Mere Incorporation Of S. 307 IPC In FIR & Chargesheet No Bar To Quash Case Based On Compromise B/W Parties: Allahabad HC

Sparsh Upadhyay

4 Feb 2022 4:11 PM GMT

  • Mere Incorporation Of S. 307 IPC In FIR & Chargesheet No Bar To Quash Case Based On Compromise B/W Parties: Allahabad HC

    The Allahabad High Court on Thursday said that mere incorporation of Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) in the FIR and the charge-sheet, would not be a bar to the compromise entered into between the parties to put an end to the disputes between them.Observing thus, the Bench of Justice Subhash Vidyarthi allowed a 482 CrPC application filed by the applicants seeking quashing of the...

    The Allahabad High Court on Thursday said that mere incorporation of Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) in the FIR and the charge-sheet, would not be a bar to the compromise entered into between the parties to put an end to the disputes between them.

    Observing thus, the Bench of Justice Subhash Vidyarthi allowed a 482 CrPC application filed by the applicants seeking quashing of the summoning order, in a case registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504, 506, 427, 307 IPC.

    It was informed to the Court that with the intervention of respected persons and relatives, the parties have entered into a compromise and there is no dispute remaining between them and the opposite parties no. 2 and 3 do not want any action against the applicants.

    The opposite parties no. 2 and 3 (victims) appeared before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki along with their Advocates and they accepted the compromise. Now, in their 482 plea, they sought quashing of the Chargesheet.

    Court's order

    Before proceeding to decide the instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in terms of the compromise, the Court examined the question as to whether the charge-sheet and the proceedings of a case can be quashed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the parties.

    For this purpose, the Court referred to Apex Court's ruling in the case of Narinder Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another; (2014) 6 SCC 466, later on, followed by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688.

    Essentially, in Laxmi Narayan case, the Supreme Court had observed that though offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences such offences can't be quashed by HCs in the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, only on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.

    However, the Court had further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.

    "It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc

    Against this backdrop, the Court noted that although the FIR and the charge-sheet in the case made a mention of Section 307 IPC, the medical examination report of the opposite parties no. 2 and 3 mentioned simple injuries of contusions and abrasions only and there was no report of any serious injury having been suffered by the opposite parties no. 2 and 3.

    Further, the Court observed that none of the injuries is reported to have been inflicted on any vital part of the body of any of the injured persons. The injuries are reported to have been caused by a hard and blunt object.

    In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Court opined that continuance of the proceedings of the case even after the parties have entered into a compromise would only result in persecution of the applicants, which would give rise to a failure of justice. 

    Therefore, the Court allowed the 482 application and quashed the summoning order including the entire proceedings initiated thereafter.

    Case title - Dr. Mohd. Ibrahim And Ors. v. State Of U.P. And Ors.
    Case citation: 2022 LiveLaw (AB) 34

    Click Here To Read/Download Order

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