Teacher Who Administers Moderate Force On Pupil To Enforce Discipline Without Malicious Intention Can't Be Fastened With Penal Liability : Kerala High Court

The Kerala High Court recently held that a teacher who administers a reasonable force on a pupil without any malicious intention to enforce discipline in a classroom should not be fastened with criminal liability. 

Holding so, Justice Kauser Edappagath discharged a teacher against whom the trial court had framed charges, finding that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against her.  

"Classroom discipline is very important for effective teaching and learning. Thus, a teacher who without malicious intention administers a moderate and reasonable force to a pupil to enforce discipline in classroom/school cannot be exposed to criminal prosecution or fastened with penal liability."

The criminal revision petition was preferred by a Grade VI class teacher who was charged under Section 324 of IPC and Section 23 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act by the trial court.

The case against the petitioner was that in 2011, she attempted to beat a student with a cane near his elbow for allegedly being late to take out the textbook for the class. 

However, since the student suddenly turned his face up, the butt of the cane touched his eye causing an abrasion on his cornea. 

Although she had argued for a discharge, the trial court had framed charges against her. Aggrieved by this, she moved the High Court.

Advocates T.K. Sasindran and T.S. Shyam Prasanth appearing for the petitioner submitted that a close reading of all the records reveal that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against her.

They contended that not even a prima facie case is made out by the prosecution for accusing the revision petitioner with the offence u/s 324 of IPC and S.23 of JJ Act. The court below ought to have discharged the revision petitioner u/s 227 of Cr.P.C., submitted the counsel. 

Further, the petitioner argued that she was only performing her duty in the classroom in its right spirit and had no intention at all to cause hurt.

It was submitted that she had only tried to grab his attention to the class in good faith for his benefit. It was further urged that she never crossed the limit and exercised her authority reasonably and lawfully as warranted on occasion when the classroom became a pandemonium. 

Public Prosecutor Sangeetha Raj and Advocate K.I. Sageer appearing for the respondents argued that the petition had enmity towards him and that this was done with an intention to cause hurt. 

Section 227 provides that upon consideration of the documents submitted and after hearing the accused and the prosecution, the Court is bound to decide if there is 'sufficient ground' to proceed against the accused and thereby either discharge the accused or frame charge against him. 

Justice Edappagath noted that the words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' imply that the Court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of a case to determine if a case for trial has been made out and that there is no universal rule for this. 

"In assessing this fact, the Court has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine a prima facie case depends upon the facts of each case and in this regard it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a rule of universal application." 

The Judge added that if the Court is satisfied that the evidence produced before it gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, it will be fully within its right to discharge the accused.

Therefore, it was concluded that if prosecution evidence when challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence cannot show that the accused has committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. 

Applying this principle to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the petitioner being the class teacher only tried to quiet down a noisy class by beating the cane on the table. 

According to her, when all the students sat silently and properly, the de facto complainant was sitting under the bench looking for something. 

With bonafide intention to call his attention to the class, without the intention to beat him or cause hurt to him, she tried to touch his elbow with the cane. However, unfortunately, the student looked up and this caused a slight abrasion. 

The Court admitted that inflicting disproportionate corporal punishment on children was forbidden. 

"Parents at home and teachers at school are most important influences in one's life. Parents give birth to a child whereas teachers mould that child's personality and provide a better future. Children have the right to clean environment at home, school or wherever they are. Safe and secure childhood is the right of every child. Paddling children or inflicting disproportionate corporal punishment on them either by a parent or a teacher is, no doubt, forbidden."

However, it was clarified that parents and teachers were entitled to apply a reasonable degree of force on their pupils:

"Parents, teachers and other persons in loco parentis are entitled as a disciplinary measure to apply a reasonable degree of force to their children or pupil old enough to understand the purpose to which the act was done. Hurt of a less serious crime is not forbidden when inflicted in the reasonable chastisement of a child by a parent or by a school teacher to whom the parent has delegated or is deemed to have delegated his authority."

As held by the court in Prameela Fergod v. State of Kerala [2021 (6) KLT 845], the nature and gravity of the corporal punishment inflicted by the teacher would determine whether he/she can be prosecuted under the penal provisions.

In this case, apart from there being no malicious intent on part of the petitioner, the injury sustained was trivial in nature. Similarly, the prosecution did not have a case that the degree of punishment inflicted by the revision petitioner was administered for the gratification of passion or rage or that it was immoderate or unreasonable. 

For these reasons, the Court took the view that the petitioner's act cannot be said to be with malicious intention to cause hurt. On the contrary, facts disclose that she exercised her authority reasonably and in good faith.

Further, it was found that the prosecution allegations even if admitted as true in their entirety, would not make out offences alleged, therefore, there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against her.

Accordingly, the petitioner was discharged and the criminal revision petition was allowed. 

Case Title: Jaya v. State of Kerala & Ors

Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Ker) 77

Click Here To Read/Download The Order