Complainant Must Show Sufficient Cause For Bypassing Magistrate, Directly Approaching HC For Registering FIR: Punjab & Haryana High Court

The Punjab & Haryana High Court has made it clear that before moving High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking registration of FIR, the complainant should show sufficient cause for not approaching the Jurisdictional Magistrate first.

Justice Sumeet Goel said, "if the facts/circumstances of such case so warrant, the High Court is well within its jurisdiction to entertain and consider plea(s) seeking registration of FIR, monitoring of investigation in a FIR, constituting an SIT (Special Investigating Team), change of investigating officer & all such prayer(s) of such kind and nature. However, it would be prudent that an applicant/complainant, while seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the first instance seeking prayer(s) of above nature, shows sufficient cause for not having approached the Illaqa/Jurisdictional Magistrate in the first instance."

Adding a "word of caution" the Court said that a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. invoking the inherent powers of the High Court to seek registration of FIR is “maintainable” in "strict- sense" but it may not be desirable to entertain such a petition since the High Court may be flooded with such litigation.

These observations came in response to the plea of an alleged rape victim seeking registration of FIR under Section 482 CrPC against the accused persons in Haryana's Nuh.

It was argued that representation was made in February to the Superintendent of Police, Nuh, District Mewat, Haryana for taking legal action against the persons named in the complaint but no action has yet been taken.

The Court considered the question on whether a person/ complainant ought to approach the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for issuance of directions for registration of FIR or such person/ complainant ought to approach the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C at the first instance.

After hearing the submissions, the Court opined, that ordinarily, a complainant ought to approach the Magistrate at the first instance for issuance directions for registration of FIR but the same does not divest the High Court of its inherent plenary jurisdiction.

However, it added that the tendency to approach the High Court directly even when an independent and robust mechanism for dispensation of justice is available in the Illaqa/ Jurisdiction Magistrate is "worrisome."

"It avoidably prolongs the grant of relief(s) that the litigant seeks apart from adding to the cost of litigation. The Magistracy is specifically put in place for expeditious and accessible judicial remedy within the reasonable and easy reach of the litigant. Bypassing the Magistracy, without a justifiable cause, is patent subversion of judicial authority in general. Instead knocking at the doors of the High Court directly indicates indifference towards the judicial process," said the Court.

Justice Goel observed that the volume of such petitions pouring into the High Court is stalling the working and also the proficiency of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, he stated that unless there are accentuating circumstances, a complainant ought not to approach the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. at the first instance seeking directions for registration of FIR, fair investigation etc.

In the present case, the Court noted that the alleged rape victim had invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. without even referring to or disclosing any impediment being faced by her in approaching the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate by invoking Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

Consequently, it opined that the petitioner ought to have approached the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate at the first instance who is well empowered to grant the substantial relief sought in the present petition.

In the light of the above the petition was dismissed.

Advocates M.D. Khan and Dr. Kirandeep Kaur for the petitioner.

Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 81

Title: XXX v. XXX