S.468 CrPC | Reckoning Date For Limitation Is The Date Of Filing Final Report, Not Registration Of FIR: Madras High Court

Justice Anand Venkatesh noted that in a case emanating from the FIR, cognizance is taken by the Magistrate upon the filing of the final report. The court added that the basis of the FIR is only information received by the police authorities and not a “complaint” of which cognizance is taken.

The court went on to the discussion while hearing a plea seeking to transfer an investigation on the ground that police had not taken steps to complete the investigation. In another case, the plea was for quashing the FIR as the final report had not been filed to date thus contending that there was a bar in taking cognisance.

During the hearing, the Additional Public Prosecutor informed the court that in the first case, the final report had been filed but since the final report was filed much beyond the period of limitation, the court had not taken cognizance of the same and issued notice to the accused.

Relying upon another decision of the Madras High Court in Kishore v. State, it was contended that there was no requirement for condoning since the complaint was lodged with the police within the period of limitation. In the above case, the single judge had observed that the relevant date for Section 468 CrPC was the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution. Justice Venkatesh, however, opined that the single judge had misunderstood information given to the police under Section 154 CrPC as a complaint under Section 9(d).

The court observed that as per Section 154 CrPC, registration of FIR was based on “information” and the same could not be equated to a “complaint”. The court also noted that a complaint could be made only to the court and not to a police officer.

During the discussion, the court also discussed the decision of the Apex Court in Sarah Mathew v Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease wherein the Apex court had held that the relevant date was the date of filing of the complaint. However, the court noted that Sarah Mathew arose from a complaint made to the magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) and was not based on a police report.

The court also looked into the Apex Court decision in Arun Vyas v Anita Vyas, where the court had held the cut-off date as the date on which the final report was filed and not the date of filing of the FIR. The court also noted that this decision was upheld by a three-judge bench in State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt and a two-judge bench in Ramesh v. State of T.N.

Thus, the court noted that the earlier decision of the single judge had wrongly relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Sarah Mathew which was based on a complaint and thus did not subscribe to the view taken therein.

In the first case, the court thus directed the Magistrate to grant the opportunity of hearing to the accused and dispose of the petition within six weeks.

In the second case, the court noted that though the crime was registered in 2015, no final report had been filed till date even though it should have been filed within 3 years. Thus, the court opined that keeping the FIR pending would not serve any purpose and thus quashed the FIR.

Advocates Mr. M Mohamed Riyaz and Mr. S Thiruvengadam also assisted the bar in the discussion.

Counsel for the Petitioner: Mr.R.Venkatesulu, Mr.M.Vijayaragavan

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A.Damodaran Additional Public Prosecutor

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Mad) 45

Case Title: A.Kaliyaperumal v. The Superintendent of Police

Case No: Criminal Original Petition Nos.433 and 543 of 2024