23 Sep 2019 1:08 PM GMT
On day 29 of the Ayodhya hearing Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan resumed his arguments on the Juristic personality of the Janmasthan. He urged the bench that there must be an objective manifestation of a belief to confer the status of a juristic person to that belief. "At what point does a belief translate into something objective and when does that objective form transform into a...
On day 29 of the Ayodhya hearing Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan resumed his arguments on the Juristic personality of the Janmasthan. He urged the bench that there must be an objective manifestation of a belief to confer the status of a juristic person to that belief. "At what point does a belief translate into something objective and when does that objective form transform into a juristic person?", Dhavan asked the bench, and further stated that there has to be consecration of an idol.
While Justice Ashok Bhushan distinguished the concept of idol from that of Janmasthan saying the latter was based on epics, Justice DY Chandrachud threw light on difference between Swayambhu, consecration of idol and juristic person. There are times when it is about belief, but sometimes it needs more than belief to make it juristic personality, he added.
Dhavan further submitted that belief was tenuous, and even if he conceded to the belief, objective manifestation of that belief had not been shown. His argument was that the Janmasthan could be much larger in area as compared to the exact spot claimed, and such a large area could not have juristic personality.
Justice Bobde then sought to know whether to make an entity a juristic person, divinity was necessary.
J Chandrachud then stated that Dhavan's first argument that belief is tenuous was an evidentiary issue, however sought clarification regarding his second argument that a manifestation of the belief was required. "What is the object of the manifestation of belief that is required?" he asked. "Worship is good enough, but they've shown belief, not worship", replied the senior advocate.
With regard to J Bobde's question, Dhavan said the other side had argued that trees and rivers were juristic persons, which is a vedic concept, but respect for it is nothing juristic. He further questioned whether area was to be added to the concept of juristic persons.
Moving on, Rajeev Dhavan stated that the purpose of plaint 5 was to destroy the shebait, make a new temple and take over. Reiterating his allegation that, as per that suit, the existing structures are to be destroyed and new temple is to be constructed. He submitted that Suit no.5 was "simply a vehicle to destroy, to remove."
They have only mentioned Lord Ram was born there, without establishing contours of the area, he added. Refering back to his original argument of juristic personality, Rajeev Dhavan submitted that he agreed that "Lord Ram was born here but that does not make it a juristic personality...only after 1989 was it claimed that the place is a juristic personality". To this J Bobde asked why should anyone have to prove there's a divine character?
"Because the case is based on belief, spirituality and divinity", came the answer. Dhavan went on to say that "without divinity there would be no sacredness. However tenuous, belief has to be respected...If we do not respect Ram and Allah, this nation will fall apart."
Coming to the question of title, Dhavan then argued that only the Ram Chabutra can be shown as the place of offering prayer, and discussing parikrama, it was asserted that parikrama itself cannot create title.
After lunch Rajeev Dhavan countered the arguments of various parties from the opposite side, citing the substance of Nirmohi Akhara's case as based Sec 23, and that of Mr Parasaran (who appeared for deity) as based Sec 10 of the Limitation Act. Dealing with Sec 10 of Limitation act, Dhavan traced the evolution of the Section through precedents and added that the purpose of the same was to protect endowment property of Hindus and Muslims. Through further precedents it was urged that the manager of a Hindu or muslim property cannot be treated as a trustee of that property.
Relying on his argument that "once a mosque, always a mosque", Dhavan said it was never abandoned. The best case from the other side is that the mosque might have been unused for sometime. This was argued to persuade the court that both parties on the Hindu side had failed to establish adverse possession over the inner courtyard, and easementary rights were all they had. To prove adverse possession it must be shown that there existed hostile possession against owner of the property and nothing had been shown except that an attempt to frighten some Muslims was made, submitted Dhavan.
He went on to state that since other parties argued that the deity has juristic personality, and that they have title and possession, therefore the onus of proving it was on them.
Dhavan ended the day by summarizing his submissions regarding suit no. 5 and will now argue suit no 1 from tomorrow. Before rising at 5 pm today, the bench stated that they would continue to hear arguments till 5pm throughout the week, except Friday, when the matter will be heard till 1pm