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Supreme Court Weekly Round Up: January 3 To January 9, 2022
Nupur Thapliyal
9 Jan 2022 8:05 AM GMT
JUDGMENTS THIS WEEK1. Employee Who Refuses Promotion Offer Not Entitled To Financial Upgradation Merely Because She Suffered Stagnation : Supreme CourtCase name: Union of India vs Manju AroraCitation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1The Supreme Court observed that if a regular promotion is offered but is refused by the employee before becoming entitled to a financial upgradation, she/he shall not be...
JUDGMENTS THIS WEEK
Case name: Union of India vs Manju Arora
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1
The Supreme Court observed that if a regular promotion is offered but is refused by the employee before becoming entitled to a financial upgradation, she/he shall not be entitled to financial upgradation only because he/she has suffered stagnation.
The court said that Central Government employees who have refused the offer of regular promotion are disentitled to the financial upgradation benefits envisaged under the O.M. dated 9.8.1999
When an employee refuses the offered promotion, difficulties in manning the higher position might arise which give rise to administrative difficulties as the concerned employee very often refuse promotion in order to continue in his/her own place of posting, the bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed.
In this case, some employees claimed the benefit of Assured Career Progression Scheme for the Central Government civilian employees under the O.M. dated 9.8.1999 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India. The ACP Scheme provided for financial upgradation to the next higher grade of pay for those employees who could not get promotion after 12 years of service. Second upgradation is similarly admissible after 24 years of service.
Case name: I-Pay Clearing Services Private Limited vs ICICI Bank Limited
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 2
The Supreme Court observed that merely because an application is filed under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act by a party, it is not always obligatory on the part of the Court to remit the matter to Arbitral Tribunal.
"When it prima facie appears that there is a patent illegality in the award itself, by not recording a finding on a contentious issue, in such cases, Court may not accede to the request of a party for giving an opportunity to the Arbitral Tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings.", the bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed.
The court said that the discretionary power conferred under Section 34(4) of the Act, is to be exercised where there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the awar
As per Section 34(4) of the Act, upon a request by a party, the Court may adjourn the proceedings for a period determined by it in the order to give the Arbitral Tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of Arbitral Tribunal, will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.
Case name: Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs Dilip Uttam Jayabhay
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 3
The Supreme Court observed that an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings.
The standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives, the bench comprising Justices M R Shah and BV Nagarathna observed while setting aside an order passed by Industrial Court which directed Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation to reinstate a driver whose services were terminated by it after holding a disciplinary enquiry.
"Therefore, at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence. That does not mean that the respondent – workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of the misconduct.", the court said.
Case name: Kerala State Beverages Manufacturing and Marketing Corporation Ltd versus Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 4
The Supreme Court has rejected the argument raised by the Kerala State Beverages Corporation that it is entitled to deduct the levies made by the state government on it from income. The Beverages Corporation's claim was on the premise that the license given to by the State Government to trade in liquor was not 'exclusive'.
Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, which refers to charges paid to the government that are not deductible from income, uses the word "exclusively". The Supreme Court held that this term "exclusively" is not to be understood on the basis of the number of undertakings involved.
A bench comprising Justice Subhash Reddy and Justice Hrishikesh Roy observed that, "The aspect of exclusivity under Section 40(a)(iib) is not to be considered with a narrow interpretation, which will defeat the very intention of Legislature. The aspect of 'exclusivity' under S. 40(a)(iib) has to be viewed from the nature of undertaking on which levy is imposed and not on the number of undertakings on which the levy is imposed."
Case name: Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. vs Maheshbhai Tinabhai Rathod
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 5
The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered last month (16th December 2021), held that Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be applied to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In this case, petition under Section 34 was filed before the High Court with a delay of 185 days beyond the time period allowed under Section 34 (3) of the Act. The singe judge refused to condone the delay. In appeal, the Division Bench condoned it and directed to place it before Single bench for admission. This order was assailed before the Supreme Court.
"The scope available for condonation of delay being self contained in the proviso to Section 34(3) and Section 5 of Limitation Act not being applicable has been taken note by this Court in its earlier decisions, which we may note.."
Case name: Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank (RMGB) vs Ramesh Chandra Meena
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 6
The Supreme Court observed there is no absolute right in favour of the delinquent employee to be represented in the departmental proceedings through the agent of his choice and the same can be restricted by the employer.
In this case, High Court has permitted the delinquent employee who is facing disciplinary proceedings to represent through ex-¬employee of the Bank. It was observed that the Regulation 44 only restricts representation by a legal practitioner, and even that too is permissible of course with the leave to the competent authority, and there is no complete or absolute bar even on engaging a lawyer, the employee cannot be restrained from availing services of retired employee of a Bank.
The court noted that the Regulation neither restricts nor permits availing the services of any outsider and / or ex¬-employee of the Bank as DR and to that extent Regulation is silent. But it noticed that the Clause 8 of the Handbook Procedure specifically provides that DR should be serving official / employee from the Bank. The bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna observed:
If the reasoning of the High Court is considered, the High Court is of the opinion that as there is no complete or absolute bar even on engaging a lawyer, it is difficult to accept that a retired employee of the Bank cannot be engaged to represent a delinquent officer in the departmental inquiry. However, the High Court has not appreciated the effect of the Handbook. As per The High Court has considered Regulation 44 of the Regulation, 2010, however has not considered clause 8 of the Handbook Procedure on the ground that the same cannot be said to be supplementary. However, we are of the opinion that Handbook Procedure can be said to be supplementary. The same cannot be said to be in conflict with the Regulation 44 of Regulation, 2010. As observed herein above, neither Regulation 44 permits nor restricts engagement of an ex¬employee of the Bank to be DR. Therefore, Clause 8.2 cannot be said to be in conflict with the provisions of Regulation, 2010. Provisions of Regulation, 2010 and the provisions of Handbook Procedure are required to be read harmoniously, the result can be achieved without any violation of any of the provisions of Regulation, 2010 and the Handbook Procedure. The objects of Regulation 44 of Regulation, 2010 and Clause 8 of the Handbook Procedure seem to be to avoid any outsider including legal representative and / or even ex-¬employee of the Bank. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that there is no absolute right in favour of the delinquent officer's to be represented in the departmental proceedings through the agent of his choice and the same can be restricted by the employer. (Para 7)
Case Title : Small Industries Development Bank of India vs M/s Sibco Investment Pvt Ltd
Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 7
A Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Subhash Reddy and Justice Hrishikesh Roy, while presiding over a matter regarding delayed payments of principal amount and interest accrued on bonds issued by SIDBI, stated that "RBI has wide supervisory powers over financial institutions like SIDBI, in furtherance of which, any direction issued by the RBI, deriving power from the RBI Act or the Banking Regulation Act is statutorily binding.
The Apex Court bench while looking into the question of whether the facsimile issued by RBI to the appellant (SIDBI) was a directive or a suggestion. The bench looked at S. 35A of Banking Regulation Act, 1949 which talks about RBI's powers to give directions to banking companies and stated that "It is not necessary for RBI to mention a specific provision before issuing directions for it to have statutory consequences. All that is required is the authority under the law, to issue such a direction. Hence, it is undisputed that any direction by the RBI is compelling and enforceable similarly like the provisions of the RBI Act by its very nature."
Thus, the bench concluded that the RBI's communication in question was a direction with appropriate statutory backing traceable to S. 45MB of the RBI Act and S. 35A of the Banking Regulation Act.
Case Name: Ellora Paper Mills Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 8
The Supreme Court held that an arbitral tribunal constituted as per an arbitration clause before the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 will lose its mandate if it violates the neutrality clause under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, which were incorporated through the 2015 amendment.
The Court held that an arbitration clause that prescribes appointment of arbitrators contrary to the amended provision of Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act cannot be given effect.
"...when the arbitration clause is found to be foul with the amended provision, the appointment of the arbitrator would be beyond the pale of the arbitration agreement, empowering the Court to appoint such an arbitrator as may be permissible.That would be the effect of the non-obstante clause contained in sub-section (5) of Section 12 and the other party cannot insist upon the appointment of the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement", the Supreme Court observed in the case Ellora Paper Mills Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh.
Case Name: M/s. Durga Welding Works v. Chief Engineer, Railway Electrification, Allahabad And Anr.
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 9
The Supreme Court has held that a party to the arbitration agreement can appoint an arbitrator even after an Arbitration Petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the other party before the High Court for appointment of an arbitrator if the party has not been given due notice of the same.
A bench comprising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka dismissed an appeal filed to assail the order the Orissa High Court, which had dismissed an Arbitration Petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act") for the appointment of an arbitrator, since the appellant himself had selected an arbitrator; filed its statement of claim and the Arbitral Tribunal had passed ex-parte arbitral award almost three years before the Respondents were put to notice of the Arbitration Petition filed before the High Court.
Case name: Bhadar Ram (D) vs Jassa Ram
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 10
The Supreme Court observed that a person belonging to Scheduled Caste /Scheduled Tribe in relation to his original State of which he is permanent or an ordinarily resident cannot be deemed to be so in relation to any other State on his migration to that State.
The court noted that as per Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, there is a restriction on sale, gift or bequest by a member of Scheduled Caste in favour of a person, who is not a member of Scheduled Caste. This provision is to protect a member of the Scheduled Caste belonging to the very State he belongs to, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed.
It is to be noted that as per Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, there is a restriction on sale, gift or bequest by a member of Scheduled Caste in favour of a person, who is not a member of Scheduled Caste. Looking to the object and purpose of such a provision, it can be said that the said provision is to protect a member of the Scheduled Caste belonging to the very State he belongs i.e., in the present case the State of Rajasthan. Being a Scheduled Caste in the State of Punjab whether the sale transaction in favour of the appellant ¬ original defendant could have been saved from the bar under Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is now not res integra.
Case Name: Shobhabai Narayan Shinde v. The Divisional Commissioner, Nashik Division, Nashik And Ors.
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 11
The Supreme Court held that no statutory appeal lies against an order passed under Section 14B(1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, refusing to disqualify the Sarpanch or Member of Panchayat. The Apex Court clarified that Section 14B(2) of the Act does not provide for an appeal mechanism for the orders passed under Section 14B(1).
A bench comprising Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and C.T. Ravikumar allowed an appeal filed assailing the order of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, wherein the order of disqualification passed by the Divisional Commissioner under Section 14B(2) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959 ("Act") setting aside the orders of the Collector under Section 14B(1) was affirmed. The Apex Court set aside the order of the Divisional Commissioner as non-est in law, and restored the orders passed by the Collector rejecting the applications seeking disqualification of the appellants.
12. Tribunal Decisions Can Be Scrutinized Only By A Jurisdictional High Court : Supreme Court
Case Title: Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 12
The Supreme Court has held that any decision of a tribunal (inclusive of one passed under S. 25 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) can only be scrutinized by a High Court which has territorial jurisdiction over the tribunal in question.
"All decisions of tribunals created under Article 323A and 323B of the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned tribunal falls", the Court referred to the dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench in L Chandrakumar decision.
The Supreme Court faulted the approach of the High Court by noting that it was contrary to the dictum of the Constitution Bench in L Chandrakumar. The judgment authored by Justice Ravikumar held :
"When once a Constitution Bench of this court declared the law that "all decisions of Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls", it is impermissible to make any further construction on the said issue.
The law thus declared by the Constitution Bench cannot be revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for that matter by the High Courts by looking into the bundle of facts to ascertain whether they would confer territorial jurisdiction to the High Court within the ambit of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. We are of the considered view that taking another view would undoubtedly result in indefiniteness and multiplicity in the matter of jurisdiction in situations when a decision passed under Section 25 of the Act is to be called in question especially in cases involving multiple parties residing within the jurisdiction of different High Courts albeit aggrieved by one common order passed by the Chairman at the Principal Bench at New Delhi".
Case name: State of UP vs Mcdowell and Company Limited
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 13
The Supreme Court observed that a fire accident cannot be said to be an 'act of God' if it did not happen due to the operation of any forces of nature.
"When nothing of any external natural force had been in operation in violent or sudden manner, the event of the fire in question could be referable to anything but to an act of God in legal parlance.", the court said in a judgment delivered on Thursday (6 January 2022)
In 2003, a fire incident took place in a godown of the distillery of the Mcdowell & Co. As many as 35,642 cases of Indian Made Foreign Liquor of different brands got destroyed in this fire. After receiving the initial reports that the fire possibly took place due to short circuit of electricity, the Revenue department proposed to recover the amount of excise duty lost, due to such destruction of liquor, from the company. Allowing the writ petition filed by the Company, the Allahabad High Court quashed the demand notice issued by the Department.
Case Title: Ram Ratan v State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 14
In a judgement delivered recently, the Supreme Court through a three-judge bench comprising Chief Justice N.V. Ramana and Justices A.S. Bopanna and Hima Kohli clarified two important positions of the law relating to the offence of Robbery under the Indian Penal Code. The question that came up for the Court's consideration was whether the charge under Section 397 of IPC would hold in case the firearm had not been put to use.
The judgement authored by Justice Bopanna notes that in order to meet the ingredients of Section 397 of the IPC, first, it is not necessary for the offender to have literally used the weapon for the purpose it serves. Even showcasing the same to create fear in the mind of the victim would be sufficient. The Court held:
"It is clear that the use of the weapon to constitute the offence under Section 397 IPC does not require that the 'offender' should actually fire from the firearm or actually stab if it is a knife or a dagger but the mere exhibition of the same, brandishing or holding it openly to threaten and create fear or apprehension in the mind of the victim is sufficient."
Case name : Gayabai Digambar Puri (Died) vs Executive Engineer
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 15
The Supreme Court observed that if a person is deprived of possession of his property on account of acquisition of land, he should be paid compensation immediately.
If the same is not paid to him forthwith, he would be entitled to interest on the compensation amount from the date of taking possession of the land till the date of payment, the court said.
In this case, the issue was regarding the liability to pay interest whether commences from the date of taking possession or only from the date of award. The Reference Court had directed that the interest has to be paid from 04.04.1997 when possession was taken until 03.04.1998 for the first year at the rate of 9 per cent per annum and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum from 04.04.1998 till the date of payment, i.e. 08.09.2004. This was altered by the High Court.
Case name: Asst. Director Enforcement Directorate vs Dr. VC Mohan
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 16
The Supreme Court observed that, once the prayer for anticipatory bail is made in connection with offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the underlying principles and rigors of Section 45 of the PMLA Act must get triggered although the application is under Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is the duty of court to examine the jurisdictional facts including the mandate of Section 45 of the PMLA Act, which must be kept in mind, the bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and CT Ravikumar observed while setting aside an order passed by the High Court of Telangana by which it granted anticipatory bail to an accused in connection with offence concerning the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
Case Title : Neil Aurelio Nunes and others versus Union of India
Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 17
The Supreme Court has allowed the commencement of counselling process for NEET-PG and NEET-UG for 2021-22 admissions on the basis of the existing 27% quota for Other Backward Classes (OBC) and 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections(EWS) in the All India Quota.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of 27% OBC reservation. As regards criteria to determine EWS(Rupees 8 lakhs gross annual income cut-off), the Court allowed the existing criteria to operate for the current admission year so as to not delay the admission process further. However, future application of EWS criteria, which has been stipulated in the Office Memorandum of July 2019, will be subject to final outcome of the petitions.
18. Arbitrator Can Grant Post-Award Interest On The Interest Amount Awarded: Supreme Court
Case name: UHL Power Company Ltd. vs State of Himachal Pradesh
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 18
The Supreme Court observed that post-award interest can be granted by an Arbitrator on the interest amount awarded.
In this case, in terms of the award dated 05th June, 2005, the Sole Arbitrator had awarded a sum of ₹26,08,89,107.35 in favour of UHL Power Company Limited towards expenses claimed along with pre-claim interest capitalized annually, on the expenses so incurred. Further, compound interest was awarded in favour of UHL @ 9% per annum till the date of claim and in the event the awarded amount is not realized within a period of six months from the date of making the award, future interest was awarded @ 18% per annum on the principal claim with interest.
The court, however, agreed with the view expressed by the Appellate Court that the Single Judge (while considering Section 34 petition to set aside Arbitration Award) committed a gross error in re-appreciating the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal and taking an entirely different view in respect of the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the Implementation Agreement governing the parties.
Case name: Jasdeep Singh Jassu vs State of Punjab
Citation : 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 19
A mere common intention per se may not attract Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance, the Supreme Court observed in a judgment delivered in a criminal appeal on 7 Jan 2022.
In this case, the appellants were convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) with life sentence. They filed appeal challenging the invocation of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code to convict them with along with other accused.
The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh agreed with the submission on behalf of the appellant that the evidence available is not sufficient enough to hold that Section 34 IPC is attracted as against them. There is no evidence at all on record to hold that A3 and A4 were aware of the fact that A1 was having a gun with him, the court said.
Case Name: State of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi And Ors.
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 20
The Supreme Court held that the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board had correctly applied the method of 'Normalisation' of marks at the stage of Written Examination as well as the Final merit list in the process of selection of candidates for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police, Platoon Commander and Fire Officer.
A Bench comprising Justices U.U. Lalit and Vineet Saran allowed the appeals filed challenging the order of the Special Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, which had quashed the results of the examination of police officials in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The bench held that 'normalisation' was appropriately applied by the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board ("Board") at the stage of written examination.
Case Title: Arjab Jena@ Arjab Kumar Jena V. Utsa Jena @ Pattnaik| Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 19259/2021
Citation : 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 21
The Supreme Court on Wednesday observed that taking on record the comments made during the course of mediation or settlement proceedings impedes conciliation and impinges on the principle of confidentiality.
While disapproving the observations made in the order dated April 20, 2021 passed by the Orissa High Court, bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M Trivedi in its order said,
"We disapprove the observations made in the impugned order which refer to the comments made during the course of the mediation or settlement proceedings. The High Court should not have taken the aforesaid comments on record, as the same would impede conciliation and is contrary to and impinges on the principle of confidentiality. Accordingly, the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the impugned order would be erased from record."
Case name: Mahendra vs State Of MP
Citation: 2022 LIVELAW (SC) 22
The Supreme Court reiterated that it is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five or more.
Less than five persons can be charged under Section 149 only if the prosecution has a case that the persons before the Court and other numbering in all more than five composed an unlawful assembly, these others being persons not identified and un¬armed, the bench comprising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka said.
It may be noticed that the essential ingredients of Section 149 are that the offence must have been committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, and Section 141 makes it clear that it is only where five or more persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course, the other requirements of the said section as to the common object of the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. To say in other words, it is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five or more. At the same time, it may not be necessary that five or more persons necessarily be brought before the Court and convicted. Less than five persons may be charged under Section 149 if the prosecution case is that the persons before the Court and other numbering in all more than five composed an unlawful assembly, these others being persons not identified and un¬armed.
IMPORTANT APEX COURT UPDATES
1. PM Security Lapse : Supreme Court Asks Centre & Punjab To Put On Hold Committee Probes; Directs HC Registrar General To Secure Records
The Supreme Court of India this week directed the Registrar General of the Punjab and Haryana High Court to secure the records relating to the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Punjab on January 5, during which a security lapse occurred when a group of protesters blocked the PM's cavalcade.
The Court directed the State of Punjab, central and state agencies to cooperate with the Registrar General and provide entire records immediately. The Court said that both the Director-General of Police of Chandigarh UT and an officer from NIA can be nodal officers.
The Court also orally asked the Central Government and the Punjab Government to put on hold the proceedings of the respective committees constituted by them to enquire into the security lapse till next Monday.
2. Class 12 Exam: Supreme Court Quashes CBSE Policy To Treat Improvement Exams Marks As Final; Directs To Give "Better Of Two" Option To Students
The Supreme Court has struck down Clause 28 of CBSE Policy which held that marks in the later (improvement) exams will be considered final for the assessment of Class 12 exams for the last academic year. The Bench further directed that the CBSE shall provide the option to the candidate to accept the better of the two marks obtained for the final declaration of the results.
The Supreme Court in December had asked the Central Board of Secondary Education(CBSE) to reconsider its policy of treating the marks in the improvement exams of Class 12 as final over the marks tabulated as per the Standard Formula.
3. Petition Is An Abuse Of Process Of Law And Manifestly An Outcome Of Some Personal Vendetta Against Rakesh Asthana: Centre Submits Before Supreme Court
In response to NGO Centre for Public Interest Litigation's challenge to the appointment of Rakesh Asthana as the Delhi Police Commissioner, the Centre has told the Supreme Court that the petition is "an abuse of process of law and manifestly an outcome of some personal vendetta against incumbent police commissioner entertained by the petitioner"
The bench of Justices D. Y. Chandrachud and AS Bopanna is seized of two petitions filed by the CPIL - one a writ petition filed against the Central Government order appointing Asthana as the Delhi Police Commissioner, and the other a special leave petition filed agains t the Delhi High Court's judgment which rejected the challenge against Asthana's appointment.
The Supreme Court had on November 26, 2021 issued notice on the petitions filed by the NGO Centre for Public Interest Litigation challenging the appointment of Rakesh Asthana as the Commissioner of Delhi Police. As soon as the matter was taken, the bench had told Advocate Prashant Bhushan, who appeared for the CPIL, that it was issuing notice. Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta had appeared for the Union of India and Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi for Rakesh Asthana. The Court had directed that counter-affidavits be filed within 2 weeks.
4. Supreme Court Modifies Sentence Of Life Imprisonment To Imprisonment of 30 Years with No Remission in Rape-Murder Case
A Bench of Justices L.Nageswara Rao and Hrishikesh Roy modified the order of sentence of life imprisonment till natural life to a sentence of 30 years without remission.
The appellant had been convicted for the offenses of rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl child. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant under Sections 376-A, 302, 363, 201 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ('POCSO Act') imposed the death penalty.
While answering the death reference, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in its impugned judgment had upheld the conviction of the appellant but converted the death sentence into life imprisonment. However, the High Court held that the imprisonment of life shall be till the natural life of the appellant.
