Supreme Court Flags Stringent Limitation Provisions Curtailing Arbitration Appeal Remedies, Urges Parliament To Address Issue

The Supreme Court raised concerns about the interpretation of limitation statutes in arbitration cases and observed that the rigid application of the law could curtail the limited remedy available under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge arbitral awards.

“In our view, the above construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails a remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award. This must be addressed by the Parliament”, the Court observed.

A bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Pankaj Mithal dismissed an appeal filed by a company against a Delhi High Court judgment rejecting its challenge to an arbitral award as barred by limitation under Section 34.

While the Court concluded that the appellant's delay in filing the petition was not condonable under the prevailing legal framework, Justice Narasimha, in his opinion, with which Justice Mithal agreed, highlighted concerns with the strict interpretation of limitation provisions.

Justice Narasimha emphasized that the purpose of applying the Limitation Act to the Arbitration Act is to enable the exercise of remedies provided under the Arbitration Act, rather than restrict them, and suggested that legislative intervention might be necessary to address these concerns.

Section 4 of the Limitation Act states that if the prescribed period for filing a suit, appeal, or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the act may be done on the next working day.

Justice Narasimha noted that Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, which prescribes a three-month limitation period for filing applications to set aside an arbitral award, along with an additional 30-day condonable period in its proviso, does not expressly or impliedly exclude the application of Section 4.

He expressed concerns over equating the term “prescribed period” under Section 4 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act solely with the three-month limitation period under Section 34(3). This interpretation excludes the additional 30 days allowed under the proviso to Section 34(3). “In our opinion, it will be wrong to confine the period of limitation to just 3 months by interpreting it as the “prescribed period” and excluding the balance 30 days under the proviso to Section 34(3) as not being the prescribed period through a process of interpretation.”

Justice Narasimha observed that remedies available under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, which deal with challenging arbitral awards and appeals, are inherently limited due to statutory prescription and advocated for liberal interpretation of limitation provisions to preserve the limited window for parties to contest an award. A rigid approach, he warned, could result in denying remedies and discourage arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.

“The remedy under Section 34 is precious, and courts will keep in mind the need to secure and protect such remedy while applying limitation provisions. If this limited remedy is denied on stringent principles of limitation, it will cause great prejudice and has the effect of (a) denying the remedy, and (b) in the long run, it will have the effect of dissuading contracting parties from seeking resolution of disputes through arbitration. This is against public policy”, he said.

Justice Narasimha underlined that the purpose of Limitation Act was to give discretion under Sections 4 to 24 to the Court to grant the benefit. He noted that the current position of law renders the additional 30-day condonable period ineffective, as section 4 is not applicable to it.

Section 29(2) provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sections 4 to 24, apply to special laws unless they are "expressly excluded."

In the Popular Construction case, the Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act “impliedly” excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 5 provides for the extension of the prescribed period if sufficient cause is demonstrated.

Justice Narasimha criticised this, highlighting that once provisions of the Limitation Act were disapplied to the Arbitration Act through implied exclusions, the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act became subject to judicial interpretation on a case-to-case basis.

For example, while Sections 5 (extension for sufficient cause) and 17 (effect of fraud or mistake) were held to be excluded from Section 34(3), Sections 4 (expiry of prescribed period when court is closed), 12 (exclusion of time in legal proceedings), and 14 (exclusion of time spent in bona fide litigation) were deemed applicable.

“In a way, the applicability of provisions from Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and the manner in which they apply are at the doorstep of the court, rather than being determined by a clear and categorical statutory prescription. This is perhaps the reason why the Parliament has used the expression “express exclusion” in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact that it is too late in the day to hold that “express exclusion” will not include implied exclusion. It is for the legislature to take note of this position and bring about clarity and certainty. We say no more, for the overbearing intellectualisation of the Act by courts has become the bane of Indian arbitration”, he concluded, emphasizing that it is now imperative for Parliament to address these issues.

The Case

The appellants, My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and another, had entered into lease agreements with M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., leading to arbitration and an award in favor of the respondent on February 4, 2022. The appellants received the signed award on February 14, 2022, marking the start of the limitation period. The three-month limitation period was extended due to COVID-19 and expired on May 29, 2022, with an additional 30-day condonable period ending on June 28, 2022, during the Delhi High Court's summer vacation. The appellants filed their application on July 4, 2022, the first day the court reopened. The High Court dismissed the application as time-barred, and the division bench upheld this decision.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which permits filing on the next working day if a deadline falls during a holiday, should apply to the condonable period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to Section 34(3) since the Limitation Act governs such cases. Relying on prior judgments, including State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd., the Court clarified that Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies only when the initial three-month period expires on a court holiday and not to the additional 30-day condonable period.

The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the application was filed beyond the permissible period.

Case no. – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M/S Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.

Case Title – Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2025

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49