Sports Governance: A Case Of Apathy, Lethargy And Unbridled Corruption

R. Arunadhri Iyer

28 Nov 2024 4:36 PM IST

  • Sports Governance: A Case Of Apathy, Lethargy And Unbridled Corruption

    Regulation of sports governance by the Central Government has always been a thorny issue, and the latest attempt by the Ministry for Youth Affairs and Sports (“Ministry”) is no different. In the second week of October this year, the Ministry issued the Draft National Sports Governance Bill, 2024 (“Bill”),[1] inviting comments and suggestions. In what could have been...

    Regulation of sports governance by the Central Government has always been a thorny issue, and the latest attempt by the Ministry for Youth Affairs and Sports (“Ministry”) is no different. In the second week of October this year, the Ministry issued the Draft National Sports Governance Bill, 2024 (“Bill”),[1] inviting comments and suggestions. In what could have been an excellent opportunity for the Ministry to finally bridge the gap between intent and action, the Ministry yet again fell into what is now its nearly 50 years old pattern of pandering to vested interests.

    These vested interests in sports governance are created and perpetuated primarily owing to two factors: firstly, the near total lack of government oversight, and secondly, the concentration of power in one or a few hands for long periods of time. Before we discuss the creation and perpetuation of vested interests, a brief discussion on what “sports governance” is, may be warranted.

    Sports governance can be considered as the concept of local self-government, but for sports. In theory, persons interested in sports and the development of sports come together at district level and set up District Associations for their sport, electing their own management and governing their sport in their district. The District Associations in a State (or Union Territory) come together and form a State Association, electing their own management and governing the sport in their State. These State associations, in turn, set up a National Sports Federation (“NSF”), elect a management, and govern the sport in the entire nation.

    When we say “govern the sport”, what we mean is a complete control and management of every aspect of the sport, from training camps for players, selections of teams, hiring of coaches, and obtaining funds and sanctions from the Government. An NSF implements the laws of its sport in games and matches sanction by it. It liaises with its international counterpart to send teams to represent the country in international events.

    To complete the picture on sports governance, these NSFs for separate sports come together and form the Indian Olympic Association (“IOA”), elect its management and govern themselves. The IOA is a super-body that functions above the NSFs. Though it does not conduct selections or training, it still plays a crucial role in sports governance. In the way that internationally every sport has an International Federation (like FIFA for football, and ITF for tennis etc.), who all function under the aegis of the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”), the NSFs function under the aegis of the IOA. The International Federations and NSFs control and manage their respective sport, whereas the IOC and IOA control and manage multi-sports events such as the Olympics, Asian Games etc.

    The federations follow a clear structure even at the national and international levels. At the apex is the IOC governed in terms of the Olympic Charter, and in charge of the entire Olympic movement. Under the IOC, at the international level are the International Federations, and at the national level for India is the IOA. The IOA, in effect, owes its status to its being affiliated with the IOC, and is bound by the Olympic Charter and the directives of the IOC.

    For multiple reasons, for almost thirty years since independence, the Central Government followed a hands-off approach with the federations, giving them free rein with their functioning. While doing so, it continued to fund and assist the federations by giving them access to stadia, and travel and tax concessions, etc. This combination of lack of oversight and guaranteed sustenance in the form of funding and assistance notwithstanding the outcome, led to vested interests being created. Persons in charge of the federations realised the unlimited power they wielded, given that they were in complete control of every single aspect of a sport, with no fear of consequences, no matter how they ran the federation.

    Possibly owing to this, the Government took its first step in 1975 towards regulating these federations. It imposed conditions subject to which it will continue to provide funding and assistance to the federations, though it termed them “guidelines”.[2] One of the conditions that it had imposed was that office bearers of the federations should not hold office for more than two terms lasting not more than eight years.[3] Despite the obvious benefit of such a condition, the Government was never able to, or willing to, implement it for the next forty-nine years.

    The Government thereafter issued revised guidelines on a regular basis—in 1988,[4] 1997,[5] 2001,[6] 2010[7] and eventually culminating in the National Sports Development Code of India, 2011 (“Sports Code”).[8] Though it did not make any significant revisions in 1988, between the 1997 and 2001 guidelines, the Ministry brought about the concept of “recognition” for federations.[9] The concept of requiring recognition to receive funding and assistance from the Ministry, was effectively a paradigm change in regulation of sports governance. It was an acknowledgement by the Ministry that it will decide which body can be considered an NSF, and it does not have to simply accept a body claiming to be one. The 2001 guidelines also re-asserted the tenure restrictions introduced in 1975.[10]

    Though the guidelines kept evolving, and though funding and assistance continued unstinted, the Ministry never took any serious action against any federation. Despite the paradigm change brought about by the 1997 and 2001 guidelines, which even included an “eligibility criteria”, the Ministry kept ignoring violations. Existing NSFs continue to remain recognised, regardless of whether they met the eligibility criteria. To the contrary, when faced with stiff opposition from the federation for reinstating the tenure restrictions, the Ministry even kept the said restrictions in abeyance.[11]

    Significant changes took place, however, between 2009 and 2014. Possibly taking strength from a more stable coalition government at the centre, the Ministry re-introduced the tenure restrictions afresh in May, 2010, in a modified version.[12] Now, the office-bearers were allowed a maximum of three tenures of four years each. Though the President could do the three tenures at a stretch, other office-bearers could only do two tenures (eight years) at a stretch. If they wanted to do a third tenure of another four years, they had to undergo a mandatory cooling-off for one tenure (four years) before they could hold another office.[13]

    This set off alarm bells at every level of sports administration. All the NSFs came together as members of the IOA, and passed a resolution condemning the new tenure restrictions.[14] The IOA even complained to the IOC that this amounts to government interference, which is strictly prohibited under the Olympic Charter.

    This time, the Ministry did not take things lying down. The Secretary (Sports) himself flew down to Lausanne, Switzerland, and met the IOC to resolve the issue.[15] He convinced the IOC that these reforms were essential, and fully within the right and might of the Ministry to impose. He successfully argued that the extensive funding and near-unlimited assistance being rendered to the federations, entitles the Ministry to impose conditions subject to which such benefits will be rendered. The IOC agreed, and insisted that so long as the Olympic Charter is being violated, the Ministry can insist on holding the federations accountable for using public monies.

    Encouraged by the IOC's stand, the Ministry issued the Sports Code in January, 2011.[16] The Sports Code was by no means comprehensive. However, it was a signal to the federations to come to heel. With the introduction of “annual recognition”,[17] an NSF could lose its benefits and privileges without any positive act by the Ministry. The IOA even challenged the Sports Code in the High Court of Delhi in 2012, unsuccessfully though.[18] In its judgement delivered in 2014,[19] the High Court agreed with the Ministry's contention. It held that aid is not a one-way street, and the Ministry is entitled to lay down basic conditions subject to which aid is granted to the NSFs.[20]

    The Sports Code resulted in many NSFs, including the IOA, bringing in some reforms. Persons who had held office for years and even decades were eventually ousted. The implementation remained a half-measure at best, however. While violations of age and tenure restrictions were dealt with by the Ministry, implementation of the other provisions of the Sports Code was sparse at best.

    For example, the Sports Code did not simply reinstate the age and tenure restrictions. It mandated that at least 25% of the management[21] and members[22] of the NSF must be comprised of prominent sportspersons of outstanding merit. It further insisted that NSFs must be truly representative of their sport, and so must affiliate at least 2/3rd of the States/Union Territories in India.[23]

    Litigations multiplied after the Sports Code was issued, especially after the 2014 judgement of the High Court of Delhi upholding it. The Ministry, however, largely dragged its feet on implementing the Sports Code. Even in implementing the age and tenure restrictions, the Ministry's most vaunted provision, it came up short.

    The intent of the age and tenure restrictions was obvious right from 1975: persons who get elected to a post in a federation should not hold office forever. The federations nonetheless found a work-around. They took advantage of the fact that the Sports Code (as also all the guidelines from 1975 to 2010 that preceded it) imposed the age and tenure restrictions only on “office-bearers” and the term “office-bearers” was defined to mean the President, Secretary General and Treasurer of a federation.[24] Federations thus simply moved persons who had exhausted their tenure limits, or had crossed the age limit of 70 years, to other posts like “Vice-President” or even custom-made posts like “Chairperson”, “Life President” and “Life Member”.[25]

    In 2012, the Ministry clarified in an affidavit filed in the High Court of Delhi that the age and tenure restrictions must apply to everyone who gets elected in a federation.[26] It further clarified that persons who finish their tenure limit or cross the age limit cannot continue to hold office under other names, since this would amount to a breach of the spirit of the Sports Code.[27] Despite such statements, the Ministry did not enforce this understanding on the federations.

    [28]For example, there was a person whose tenure limits had expired as an office-bearer of the NSF for hockey. The NSF simply designated him a “Life Member”, and he continued to represent the NSF. Based on this designation, he became an office-bearer in IOA, a member of the IOC, and even the President of the International Federation for hockey. The Ministry took no action despite being aware of this. Eventually, the High Court of Delhi held that this is contrary to the Sports Code, and contrary to even the Ministry's own stand taken in 2012. The person then resigned from the said posts.[29]

    Similarly, the Ministry took a stand in its 2012 affidavit that age and tenure restrictions are principles of good governance, and must apply to persons at State level and District levels as well.[30] Nonetheless, the Ministry never implemented this, never directed any NSF to implement it, and never inquired from any NSF as to whether they are implementing this.

    Such repeated instances of failure to implement the Sports Code invited the ire of the Courts on multiple occasions. More recently, in mid-2022, the High Court of Delhi issued a comprehensive judgement on the subject.[31] The judgement criticised the Ministry for its failure to implement the Sports Code. It bound the Ministry to its stand taken in the Affidavits, and directed that the age and tenure restrictions must be implemented in their true spirit.[32] It directed that any person who gets elected to any federation can only serve eight years at a stretch. After that, they must undergo a mandatory cooling-off of four years if they wish to contest for any post. Even then, they can only serve an additional four years, after which they have to retire.[33]

    The intent of the judgement was clear and precise: persons cannot continue in the federations forever. It struck at the key factor that enable creation and perpetuation of vested interests, i.e., the concentration of power in the hands of one or a few for a long period of time. The Court even went on to insist that such restrictions as well as the entire Sports Code must be applied to a federation at every level, i.e., National, State and District level.[34]

    The IOA challenged the judgement in the Supreme Court within two days.[35] The Supreme Court, however, refused to stay the judgement.[36] The High Court of Delhi followed the judgement with multiple directions[37] in subsequent matters, insisting that directions in the judgement must be followed. The High Court of Delhi, in at least three different matters,[38] stayed elections of NSFs that were proposed to be held without complying with the said judgement. This, the High Court has done within two years of the judgement being issued. The message from the Court was clear: perpetuation of vested interests is no longer permissible.

    It appears that the NSFs decided that they were fighting a losing battle in the High Court, and they will be better off bringing pressure to bear on the Ministry instead. In effect, the Bill sets at naught the various salutary changes brought about by various judgements. Yet again, elected office-bearers will not be bound by age and tenure limits unless they are holding the post of President, Secretary General or Treasurer.[39] So if a person finishes their tenure in any of those posts, they can simply switch to a post to which the restrictions do not apply.

    Earlier, there was to be a minimum of 25% sportspersons in the membership of the NSF.[40] This has now been reduced to 10%.[41] This is despite the Supreme Court observing in August, 2022 that sportspersons are vital stakeholders, whose experience, knowledge and concerns will benefit the administration of a sport.[42] The intent of the reduction is obvious: a greater number of sportspersons as members will diminish the voice of persons who serve vested interests.

    The 2022 judgement was not passed negating the contentions of the Ministry. Rather, the Ministry was front and centre defending its Sports Code, and insisting that it must be implemented. The Ministry's own interpretations of the Sports Code were accepted and received the Court's imprimatur. Even after the judgement, the Ministry has gone on record in Courts, insisting that the judgement must be followed by the federations.[43] However, the Ministry's doublethink is apparent from the Bill. The Bill is just another episode in the Ministry's nearly fifty years old pattern of caving in to pressure from vested interests.

    It was not lightly that the 2014 judgement delivered by the High Court of Delhi scathingly criticised the Ministry and NSFs for the abysmal state of Indian sports.[44] The Court rightly observed that sports administration has reached depths from where neither NSFs nor the Ministry cares for the successive generations' sporting future. It was critical of NSFs and the Ministry for the state of sports being in a lockjaw where over a billion people have to rest content with a harvest of medals (in the 2012 London Olympics) so meagre as to be surpassed by just one individual like Micheal Phelps. It called out sport administration, the way it is run in India, through coteries, cabals, manipulations and intrigues for discouraging a vast majority of the population to devote itself to various sports.

    The author is an Advocate practising at Delhi High Court . Views are personal.


    [1] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20National%20Sports%20Governance%20Bill%20-2024.pdf.

    [2] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=71.

    [3] Ibid. at p. 71, at para. 3.

    [4] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=37, at para. 53.

    [5] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=38, at para. 54 et seq.

    [6] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=40, at para. 60 et seq.

    [7] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=78.

    [8] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf.

    [9] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=43, at para. 63.

    [10] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=43, at para. 46.

    [11] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=48, at paras. 67-68.

    [12] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=78.

    [13] Ibid. at para. 9.

    [14] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/6764154268.pdf#page=25, at para. 33.

    [15] https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-noc-of-india-and-government-of-india-meet-in-lausanne.

    [16] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf.

    [17] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=86.

    [18] Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2310 of 2012.

    [19] 2014:DHC:2489-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2014%3ADHC%3A2489-DB&ctype=CW&cno=2310&cyr=2012.

    [20] Ibid. at para. 85, p. 74.

    [21] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=22 at para. 9.3(xii).

    [22] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=44 at clause 3.20.

    [23] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=43 at clause 3.4.

    [24] https://yas.nic.in/sites/default/files/File918.compressed.pdf#page=72, at Explanation 1.

    [25] 2022:DHC:3066-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A3066-DB&ctype=CW&cno=195&cyr=2010#page=21, at paras. 21-24.

    [26] 2022:DHC:3066-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A3066-DB&ctype=CW&cno=195&cyr=2010#page=35, at paras. 46 and 48.

    [27] 2022:DHC:2039-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A2039-DB&ctype=CW&cno=5703&cyr=2020#page=21, at para. 27.

    [28] 2022:DHC:3066-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A3066-DB&ctype=CW&cno=195&cyr=2010#page=71, at para. 113.

    [29] https://www.thehindu.com/sport/hockey/narinder-batra-resigns-as-fih-president-gives-up-ioc-membership-too/article65653625.ece.

    [30] https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A2039-DB&ctype=CW&cno=5703&cyr=2020.

    [31] 2022:DHC:3066-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2022%3ADHC%3A3066-DB&ctype=CW&cno=195&cyr=2010.

    [32] Ibid. at p. 32, paras. 42-55.

    [33] Ibid. at pp. 39-40, paras. 54-55.

    [34] Ibid. at pp. 71-72, para. 113.

    [35] Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14533 of 2022.

    [36] https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/25767/25767_2022_1_817_37390_Order_18-Aug-2022.pdf read with https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/25767/25767_2022_1_22_45164_Order_17-Jul-2023.pdf.

    [37] https://dhcappl.nic.in/dhcorderportal/GetOrder.do?ID=599/2023/666218341694581516713_77353_2023.pdf and https://dhcappl.nic.in/dhcorderportal/GetOrder.do?ID=ras/2024/100025281707838908997_71240_86912020.pdf.

    [38] WP(C) 5803/2023, WP(C) 10138/2023, WP(C) 2136/2024.

    [39] Ss. 7(1)(g), 8(1)(g) and 9(1)(h) read with s. 2(a).

    [40] Supra at footnotes. 21 and 22.

    [41] Ss. 7(1)(b), 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b).

    [42] https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/35846/35846_2017_3_1_37092_Order_03-Aug-2022.pdf#page=8, para. 15.

    [43] https://dhcappl.nic.in/dhcorderportal/GetOrder.do?ID=ras/2024/100025281707838908997_71240_86912020.pdf, paras. 3.1 and 3.2.

    [44] 2014:DHC:2489-DB | https://dhccaseinfo.nic.in/jsearch/qrcode.php?nc=2014%3ADHC%3A2489-DB&ctype=CW&cno=2310&cyr=2012.


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