“Recovery Evidence” Under Section 27 Of The Evidence Act- Questions & Answers By Justice V Ramkumar [Part-XI]

Q.51 The culprit husband who is subsequently made an accused voluntarily goes to the police station soon after committing brutal murder of his wife and tells the Sub Inspector who is the SHO that he butchered his wife to death and reveals the place where he has concealed the chopper. The Head Constable is sent to the place mentioned by the person. The Head Constable finds the chopper at the spot mentioned and recovers it under a mahazar. Whether it is discovery of a fact provable under Section 27 of the Evidence Act? Ans. Yes. Such a person who offers to furnish information which may be used against him, submits himself to “police custody”. Hence, the requirement that he should be in the “custody” of a police officer is satisfied. As for the requirement that he should be “accused of an offence”, there need not be a formal accusation against him at the time when he gives the statement. It is enough if he is subsequently made an accused. See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya - AIR 1960 SC 1125 (C.B). - S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah - JJ. paras 12 and 18). A person can be deemed to have surrendered to the police when he offers to give information leading to discovery under Sec. 27. [Vide – Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab - (1980) 2 SCC 565 = AIR 1980 SC 1632 (5 Judges) - Y. V. Chandrachud - C. J. I., P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia, R. S. Pathak, O. Chinnappa Reddy – JJ;Gujaganda Somaian v. State of Karnataka - AIR 2007 SC 1355 - Arijit Pasayat, Lokeshwar Singh Panta - JJ.]. There is absolutely nothing in Section 27 to indicate that the person who discovers the incriminating fact should be the identical person who received the information. (Vide para 34 of Sekharan v. State of Kerala 1979 KLT 337 = 1980 Cri.L.J. 31 – Narayana Pillai, Kaader – JJ and para 57 of Rijo v. State of Kerala; Para 57 of Rijo v. State of Kerala 2009 KHC 1145 = 2010 Cri.L.J. 1315 (DB) – K Balakrishnan Nair, P. Bhavadasan - JJ).Q.52 In paragraph 8 of the decision rendered on 25-4-1995 by the Supreme Court of India in Jackaran Singh v. State of Punjab - AIR 1995 SC 2345 = 1995 Crl.L.J. 3992 it is observed as follows:- “So far as the conscious possession of the weapon Ext. MO/4 is concerned, the disclosure statement, Ex. P9 inspires no confidence. Firstly ,because none of the two panch witnesses, Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh ASI, have been examined at the trial and secondly because the disclosure statement does not bear the signatures or the thumb impression of the appellant. Even, the recovery memo of the revolver and the cartridges, Ext.P-9/A, which is also attested by Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh, ASI does not bear either the signatures or the thumb impression of the accused. The absence of the signatures or the thumb impression of an accused on the disclosure statement recorded under Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act detracts materially from the authenticity and the reliability of the disclosure statement”. Do the following statements in the above observation, reflect the correct position of law for supporting the acquittal, namely – (a) The disclosure statement does not bear the signatures or the thumb impression of the appellant (accused). (b) The absence of the signatures or the thumb impressions of the accused on the disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act detracts materially from the authenticity and the reliability of the disclosure statement. (c) None of the two panch witnesses, Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh ASI, have been examined at the trial. (d) Even the recovery memo of the revolver and the cartridges, Exhibit P-9/A which is also attested by Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh ASI, does not bear either the signatures or the thumb impressions of the accused. (e) Has the above observation made by the Apex Court, resulted in any injustice ? Ans. (a) The observation made by the Supreme Court is that the disclosure statement by the accused does not contain the “signatures” or “thumb impressions” of the accused. The above observation overlooked the fact that under Sec. 162 (1) Cr.P.C. there is an interdict against obtaining the signatures of persons interrogated in their statements. When Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. prohibits the police officer recording the statement from taking the signatures of the persons interrogated by him, the Supreme Court is finding fault with the prosecution in not obtaining the signatures and thumb impressions of the accused in the disclosure statement. This is an observation clearly overlooking the interdict under Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. The prohibition contained in Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. against obtaining the signature, is not applicable to any proceedings under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. (Vide para 29 of State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram AIR 1999 SC 1776 = (1999) 3 SCC 507 – K. T....

“Recovery Evidence” Under Section 27 Of The Evidence Act- Questions & Answers By Justice V Ramkumar [Part-XI]

Justice V Ramkumar

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