceedings: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Dhananjai Lifestyle Limited vs. Sanvie Retail Private Limited
Case Number: AP-COM/980/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act can be sought by the MSME only after mandatory conciliation before the MSME Council fails and the dispute proceeds to arbitration—either conducted by the Council or referred to an arbitral institution. Only then do the provisions of the Arbitration Act apply. Consequently, seeking relief under the Arbitration Act during conciliation is clearly prohibited under section 77 of the Arbitration Act.
The Court further added that however, an exception allows such proceedings if necessary to preserve rights, but only in exceptional cases. This reflects the legislature's intent to promote non-adversarial dispute resolution. In this case, the petitioner has already issued a notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act following cheque dishonour.
Court Is Not Appropriate Forum To Seek Interim Relief During Arbitration Proceedings: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Mittal Technopack Private Limited Vs Ideal Real Estate Private Limited And Anr.
Case Number: AP-COM/413/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the appropriate forum for seeking interim relief after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal is the Tribunal itself under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Recourse to the court under Section 9 is permitted during the arbitration proceedings only if the remedy under Section 17 is found to be inefficacious.
The court observed that a post-award injunction application under Section 9(1) allows a party to seek interim relief from the Court after the arbitral award but before its enforcement under Section 36. However, per Section 9(3), once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the Court will only entertain such applications if remedies under Section 17 are ineffective.
It further added that the arbitral tribunal holds the power to grant interim relief during the arbitration, including after an interim award but before enforcement. This power ends when the arbitral proceedings terminate, and the arbitrator becomes functus officio. This legal position has been effective since August 30, 2019.
Original Claim Can Be Amended At Argument Stage In Arbitration Proceedings, Provisions Of CPC Do Not Apply Strictly: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Steel Authority of India Limited Vs H. R. Construction Private Limited
Case Number: C.O. 4004 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) has held that an amendment to the original claim may be permitted during arbitral proceedings, even at the stage of final arguments, particularly when costs have been imposed on the party seeking the amendment and accepted by the opposite party—provided the amendment does not materially alter the nature of the original claim or cause prejudice.
It further held that while Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) provisions may be applied in arbitration, they are not to be strictly enforced to bar such amendments under Order VI Rule 17, given the more flexible framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Once Arbitration Commences After Failure Of Conciliation Under MSME Act, It Cannot Be Reinitiated By Halting Arbitration: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: The Board of Major Port Authority for the Syama Prasad Mukherjee Port, Kolkata Vs. Marinecraft Engineers Private Limited
Case Number: A.P.-COM No.296 of 2024 (Old No. A.P. 179 of 2023)
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya has held that once arbitral proceedings commenced under Section 18(3) under the MSME Act, the process could not be reversed to reinitiate pre-arbitral conciliation. The Council did not do so either. It was only at the petitioner's request that additional avenues for mutual settlement were explored alongside the arbitration. Upon the failure of these efforts, the Council proceeded to decide the matter on merits.
The court noted that the timeline stipulated under Section 29A of the 1996 Act are not applicable to an arbitral proceeding under the 2006 Act. Rather, the period stipulated under Section 18(5) of the 2006 Act is the relevant guiding factor. However, the latter period is directory and not mandatory.
It further observed that unlike Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, Section 18(5) of the 2006 Act prescribes a 90-day timeline for arbitral proceedings without imposing a penalty for delay or terminating the Council's mandate, indicating the provision is directory, not mandatory.
Injunction Can't Be Granted In Absence Of Any Risk Of Assets Dissipating Or Pleadings Indicating Frustration Of Award: Calcutta High Court
Case Title:SREI EQUIPMENT FINANCE LIMITED VS TRINITY ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGERS LIMITED
Case Number: AP-COM/1049/2024 IA GA-COM 1 of 2025 GA-COM 2 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that at this stage, the petitioner is adequately secured under the schedule to the deeds of hypothecation agreement. The respondent remains fully operational and continues its business activities. There is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that the respondent has attempted to remove or alienate its assets in a manner that would render any future award in favour of the petitioner unenforceable or illusory.
The court noted that the petitioner's claim of Rs. 53.61 crores being due is unsupported by any admission from the respondent. While the petitioner valued certain investments at Rs. 12.41 crores, additional investments disclosed in this proceeding were valued at Rs. 41.04 crores. It further observed that although the petitioner disputes these valuations, no concrete calculations have been provided to disprove them. Further examination would amount to a mini-trial, and investment values are subject to market fluctuations. The charge on these investments was created consciously between experienced commercial entities, with no evidence of malafide conduct by the respondent.
Arbitrator Can't Be Impleaded In Application U/S 36(2) Of A&C Act Unless Prima Facie Case Of Fraud Or Corruption Is Established: Calcutta HC
Case Title:West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Tata Motors Limited
Case Number: Ap-Com/88/2024 Ia No. Ga No. 1 Of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Aniruddha Roy has held that when an application under Section 36(2) seeking unconditional stay of the award on the ground of fraud or corruption is pending adjudication, the question of impleading the person who delivered the award does not arise at such a premature stage. Unless the court, upon examining the application, arrives at a prima facie finding that the award was indeed procured by fraud or corruption, impleadment is neither necessary nor maintainable.
The court noted that at the outset, it appears that the instant application is premised on the Supreme Court's judgments in Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain and Microsoft Corporation, both of which were rendered in the context of Section 34 proceedings. While a Section 34 court may review the award in detail within its limited jurisdiction, the grounds of fraud, corruption, or bias must be adjudicated at that stage. For an unconditional stay under Section 36(2), the applicant must clearly establish fraud or corruption by the tribunal as defined under Section 36(3); mere allegations of bias do not suffice.
Professional Engagement With Law Firm Does Not Disqualify Advocate From Acting As Arbitrator: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Damodar Valley Corporation Vs Aka Logistics Private Limited
Case Number: Ap-Com/178/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that an Advocate who has accepted briefs from a law firm for unrelated clients cannot, by that fact alone, be deemed ineligible to act as an Arbitrator in disputes involving parties not personally known to or represented by him, even if the same law firm appears in the arbitration.
The Court noted that Section 12(5) of the said Act provides that, notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel or the subject matter of the dispute falls under any of the categories specified in the VIIth schedule, shall be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator.
It further observed that Schedule VII deals with the arbitrator's relationship with parties or counsel. Category 3 of the VIIth Schedule, provides that the arbitrator shall not represent the lawyer or the law firm, acting as counsel for one of the parties. Which means that the learned Arbitrator should not have represented the law firm as its Advocate or counsel in any legal proceeding.
Arbitration Clause Mandates Reference, Question Of Appropriateness Can't Be Considered U/S 8 Of A&C Act: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: M/S. Cholamandalam Investment And Finance Company Limited Versus Sujan Seikh
Case Number: Fma/251/2025 Ia No: Can/1/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justices Arijit Banerjee and Rai Chattopadhyay has held that where an agreement between the parties contains a clear arbitration clause and disputes arise under that agreement, the Trial Court is bound to refer the parties to arbitration. The question of whether such reference is appropriate or not does not arise, as Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is mandatory in nature.
The court observed that the impugned order must be set aside. Since the agreement contains a valid arbitration clause and disputes have arisen under it, the Trial Court was bound to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act. The question of it being appropriate or inappropriate does not arise in view of the language of Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act, which is mandatory. Once a party applies before filing the first substantive statement, the Court must refer the matter to arbitration unless it finds that no valid arbitration agreement exists.
"Purchase Order Containing Arbitration Clause Will Supercede Tax Invoice Which Does Not Contain Arbitration Clause": Calcutta High Court
Case Title – Super Smelters Limited v United Cables Limited
Case No. – AP-COM 470 OF 2024
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar while allowing an application for appointment for arbitrator observed that the terms and conditions of the purchase order including the arbitration agreement would prevail over and supersede the terms and conditions of the tax invoice which does not contain an arbitration clause.
The Court held that the purchase order was the main contract which contained all the terms and conditions which the parties agreed to be bound by, including the arbitration clause. The tax invoice was issued later. It contained the description of goods sold and the payment to be received. The invoice did not contain any arbitration clause, although the main agreement contained the same. Thus, the intention of the parties to arbitrate was clear and the arbitrator should be appointed.
Thus, the Court concluded that the arbitration clause in the purchase order would bind the parties as it is an all-encompassing agreement. The tax invoice does not contain an arbitration clause but it also does not mention that the purchase order has been superseded. Additionally, the tax invoice has been signed by the Respondent alone. In any event, the issue of novation of the purchase order will be decided by the Arbitrator who is competent to rule on his own jurisdiction and decide the arbitrability of the dispute.
Case Name: Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary v. Steel Authority of India and Anr.
Case Title: AP-COM 169 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar, while hearing a section 11 petition, observed that Courts at Durgapur would have the exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding vide Clause 46.2.4 of the GCC, as the parties could not agree upon the rules of arbitration governing the proceedings as provided under Clause 46.2.5.
The bench noted that Clause 46.2.4, being an independent clause, provides that unless otherwise mentioned in the contract, the arbitration shall be held at SAIL DSP Durgapur, and the Courts of Durgapur shall have exclusive jurisdiction. It observed that Clause 46.2.5 would apply if the parties had agreed to follow the ICA Rules or the Rules of SCFA. The parties not agreeing with respect to the implementation of Clause 46.2.5, the choice of New Delhi as the venue of the arbitration cannot be treated as the venue. On the contrary, Clause 46.2.4, an independent clause, specifying the seat of the arbitration at Durgapur, and conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts of Durgapur, shall prevail. Furthermore, the parties had the option to select either ICS or SCFA, which they chose not to; hence, the mechanism provided under Clause 46.2.5 failed. Clause 46.2.2 provides that the arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of A&C Act 1996, and therefore the Section 11 application is maintainable.
Arbitration Can Be Initiated Over Termination Of Employee Contract Containing Both Dispute Resolution & Termination Clause : Calcutta High Court
Case Title – Sreepad Bhiwaniwala v. Grant Thornton US Knowledge and Capability Center India Pvt. Ltd.
Case No. – AP No. 62 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar while allowing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that where an employee has been terminated in terms of an employment contract which contains both Dispute Resolution clause and Termination clause, if it is not a case of termination simpliciter, then the dispute shall be referred to arbitration in terms of the dispute resolution clause.
The Court observed that the ground showed for termination was other "business reasons”. This in the view of the Court was not termination simpliciter as urged by the Counsel for the Respondent. The letter of termination contained a lot of compliances to be maintained by the Petitioner for a considerable period, even after termination.
The Court further held that it is a settled position of law that an arbitrator can rule on his own jurisdiction, which includes arbitrability of the claim made by the Petitioner. For the referral Court, the prima facie existence of the arbitration clause is sufficient to appoint an arbitrator and in this case the dispute is alive.
Case Title – Bimla Devi Jaiswal v. M/s Indus Towers Limited
Case No. – AP- 256 of 2021
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar, while allowing an application for appointment of arbitrator has observed that the issues of misjoinder/non-joinder of parties and whether the arbitration clause contained in the principal agreement was incorporated by reference in a subsequent agreement by the successors-in- interest would fall within the domain of the arbitral tribunal.
The Court observed that the law permits the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction covers all questions including validity of the arbitration agreement, joinder of parties, scope of disputes referable etc. The referral court is to satisfy itself, prima facie as to the existence of an arbitration agreement and/or whether the parties chose to be bound by the same, thereby agreeing to refer all disputes between them to an independent and impartial private Tribunal.
The Court relied upon the judgments in Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S Patel (2025) 2 SCC 147, Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP (India)(P) Ltd. (2025) 1 SCC 611, amongst other in support of the position of law that the issue of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties falls within the domain of the arbitral tribunal.
Legal Heir Of Partner Can Seek Reference To Arbitration When Deed Provides For Partnership To Continue After Partner's Death: Calcutta HC
Case Title – Avirup Talukdar v. Avishek Talukdar & Anr.
Case No. – AP- COM/523/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has observed that where a partnership deed provides that the heir of the deceased shall inherit the share and the partnership will continue, then the legal heir can seek reference of disputes to arbitration based on the arbitration clause in the deed of partnership. The Court highlighted that for non-signatories to be made a party to arbitration the requirement of law is that they must prima facie be connected to the arbitration agreement, which is satisfied in case of such a partnership deed.
The Court observed that the dispute arose upon violation of the above Clauses by Respondents, as alleged by the Petitioner. The Court noted that the issue as to whether a non signatory can seek reference of the dispute to arbitration has to be gathered from the agreement, circumstances and conduct and the referral Court is merely required to asses whether prima facie the parties are intrinsically connected to the arbitration agreement or the contract out of which the disputes arose.
Bar Against Even Number Of Arbitrators Is Not Attracted In Case Of Statutory Arbitration U/S 18(3) Of MSMED Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title – M/s BESCO v M/s Hindon Chemicals Pvt. Ltd.
Case No. – F.M.A.T (Arb. Award) No. 47 of 2023
A division bench of Calcutta High Court comprising Justices Uday Kumar and Sabyasachi Bhattacharya in a notable judgment has observed that the bar restricting the number of arbitrators to even numbers, which is applicable when the parties themselves appoint arbitrators under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”), is not attracted to a statutory arbitration under Section 18(3), Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (“MSMED Act”). Thus, even if the number of the Council members who acted as arbitrators as in the present case is an even number, it per se does not vitiate the award.
Impleading Non-Signatory Against Whom No Cause Of Action Is Disclosed Does Not Defeat Reference To Arbitration: Calcutta High Court
Case Title – Murshidabad Zilla Parishad v Asian Care Development Private Limited and Ors.
Case No. – FMA 816 of 2025 with CAN 1 of 2025 with FMAT 167 of 2025
The Division Bench of Calcutta High comprising Justices Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Uday Kumar while deciding an appeal under Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) against the dismissal of an application for reference under Section 8, ACA observed that where a non-signatory party has been impleaded against whom no cause of action has been disclosed in the suit and who is a collateral beneficiary, the Court can refer the parties to arbitration. The Court noted that it was well aware that precedents allowed impleadment of such parties only when they were applicants, however, the spirit of Section 8, ACA would allow such reference even if the non-signatory party is a defendant.
The Court observed that the restrictive interpretation given in Sukanya Holdings had suffered a definitive shift as is recorded in a plethora of judgments including the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Cox and Kings Limited v SAP India Private Limited and Anr. (2024) 4 SCC 1 (Cox and Kings). Although the 'group company' theory laid down in Cox and Kings was not applicable in the present case, the concept of primary and substantive relief would still be a guiding factor in case of Section 8 references.
Calcutta High Court Upholds Arbitral Award In Favour Of Sourav Ganguly Over Termination Of Player Representation Agreement
Case Title – Precept Talent Management Limited v. Sourav Chandidas Ganguly
Case No. – AP-COM/167/2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Ravi Kishan Kapur dismissed a Section 34 petition filed against an arbitral award passed in favour of cricket player Sourav Ganguly (“Respondent”) by his former management agency, Precept Talent Management Ltd. (“Petitioner”). While upholding the Arbitral Award, the Court observed that the award was well reasoned and the views taken by the Arbitral Tribunal were plausible. Therefore, the Award did not warrant any interference by the Court.
The Counsel for the Petitioners had argued that as a personality, the Respondent had received Rs. 13.11 crores and the Respondent owed 20% of the same to the Petitioners. The Petitioners had contended that the Tribunal was bound to give effect to the plain terms of the PRA and erred by ignoring the definition of 'commercial rights' and 'promotional services' under Clause 1.1 (gg) of the PRA. The Respondent had advertised and promoted various brands at the request of KKR and had in effect commercially exploited himself for gain.
The Court observed that the Tribunal had arrived at a finding that the contract entered into by KKR with the Respondent was for playing cricket and independent of the exploitation of the commercial rights of the Respondent. Additionally, the tribunal had held that the promotional activities which the Respondent had undertaken in terms of the KKR contract were promotional activities of and on behalf of KKR and were not individual endorsements of any of the players playing for KKR. Thus, the Petitioners were not entitled to a share.
Court Can Extend Mandate Of Arbitrator Multiple Times If Sufficient Cause Is Shown U/S 29A(5) Of Arbitration Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs Berger Paints India Limited
Case Number: Ap-Com/428/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that the courts are not prohibited from extending the mandate of the Arbitrator multiple times if sufficient cause is established under section 29A(5) of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, it extended the mandate of the Arbitrator beyond the timeline set by the Supreme Court.
This is the second filed by the Petitioner seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitrator under section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The court observed that the Supreme Court while disposing of the application held that the courts are not bound by the limitation period for filing extension applications nor are they prohibited from granting extension more than once. While parties can mutually extend the time period by six months, such timelines are not applicable to extensions ordered by the courts. Even delayed applications can be entertained if the sufficient cause is shown.
Based on the above, the court held that this court is not prohibited from granting further extensions if sufficient cause is established even if the Supreme Court has fixed the date of publication of the Award.
[Arbitration Act] S.34 Pleas Are Of Commercial Nature, Cannot Be Decided By Bench Having Ordinary Original Jurisdiction: Calcutta High Court
Case Title – Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited v Marine Craft Engineers Private Limited
Case No. – A.P.O. 84 of 2023 With A.P. 831 of 2018
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justices Arijit Banerjee and Om Narayan Rai while deciding a Section 37, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) appeal, set aside an order passed in Section 34, ACA petition on the ground that the court passing it lacked the jurisdiction to pass such an order. The concerned judge had the power to determine only such applications under Section 34 which did not pertain to commercial matters, whereas the power to decide Section 34 applications of commercial nature vested with another judge.
After looking at the roster of the Court on the said dates, the Court observed that on both the aforesaid dates i.e. when the said Judge (who has passed the Impugned Order) took up the matter for adjudication for the first time and when the matter was marked heard in part by the said Judge, the said Judge had determination only over such applications under Section 34, ACA which did not pertain/relate to commercial matters. The Court clarified that the determination in respect of all arbitration applications including those under Section 34, ACA relating to commercial matters in terms of Section 10, CC Act rested with another Hon'ble Judge of this Court in terms of the roster dated November 14, 2019.
Mere Use Of Expression “Arbitration” Insufficient To Constitute A Binding Agreement U/S 7 Of A&C Act: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Roshan Agarwal Vs. National Projects Construction Corporation Limited (Npccl) & Anr.
Case No.: Ap-Com/218/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that mere use of the expression “Arbitration” in a clause will not automatically make the clause a binding arbitration agreement as contemplated under Section 7 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act, 1996 unless there is a clear intent to refer disputes to Arbitration. The court observed that an arbitration agreement has to be couched not in precatory, but obligatory words. Although, there is no particular form or universally practiced format in framing an arbitration agreement, but the words used must be certain, definite and indicative of the determination of the parties to go for arbitration and not a choice or a mere possibility to refer such dispute to arbitration.
Rejection Of Claims By Writ Court Over Disputed Issues Does Not Bar Reference To Arbitration: Calcutta High Court
Case Title:P.K Thakur And Company Private Limited Vs. Steel Authority Of India Limited
Case Number:Ap-Com 461 Of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that when the claims of the petitioner are not adjudicated by writ courts and subsequently by the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition on the ground that they involve disputed questions of fact and law which are beyond the remit of the court, and the petitioner is directed to invoke the alternative remedy of arbitration due to the undisputed existence of an arbitration clause, the matter should be referred to arbitration and whether the time period spent in prosecuting before the writ courts should be excluded can be decided by the Arbitrator.
Cause Of Action Arises From Clear Refusal To Perform Contractual Obligations, Not Mere Non-Performance: Calcutta High Court
Case Title:Kamini Ferrous Limited Vs. Om Shiv Mangalam Builders Private Limited & Anr.
Case Number:A.P - 43 of 2024
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that when there is a clear refusal by one of the parties to perform the terms of a contract, the cause of action arises from the date of such refusal, and not from the date of initial non-performance, especially where negotiations continued, implying that the parties possibly wanted to extend the time for performance.
The present application filed under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 arose from an agreement executed on 13.04.2012. Clause 14 of the Agreement states that all disputes and differences relating to or arising from the agreement shall be referred to arbitration.
Reference To Dispute Resolution Board Not Mandatory Before Invoking S.11(6) Of Arbitration Act If It Is Not Constituted On Time: Calcutta HC
Case Title: M/S. National Project Construction (Npccl) Vs Military Engineer Services (Mes)
Case Number:Ap-Com/559/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar has held that a party cannot be compelled to approach the Dispute Resolution Board (DSB) for resolution of disputes first before invoking the jurisdiction of the court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act especially when the DSB was not constituted as per terms of the contract and its composition was not even communicated to the Petitioner within the stipulated time period after the execution of the contract therefore seeking reference to the DSB when the petitioner approaches the court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act cannot be accepted.
Proceedings Between Expiry Of Arbitrator's Mandate And Its Extension Are Not Void If Mandate Is Extended: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Glen Industries Private Limited Vs Oriental Insurance Company Limited
Case Number: AP-COM/540/2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that proceedings conducted by the Arbitrator between the expiry of the mandate and its subsequent extension cannot be declared void once the application seeking extension is allowed. Upon extension, the mandate relates back to the date of expiry.
The present application has been filed seeking extension of the Arbitrator's mandate. Earlier, the Respondent objected on the ground that the Arbitration continued the proceedings even after the mandate had lapsed. However, as noted by the court in its previous order, the petitioner's continuous participation and examination of witnesses constituted an implied agreement between the parties to extend the mandate.
Delivery Of Certified Copy Of Award After Signing & Authentication Constitutes Valid Service U/S 31(5) Of Arbitration Act: Calcutta HC
Case Title: J.D. Electrical Products Private Limited Vs Purbachal Udyog
Case Number: IA No: Ga/1/2022 Ec/87/2021
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that delivery of a certified copy of the award, signed by the members, when properly addressed, stamped, and sent by speed post with delivery confirmed by the postal department, amounts to effective service even if the original signed copy of the award is not dispatched.
The present application has been filed under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) seeking a declaration that the award dated 10.11.2020 is non-est and unenforceable. It is further prayed that the execution proceedings should be stayed pending disposal of the application.
Counterclaim In Arbitration Cannot Be Allowed After Commencement Of Claimant's Evidence: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Gayatri Granites & Ors. VS. SREI Equipment Finance Ltd.
Case Number: C.O. 2449 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya has held that a counterclaim in arbitration proceedings cannot be allowed after the commencement of the claimant's evidence, as doing so would cause serious injustice to the other party.
The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution against an order passed by Arbitrator by which an application seeking amendment in the Statement of Defence (SoD) to include a counterclaim was rejected.
The court observed that upon a reading of Section 23 as a whole and more particularly Subsection 2A, it is evident that no time limit has been prescribed within which the respondent may submit a counter claim. The only limitation for submitting a counter claim as provided in sub-section (2A) is that the same shall have to fall within the scope of arbitration agreement. It further observed that a counter claim can be raised with the written statement, through its amendment and by subsequent pleadings. However, the cause of action for filing the counter claim must arise either before or after filing of the suit but in any case it must not arise after the defendant has delivered his written statement or the time period for filing the written statement has expired.
Court Hearing Appeal U/S 37 A&C Act Can Direct Furnishing Of Security Even Without Application U/S 9: Calcutta HC
Case Title: Beevee Enterprises & Ors. Versus L & T Finance Limited
Case Number: APOT 208 OF 2025 IA NO. GA 1 OF 2025
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Arindam Mukherjee has held that while disposing of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the Court is empowered under Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) to impose conditions and direct the respondent to furnish security for the loan as per the Agreement, even in the absence of a formal application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, since such a course does not contravene any of the provisions of the Act.
The court noted that the arbitration clause gives exclusive power to the lender to appoint the arbitrator without any participation of the borrower. In the clause, no specific arbitrator has been named granting absolute authority to the lender to appoint the arbitrator through its Principal Officer. However, as per section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act read with fifth schedule and the Supreme Court's judgments in TRF Limited and Perkins, a Principal Officer is ineligible to appoint an arbitrator due to a direct connection with the party. Therefore, the appointment was void.
Plea Against Misuse Of Digital Signature Does Not Amount To Denying Existence Of Arbitration Agreement: Calcutta High Court
Case Title – Sunita Gupta v Ms URGO Capital Limited & Ors.
The Calcutta High Court Bench of Justice Krishna Rao, while referring parties to arbitration, has observed that if the Plaintiff alleges that its digital signatures were used without its consent, such an allegation of fraud does not amount to a denial of the existence of the arbitration agreement.
The Court analysed the loan documents to assess the contention of the Plaintiff that their signatures were obtained by fraud and their digital signatures were used without their consent. The Court observed that in the sanction letter dated 25.07.2023, the name of the Plaintiffs appeared as co-applicants nos.3,4 and 5. In the schedule of term, Vedanta Limited was recorded as the principal borrower and the names of Defendant No.3 along with Plaintiffs was also mentioned.
The Court observed that the Plaintiffs had only taken the ground of fraud that Defendant No.3 had misused the OTP provided by the Plaintiffs and the said OTP was used for digital signatures of the plaintiffs to which the Plaintiffs had never consented. Defendant No.3 was not denying the agreement.
Single Petition U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act Is Maintainable Against Composite Arbitral Award: Calcutta High Court
Case Title: Damodar Valley Corporation Vs. Aka Logistics Private Limited
Case Number: AP-COM -166 of 2025
The Calcutta High Court has held that a single petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) is maintainable challenging a composite arbitral award disposing of multiple references.
A bench led by Justice Shampa Sarkar held that “the Court does not hesitate to hold that the learned arbitrator and the parties understood the proceeding before the learned arbitrator arising out of five references, to be one composite proceeding and the learned arbitrator proceeded to pass a composite award. Thus, in the present case, though five distinct references were made, the learned arbitrator had chosen to dispose of all the references by passing one composite award at the suggestion of the parties. When a common award covers all the references, the challenge by way of a single petition is maintainable.
Calcutta HC Declines To Interfere With Arbitral Awards In Iron Ore Supply Dispute; Says No Grounds Made Out U/S 34/37 A&C Act
The Orissa Minerals Development Company Limited Vs. Jai Balaji Industries Limited
Case No: F.M.A. No. 939 of 2012
Reaffirming the limited scope of judicial review under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the Calcutta High Court has dismissed two connected appeals under Section 37 filed by Orissa Minerals Development Company Ltd. (OMDC), upholding arbitral awards directing payment for excess procurement costs and loss of profits arising from stoppage of iron ore supplies to Jai Balaji Industries.
A Division Bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya held that OMDC failed to show perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or breach of public policy to justify interference, observing that the appellants' grievance was essentially against contractual interpretation and factual findings by the Tribunal.
Arbitration Act | Section 8 Application Not Maintainable Without Written Arbitration Agreement: Calcutta High Court
Case: Flint Group India Pvt. Ltd. v. Sujay Lodha
IA No.: GA-COM/4/2024 in CS-COM/652/2024
The Calcutta High Court dismissed an application filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking reference of a commercial suit to arbitration. Justice Aniruddha Roy held that since no written arbitration agreement exists between Flint Group India Pvt. Ltd. (plaintiff) and Sujay Lodha (defendant), the mandatory requirement under Section 7 of the Act is not satisfied, and therefore the suit cannot be referred to arbitration.
Citing the requirement under Section 7 that an arbitration agreement must be in writing, Justice Roy held that “no arbitration agreement exists between the parties as disclosed in the plaint,” making Section 8 inapplicable. The group of companies doctrine, the Court added, could not be invoked in the absence of any demonstrated nexus between the suit transaction and the distributorship agreement.
Parties' Conduct Overrides Clause: Calcutta High Court Rejects Literal Interpretation Of Arbitration Venue Clause
Case Title: Chittaranjan Locomotive Works v. Arihant Electricals
Case No: COM (AP) 910/2024
The Calcutta High Court comprising of Justice Shampa Sarkar held that the relief under the second proviso to Section 36(3), is a legislative exemption which is confined to cases involving fraud or corruption in the award-making process. Reiterating that unconditional stay "is a very narrow exception" especially after the introduction of the 2021 amendment, the Court held: “this Court does not find that the arbitral award was induced by fraud, the respondent has not secured any unfair and unlawful gain.”
It highlighted that seat and venue is subject to change based on conduct, and that juridical seat will be inferred from “where the proceedings were administered and controlled”. The court states: “The conduct of the parties and of the arbitrator indicate that the proceedings were administered and controlled from Kolkata.”
Chhattisgarh High Court
Additional Evidence Can Only Be Allowed In Exceptional Circumstances While Deciding Plea U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Chhattisgarh HC
Case Title: M/s Hira Carbonics Private Limited versus Kunwar Virendra Singh Patel and Anr.
Case Number: WP227 No. 8 of 2025
The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey has held that additional evidence not forming part of the arbitral record can be allowed to be given only in exceptional circumstances while hearing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The court noted that in Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd.(supra) the Supreme Court held that ordinarily additional documents which are not part of the arbitration record cannot be permitted to be given by the court hearing the application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The proceedings under section 34 are summary proceedings and if additional evidence are permitted, the purpose of speedily disposing of the petition would be defeated.
Execution Proceedings Can't Be Quashed Solely Due To Non-Supply Of Signed Arbitral Award: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: Amit Kumar Jain vs. Induslnd Bank Limited Through Its Director & Anr.
Case Number: WP227 No. 39 of 2025
The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey has held that non-supply of the signed arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside an award, but on this ground alone, the execution proceedings cannot be quashed.
The court noted that the petitioner did not take any steps to obtain a certified copy of the award. “Non-supply of the signed arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside an award, but on this count alone, the execution proceedings cannot be quashed”, the court observed. The court observed that an award can only be challenged under section 34(2) and not otherwise. It dismissed the petition.
Reliefs Similar To Those Sought Before Arbitrator & Commercial Court Can't Be Claimed Before Writ Court: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case Title: Angelique International Limited versus Union of India Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) and Ors.
Case Number: WPC No. 2946 of 2025
The Chhattisgarh High Court bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru has held that reliefs similar to those already sought before the Arbitrator and subsequently before the Commercial Court cannot be claimed before the writ court, especially when alternative efficacious remedies are available before the same forums for seeking such reliefs.
The court noted that perusal of the record would show that there were two Contract Agreements i.e. Contract Agreement dated 18.09.2017 as well as Contract Agreement dated 26.04.2017 and the petitioner has challenged Contract Agreement dated 26.04.2017 before the Sole Arbitrator, which was allowed vide order dated 15.03.2022 and the final award was passed. It further noted that the record reflects that the respondents challenged the final award dated 15.03.2022 by filing Case No. Arb. MJC 06 of 2024, which was dismissed by the Commercial Court vide order dated 08.11.2024.
Delhi High Court
No Bar To Avail Remedy U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Even Against Non-Parties To Subject Matter Of Dispute: Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna has held that the Plaintiffs are not barred from availing the remedy under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 even against individual(s)/entities who are not party to the Family Settlement out of which the dispute arose.
The application for ad interim injunction was held to be not maintainable due to pending Arbitration proceedings in regard to the Family Settlement and a pending Application under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.
The court noted that the Application under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is yet to be adjudicated. It noted that the cause of action reflected that there was no immediate urgency. The issue of whether the suit was only maintainable under the Companies Act before the NCLT was also raised.
Date Of Receipt Of Corrected Award Would Be Taken As Disposal Date U/S 34(3) Of Arbitration Act, Even When Application U/S 33 Has Been Filed: Delhi HC
Case Title: TEFCIL BREWERIES LIMITED v. ALFA LAVAL (INDIA) LIMITED
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 18
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that taking the date of receipt of the corrected award as the starting point and not as the date of disposal would actually go contrary to the plain reading of Section 34(3) of the Act. This will apply even in cases where an application under Section 33 of the Act has been filed.
The court held that the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Act give two timelines. One, where an application under Section 33 of the Act has not been filed in which case the legislature was conscious enough to state that it would be the date of receipt of the award. Whereas, in the case where an application under Section 33 of the Act has been filed, the legislation was conscious enough to lay down that the date of disposal would be the starting point for calculation of limitation.
Expert Tribunal's Award Did Not Suffer From Patent Illegality, Cannot Be Set Aside U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Center For Research Planning And Action v. National Medicinal Plants Board Ministry Of Ayush Government Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 42
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Dharmesh Sharma has held that the scope of interference by the Court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited, and the Court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to determine whether the award is good or bad.
In the present case, the court held that the expert tribunals award did not suffer from patent illegality, and thus could not be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Arbitral Award Cannot Be Challenged In Writ Petition, Party Must Use Remedy U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd V. Micro And Small Enterprise Facilitation Council And Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 44
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that it cannot entertain a writ petition challenging an arbitral award, and the petitioner should challenge the award by taking recourse to appropriate remedies under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The court observed it is impermissible for the petitioner to agitate these issues in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned award having been rendered by the sole arbitrator, and the objections as regards (lack of) jurisdiction having been rejected by the sole arbitrator, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to assail the same by taking recourse to the remedies under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Arbitrator's Order Determining Substantive Rights Of Parties Constitutes “Award”, Amenable To Challenge U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi HC
Case Title: Aptec Advanced Protective Technologies AG vs. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 48
The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that orders passed by the Arbitrator during the pendency of Arbitral proceedings, which finally determines any substantive rights of the parties, constitutes an interim Arbitral Award, and can be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
At the outset, the court noted that the A&C Act does not define “interim award”. The court referred to IFFCO Ltd. v.Bhadra Products which held that the Arbitral Tribunal can make an interim arbitral Award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final Award; and the term “matter” in Section 31(6) of the A&C Act includes any point of dispute between the parties which has to be answered by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Supreme court had held that while the arbitration proceedings can be terminated only by way of a final Award, there can be one or more interim Awards before the final Award, which conclusively and finally determine some of the issues between the parties, finally leading upto the final Award.
Case Title: Synergies Casting Ltd. vs. National Research Development Corporation & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 64
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has held that an order which neither sets aside nor refuses to set aside the arbitral award, does not fall under the ambit of Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and is not appealable.
The court observed that appeals in arbitration matters are maintainable only if expressly provided for in section 37/ 50 of the A&C Act. Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not confer an independent right to appeal.
Case Title: M/s Jaiprakash Associates Limited v. M/s NHPC Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 66
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad, while refusing to appoint an arbitrator in a Section 11 petition, has held that the referral court in a post-award stage must protect the parties from being forced to arbitrate when, after prime facie scrutiny of the facts the claims are found to be non-arbitrable. The court applied the 'eye of the needle' test, which allows the referral court to reject arbitration in exceptional circumstances where the claims are deadwood.
Issue Related To Existence Of Arbitration Agreement Cannot Be Decided Ex-Parte, Without Hearing Respondent: Delhi High Court
Case Title: WTC Noida Development Company Pvt. Ltd V. Ms. Arti Khattar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 83
A Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur held that the District Judge should not have decided the issue related to the existence of an arbitration agreement ex-parte, without calling upon the respondent to give its stand on the same.
The court observed that the arbitration agreement, by virtue of the presumption of separability, survives the principal contract in which it was contained. The Arbitration Agreement forming part of a contract is treated as an agreement independent of other terms of the contract. The question of whether the underlying agreement stands discharged itself may be a dispute arising out of or in relation to or under the substantive contract and would not be precluded from reference to arbitration.
[Arbitration Act] Application U/S 34 Without Award Copy Or Vakalatnama Is Merely A 'Stack Of Papers' Filed To Save Limitation: Delhi HC
Case Title: KGF Cottons Pvt Ltd V. Haldiram Snacks Pvt Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 94
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, filed without the award itself, would not be a valid filing.
Justice Prasad stated that without the Award, the challenge would become meaningless because unless the award is perused by the court, it cannot adjudicate upon the appropriateness and correctness of the award. An application under Section 34 of the Act, filed without an award and admittedly without a vakalatmana, can only be a stack of papers filed only to save the limitation, he said.
When Application U/S 33 Of A&C Act Is 'Disguised Review', Limitation For Challenging Award U/S 34 Cannot Be Extended: Delhi HC
Case Title: Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. Vs. Hcc Samsung Jv
Case Number: O.M.P. (COMM) 381/2024 & I.A. 38567/2024
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that if the application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is purely an application for review, then the person seeking to challenge the award cannot avail of the time taken between the filing of the application under Section 33 and the date of disposal for calculating the period to challenge the award. The court stated that Section 33 cannot be allowed to be used as a tool to prolong limitation under Section 34, as it would undermine the legislative intent behind Section 33.
The court referred to the case of Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd. (2023), wherein the Respondent had moved an application under Section 33 seeking an increment in the valuation of gold based on the prevailing market value, which the Petitioner was required to pay under the award. The Supreme Court while setting aside the order of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Section 33 application, observed that "only in a case of arithmetical and/or clerical error, the award can be modified and such errors only can be corrected”.
Time Spent Before 'Wrong' Court Excluded U/S 14 Of Limitation Act While Calculating Limitation Period U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Incite Homecare Products Pvt Ltd Versus R K Swamy Pvt Ltd Erstwhile Rk Swamy Bbdo Pvt Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 279
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Dharmesh Sharma has held that during the calculation of the limitation period of three months for the application under Section 34(1) of the Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is excluded. Court noted that the proceedings in the wrong court should be bona fide, with due diligence.
The court observed that the District Judge had failed to consider the aspect of exclusion of time in accordance with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Further, the court also relied on the judgment in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secy. Irrigation Deptt., wherein the Supreme Court distinguished the scope and ambit of Section 5 vis-a-vis Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Limitation Does Not Stop If Initial Filing Is Non Est, Date Of Filing Must Be Reckoned From Date Of Refiling: Delhi HC
Case Title: Sudesh Hans v. Gian Chand Hans and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 281
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the filing of the arbitral award under challenge along with application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement and non-filing of the same would make the application non est in the eyes of law. The Court further observed that such a non est filing would not stop the limitation and the date of filing would be reckoned from the date of refilling.
The Court relied on its recent full bench decision in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India and Another 2025 SCC OnLine Del 636, wherein it was observed that an initial filing is considered to be non est if the application under Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act is so deficient so as not to be considered as a filing at all. Even if such a deficient filing is made within the period of limitation, the Court will not consider the same to have been filed in law and the period of limitation for filing the same shall not stop and shall continue to run. It was further observed that filing of the Arbitral Award under challenge along with the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement and non filing of the same would make the application non est in the eyes of law.
Delhi HC Grants Interim Relief U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act By Attaching TMT Steel Bars Worth ₹69.5 Crores Made Using Coal Whose Quality Was Disputed
Case Title: Rescom Mineral Trading Fze Versus Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited Rinl And Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 282
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has granted interim relief to a petitioner under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the extent of 50% of the balance outstanding claimed i.e., Rs. 69.50 Crores by attaching TMT Steel bars (finished product) of the equivalent amount in a dispute over the quality of coal delivered, which was used to manufacture the steel bars.
Arbitral Awards Can Be Granted On The Basis Of Evidentiary Admissions: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Rattan India Power Ltd. v. BHEL
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 299
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Prateek Jalan has observed that the power to pass an award on admissions is wide, and evidentiary admissions (admissions contained outside pleadings) can also form the basis of an arbitral award. The Court observed that while it is true that admissions in pleadings are placed on a higher footing to the extent that they may require nothing more for a decree to follow, those outside of pleadings must be considered contextually. However, to hold that there is a bar on granting an award of admissions in the case of evidentiary admissions would be inconsistent with the text of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
The Court observed that the argument of the Petitioner that an award cannot be made on evidentiary admissions i.e. admissions beyond pleadings was liable to be rejected in view of the use of the phrase “pleadings or otherwise” used in Order XII Rule 6. The Court observed that while it is true that admissions in pleadings are placed on a higher footing to the extent that they may require nothing more for a decree to follow, whereas those outside of pleadings must be considered contextually. However, to hold that there is a bar on granting an award of admissions in the case of evidentiary admissions, would be inconsistent with the text of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
Veracity Of Allegations Against Settlement Agreement Cannot Be Looked Into By Court In Application U/S 11 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s ARSS Infrastructure Projects Ltd. v. National Highway Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 313
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is limited to examining the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement. It was further observed that if either party contests a prior settlement agreement, then such allegations cannot be looked into by the Court under an application for appointment of arbitrator and would have to take recourse under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
The Court observed that the Petitioner had alleged that the settlement proceedings were vitiated because at that time the Petitioner was in financial duress. The veracity of the allegations of the Petitioner qua the settlement agreement could not be looked into by the Court in a petition under Section 11 of the Act. As per Section 74 of the A&C Act, the settlement agreement entered shall have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an arbitral tribunal under section 30. If the Petitioner wished to challenge the settlement agreement, they would have to take recourse under Section 34 of the A&C Act, subject to the rules of limitation.
Withdrawal Of MSMED Council Application Does Not Preclude Arbitration U/S 11, Even Without Council's Response: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S Smartschool Education Private Limited Vs M/S Bada Business Pvt. Ltd And Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 320
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that withdrawal of an application before the MSMED Council does not bar a party from seeking the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, even in the absence of any corresponding response from the MSMED Council.
The Court observed that Clause 11.2.2 of the agreement contains an arbitration clause which provides that the seat of arbitration shall be at New Delhi. The Petitioner issued notice dated 02.03.2023 followed by another notice dated 30.05.2024 invoking arbitration. The Respondent has chosen to deny its liability and therefore there is no question of making any attempt to settle the disputes amicably. The Petitioner has therefore approached this Court for appointment of arbitration and this Court has issued notice in the matter on 05.08.2024.
Serious Allegations Of Fraud Constituting Criminal Offense Are Non-Arbitrable: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Bentwood Seating System (P) Ltd. vs Airport Authority Of India & Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 321
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that the allegations of fraud which are extremely serious and potentially constitute a criminal offense are non-arbitrable. The court noted that the plea of fraud is of such a nature that it impacts the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement. Consequently, the court held that such a dispute is not arbitrable in nature.
The High Court referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors [(2016) 10 SCC 386] and Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation [(2021) 2 SCC 1]. The Supreme Court in these cases clarified the distinction between arbitrable and non-arbitrable disputes involving fraud. The Supreme Court held that while allegations of fraud simpliciter could be adjudicated by an Arbitral Tribunal, serious allegations of fraud should be best left to the Civil Courts. The High Court noted that in this case the allegations of fraud were not simple but involved complex issues. It noted that this included the fabrication of documents from foreign entities and the involvement of international witnesses. The court further held that the Civil Court is better equipped to handle such matters, given the need to summon witnesses from outside the country and the involvement of governmental authorities.
Party Entering Settlement Agreement, Agreeing To Consent Award Cannot Later Object To Its Enforcement On Grounds Of Lack Of Knowledge: Delhi HC
Case Title: Mercedes Benz Group AG v. Minda Corporation Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 322
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Anish Dayal has rejected an objection raised by the Award Debtor against the enforcement of an Award on the ground that it was contrary to public policy since it was not informed by the Award Holder about a previous settlement with the Judgment Debtor's subsidiary. The Court deprecated the stance taken by the Award Debtor, as in view of the facts of the case, it found the objections to be unjust, unfair and nothing but an attempt to obstruct the enforcement of the Award.
Order Passed U/S 23(3) Of Arbitration Act Is Procedural & Not An Interim Award, Cannot Be Challenged U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: NTPC LIMITED versus STARCON INFRA PROJECTS INDIA PVT LTD
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 32
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that an order dismissing an application under Section 23(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is only a procedural order and does not qualify as an 'interim award' amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The court relied on the judgment in Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1999) and held that for any order to be termed as an interim award, it must finally determine the rights of the parties and any order which does not give any imprimatur on the rights of the parties cannot be termed as an interim award.
Application U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act Not Maintainable If Not Filed With Copy Of Arbitral Award: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Ircon International Limited vs M/S Pnc-Jain Construction Co (Jv)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 332
The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan has held that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is non-maintainable if it is not accompanied by a copy of the impugned award. The court held that the filing of the award is not a mere procedural requirement but a mandatory prerequisite for invoking the court's jurisdiction under Section 34. The Division Bench referred to its decision in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India. The Full Bench in this case noted that a challenge to an arbitral award is maintainable only on limited grounds. The Full Bench held that none of these conditions can be assessed unless the arbitral award itself is placed before the court. It held that the filing of the award along with the application under Section 34 is not a mere procedural formality but an essential requirement.
Arbitral Tribunal Is Sole Judge Of Evidence, Court Not Required To Re-Evaluate Evidence U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Direct News Pvt. Ltd VERSUS Dts Travels Pvt. Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 333
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia held that the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. An award would not be held invalid merely because the award is based on little evidence or on evidence which does not meet the quality of a trained legal mind. Also, the Court held that it is not required to reappreciate or reevaluate the evidence and reagitate the disputes under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Prevails Over Seat Of Arbitration Clause If It Expressly Covers Proceedings Relating To Arbitration: Delhi HC
Case Title: Precitech Enclosures Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Rudrapur Precision Industries
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 347
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar has observed that generally if an agreement contains both exclusive jurisdiction clause and seat of arbitration clause, then judicial proceedings relating to arbitration would lie only before the court having territorial jurisdiction over the arbitral seat/venue. However, as in the instant case, if the exclusive jurisdiction clause also covers proceedings relating to arbitration then it would prevail over the seat of arbitration clause.
The Court observed that where the agreement between the parties had contractually conferred jurisdiction for appointment of the arbitrator on competent courts in a particular territorial jurisdiction by exclusive jurisdiction clause, such court and no other would have the jurisdiction to entertain a Section 11 application. Thus, where an exclusive jurisdiction clause covered and included applications relating to the arbitral proceedings it would predominate over the seat of arbitration clause.
Participation In Arbitral Proceedings Does Not Imply Acceptance Of Unilateral Appointment Of Arbitrator Unless Objections Are Waived In Writing: Delhi HC
Case Title: Shakti Pump India Ltd v. Apex Buildsys Ltd And Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 351
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that the mandate of the Arbitrator can be terminated under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) if the Arbitrator was appointed unilaterally, which is explicitly prohibited under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act unless the ineligibility is expressly waived through a written agreement. It also held that mere participation in the arbitration proceedings without expressly waiving any objections in writing cannot tantamount to acceptance of unilateral appointment of Arbitrator.
The court observed that a person's ineligibility to act as an Arbitrator strikes at the very root of the appointment. If the Arbitrator was ineligible to be appointed, anything and everything that flows from such illegal appointment is also non est in law. It further added that the essence of Section 12(5) and the proviso thereto is that there must be an explicit agreement in writing which should be obtained after the dispute has arisen. For the proviso to apply, in this case there has been no such waiver on the part of either of the petitioners.
Case Title: M/S Vallabh Corporation Versus Sms India Pvt Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 352
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that When the Facilitation Council under the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises Development Act (MSMED Act) fails to initiate the mediation process under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, the court can appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
The Supreme Court in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd., (2023) held that the MSME Act will prevail over the Arbitration Act as the object of MSME Act is to ensure timely and smooth payment to the suppliers who are the micro and small enterprises, and to provide a legal framework for resolving the dispute with regard to the recovery of dues between the parties under the MSME Act. The court held that the Arbitration Act is not inconsistent with the provisions of the MSMED Act as the only provision for appointing an Arbitrator under the MSMED Act is section 18. If the Facilitation Council fails to appoint the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator can be appointed by the Supreme Court or the High Court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.
Court's Jurisdiction U/S 11(6) Of A&C Act Is Decided Under CPC When No Seat Or Venue Is Specified In Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Faith Constructions Versus N.W.G.E.L Church
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 353
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri held that in the absence of a specified seat or venue in the Arbitration Agreement, the court's jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) is determined by Sections 16 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC). The relevant factors include where the respondent resides or conducts business and where the cause of action arose.
The court held that when the arbitration clause lacks clarity on the seat/venue, jurisdiction under section 11 of the Arbitration Act must be determined on the basis of sections 16 to 20 of the CPC. In such a case, two factors are important- where the respondent resides or conducts business and where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The court further observed that the cause of action consists of material and integral facts that establish rights, obligations and the right to sue. Insignificant facts do not form part of the cause of action and only those facts which have a direct nexus with lis between the parties are considered relevant.
Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitrator's Refusal Of Injunction Against Use Of Tagline "Jeeto Har DinZo" By Winzo Games
Case Title: Creativeland Advertising Private Limited Vs. Winzo Games Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 355
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has upheld the findings of the Arbitrator, who refused to grant an injunction restraining Winzo Games Private Limited (“Respondent”) from using the tagline “Jeeto Har DinZo” developed by Creativeland Advertising Private Limited (“Appellant”). Since there was no formal agreement fixing a price for the tagline and no claim of copyright infringement, the Appellant's claim was based solely on an alleged breach of confidentiality. The court observed that its jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was limited. It held that the view taken by the Arbitrator in the Section 17 application was not so erroneous so as to shock the conscience of the Court.
Case Title: Siddharth Sood v. Munish Kumar Aggarwal
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 356
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that the execution of the Gift Deed by the petitioner after an arbitral award is passed suggests an attempt to frustrate the rights of the decree-holder. The court observed that when the arbitration proceedings were invoked, there was no prohibition and embargo on any kind of attachment with respect to the said property. Admittedly, even when the Award was passed, there was no such prohibition or attachment, but the Court cannot be unmindful of attendant facts and the relationship between judgment debtors and objectors. The objector is the son of the judgment debtors and there is an apparent attempt to frustrate the rights of the decree holder.
Court Cannot Interfere In Arbitration Proceedings At Final Stage, When Sufficient Opportunity Has Been Given To Claimant To Inspect Documents: Delhi HC
Case Title: Sunehri Bagh Builders Pvt Ltd Versus Delhi Tourism And Transportation Development Corporation Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 367
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Jain has upheld the order passed by the Arbitrator whereby an application seeking production of certain documents has been dismissed. The court held that sufficient opportunity had been given to the claimant, but he didn't avail that opportunity. Thus, the court cannot interfere with the order of the arbitrator at the final stage. Additionally, it said that the case is at the stage of final arguments and, therefore, the Court did not find any requirement of interfering with the abovesaid order, particularly, when the scope of interference in such type of arbitral proceedings is very limited.
Force Majeure Clause 'Eclipses' Contractual Terms, Existence And Duration Of Force Majeure Event To Be Determined By Arbitral Tribunal: Delhi HC
Case Title: Airports Authority Of India Versus Delhi International Airport Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 380
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma has held that while deciding a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, courts cannot adopt the approach of one-size-fit-for-all. Courts can interfere into the award only if it shocks the conscience of the court and is prone to adversely affect the administration of justice. The court held that a force majeure clause' in a contract is generally an exception or an eclipse provision, meaning thereby if a force majeure is enforced the performance as mandated in the other terms of the contract will remain eclipsed till the force majeure event persists. Whether the force majeure has taken place or not or it exists or not or the time till when it exists is a question of fact to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Unconditional Withdrawal Of Prior Petition Filed U/S 11 Of A&C Act Bars Subsequent Petition On Same Cause Of Action: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s Dewan Chand v. Chairman cum Managing Director and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 389
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that if a petition for appointment of arbitrator is withdrawn without liberty to file a fresh petition, then by application of Order 23 Rule 1(4), CPC, a subsequent petition on the same cause of action would be barred. The Court held that though Order 23 Rule 1 mentions the words, “plaintiff” and “Suit”, the Courts have extended the same principles to writ petitions, SLPs and even petitions such as the present one, filed under Section 11 of the A&C Act. In this regard court placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190.
Delay In Publication Does Not Invalidate Award Unless It Is Shown That The Award Has Materially Affected Rights Of Parties: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s Brij Lal & Sons v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 397
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Dharmesh Sharma while dismissing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has observed that delay in publication of award does not invalidate the award unless it is shown that the award has materially affected the rights of the parties.
The Court further discussed the scope of the expression “the public policy of India” contained in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Court placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 wherein it was observed, “However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice”. In view of the aforesaid propositions of law, the Court held that it was unable to find any illegality, perversity in the impugned award passed by the arbitrator. A perusal of the record indicated that the parties were heard at length and the claims were duly considered. There was no issue of any proceeding being unfair or violative of the principles of natural justice in the course of arbitration.
Case Title: NHAI v. Ssyangyong Engineering Construction Co. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 403
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has observed that in an international commercial arbitration in terms of Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the IVth Schedule pertaining to fees of the arbitrator will not apply mandatorily in view of Explanation to Section 11(14) of the Act.
The Court concluded that the assertion by the Petitioner that the fees had been unilaterally fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal was not borne out from the record. Further, reliance placed on of ONGC Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV in which it has been observed that unilateral determination of fees violates the principle of party autonomy and the doctrine of the prohibition of in rem suam decisions was wholly inapplicable in the context of the facts of the present case.
Referral Court Should Limit Enquiry To Whether Plea Has Been Filed Within Limitation, Not Whether Claims Are Ex-Facie Time Barred: Delhi HC
Case Title – M/s Pavan Metal Refiners v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 418
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that at the stage of appointment of arbitrator under Section 11, A&C, the referral court should limit its inquiry to whether the petition itself is within the limitation period of three years and should leave the question of whether the claims are deadwood to the arbitral tribunal.
The Court noted that two major grounds for opposition to the present petition had been raised by the Respondents, namely non-existence of arbitration clause and limitation. In so far as the first contention was concerned, the Respondents had argued that Clause 2905(a) did not apply to the present dispute as it had first arisen in 2001. However, the Court noted that a perusal of the letter dated 20.10.2021 showed that the Respondents did not raise even a sliver of doubt regarding the applicability of the arbitration clause. Similarly, in a follow up letter dated 20.10.2021, by which the Respondents refused the request of the Petitioner regarding appointment of sole arbitrator on the ground that the claims were time barred, no mention regarding the inapplicability of the arbitration clause was made.
Writ Petition Cannot Be Construed As “Earlier Application” U/S 42 Of Arbitration & Conciliation Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Hariram & Ors. V. NHAI
Case No. – O.M.P. (COMM) 86/2021
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has observed that a writ petition cannot be construed as an "earlier application" under Section 42 of the Arbitration Act to decide jurisdiction as the very nature of a writ petition is to challenge an administrative action or a legal decision, not to initiate arbitration proceedings. Section 42 specifically refers to an "application made in a Court with respect to an arbitration agreement," which implies an initial application to commence or regulate arbitration, rather than a challenge to an existing decision.
The Court observed that in view of Section 2, A&C Act, the relevant Court would be the one having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. The Court observed that in view of the factual matrix, there was nothing to show that this Court had the territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The impugned arbitral award dated 16.10.2020 under Section 3G(5) and 3G(6), NHAI Act was rendered in Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh, all proceedings in arbitration were also conducted in Baghpat, Uttar Pradesh and even the land that was the subject matter of the impugned arbitral award is situated in Uttar Pradesh.
Delivering Arbitral Award To Power Of Attorney Holder Satisfies Requirement Of 'Delivery' U/S 31(5) Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Kiran Suran v. Satish Kumar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 445
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Navin Chawla and Ravinder Dudeja has observed that the delivery of a copy of the Award to the Power of Attorney holder, who has also represented the party in the arbitral proceedings, shall be a due compliance with Section 31(5) of the A&C Act. Citing a plethora of case laws including Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors (2005) 4 SCC 2, the Court observed that it is settled law that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it aside. The main question for determination in the present case was whether the Appellant had received the impugned award.
The Court noted that the Appellant had challenged the Power of Attorney as being forged, this question and issued could not be determined in a petition filed under Section 34 of the A&C Act against the impugned award. Additionally, the Court had not been informed of the Appellant having instituted any independent proceedings challenging the said Power of Attorney till that date.
Grant Of Post-Award Interest U/S 31(7)(B) Of A&C Act Is Mandatory, Arbitrator's Discretion Limited To Rate Of Interest: Delhi HC
Case Title: Union of India & Anr. vs. Sudhir Tyagi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 456
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja has held that the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) is mandatory. The only discretion which the Arbitral Tribunal has is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded. Where the Arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, then statutory rate, as provided in Section 31(7)(b), shall apply.
It noted that the section consists of two distinct parts: Clause (a) deals with the interest that may be granted up to the date of the award, whereas Clause (b) provides that “a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per annum from the date of award to the date of payment”. The Court clarified that Clause (b) is concerned with post-award interest and stated: “What Clause (b) provides for is that Arbitral Tribunal may award interest on the sum adjudged under Clause (a). But if no such interest is awarded, then there shall be interest at the rate of 18%.”
Delhi High Court Dismisses BSNL's Appeal U/S 37 Of A & C Act, Upholds Arbitral Award Of Rs. 43.52 Crore
Case Title: Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd Versus Vihaan Networks Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 491
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia dismissed BSNL's appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) holding that the Single Judge correctly upheld the Arbitrator's finding that Vihaan Networks Limited carried out the work under the Advance Purchase Order, issued on BSNL's specific instructions, which was later withdrawn. Therefore, the Respondent was rightly compensated under the principle of quantum meruit for the losses incurred.
The court at the outset observed that it is settled law that the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is very limited. The Court cannot independently assess the evidence or merits of the arbitral award. Its jurisdiction is confined to examining whether the power under Section 34 was exercised within its scope.
It further added that an appeal under Section 37 cannot go beyond the limits set by Section 34. If the arbitral award reflects a possible and reasonable view based on the evidence, the petition under Section 34 must be dismissed, and the appeal under Section 37 cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different finding.
Separate Notice For Counter Claims U/S 21 Of A&C Act Not Required When Arbitration Proceedings Are Pending Between Parties: Delhi HC
Case Title – Railtel Corporation of India Limited v. Primatel Fibcom Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 496
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has observed that where the disputes between the parties are already the subject matter of an earlier arbitral reference, a separate notice under Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) would not be necessary for separate proceedings to adjudicate counter claims.
The Court observed that while it is true that the notice under Section 21, ACA is a sine qua non of arbitration proceedings but where arbitration proceedings have been initiated by one party seeking for reference for the arbitration proceedings under Section 21, ACA for adjudication of disputes, a separate notice under Section 21, ACA would not be necessary only for the purposes of counter claim. This is not the mandate of ACA. Thus, the instant petition need not be dismissed only on the ground that further notice for the purpose of counter claim was not given.
Writ Petition Is Not An Appropriate Remedy To Seek Enforcement Of Arbitral Award: Delhi High Court
Case Title: RAMCHANDER versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 390
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The court found merit in the preliminary objection of the Railways that a writ is not the appropriate remedy for the petitioner to seek enforcement of the arbitral award. Further, the court held that it is prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the procedure under the enactment and this power under Article 226 needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under the Statute, or a clear 'bad faith' is shown by one of the parties.
When Counter-Claim Is Related To Primary Dispute, It Can Be Filed Before Tribunal U/S 23 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S. Akn Developers Private Limited v. M/S. Premsons Southend
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 96
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that while any counter-claim may relate to a different cause of action, it can still stem from a primary dispute between the parties. Thus, the court held that the governing factor would be to see whether it has any connection with the original dispute or is isolated and separable. For all purposes, the court observed that the counter-claim in this case was, directly or indirectly, related to the primary dispute between the parties and the claim in question. Additionally, the court held that if there is a strong interconnectivity or linkage between the two i.e. claim and counter-claim, these can be assumed to be a part of the same transaction.
Case Title: Bhadra International India Pvt Ltd And Ors. Versus Airports Authority Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 173
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices C. Hari Shankar and Ajay Digpaul held that the award cannot be set aside solely on the ground that the appointment of the Arbitrator was illegal in view of section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Arbitration Act) when no such objections were raised before the Arbitrator or the court under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The court noted that if the arbitrator was legally incompetent to act as an arbitrator, mere acquiescence of the appellants would not render him competent. However, the court while setting aside the award solely on this ground must also consider the broader objective of the Arbitration Act that is to promote Arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute resolution mechanism. It also observed that despite the introduction of section 12(5), the arbitration continued for two more years and the award came to be passed. But the appellants never raised a whisper before the Arbitrator or the court under section 34 that the arbitrator was incompetent to act as an arbitrator based on section 12(5).
Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Against IRCTC In Dispute Over Reimbursement For Catering Services, Sets Aside Interest As 'Patently Illegal'
Case Title: Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corp. Ltd. (IRCTC) vs. M/s. Brandavan Food Products
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 179
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Shalinder Kaur has reiterated the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”). The court upheld the arbitral award granted in favour of M/s Brandavan Food Products Ltd. (“Claimant”) in a dispute regarding the reimbursement of differential costs for meals and beverages supplied under a catering contract with the Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (IRCTC) (“Respondent”). The court set aside the interest award as 'patently illegal' as interest could not be granted on amounts not due as of a particular date.
Delhi High Court Re-Affirms Discretion Of Arbitral Tribunal To Implead 'Non-Signatory' As 'Necessary Party' In Arbitration Proceedings
Case Title: Dixon Technologies (India) Limited vs. M/s Jaiico & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 194
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has reaffirmed that an Arbitral Tribunal has the authority to implead non-signatories to an arbitration, provided they are deemed 'necessary parties' to the proceedings.
The court was hearing an application u/s. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for the appointment of Arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising under a Standard Transportation agreement and Customs Clearing Agent agreement. The petitioner had impleaded Respondent no.2, a non-signatory to the agreements.
Case Title: Union of India v. Reliance Industries Limited & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 202
A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising of Justice Rekha Palli and Justice Saurabh Banerjee, while hearing an appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act, set aside an arbitral award in favour of Reliance Industries Limited(RIL). The Court invoked the doctrine of 'public policy in India', 'public law' and 'Public Trust Doctrine' and observed that the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) which held that the RIL's breach of Production Sharing Contract (PSC) was not a material breach of the PSC and 1959 PNG Rules, was in violation of fundamental law of India and the award was patently erroneous.
The Court observed that the issue of 'patent illegality' involves Article 297 of the Constitution, and 'public policy in India', 'public law' and 'Public Trust Doctrine', being all intertwined, are to be considered. By Article 297 of the Constitution, UOI is a depository holding the natural resources of India as a Trustee, and without the explicit and express permission of the UOI, there can be no extraction of the said resources by anyone. The findings of AT pertaining to the implicit permission of the UOI of the 'migrated gas' require consideration. The UOI entered into a PSC with RIL since RIL had the 'technical know-how.' RIL was appointed for a specific and limited purpose of exploring/extracting the natural resources for and on behalf of the UOI.
Failure To Attach Impugned Arbitral Award Along With Section 34 Application Would Render Filing Non-Est: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 210
A full bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Rekha Palli, Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Saurabh Banerjee while hearing a reference made by a single judge bench in Pragati Construction Consultants v. Union of India [FAO(OS)(COMM) 70/2024] held that if the party challenging an award u/s 34 of the A&C Act does not attach the impugned arbitral award with the Section 34 application, the filing will be considered "non-est." The Court further held that the filing of the arbitral award along with the Section 34 application is an essential requirement.
The bench observed that the arbitral award can be set aside by the Court u/s 34(2)(a) of the A&C Act, if the applicant establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that any of the grounds mentioned in the said section were violated during arbitral proceedings. An award can also be set aside u/s 34(2)(b) of the A&C Act, if the subject matter of the dispute was not capable of being settled by arbitration, or if the award was in conflict with the public policy. Furthermore, an award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court u/s 34(2A) of the A&C Act, if the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It would be impossible to satisfy the conditions given u/s 34 of the A&C Act, if the arbitral award is not placed on record.
Case Name: Unison Hotels Pvt Ltd v. KNM Chemicals Pvt Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 219
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has upheld an Arbitral award stating that objections regarding the quality of goods must be raised within a reasonable time as per section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The court concurred with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal that since the Petitioner failed to dispute the quality of supplies within a reasonable time, its counterclaims were rightly dismissed.
The court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal observed that the petitioner ought to have aired its objections with regard to the quality of the goods within 15 days of receipt of the same. As per the admitted case of the parties, the goods were last supplied on 12.06.2019; however, the objections for the first time were put on record after nearly four and a half months.
MSMED Act Will Prevail Over Arbitration Act In Disputes Pertaining To A Party Which Is An MSME: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Idemia Syscom India Private Limited v. M/s Conjoinix Total Solutions Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 231
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has reiterated that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a general law governing the field of arbitration whereas the MSMED Act, 2006 governing a very specific nature of disputes concerning MSMEs, is a specific law and being a specific law would prevail over Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Court observed that while Arbitration & Conciliation Act is a general law governing the field of arbitration, MSMED Act governs a very specific nature of disputes concerning MSMEs and it sets out a statutory mechanism for the payment of interest on delayed payments. Thus, MSMED Act being the specific law and Arbitration and Conciliation Act being the general law, it would prevail over the general law. The Court noted that in view of Section 18 and Section 24 of the MSMED Act which provide non obstante clauses which have the effect of overriding any other law for the time being in force, the legislative intent is clear that MSMED Act would have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. The Court relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Silpi Industries and Ors. v. Kerala SRTC and Anr. (2021) and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods (P) Ltd. (2023).
Arbitral Award Not Signed By All Members Of Tribunal Can Be Set Aside If Reasons For Omission Of Missing Signature Are Not Stated: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s Isc Projects Private Limited v. Steel Authority of India Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 249
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Prateek Jalan has observed that the signature of all members of the arbitral tribunal should be available on the award as the signing of an award is not a ministerial act but a substantive requirement. It was further observed that if the signature of any member of the tribunal is omitted, then the reasons should be stated as this requirement is referable to the need to ensure that all members of the tribunal have has an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.
Construction Of Terms Of Contract Must Be Primarily Decided By Arbitrator, Not Court U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: 'Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd Versus Voestalpine Schienen Gmbh, Austria
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 137
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Dinesh Kumar Sharma has held that Construction of the terms of the contract is primarily for the arbitrator to decide, unless it is found that such a construction is not at all possible.
The court at the outset traced the jurisprudence with respect section 34 of the Arbitration Act.It referred to the Supreme Court judgment in MMTC Ltd. V.JM. Combine (2019) where it was held that an arbitral award can be set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, perverse or shocks the conscience of the court. The award passed by the arbitrator can also be set aside when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view based on facts. Similarly, the Apex Court in K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2020) held that there is the highly constricted power of the court to interfere with an arbitral award for the reason that if parties have chosen to avail an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution, they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision of the arbitrator and the role of the court should be restricted to the bare minimum.
Award Passed By Improperly Appointed Arbitrator Is Non-Est In Law And Invalid: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Isar Engineers Private Ltd. Versus Ntpc-Sail Power Company Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 140
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that it is settled law that the Arbitrator is a creature of the contract and has to function within four corners of contract. If a particular mechanism is contemplated for his appointment, the same must be followed in its true letter, spirit and intent, failing which the Arbitrator is without jurisdiction and the appointment is non-est and invalid.
The court noted that as per arbitration clause, the general manager/unit head was empowered to act as an arbitrator and in the absence of the general manager/unit head, managing director or chairman of the respondent company was empowered to appoint any other person as an arbitrator. It further added that prior to amendment act of 2015, appointment of an employee as an arbitrator was not by itself a ground for bias as held by the Supreme Court in Aravali Power Co. (P) Ltd. v. Era Infra Engg. Ltd., (2017) . However, justifiable doubts could be raised if the person was a controlling or dealing authority with respect to subject matter in dispute.
Appointment Of Arbitrator In International Commercial Arbitration By HC Does Not Vitiate Award: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Hala Kamel Zabal Versus Arya Trading Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 102
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar has held that the appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration (“ICA”) by the Chief Justice of the High Court, does not vitiate the impugned award.The bench held that the objection to the appointment of the arbitrator should have been raised during the arbitration proceedings. Since the parties failed to do so, they were deemed to have waived their right to object.
The examination of the impugned award hinges on whether the award is vitiated due to the alleged illegality in the appointment of the arbitrator, particularly concerning Issue (3), which would only be pertinent if the award is already compromised due to such illegality. Regarding Issue (1), the appointment of the arbitrator, it was determined that it was not in accordance with the 1996 Act, as Section 11(6) clearly mandates that in the case of an ICA, the arbitrator must be appointed by the Supreme Court. However, in this instance, the appointment was made by the Chief Justice of the High Court, rendering the appointment technically flawed.
Case Title: Shristi Infrastructure Development vs Scorpio Engineering Private Limited and Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 521
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh held that an ad-hoc arbitrator (appointed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) is empowered to grant interest rate contemplated under Section 16 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, even if the reference was not made to the MSME Facilitation Council for resolving disputes.
The High Court further held that under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, reference to the Facilitation Council is optional and not mandatory. Since Scorpio had not approached the Facilitation Council, Section 18 of the MSMED Act was not triggered. Therefore, the ordinary arbitral proceedings were valid and unaffected.
SMAS Auto-Leasing Entitled To Protection & Preservation Of EVs Leased To 'Blu Smart', 'Gensol' Pending Arbitration: Delhi High Court
Case Title: SMAS Auto Leasing India Private Limited v. Gensol Engineering Limited & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 528
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has granted interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to the the petitioner who is the owner of electric vehicles (EVs) leased under Master Lease Agreements upon apprehensions of financial distress, default in lease payments by the respondents and a risk of dissipation or deterioration of assets pending arbitration. The Court restrained the respondents from transferring or encumbering the EVs.
No Objections U/S 47 Of CPC Can Be Moved By Judgment Debtor Against Execution Of Award U/S 36 Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 538
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that a judgment debtor is not entitled to move objections under Section 47, CPC in an application for execution of award under Section 36, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) as it would amount to effectively opening a second round for challenging the Award which would undermine the provision of section 34 i.e. challenge to Award on limited grounds and go against the intent of ACA.
The Court clarified that the provisions of CPC are only applicable to the extent of “enforcement” of an Award such as attachment, sale, auction, detention etc. which are reflected in Order XXI, CPC. The legislature did not intend to permit a challenge to an Award during enforcement proceedings again on merits as this would be contrary to the objectives of ACA which aim to ensure finality and limited judicial interference.
When Deciding Application For Appointment Of Arbitrator, Court Cannot Examine Whether Claim Is Barred By Res Judicata: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Hindustan Construction Company Ltd v. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 551
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has observed that it is not open to the referral court in a petition filed under Section 11, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) to examine the issue whether the claim is barred by res judicata. Such an examination falls within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court observed that it is settled that in the scope of jurisdiction under Section 11, ACA, the referral Court does not examine the tenability of the claims sought to be referred to arbitration by the applicant. The enquiry at this stage of appointment of arbitrator is restricted to the existence of arbitration agreement and/or whether the petition itself is barred by limitation.
Initial Filing Without Essential Documents Non Est In Law, Limitation Can't Be Circumvented By Curing Defects: Delhi High Court
Case Title: UNION OF INDIA Versus M/S GR-GAWA R(J.V.)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 565
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that an initial filing made without the essential documents like attaching impugned award etc. required for adjudication is non est in law and has no legal existence. Such a filing, made merely to evade the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be considered valid. The court at the outset noted that the final filing dated 20.01.2025 spans 6,677 pages, in stark contrast to the initial 146-page filing. This significant disparity clearly indicates that the initial filing was a mere formality, intended only to halt the limitation period.
It further added that the skeletal nature of the original filing, lacking essential pleadings and annexures, reflects an attempt to bypass the limitation law. Such a filing cannot be regarded as a bona fide institution of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Case Title:M/S Rhine Power Pvt. Ltd. Versus M/S Ramprastha Promoters And Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 568
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Anish Dayal has held that the contempt court is empowered to issue directions to reverse any benefits obtained in disobedience of an order passed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) to ensure that parties are restrained from violating the court's orders.
The Supreme Court in Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari v Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (2023) held that the contempt court does have the power to declare a contemptuous transaction as void, even if such transfer pendente lite is not void ab initio under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The Apex Court further held that in contempt proceedings, the court can declare such transactions void or direct their reversal to ensure that the contemnor does not benefit from disobedience of court orders. This includes issuing appropriate directions to authorities to nullify any advantage gained through such contumacious conduct, thereby upholding the majesty of law.
Arbitrator's Decision To Choose Internationally Recognised Formula Based On Expertise For Computing Damages Can't Be Faulted: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Delhi Development Authority Versus M/S Naraindas R Israni
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 570
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that different formulae may be applied depending on the circumstances, and the choice of method for computing damages falls within the arbitrator's discretion. Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Contract Act) do not prescribe any specific formula for the calculation of damages. Therefore, the arbitrator's decision to apply any internationally recognized method, based on their expertise, cannot be faulted.
The court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) reviewed the evidence, including the hindrance register, and concluded that the delay was attributable to the petitioner. These are factual findings within the AT's domain, and this Court will not reappreciate the evidence or assess its sufficiency. Based on the above, it held that there is no patent illegality or apparent error in the award. As for the lack of detailed calculations, the AT's reasoning sufficiently explains the partial allowance of the claim and the basis for the awarded amount.
Limitation For Application U/S 11(6) Of Arbitration Act Can't Be Bypassed By Claiming Advocate Was Not Authorised To Issue Notice: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Rinkoo Aggarwal v. Gaurav Sabharwal & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 572
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has held that the bar of limitation for filing an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) seeking the appointment of an arbitrator, cannot be circumvented merely on the ground that the demand-cum-arbitration invocation notice was issued by the petitioner's counsel without proper authorization. The court held that such a contention, if accepted, would render the limitation period for filing such applications meaningless and defeat the very purpose of prescribing a time frame.
The Court also noted that the Apex Court further clarified that while determining the issue of limitation in a petition under Section 11(6), the referral Court would confine its inquiry to examining whether the petition is within the period of limitation of 03 years or not. It further said that the referral Court will not conduct an intricate evidentiary inquiry into the question whether the claims raised by the applicant are time barred and this would be left for determination by the Arbitrator.
Waiver To Section 12(5) Of Arbitration Act Has To Be Given After Constitution Of The Tribunal: Delhi High Court
Case Title – M.V. Omni Projects (India) Ltd. v. Union of India through Chief Engineer Northern Railways & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 573
Th Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that the party giving no-objection to the applicability of Section 12(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) has to give such no-objection after the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The waiver to applicability has to be done after the arbitrators are appointed with the names and details. The Court also observed that any waiver before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is no waiver in the eyes of law.
The Court observed that the waiver contemplated in the proviso of Section 12(5), ACA applies not to the manner or the mechanism under which the Arbitral Tribunal is to be constituted but to the constitution/individual members of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Court referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband v. United Telecom (2019) 5 SCC 755, whereby it was clarified that “express agreement in writing” to waive refers to a “person” who is interdicted by the Seventh Schedule. If an individual falls within any of the categories as mentioned in the Seventh Schedule, then the said person/s are ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator and only to remove the ineligibility, the party may waive by an express agreement the said ineligibility in writing qua the person/s who are ineligible to be appointed.
No Damages For Loss Of Profit In Absence Of Proof Of Missed Profitable Ventures Due To Delay In Contractual Payment: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Union Of India v. Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 576
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia has held that unless it is demonstrated that the delay in payment for the completion of the work contract prevented the contractor from undertaking other profitable ventures, damages for loss of profits cannot be awarded.
The court noted that the 15% mark-up under the contract applies only to deviations involving extra items, quantities, or substitutions, to cover overheads and costs. However, the respondent's claim did not arise from such deviations but sought compensation for costs incurred due to prolongation of the contract, which was allegedly caused by the appellant. Based on the above, it held that the Arbitral Tribunal's rejection of the respondent's claim, citing the 15% mark-up under Schedule 'F', is unsustainable. Clause 2(x) of Schedule 'F' does not apply to claims for additional costs due to prolongation of work. Therefore, the award is vitiated by patent illegality to that extent.
Questions On Legality Of Revival Of Arbitral Proceedings To Be Adjudicated By Tribunal U/S 16 Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: MDD Medical Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Delhi International Arbitration Centre and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 581
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, while hearing a writ petition challenging the decision of Delhi International Arbitration Centre (Respondent No. 1) to revive arbitral proceeding after closing the proceedings due to non-filing of the State of Claim (SOC) observed that since the proceedings have been revived, the Arbitral Tribunal is the competent authority to adjudicate and rule upon.
The bench observed that the three-month time limit under Section 18 of the MSMED Act pertains to the reference to the Facilitation Council and not the arbitration. Section 18(3) of the Act states that once a reference is made to arbitration, the provisions of the A&C Act would apply to the dispute. A Co-ordinate Bench in Indian Highways Management Company Limited v. Mukesh & Associates (2021) took the same view wherein it was observed that 'reference' in Section 18(5) has to be construed as a reference to the facilitation council. Furthermore, the timeline ascribed under Section 18(5) of the Act is directory and not mandatory, unlike the timeline ascribed under Section 29A of the A&C. Unlike Section 18(5), non-adherence to the prescribed time limit under Section 29A would result in the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator.
Case Title: Tirupati Constwell Private Limited Versus Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 582
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that if, after the issuance of a notice invoking arbitration, no bonafide negotiations take place between the parties, and the limitation period for filing an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) expires, the time allegedly spent in such negotiations cannot be excluded while computing the limitation period under Section 11.
The court noted that in Geo Miller & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2020), the Supreme Court held that although the limitation period may have commenced, the time spent in bonafide negotiations for an amicable settlement would be excluded when determining whether a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act was filed within the limitation period.
Intent Of S.11(6) Of Arbitration Act Is Not To Confer Jurisdiction On Courts Incompetent To Entertain Such Applications: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Iifl Home Finance Ltd v. Punkaj Bhagchand Chhallani & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 583
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that the intent of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) cannot be interpreted to confer jurisdiction on a court that is otherwise incompetent to entertain an application under this provision.
The court noted that section 3 of the Arbitration Act provides that a written communication is deemed received if sent to the addressee's last known business or mailing address by any method that records the delivery attempt. In this case, the petitioner has made multiple attempts to serve the respondents, thereby fulfilling its duty to effect service.
It further observed that the arbitration clause in the Standard Terms and Conditions governing the parties' agreements is silent on the “seat and venue of arbitration.” The Supreme Court, in Ravi Ranjan Developers (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Kumar Chatterjee (2022), held that Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act cannot be interpreted to empower a High Court lacking territorial jurisdiction to entertain an application for the appointment of an arbitrator.
Appointment Of Arbitrator As 'Observer' In Another Matter Does Not Render Him Ineligible Under 5th & 7th Schedule Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Ram Krishan Associates Pvt. Ltd. Versus Asian Hotel (North) Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 585
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that the appointment of an arbitrator as an observer in a matter unrelated to the arbitration dispute does not constitute de facto or de jure ineligibility under the Fifth or Seventh Schedules of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Consequently, the arbitrator's mandate cannot be terminated on this ground under Section 14 of the Act. However, the court permitted the petitioner to raise this objection under Section 34 after the award is passed.
The court noted that the Delhi High Court in National Highways Authority of India v. K.K. Sarin & Ors., 2009 held that an important question arises as to whether an unsuccessful challenge to the arbitrator under Section 13(1) of the Arbitration Act confines the aggrieved party's remedy solely to Section 34, given that Section 13(5) does not refer to Section 14. However, interpreting the provision in this manner would render the concept of de jure inability—such as bias—ineffective.
Case Title: Mdd Medical Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd. VERSUS Delhi International Arbitration Centre And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 591
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that the mandate of the MSME Facilitation Council to refer a dispute to arbitration under Section 18(3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act, following the failure of conciliation under Section 18(2), is not automatically terminated if the referral is not made within 90 days as prescribed under Section 18(5). Unlike Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) Section 18(5) of the MSMED Act does not specify any consequences for non-compliance with the 90-day timeline.
Case Title: Harshvardhan Metals Ltd & Anr. Versus ISF Commodities (P) Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 595
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that Bye-laws may serve as operational guidelines, but they cannot impose conditions that conflict with statutory rights. The Court held that when there is no requirement of depositing the awarded amount as a precondition for filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to set aside an award, any attempt to introduce such a requirement through bye-laws is impermissible.
The court at the outset observed that the right to appeal under Bye-Law 15.40 and the right to challenge an arbitral award under Bye-Law 15.41 must be interpreted harmoniously. Bye-Law 15.40.1 requires a party dissatisfied with an arbitral award to deposit the awarded amount with the Exchange before filing an appeal, reflecting an intent to ensure a genuine financial stake in the outcome.
Case Title: PCL Sticco (JV) v. National Highways Authority Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 596
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Vibhu Bakhru and Tejas Karia has held that once the Judgment Debtor deposits the decretal amount with the court registry pursuant to a court order, and the Award Holder has notice of such deposit, interest on the deposited amount ceases to accrue. Consequently, interest can only be claimed on the remaining outstanding amount, not on the sum deposited with the court.
The court noted that although the Judgment Debtor had challenged the Arbitral Award, no court had passed any stay order or restrained enforcement under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The Award Holder remained entitled to enforce the Award at all times and had, in fact, filed an enforcement petition under Section 36 on 02.11.2020. In those proceedings, the learned Single Judge directed the Judgment Debtor to deposit the awarded amount with the Registry of the Court.
Opposite Party's Failure To Reply To S.21 Notice Doesn't Imply Consent To Appointment Of Named Arbitrator: Delhi High Court
Case Title – M/s Supreme Infrastructure India Limited v Freyssinet Memard India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 599
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh while setting aside an arbitral award has observed that unilateral appointment of arbitrator vitiates the award and if the opposite party fails to reply to the notice under Section 21, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”), then such inaction cannot lead to an inference as to implied consent or acquiescence of the party to appointment of the named Arbitrator. The Court held that in such a situation the only recourse available to the party is to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for appointment of an arbitrator.
S.10 Of General Clauses Act Applies Only If S.34 Application Was Filed Within Time, Court Was Closed On Last Day Of Limitation: Delhi HC
Case Title: Vasishta Mantena Nh04 JV & Ors. Versus Mr. Ashish Kothari, Adv. Blacklead Infratech Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 603
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Hari Shankar and Ajay Digpaul has held that the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act is available only when the petition is filed within the normal limitation period that is 90 days as prescribed under section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act and the court was closed on the last day of that period. It does not apply when the court was closed on the last day of the extendable period under proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.
The court at the outset noted that in UOI v. Popular Construction, the Supreme Court held that the time limits prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act—three months plus an extendable period of 30 days—are mandatory. A Section 34 petition cannot be filed beyond this combined period from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. The court further observed that the Section 34 petition was initially presented to the Registry on 21 August 2023 but was not accompanied by any documents, including the copy of the award under challenge.
'Conduct Is Disquieting To Court's Conscience': Delhi High Court Dismisses Applications For Condonation Of Delay In Filing & Re-Filing Appeal
Case Title: Kal Airways Private Limited v. Spicejet Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 604
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices C. Harishankar and Ajay Digpaul observed that the conduct of the appellants in this case is deeply troubling to the court's conscience. They neither informed the respondents about the filing of the present appeals nor disclosed the same to the court, even though the respondents' appeals challenging the same arbitral award had been listed and heard multiple times. Under these circumstances, the delay in filing and refiling the appeals cannot be condoned due to the appellants' evident lack of bona fide.
The court at the outset observed that while courts generally adopt a liberal approach toward condoning delays in refiling, this principle is not absolute. The leniency is based on the idea that if a party initially approaches the court in time, delays in curing defects and refiling are usually due to ministerial lapses—often attributable to counsel—and not a delay in seeking legal remedy. Hence, such delays are more readily condoned than delays in the original filing of proceedings.
Case Title: M/S Construction Industry Development Council Versus M/S Mcm Worldwide Private Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 614
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathanshankar has held that for a valid acknowledgment under section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 certain essential requirements must be met. Firstly, the acknowledgment must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired. Secondly, it must pertain specifically to the liability concerning the right in question. Lastly, the acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the party against whom such right is claimed.
Since, in the present case, the liability was acknowledged only after the expiry of the limitation period, the claims could not be adjudicated by the Arbitrator or the District Judge. Consequently, both the award and the District Judge's order affirming it were set aside on the grounds of public policy and patent illegality.
No Fixed Format For Sending Notice U/S 21 Of A&C Act, Outlining Clear Intention To Adopt Arbitration Is Sufficient: Delhi High Court
Case Title: National Research Development Corporation & Anr. V. M/S Ardee Hi-Tech Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 615
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that there is no prescribed format for a notice invoking arbitration. The legal requirement is that the party invoking arbitration must clearly outline the disputes between the parties and state that if these disputes remain unresolved, arbitration proceedings will be initiated. The intention to resolve the disputes through arbitration must be explicitly stated in the notice.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd. &Anr., 2024 held that when determining the issue of limitation under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, the referral court's role is limited to examining whether the application has been filed within the three-year limitation period. It should not engage in a detailed inquiry into whether the petitioner's claims are time-barred.
Plea Of Waiving Arbitration Clause Cannot Be Examined By Referral Court U/S Of 8 A&C Act, Falls Within Domain Of Tribunal: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Porto Emporios Shipping Inc v Indian Oil Corporation Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 616
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav while allowing an application under Section 8, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) has observed that the plea of waiver of arbitration clause is a plea concerning rights in personam and does not render the dispute to be manifestly non-arbitrable. Consequently, the determination of such a plea properly falls within the jurisdictional domain of the Arbitral Tribunal itself.
The Court held that the solitary issue for consideration before it was whether under the limited periphery of the scope and extent of enquiry envisaged under Section 8, ACA, the plea of waiver of the arbitration clause could be meticulously examined by the referral court in the present case.
After a detailed analysis of the scheme of ACA, the Court concluded that the legislative scheme couched in Sections 5,8,11,16,34 and 37 of ACA would emphatically underscore that the interjection to arbitral proceedings at the inception is an exception to the general rule.
Arbitration Clause Prevails Over Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause, Court At Designated Seat Retains Jurisdiction: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S Kla Const Technologies Pvt Ltd v. M/S Gulshan Homz Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 623
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that when an exclusive jurisdiction clause is expressly made "subject to" the arbitration clause, and the arbitration clause designates a different territorial location as the seat of arbitration, the arbitration clause prevails. In case of conflict, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the seat designated in the arbitration agreement which overrides the exclusive jurisdictional clause mentioned in the agreement.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Ramkishorelal held that the golden rule of interpretation mandates that the entire document must be read as a whole in order to cull out a true intention of the parties by using the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, while considering the context and background, including the status and expertise of the parties. It further added that where conflicting clauses exist—such as an earlier clause granting absolute title and a later clause imposing restrictions—the former generally prevails if it is clear and unambiguous. Courts should first strive to harmonize conflicting parts, and only if harmony is impossible should the later inconsistent clause be disregarded.
Jurisdiction Of Arbitral Tribunal Continues Despite Provisional Attachment Of Assets Under PMLA Or Parallel Proceedings: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Lata Yadav v. Shivakriti Agro Pvt. Ltd & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 696
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Amit Mahajan has held that the mere reference to certain assets in a provisional attachment order does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Similarly, the pendency of parallel investigations by the CBI or ED into allegations of fraud does not bar the arbitrator from adjudicating the dispute. Arbitration proceedings can continue independently, even when some aspects of the subject matter are under criminal investigation.
The court noted that the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited and must be exercised sparingly. Though courts can review orders passed in arbitral proceedings, such interference is justified only in exceptional cases where glaring perversity is evident. The Supreme Court in Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC (2020)held that Article 227 cannot be used to bypass the arbitration framework and should be invoked only in rare circumstances. It further observed that merely alleging fraud does not render a dispute non-arbitrable. In A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam (2016), the Supreme Court distinguished between simple and serious allegations of fraud, holding that only serious allegations—those affecting the validity of the arbitration agreement itself—would bar arbitration.
Plaint Can't Be Rejected Under O.VII R.11 Of CPC Due To Arbitration Clause Unless Application U/S 8 Of A&C Act Is Filed: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Din Dayal Agrawal Huf v. Capriso Finance Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 715
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja has held that if a proper application is filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court must refer the parties to arbitration and may reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) as barred by law. However, if no such application is filed and no prayer is made for reference to arbitration, the mere existence of an arbitration clause is not sufficient to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. (2011) laid down a five-factor test for courts to determine whether to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. These include confirming the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, whether all parties to the suit are parties to the agreement, if the disputes fall within the agreement's scope, and whether the application under Section 8 was made before the first statement on the substance of the dispute. Section 8 mandates referral to arbitration unless the court finds no valid agreement exists.
Party That Unilaterally Appointed Arbitrator Not Barred From Challenging Appointment U/S 12(5) Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S Mahavir Prasad Gupta And Sons v. Govt. Of NCT Of Delhi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 716
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Tejas Karia and Justice Vibhu Bakhru has held that a party that unilaterally appoints an arbitrator is not prohibited from challenging the award on the ground that it violates Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration Act. Mere exercise of the power to make such an appointment does not constitute an express written waiver as required under the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.
The court noted that unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by one party is impermissible under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act, read with the Seventh Schedule, as it raises justifiable doubts regarding the arbitrator's independence or impartiality. Such an appointment is void ab initio, and any award passed by an ineligible arbitrator is unenforceable in law.
It further observed that Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act overrides Section 4 and requires an express written waiverto validate an otherwise ineligible arbitrator's appointment. Waiver by conduct or participation is not sufficient. The Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband held such ineligibility is de jure, and the arbitrator's mandate terminates automatically under Section 14(1)(a).Consenting to the extension of the mandate of the arbitrator under Section 29A(3) of the Act does not constitute a valid express waiver in writing as required under the proviso to Section 12(5) of the Act.
Applicability Of Arbitration Clause Is To Be Determined By Arbitrator, Cannot Be Decided In S.11 Plea: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Indraprastha Gas Limited v. M/S Chintamani Food And Snacks
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 683
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Sachin Datta has held that contentions regarding the applicability and relevance of an arbitration agreement are to be dealt with by the arbitrator and cannot be gone into at the stage of section 11 petition. Once the existence of arbitration agreement is not disputed, any dispute related to the applicability of the agreement has to be dealt by the arbitrator. Further, the court observed that the arbitration agreement between the parties contemplates that the appointment of the sole Arbitrator shall be made out of a panel of three persons chosen by the petitioner. This appointment procedure is no longer valid in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification Vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company (2024). It is held that it is incumbent on the court to appoint an independent sole arbitrator.
Once Right To File Written Statement Is Closed, Application U/S 8 Of Arbitration Act Can't Be Entertained: Delhi High Court
Case Title: R. Santosh v. One97 Communications Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 688
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Shalinder Kaur and Navin Chawla has held that once the right to file a written statement is closed, an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking reference to arbitration is not maintainable.
The court noted that the Respondent supported its claim through PW-1's affidavit and documentary evidence, including the Ticketing Agreement , Addendum Agreement and statement of accounts, and the termination notice. The Appellant did not cross-examine PW-1 on 12.12.2023, thus failing to contest either the testimony or the documents. This unchallenged evidence is deemed proved, indicating the absence of any credible defence by the Appellant.
Recourse To External Correspondences To Interpret Clause Despite Clear & Unambiguous Terms Amounts To 'Patent Illegality': Delhi High Court
Case Title: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. JSIW Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 692
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia has held that when the language of the contract is plain, clear and unambiguous, recourse to internal aids of interpretation or extraneous materials such as negotiations and correspondence is impermissible. “Ignoring an explicit clause of the contract or acting contrary to the terms of the contract amounts to patent illegality.”, the court held.
The Court further observed that when the language of Clause 3.4.1.5 of the GCC was plain, clear and unambiguous, the internal aid of interpretation was impermissible. It held that the arbitral tribunal wrongly relied on negotiations and correspondence that were explicitly excluded by the contract. “Ignoring an explicit clause of the contract or acting contrary to the terms of the contract amounts to patent illegality”, the Court held.
Arbitration Clause Allowing MD To Appoint Sole Arbitrator After Failure Of Appointment By Mutual Consent Violates SC's Order: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Ballarpur Industries Limited v. Sg Enterprises & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 693
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh has held that the clause in question indeed contemplates the appointment of an Arbitrator by mutual consent; however, in the event of failure, it vests the power of appointing a Sole Arbitrator with the Managing Director of Respondent No. 1.
It further held that the Company acting through its Managing Director will have interest in the outcome of the dispute and therefore, appointment of Sole Arbitrator will be directly hit by the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Party autonomy as also impartiality and independence of the Arbitrator appointed to adjudicate inter se disputes between the parties are the foundational pillars of arbitration.
'File Movement' & 'Change In Counsel' Not Sufficient Cause For Condonation Of Delay In Filing S.37 Arbitral Appeals: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Union of India v. M/s Rajiv Aggarwal (Engineers and Contractors)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 695
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta has held that mere movement of file and change in counsel due to administrative issues does not constitute “sufficient cause” to condone inordinate delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The court reiterated that for appeals under Section 37 that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule.
Dispute Review Board's Recommendations Are Arbitral Awards, Enforceable U/S 36 Of A&C Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S. Jaiprakash Hyundai Consortium v. M/S. SJVN Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 679
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Tejas Karia has held that the recommendations of the Dispute Review Board (DRB) rendered under a contract constitute an arbitral award which is enforceable as a decree under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The court further held that the limitation for enforcement begins from the date of the award, not from the date of the judgment declaring it as an 'award'.
The Court relied on the case of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited v. M/s Nathpa Jhakri Joint Venture where the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that a decision rendered by the DRB in respect of disputes of a value less than ₹5 crores is required to be construed as an arbitral award under the A&C Act and the same cannot be challenged by an aggrieved party by filing a suit. The only remedy available to such a party would be to file an application under Section 34 of the A&C Act to set aside the award.
Inconsequential Errors Cannot Be Grounds To Challenge Judicious & Reasoned Award U/S 34 Of Arbitration Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Hindustan Hydraulics Pvt. Ltd v. Union Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 681
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Manoj Kunar Ohri has held that the petitioner cannot take advantage of apparent inconsequential errors and fumbles to challenge the award. Inconsequential errors in the award cannot be a ground to challenge otherwise judicious and reasoned award.
The court observed that the respondent did not outrightly reject the machine, when it discovered the basic design deviation, which was pointed out by the RCF in its earliest deficiency list. However, the said deviation was called out consistently in several letters, over the trial run of the machine. Also, the court noted that the respondent expected the petitioner to rectify the defects raised, including the basic design deviation mentioned above, but the same could not be achieved.
WhatsApp, Email Communications Between Parties Can Constitute Valid Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court
Title: Belvedere Resources Dmcc v. Ocl Iron And Steel Ltd & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 740
The Delhi High Court has ruled that communications between the parties through WhatsApp and emails can constitute a valid arbitration agreement.
Justice Jasmeet Singh perused Section 7(4)(b) of the Arbitration Act and said that it is not necessary for a concluded contract to be in existence for a valid arbitration agreement to be existing between the parties. The Court was dealing with a plea filed by a UAE based company, Belvedere Resources DMCC, seeking monetary security of approximately Rs. 23.34 Crores from OCL Iron and Steel Ltd., Oriental Iron Casting Limited and Aron Auto Limited.
Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause Prevails Over Arbitrator's Procedural Order In Determining 'Seat' Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/S Viva Infraventure Pvt. Ltd. vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 755
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that an 'exclusive jurisdiction clause' in the arbitration agreement unequivocally denotes the 'seat' of arbitration. The court observed that any contrary determination made by the Arbitrator without the express written consent of the parties only relates to a 'venue' under Section 20(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court therefore dismissed the Section 29A(5) petition due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.
The court observed that the phrase 'Any suit or application for the enforcement of this arbitration clause shall be filed in the competent court at Gautam Budh Nagar, no other court or any other district or Pradesh or outside Uttar Pradesh shall have any jurisdiction in the matter' in Clause 32 of the Contract unequivocally reflected the intention of partis to confer exclusive jurisdiction solely on the courts at Gautam Budh Nagar 'for enforcement of the arbitration clause'.
The Court noted that although the arbitrator had fixed the seat as Delhi in the Procedural Order, the respondent had not consented to it. It noted that the respondent had already filed an application before the Arbitrator seeking clarification/review/modification of the Procedural Order to the limited extent that New Delhi is merely the venue.
Past Professional Relationship Creates Enough Bias To Terminate Arbitrator's Mandate U/S 14 Of A&C Act, Duration Is Immaterial: Delhi HC
Case Title: Roshan Real Estates Pvt Ltd v. Government Of NCT Of Delhi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 758
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that if any person had any professional or supervisory relationship with the party to the Arbitration, such person cannot be appointed as an Arbitrator as per Entry 1 of the Seventh Schedule. It does not matter whether such a relationship existed over 17 years ago but the real test is whether such a relationship created a reasonable apprehension of bias. Accordingly, the mandate of the Arbitrator was terminated in the present case.
The court held that in the present case, the petitioner and the appointed arbitrator had a professional relationship in the past. The Petitioner was a contractor and the Appointed Arbitrator was acting as a Superintendent Engineer in CPWD which was a client of the Contractor. The Respondent contended that their interaction was limited and happened over 17 years ago. Nonetheless, it shows that a professional, business or supervisory relationship existed between the petitioner and the Arbitrator.
It further held that “Entry 1 of the Seventh Schedule, in particular, is designed to insulate the arbitral process from both actual and perceived bias by disqualifying individuals who have had a past or present business relationship with a party to the dispute.”
Contract Clause Favouring Employer Over Contractor In Claiming Damages Are Deemed Knowingly Included If Not Challenged Before Tribunal: Delhi HC
Case Title: M/S Larsen & Toubro Limited. v. Rail Vikas Nigam Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 760
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri has held that clauses of the contract giving an advantage to the employer over the contractor in claiming damages, if not questioned before the Arbitral Tribunal or at the time of formation or execution of the contract, cannot be questioned under section 34 of the Arbitration Act as the parties are deemed to have knowingly incorporated such clauses in the contract.
It further observed that the petitioner's conduct shows that it was aware of the arrangement entered into between the parties as no compensation was claimed while seeking extension of time due to the failure of the Respondent in handing over the site and obtaining approvals. The extension of time was granted by the Respondent without imposing any penalty.
It further observed that however, the claim for compensation was raised subsequently via a letter which was denied by the Respondent citing clause 2.2 of the GCC. It is well settled that the AT is the master of facts and evidence and is in a better position to interpret the clauses of the contract based on the factual context. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Susaka (P) Ltd held that a plea not raised before the AT amounts waiver or clear abandonment and cannot be raised later in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Amendment To Bring Additional Grounds U/S 34 Of A&C Act Is Maintainable If Objections Are Not Beyond Judicial Scrutiny Of Court: Delhi HC
Case Name: Raheja Developers Limited v. Ahluwalia Contractors India Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 762
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri while hearing amendment petition filed u/s 34 of the A&C Act observed that the omission to plead a ground of challenge in the original Section 34 petition pertaining to non-adherence to the mandatory procedure of Section 29A would not oust the jurisdiction of the Section 34 Court to scrutinize the same. The Court held that the amendments sought in the present application fall within the exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction.
The bench further observed that the amendment sought in the present petition, when tested on the yardstick laid down in Hindustan Construction, is clear that the additional grounds raised are legal in nature, which are supported by the foundational facts pleaded in the Section 34 petition. The Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdictional competence to continue with the arbitral proceeding after the expiration of the statutory period enshrined u/s 29A of the A&C Act is a legal question which the Section 34 Court would have enquired into. The failure to raise an objection in the original Section 34 petition pertaining to the failure to adhere to the mandatory procedure u/s 29A for extension of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate would not oust the Section 34 Court from examining whether the Arbitral Tribunal was functus officio at the passing of the award.
Mandate Of Arbitrator Can Be Terminated For Delay In Passing Award Despite Absence Of Automatic Termination Clause In NSE Bye-Laws: Delhi HC
Case Title: Ram Kawar Garg v. Bajaj Capital Investor Services Limited Now New Name Is Just Trade Securities Limited And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 764
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that although the National Stock Exchange (NSE) Bye Laws do not provide for the automatic termination of the Arbitrator's mandate after the expiry of the time period stipulated under Bye Law 7(b) of the NSE Bye Laws, the mandate of the Arbitrator can be terminated by the Relevant Authority if the Arbitrator fails to pass the award within time thereby indirectly limiting the arbitrator's mandate. This shows that the intent and spirit of both the NSE Bye-Laws and the Arbitration Act is the same as both prescribe for the termination of the arbitrator's mandate if timely award is not passed.
Parties Can't Be Barred From Performing Contractual Obligations In Final Partial Award When It Remains In Force: Delhi HC
Case Title: Union Of India v. Vedanta Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 792
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that parties cannot be prevented from performing their contractual obligations as interpreted in the Final Partial Award, especially when both the Final Partial Award as well as the contract interpreted therein have not been stayed and remain in force.
The present appeal has been filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) against an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) by which an application of the Appellant seeking a restraint on the Respondent from unilaterally implementing the Final Partial Award (FPA) until final quantification is made by the AT, was dismissed.
It further observed that just because no agreement was reached between the parties on quantum does not relieve the Respondents from performing its obligations under the PSC which was in force. The AT only allowed the parties to return for quantification if needed. The reliance of the Respondent on the FPA is not an enforcement but mere adherence to the contractual obligations as interpreted in the FPA. As the FPA is not a money decree and final quantification is still pending, the Respondent was within its right to recover post exploration costs.
The court further observed that in the absence of the AT's directions for final quantification, the Respondent's deductions could be considered unilateral. However, since no stay on either the FPA or PSC was granted, the Respondent was obligated to follow the FPA's interpretation. Therefore, it cannot be said that their actions were unilateral rather they were performing their obligations under the PSC. The AT also permitted the Appellant to seek readjustment after final quantification.
Delhi High Court Upholds Arbitral Award Of About ₹229.5 Crores Against NHAI As 'Termination Payment'
Case Title: National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) v. South Indian Bank Ltd and Union Bank of India Ltd. & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 815
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has upheld an Arbitral Award directing the National Highways Authority of India (“NHAI”/”Petitioner”) to deposit ₹229.50 crores as Termination Payment into the Escrow Account along with interest and costs. The court reiterated that the scope of judicial interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is narrow and circumscribed. The Arbitral Award can be set aside on the ground, inter alia, being in conflict with the public policy of India, patent illegality, violation of principles of natural justice.
The Court rejected the argument of the petitioner that the Concession Agreement did not form part of the Escrow Agreement and Substitution Agreement. Upon examining the recitals of the EA and SA, the Court found that the Concession Agreement was expressly stated to “form part of this Agreement”.
Case Title: Canara Bank v. Sanjeev Sharma & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 819
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar held that when an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is filed in opposition to a civil suit, a party cannot later object that the arbitration was intended to apply only to specific respondents, especially when the pleadings indicate that the agreements formed part of a single commercial transaction.
The court noted that the Supreme Court in Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises held that in interconnected agreements which form a single transaction may be referred to arbitration even if some of them lacked arbitration clause or involved non-signatories.
It held that “the pleadings and the prayer, read holistically, indicate that the Appellant, in fact, confirms that all the Agreements are an integral part of the entire transaction and that is the reason why the Suit makes express reference to all the Agreements which formed a part of the Transaction, inter alia, the Tri-partite Agreement, which contained the Arbitration Clause.”
Case Title: Engineering Projects (India) Limited v. MSA Global LLC (Oman)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 901
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav has held that Civil Courts are not prohibited from granting anti arbitration injunction in a foreign seated arbitration if the proceedings are conducted in a vexatious and oppressive manner.
The present application has been filed seeking an injunction against the ongoing arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) stating that the proceedings are vexatious, oppressive, unconscionable and against the public policy of India.
The court while copiously referring to the Supreme Court judgments held that the court is competent to try all civil suits under section 9 of the CPC as the jurisdiction of a Civil Court can only be ousted if it is expressly or impliedly is barred by any law for the time being enforced. Courts do not easily infer exclusion of the jurisdiction and see factors like adequacy of remedies before the Tribunal, adherence to judicial procedures and legislative intent. In the absence of a clear bar on jurisdiction, the court retains its plenary jurisdiction.
The Delhi High Court in Dabhol Power Company held that the court can grant anti arbitration injunctions despite contentions that the Arbitral Tribunal can decide on its own jurisdiction. Neither section 5 nor section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) prohibit civil courts from doing the same especially when the proceedings in a foreign seated arbitration are found to be oppressive.
Mere Pendency Of Formal Signature By One Party Doesn't Preclude Parties From Being Referred To Arbitration: Delhi HC Allows Vedanta's Plea
Case Title: Vedanta Limited v. Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 902
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad has held that the mere pendency of a formal signature by one party, when the other party has signed the agreement after reading and understanding its terms, including the arbitration clause, does not prevent the parties from being referred to arbitration.
The court noted that the signed and duly filled copy of the GSA was supplied to the Respondent. In the copy, effective date, gas price and volume which were agreed upon during the RFP process as evident from e-mail, were also incorporated in the GSA. After the conclusion of the contract, the GSA was formally sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent for execution who had read, understood and confirmed its contents. Furthermore, the submission of Forms C1 and C6 by the Respondent fortifies the conclusion that the terms of the GSA including the arbitration clause were accepted.
Arbitral Award Cannot Be Challenged Through Civil Suit: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Mmtc Limited Versus Ms. Anglo-American Metallurgical Pty Limited And Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 912
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that an arbitral award cannot be challenged through a civil suit, as such a course is clearly barred under Section 5 read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). Such a plaint deserves to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), on the ground that it is barred by law.
It held that “the Arbitral Award may be set aside “only” on the grounds mentioned there under. By using the word “only” twice, section 34 of 1996 Act makes it clear that no challenge to an Award can be launched outside of the said section and beyond the grounds specified therein. This means that section 34 of 1996 Act offers an exhaustive and exclusive remedy to contest an Arbitral Award.”
Restraining Breaching Party From Activities Barred By Shareholders' Agreement Is Not Prohibited U/S 27 Of Contract Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Paul Deepak Rajaratnam & Ors. v. Surgeport Logistics Private Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 943
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that restraining a breaching party through an interim award passed under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act from engaging in certain activities, as per the terms of Shareholders' Agreement (SHA), to prevent the subject matter of arbitration from being rendered futile, is not barred under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, especially when the contract remains valid and has not been lawfully terminated.
The court further held that existence of a liquidated damages clause does not bar issuance of injunctive reliefs when the damages caused due to the conduct of the breaching party cannot be quantified. The interim reliefs under section 17 of the Arbitration Act were essential to protect the subject matter of the Arbitration and to prevent the arbitration from being rendered futile. Denial of such reliefs would allow the Appellants to cause irreparable harm to the Respondent's business abroad. Furthermore, the interim award is neither punitive nor final rather it was passed to maintain the contractual status quo.
Case Title – PEC Ltd v. Ms Badri Singh Vinimay Pvt Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 958
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar while upholding an arbitral award has observed that if the parties had agreed to transact goods on 'as is where is' basis in the tender document but agreed in the acceptance letter that the goods would be transacted on 'sound condition' basis, then the earlier agreement will stand substituted by the latter understanding between the parties and the goods will be transacted on 'sound condition' basis.
The Court observed that the earlier “as is where is basis clause” subsequently stood substituted and was only limited to as to whether the Respondents carried out their obligation of lifting that conformed to the stipulation of “sound condition”, the Court observed that it had to look at the entire dispute from the narrow conspectus of as to whether the Respondents had adhered to the Agreement between the parties which was for the supply of cargo in “sound condition”, i.e. 960 bags.
Oyo has filed a section 34 petition before the High Court of Delhi, challenging a few portions of an arbitral award passed in the dispute between Oyo and Lenskart (“Oyo Hotels and Homes Pvt Ltd v. Lenskart Solutions”) pertaining to the termination of a co-working space lease during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the arbitral proceedings, Oyo was partially successful and has filed the Section 34 petition to set aside the arbitral tribunal's finding concerning compensation for the lock-in period under the lease agreement, the award of interest, and observations concerning the issue of stamp duty.
Post-Termination Restrictive Covenants In Employment Contracts Are Void U/S 27 Of Contract Act: Delhi High Court
Case Title: Neosky India Limited & Anr. v. Mr. Nagendran Kandasamy & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 977
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that post-service restrictive covenants in employment contracts, which operate after cessation of employment, are void and are not enforceable under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”) and violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court vacated the injunction granted in an application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), which restrained the Respondents from engaging in a competing business post-termination of their employment agreements.
Timeline Prescribed For Filing Statement Of Defence Under Rule 18(3) Of Indian Council Of Arbitration Rules Is Directory In Nature: Delhi HC
Case Title: Aneja Constructions (India) v. Doosan Power Systems India Private Limited And Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 980
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Manoj Jain has held that the timeline prescribed under Indian Council of Arbitration Rules, 2024 for filing a Statement of Defence by the respondent is directory in nature and can be extended by the Arbitral Tribunal if a sufficient cause is established.
The Court noted that a careful perusal of the impugned order, it becomes clear that the Arbitral Tribunal believed that it had jurisdiction to extend the timelines in the interest of justice. While acknowledging the timelines prescribed by the ICA Rules, it held that the time can be extended if a sufficient cause is shown. The Arbitral Tribunal also noted that the cases cited by the claimant relate to statutory provisions whereas the timelines in the present case emerge from the ICA Rules, not any specific legislation.
Interim Injunction U/S 9 Of Arbitration Act Cannot Be Granted To Prevent Convening Of Meeting For Removal Of Director: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Drharors Aesthetics v. Debulal Banerjee
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 981
The Delhi High Court bench of Justices Anil Kshetarpal and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar has observed that an interim injunction under section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“ACA”) cannot be granted to prevent convening of extraordinary general meeting for removal of a director as it effectively amounts to grant of final relief and impinges upon statutory powers conferred to a Company under the Companies Act, 2013.
The Court observed that a perusal of the Impugned order revealed that the District Judge found prima facie merit in the contention of the Respondent that the notices for Board Meeting and EGM were issued in contravention of Sections 169 and 173(3), Companies Act, 2013 as they did not meet the statutory minimum of 7 days and lacked sufficient particulars regarding the grounds of proposed removal which denied the Respondent the reasonable opportunity of being heard. On this basis, the District Judge granted the interim injunction.
Failure To Frame Counter Claim As An Additional Issue When It Forms Part Of Pleadings Is Patently Illegal: Delhi High Court
Case Title – Indraprastha Power Generation Co Ltd. v EM Services P Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 991
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that once the reasons/basis for a counter claim, the amount and computation of the counter claim had been made in the Reply, it does not matter if there is no specific prayer in the prayer clause. In such a scenario, an arbitral award refusing to frame an issue for the counter claim would be patently illegal and would be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law.
The Court observed that once there was counter claim of the Petitioner in its pleading and the Petitioner had spelt out the reasons as well as has given basis for arriving at a figure of counter-claim and moreover, the Respondent in its rejoinder had denied the claim of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the Sole Arbitrator to frame an issue in this regard and to that extent the order dated 13.02.2022 passed by the Sole Arbitrator is erroneous.
Case Title: M/s Royal Infraconstru Limited v. Union of India, West Central Railway
Case No.: O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 80/2025
The Delhi High Court bench comprising Justice Amit Bansal has issued notice in a petition filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”), seeking termination of the mandate of the Standing Arbitral Tribunal (“SAT”) constituted by the Union of India, West Central Railway (“Respondent”) in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV).
Govt Notifications Imposing Restrictions On Usage In Contracts For Supply Of Gas Are Laws Under Article 12, Must Be Complied With: Delhi HC
Case Name: Gujarat State Fertilisers & Chemicals Ltd. v. M/S Gail (India) Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1019
The Delhi High Court, while dismissing a Section 34 petition, observed that the five contracts entered into between the parties were subject to the restrictions imposed by the Government. By providing the gas at a subsidised price, the Government has the authority to regulate the use of such gas.
The bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad held that the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (“MoPNG”) had apprised the Petitioner of the Government's policy concerning the usage of APM gas. The learned Sole Arbitrator was correct in holding that the buyer of the gas would not be entitled to use the subsidised gas for any other purpose than the contemplated in the contract, i.e., production of fertilisers.
Dismissal Of Plea U/S 8 Of A&C Act Amounts To Res Judicata; S.11 Court Cannot Refer Parties To Arbitration: Delhi High Court
Case Name: Surender Bajaj v. Dinesh Chand Gupta and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1032
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, while dismissing a Section 11 petition under the A&C Act, observed that dismissing a Section 8 application under the A&C Act amounts to res judicata. The Section 11 Court cannot refer the parties to Arbitration if the order dismissing Section 8 is not set aside or interfered with.
A Collaboration Agreement dated 26.11.2018 was entered into by the parties, and the Petitioner was required to carry out the construction. In lieu of the construction, the possession and ownership of the second floor were to be handed over to the Petitioner. The said construction was carried out; however, the Respondent was not handing over the possession and ownership of the property.
Case Title – BHEL v. Xiamen Longking Bulk Material Science and Engineering Co.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1062
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh while allowing a petition under Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act (“ACA”) observed that when the contract required the bidder to establish an office in India as a pre-requisite to performance, the decision by the Arbitrator holding that compliance could be deferred, amounted to rewriting the contract. Such a holding violated fundamental policy of Indian law and the award was liable to be set aside.
The Court observed that Clause 1, PEM which was part of the bid of the Respondent and was accepted by the Petitioner, contained clear undertakings by the Respondent to open an office in India and an Indian Bank Account before the commencement of the execution of the Indian component of the contract. This was not a mere formality but it was central to compliance with the RBI guidelines.
The Court further observed that from a conjoint reading of the PEM, LoA and GCC leaves no scope for payment to any unrelated third party or for waiver of the local office/bank account requirement without the consent of the Petitioner. The finding of the Arbitrator that the requirement to establish a project office and bank account could be deferred until after drawing approval and even substituted by the use of a third party's bank account, was a direct departure from the contractual framework agreed to between the parties. Additionally, the Respondent had never denied the obligation of opening an Indian office and bank account but only highlighted its inability to do so.
Independent Panel Of Arbitrators Not Curated By Either Party Cannot Be Challenged On Grounds Of Impartiality: Delhi High Court
Case Title: M/s. KNR Tirumala Infra Pvt. Ltd. versus National Highways Authority of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1068
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that when the panel of arbitrators from which appointments are to be made is broad-based, comprising retired Supreme Court Judges and other eminent officials, and is independent, not controlled by any party, the other party cannot refuse to abide by the institutional rules it has consciously agreed to, on the ground that the panel is not impartial.
The court observed that through a circular amendment in the SAROD Rules, it was provided that obtaining membership is not a mandatory precondition for invoking arbitration under its Rules. Non-members are equally entitled to initiate arbitration and participate in proceedings under the SAROD framework. Thus, the very mischief that was sought to be addressed in Rani Constructions (supra) has been remedied.
It further observed that the principles laid down in CORE II are not applicable to the facts of the present case as the contractor's choice in CORE II was restricted to two names from a list of Railway Officers while the General Manager retained an exclusive control to appoint other arbitrators giving one party dominant control. This clause was struck down by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the Appointment of Arbitrators under SAROD or ICA is made under independent rules from a neutral panel.
Absence Of Word 'Seat' Does Not Oust Court's Jurisdiction Conferred By Arbitration Agreement: Delhi High Court
Case Title: SNS Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. M/S Hariom Projects Pvt. Ltd. And Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1084
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has held that absence of the word 'seat' does not strip the court of its exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of an arbitration agreement.
This is a petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) seeking appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties arising out of the Work Order/ Acceptance Letter dated 21.10.2021.
The Court observed that in the present case, clause 14 of the Acceptance Letter clearly provides that in case of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Letter, the dispute shall be decided by the Ahmedabad Court. Therefore, the coutt at Ahmedabad has jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and appoint the arbitrator.
It further observed that “While interpreting such exclusive jurisdictional clauses it must be borne in mind, that when parties agree in the arbitration clause/ agreement to vest exclusive jurisdiction in a particular Court for adjudication of any disputes thereof, it is to be presumed that they intended that Court only to have supervisory control.”
Arbitration Clause In Loan Agreement Becomes Incorporated In Deeds Of Guarantee When Both Form Part Of Single Transaction: Delhi HC
Case Title – Intec Capital Limited v. Shekhar Chand Jain
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1090
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that contemporaneously executed Loan Agreement and Deeds of Guarantee, where the intent of the parties to incorporate the Loan Agreement into the Deeds of Guarantee is clear, the Guarantor although a non-signatory to the Loan Agreement, becomes bound by the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement.
The Court observed that since the fact that the Loan Agreement contained an arbitration clause and that the Respondents had not signed the Loan Agreement were undisputed, the main issue for consideration was whether the arbitration clause in the Loan Agreement could be said to have been incorporated into the Deeds of Guarantee.
The Court observed that the distinction between “general reference” to another contract and “incorporation by specific reference” laid down in M.R. Engineers was relevant to the present case. In the said case, the Apex Court had held that a general reference to another document would not incorporate the arbitration clause of that document, unless the reference is specific to the arbitration clause or the entire document is expressly incorporated. Thus, the Court observed that the test is whether there is clear intention of the parties to import the arbitration clause.
Usage Of Disputed Trademark Even After Filing Of Challenge Would Cause Serious Confusion To Public: Delhi High Court
Case Name: M/S Azure Hospitality Private Limited v. Amit Bhasin, Proprietor Of Retail India Solutions
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1115
The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Shail Jain, while hearing a Section 37(1)(b) appeal under the Arbitration Act, observed that using the subject brand names after a dispute between the parties can cause enormous confusion to the public. People may associate the Respondent's outlets with the Appellants.
terminated due to non-payment of the Project Management Fee. The Respondent cannot be allowed to use the subject brand name indefinitely.
The bench observed that there is a serious dispute between the parties. Prima facie, once the Franchise Agreements are terminated, using the subject brand names could cause serious confusion to the public, who may still associate the Respondent's outlets with the Appellants.
Unadjudicated Claims Cannot Be Secured Through Interim Relief U/S 9 Of A&C Act Merely Due To Financial Distress: Delhi HC
Case Title – RESCOM Mineral Trading FZE v Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1143
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh has observed that mere financial distress of the other party would not be a ground to allow interim relief and grant its unadjudicated claim under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act (ACA).
"However, the calculation of any permissible rebate and the resolution of quality-based objections require factual findings and interpretation of the terms of the Agreement, which is an exercise to be carried out in the arbitration. Hence, the amounts claimed by the petitioner at this stage are unadjudicated claims, which cannot be secured through interim relief merely because respondent No. 1 is in financial distress," the court said.
The Court observed that the main issue for its consideration was whether Respondent No. 1 could be directed to secure the amount in dispute only on the ground that it is in financial distress and consequently, the Arbitral Award that might eventually be passed against it could become infructuous.
The Court observed that though it was not strictly bound by the provisions of CPC, it could not completely disregard its underlying principles. For passing an interim order in the nature of attachment before an award, the Court needed to satisfy itself that the conditions underlying Order XXXVIII Rule 5, CPC are met. The Court has to be convinced that there exists a strong prima facie case that the other party is actively trying to dissipate its assets to defeat the outcome of the award.
Commercial Unit Buyers Not Barred From Seeking Arbitration Relief After Availing Remedies Under RERA: Delhi High Court
Case Title: HARMEET SINGH KAPOOR & ANR. versus M/S NEO DEVELOPERS PVT LTD and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1159
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Pratibha M. Singh and Justice Shail Jain has held that Buyers of commercial units are not prohibited from seeking arbitration relief subsequent to availing remedies under RERA, provided that the arbitration petitions were filed after a change in circumstances.
The court at the outset observed that although the Supreme Court's judgment in Ireo Grace Realtech bars simultaneous remedies for the same cause of action but does not prohibit the party from seeking arbitration relief once the circumstances have changed. The RERA remedies were invoked before the issuance of the completion certificate, whereas the arbitration petitions were filed after the completion certificate was issued.
It was further observed that the buyers ran from pillar to post since 2015, despite making substantial payments. The court held that the respondent not only withheld possession of the units but also earned rentals by leasing the said units, going against the RERA's directions.
Foreign Arbitral Awards To Be Enforced Under Indian Law, Interpretation Of 'Public Policy' U/S 48(2)(b) A&C Act Is Limited: Delhi HC
Case Name: Roger Shashoua & Ors. v. Mukesh Sharma & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1165
The Delhi High Court observed that to enforce a New York Convention Award, an application u/s 47 of the A&C Act, 1996 has to be filed. Thereafter, the onus shifts on the party opposing the enforcement to make out a ground enlisted in Section 48 of the A&C Act. The bench observed
"The settled legal position with respect to foreign awards is that, except strictly in terms of grounds of challenge as set out in Section 48 of the A&C Act, 1996, foreign arbitral awards are to be enforced in accordance with law in India. The substantive facts and merits of a particular case are not to be gone into. This position of law has been upheld in a catena of judgments, including the judgment of this Court in Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (India) Co., [(2008) SCC OnLine Del 1271].”
The bench observed that the Supreme Court in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano Spa (2014) has clarified the scope of the public policy exception to foreign awards. The expression 'public policy of India' u/s 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act has an extremely narrow scope and meaning. Unlike Section 34 of the A&C Act, which allows a broader interpretation of public policy, Section 48(2)(b) of the A&C Act has a circumscribed and limited application when it comes to the enforcement of foreign awards. Even based upon an assumption that the Tribunal's direction concerning the transfer of shares is beyond the scope of the agreement, the same would not bar the enforceability of the impugned arbitral awards.
Delhi HC Declines To Restrain Encalm Hospitality From Doing Business With Clients Of Dreamfolks Services, Says No Mandate Of Exclusivity
Case Title – Dreamfolks Services Limited v. Encalm Hospitality Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1183
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice Amit Bansal refused to enforce a negative covenant against Encalm Hospitality Private Limited holding that its agreement with Dreamfolks Services Limited did not mandate exclusivity between the latter and its clients and thus Encalm was not in violation of the Agreement.
The Court observed that the Petitioner placed reliance on Clause 4.4 of the Agreement to contend that the Respondent could not do business with the Clients of the Petitioner either directly or through representatives during the subsistence of the Agreement. The stand taken by the Petitioner was that “representatives” would include other third-party service providers. Further, the obligation would continue during the notice period of 90 days beginning from 04.08.2025, which the Respondent was required to honour.
The Court observed that the Agreement did not contain a list of Petitioner's clients nor did the Agreement stipulate that the Clients of the Petitioner were its exclusive Clients. The Court held that while the Petitioner had enumerated in the petition that ICICI Bank, Yes Bank, Axis Bank and American Express were its clients, however, nothing had been put on record to substantiate that the said entities/banks were its exclusive clients and that they had not entered into similar agreement with other service providers like the Petitioner.
Case Title: M/S Tefcil Breweries Ltd. Versus M/S Alfa Laval India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 Livelaw (Del) 1317
The Delhi High Court held that mere correction of typographical error does not extend the period limitation for filing a petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act). The court further held that the limitation period begins from the date of disposal of an application under section 33 of the Arbitration Act and not from the date when a signed corrected copy of the award is received by the party.
A bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta held that “where an application under Section 33 of the Act is filed, irrespective of whether it results in correction or not, the starting point for limitation under Section 34(3) is the date on which the application is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal.”
Case Title: National Highway Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd (NHIDCL) v. Nspr VKJ JV & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1334
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Jyoti Singh held that mere allegations of corruption or pendency of an unverified complaint against an arbitrator cannot justify termination of arbitrator's mandate under section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
Justice Jyoti Singh held that “mandate of an Arbitrator cannot be terminated solely on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations or mere complaints.. De jure ineligibility is an inherent disability and mere allegations cannot meet this threshold. Terminating the mandate on a mere complaint, would be contrary not only to Section 14 of the 1996 Act, but would set a dangerous precedent where any party, unhappy with the course of arbitral proceedings, may refer to a complaint by a third party with unfounded and false accusations and seek termination of the mandate.”
The court held that allowing termination of an arbitrator's mandate based on unverified accusations would set a dangerous precedent where an unhappy party with the course of the arbitration would weaponise more complaints to derail the arbitration process
Case Title: Gaurav Aggarwal v. Richa Gupta
Case Citation: 2025 Livelaw (Del) 1335
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Amit Bansal upheld an arbitral award terminating proceedings under section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on the ground that an agreement to sell (ATS) between the parties was unforceable for being unregistered and unstamped under Uttar Pradesh law.
Justice Amit Bansal held that an agreement concerning transfer of sub-leasedhold rights in immovable property situated in Uttar Pradesh constituted a contract of sale under the section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore must be registered in accordance with provisions of the Registration Act.
Case Title : Sarvesh Security Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Institute of Human Behaviour & Allied Sciences (IHBAS)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1394
The Delhi High Court held that an award passed after expiry of the arbitrator's mandate is non-est and unforceable holding that the court has no power to extend the mandate post award if no application seeking extension of the mandate was pending before the award was passed.
A Division bench of Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Vinod Kumar held that the award becomes operational only when it is written,dated and signed by the arbitrator giving reasons on which it is based and the place of the Arbitration where it was made. All these acts were not done on or before 01.11.2024, but after the expiry of the arbitrator's mandate. The court further held that the award becomes operational only when it is written, signed and dated. Since all these actions occurred after the expiry of the mandate, the award was held to be invalid.
Cause Title: Sanjit Singh Salwan & Ors. Versus Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan & Ors.
Citation : 2025 Livelaw (Sc) 810
The Supreme Court held that in disputes concerning trusts, once a party voluntarily submits to arbitration and accepts a consent decree, the doctrine of estoppel applies, making it impermissible for that party to challenge later the decree on the ground that such disputes are non-arbitrable.
The bench comprising Justices Augustine George Masih and Atul S. Chandurkar observed that since the Respondent had accepted the consent decree and derived benefits from it, making the Appellants withdraw the FIR and parted some amounts as part of the consent decree, now it would be impermissible for the Respondent to challenge the validity of the decree, questioning the arbitrability of dispute
Mecwel Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. GE Power Systems India Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1393
The Delhi High Court bench comprising of Justice Jasmeet Singh held that an order terminating arbitral proceedings under section 25 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) on account of non-filing of statement of claim does not amount to an arbitral award and therefore cannot be challenged under section 34.
The Court held that “the Award can only be considered to be an award once it adjudicates the rights of the parties. The order terminating the proceedings for non-filing of a statement of claim cannot be considered an award under Section 32(2).” The court in the present case concurred with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in PCL Sunconholding that the earlier decision in Awasthi Constructions predated the authoritative pronouncement in Lalitkumar Sanghavi and therefore could not be treated as laying down good law
Case Title: Vedanta Ltd v. Union of India
Case Number: O.M.P. (COMM) 208/2020 , O.M.P. (COMM) 208/2020
The Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Subramonium Prasad upheld an arbitral award declaring the Shareholders' Agreement (SHA) between Vedanta Limited (then Sterlite Industries) and the Union of India void, which had given Vedanta the exclusive right to buy the government's remaining 49% stake in Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO) after a three-year lock-in period. The Court agreed with the arbitral tribunal's reasoning. It observed, “These layers of restriction go behind the ethos of Section 111A(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 and affect the purpose of introducing Section 111A, which is free transferability of shares.” It also noted that just because the agreement was executed with the President of India's approval, it did not confer any “special status” or make it immune from statutory law.
Case Title: Black Gold Resources Private Limitada v. International Coal Ventures Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
Case No: O.M.P. (I) (COMM) 78/2025
The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition filed by Black Gold Resources Private Limitada to prevent the termination of its coal mining contract in Mozambique as well as the invocation of a $10.5 million Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) by International Coal Ventures Pvt. Ltd. and Minas De Benga Limitada. While withdrawing an earlier interim stay, Justice Jasmeet Singh on December 17, 2025, noted that the petitioner had not proven "irretrievable harm" and that the issues at hand were matters best suited to be resolved by an arbitral tribunal, not by a Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. ustice Singh pointed out that the standard for "irretrievable injury" for an unconditional bank guarantee is far higher than a mere financial hardship. The court held that “in cases of unconditional and irrevocable bank guarantees, the Court may stay invocation only when there is egregious fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities” and in this case, no case as such had been made out.
Non-Obstante Clause U/S 13(2) Commercial Courts Act Prevails Over S.10 Delhi HC Act: Delhi High Court Dismisses Arbitral Appeals
Case Title – M/s Ramacivil Construction Work & Another v UOI
Case No. – EFA (OS) (COMM) 25/2024 & CM APPLs. 74052/2024 & 74054/2024 ; EFA (OS) (COMM) 12/2024 & CM APPLs. 44067/2024 & 44069/2024
The Delhi High Court Bench of Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tushar Rao Gedela while dismissing an appeal under Section 10, Delhi High Court Act (“DHC Act”) and Section 13(2), Commercial Courts Act (“CC Act”) observed that the expression “any other law for the time being in force” used in Section 13(2), CC Act encompasses in its fold the provisions of Section 10 of the DHC Act as well. Thus, Section 13(2), CC Act overrides Section 10, DHC Act in relation to appeals in commercial matters including those relating to arbitration.
Additionally, Court also highlighted that Section 13(2) commences with a non-obstante clause and provides that, even if anything contrary exists in any other law for the time being in force or even in letters patent of High Court, appeal shall not lie, otherwise than in accordance with the provision of the CC Act. The expression “any other law for the time being in force” in our view, encompasses in its fold the provisions of Section 10 of the DHC Act as well. Thus, the present appeals were found to be not maintainable even under Section 10, DHC Act.
Delhi High Court Rejects DDA's Arbitration Appeal, Holds Revaluation Of Evidence Impermissible U/S 37 A&C Act
Case Title: Delhi Development Authority v. Harjinder Brothers
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1703
The Delhi High Court upheld an Arbitral Award that favoured a contractor, M/s Harjinder Brothers, in a dispute over encashment of a bank guarantee and non-payment of "watch and ward" security expenses, dismissing an appeal filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The Court presided by Hon'ble Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha reaffirmed that the appellate courts are not permitted to re-evaluate evidence under 37, and held that the arbitrator's decision is a "possible and reasonable" interpretation that did not contravene public policy.
Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha ruled that the Appellate Court's authority is "limited within the domain of Section 34 of the Act" and that the Court is not permitted to "consider the matter in dispute before the arbitral tribunal on merits" or to re-evaluate the evidence, relying on decision in Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills. Further reliance was placed on Associate Builders v. DDA, which clarified that an arbitral award may be set aside only when it “shocks the conscience,” violates the “fundamental policy of Indian law,” or suffers from patent illegality, and not merely because another interpretation is possible. The judge emphasized that Section 37 Court's “power is more akin to that of superintendence as is vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary powers”.
Case Title: Jagdish Kaur Versus Jasbir Singh Sandhu & Ors.
Citation: 2025 Livelaw (Del) 1622
The Delhi High Court held that the courts under sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act) possess limited but definite authority to correct manifest computation errors without reopening the merits of the case.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar partly modified the arbitral award to the extent of adjusting overpayment made by the homeowners to the contractor.
“This inconsistency arises not from any interpretative exercise or re-appreciation of evidence but from a manifest error, with regard to the computation of the resulting liability, that is self-evident upon comparing the numerical findings recorded in the Award. Such a computational discrepancy, being objectively demonstrable from the Award itself, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. ", the court stated.