Merely Because S.482 CrPC Does Not Prescribe Limitation Period Does Not Mean Parties Can Approach Court With Inordinate Delay: J&K&L High Court

Basit Amin Makhdoomi

5 July 2022 12:45 PM GMT

  • Merely Because S.482 CrPC Does Not Prescribe Limitation Period Does Not Mean Parties Can Approach Court With Inordinate Delay: J&K&L High Court

    The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court today held that a party cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC at his whim and caprice merely because no period of limitation in filing the petition under the aforesaid provision is provided. A petition under Section 482 of the CrPC must be filed within a reasonable time and it should not be vitiated by inordinate delay...

    The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court today held that a party cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC at his whim and caprice merely because no period of limitation in filing the petition under the aforesaid provision is provided.

    A petition under Section 482 of the CrPC must be filed within a reasonable time and it should not be vitiated by inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner, the bench comprising Justice Sanjay Dhar observed.

    "Within what time a petitioner should approach the Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Reasonable time generally means any time which is not manifestly unreasonable and which is fairly necessary for approaching the Court. Reasonable time would mean a time required by a prudent litigant to approach the Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case."

    The court was hearing a plea wherein the petitioner had challenged an FIR for offences under Section 5(1)(c)(d) read with 5(2) of the J&K Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B RPC registered with Police Station Vigilance organisation Kashmir.

    The contents of the FIR alleged that the petitioner along with other two officers/officials of Lakes & waterways Development Authority, J&K had misused his official position by grossly indulging in abuse pertaining to amount spent on fuel and other incurred expenditures on maintenance of mechanical devices engaged for deweeding and dredging.

    The petitioner had contended that the allegations made in the charge sheet against him were absolutely false. In his plea he further contended that the alleged exorbitant amount has not been released in favour of the petitioner, as such, there has been no loss to the State exchequer. He further submitted that even if there was non-adherence to certain codal formalities on the part of the officers/officials of the Lakes and Waterways Development Authority at the time of issuing supply order in favour of the petitioner, the same does not amount to criminal misconduct as it is only an irregularity.

    Contesting the said plea the respondents argued that the allegations made in the charge sheet against the petitioner has been laid before the Court on 07.06.2005 and the charges against him have been framed on 16.02.2009, in view of which doctrine of Laches gets attracted and the petition should be dismissed.

    Finding merit in the argument of the respondents the bench observed that since the charge sheet has been filed in 2005 and thus there is a delay of about 14 years in filing the present petition. The bench frowned as there exists no explanation, much less a plausible one by the petitioner for the said abnormal delay in filing the present petition under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C.

    While dealing with the question as to whether it would be proper for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C after such a long delay, particularly when evidence of the prosecution is almost complete, the court placed reliance on the judgment of Delhi High Court in Neeraj Bhargava v. State of NCT, Delhi (Crl. M. C Nos.3844/2015) wherein it was held that jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC need not to be exercised in a case where delay has been caused on the part of the petitioner by not challenging the proceedings.

    The bench also found it worthwhile to record the observations made by Delhi High Court in Vipin Kumar Gupta v. Sarvesh Mahajan 2019 wherein it had been held that ..

    "if a Court fails to take into consideration delay and laches while invoking the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C without any reasonable ground, there would be no end to the litigation, as a consequence whereof, neither any trial would be proceeded nor any trial would be concluded before the trial court".

    Deliberating further on the powers invoke 482 CrPC, the bench observed that whoever invokes the jurisdiction of the High Court for quashing of the FIR and the consequent proceedings on the ground that ingredients of the offence are not made out, has to meet the test of expeditious dispatch of approaching the court. Within what time a petitioner should approach the Court under Section 482 of the CrPC depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the bench underscored.

    Dismissing the instant petition, the court recorded that petitioner had actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court for all these years and after waking up from deep slumber, approached this Court, without any iota of explanation for the delay as per his choice, caprice and whim. Thus, it can by no stretch of imagination be stated that the petitioner has approached this Court within a reasonable time, the bench observed.

    Case Title : EAPEN CHAKOO v UT OF J&K 

    Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (JKL) 57

    Click Here To Read/Download Judgment

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