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Remand Power U/s 167 CrPC Can Also Be Exercised By Courts Superior To Magistrate: Supreme Court

LIVELAW NEWS NETWORK
16 May 2021 12:23 PM GMT
Remand Power U/s 167 CrPC Can Also Be Exercised By Courts Superior To Magistrate: Supreme Court
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The power under Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure can also be exercised by Courts which are superior to the Magistrate, the Supreme Court held in the judgment dismissing appeal filed by jailed activist Gautam Navlakha seeking default bail in the Bhima Koregaon case.The bench comprising Justices UU Lalit and KM Joseph observed thus in the judgment: Though the power is vested with...

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The power under Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure can also be exercised by Courts which are superior to the Magistrate, the Supreme Court held in the judgment dismissing appeal filed by jailed activist Gautam Navlakha seeking default bail in the Bhima Koregaon case.

The bench comprising Justices UU Lalit and KM Joseph observed thus in the judgment: Though the power is vested with the Magistrate to order remand by way, of appropriate jurisdiction exercised by the superior Courts, (it would, in fact, include the Court of Sessions acting under Section 439) the power under Section 167 could also be exercised by Courts which are superior to the Magistrate.

The court added that such custody ordered by the superior Courts would be the custody for the purpose of calculating the period within which the charge sheet must be filed, failing with the accused acquires the statutory right to default bail.

One of the contentions raised in this case was that the order passed by the High Court of Delhi, is not one passed under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., for the reason that what the Cr.P.C. contemplates is an order passed by a Magistrate. Therefore, the court considered the issue whether a Court other than a Magistrate can order remand under Section 167 CrPC.

The court explained the answer to this issue by way of two illustrations.

65. Let us take a case where a Magistrate orders a remand under Section 167 and at the same time, he also rejects the application for bail preferred by the accused. The accused approaches the High Court under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. The court reverses the order and grants him bail. The accused who was sent to custody means police custody or judicial custody is brought out of his custody and is released on bail pursuing to the order of the High Court. This order is challenged before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reverses the order granting bail. The original order passed by the Magistrate is revived. It is 113  apparent that the accused goes back to custody. Since assuming that the period of 15 days is over and police custody is not permissible, he is sent back to judicial custody. Equally if he was already in judicial custody, the order granting judicial custody is revived. Let us assume in the illustration that the accused was in custody only for a period of 10 days and after the order passed by this Court and the accused who spent another 80 days, he completes, in other words, a total period of custody of 90 days adding the period of custody, he suffered consequent upon the remand by the Magistrate. That is by piecing up these broken periods of custody, the statutory period of 90 days entitling the accused to default bail, is reached. Can it be said that the order of this Court granting custody should not be taken into consideration for calculating the period of 90 days, upon completion of which the accused can set up a case for default bail. We would think that the mere fact is that it is the Apex Court which exercised the power to remand, which was wrongly appreciated by the High Court in the illustration, would not detract from the custody being authorized under Section 167.


66. Let us take another example. After ordering remand, initially for a period of 15 days of which 10 days is by way of police custody and 5 days by way of judicial custody, the Magistrate enlarges an accused on bail. The High Court interferes with the order granting bail on the basis that the bail ought not to have been granted. Resultantly, the person who on the basis of the order of bail, has come out of jail custody, is put back into the judicial custody or jail custody. The order is one passed by the High Court. The order granting custody by the High Court cannot be treated as one which is not anchored in Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, we would think that though the power is vested with the Magistrate to order remand by way, of appropriate jurisdiction exercised by the superior Courts, (it would, in fact, include the Court of Sessions acting under Section 439) the power under Section 167 could also be exercised by Courts which are superior to the Magistrate."

Broken periods of custody can be counted whether custody is suffered by the order of the Magistrate or superior courts

Another connected issue considered was whether broken periods of custody otherwise traceable to Section 167 Cr.P.C. suffice to piece together the total maximum period of custody permitted beyond which the right to default bail arises or whether the law giver has envisaged only custody which is continuous? In this regard, the bench observed thus:

67. Therefore, while ordinarily, the Magistrate is the original Court which would exercise power to remand under Section 167, the exercise of power by the superior Courts which would result in custody being ordered ordinarily (police or judicial custody) by the superior Courts which includes the High Court, would indeed be the custody for the purpose of calculating the period within which the charge sheet must be filed, failing with the accused acquires the statutory right to default bail. We have also noticed the observations of this Court in AIR 1962 SC 1506 (supra). In such circumstances broken periods of custody can be counted whether custody is suffered by the order of the Magistrate or superior courts, if investigation remains incomplete after the custody, whether continuous or broken periods pieced together reaches the requisite period; default bail becomes the right of the detained person.

68. Equally when an order in bail application is put in issue, orders passed resulting in detaining the accused would if passed by a superior court be under Section 167.


Also from the judgment:

Supreme Court Dismisses Gautam Navlakha's Plea For Default Bail In Bhima Koregaon Case

Case: Gautam Navlakha vs. National Investigation Agency [CrA 510 OF 2021]
Coram: Justices UU Lalit and KM Joseph
Citation: LL 2021 SC 254

Click here to Read/Download Judgment





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