Can Courts Strike Down Personal Law?

On 10-03-2026, a familiar constitutional question returned. A recent petition challenging Muslim Inheritance Law has prompted the Supreme Court to ask a deceptively simple yet deeply consequential question: Can courts review personal law at all?

The issue arises in the context of claims that certain inheritance rules discriminate against Muslim women. Yet, beneath the immediate controversy lies a much older constitutional dilemma. The Indian judiciary has grappled with the relationship between personal law, religious autonomy, and fundamental rights since the earliest years of the Republic. The present moment, therefore, is not merely a new dispute, it is the latest chapter in a long and evolving constitutional story.

The Beginning: Judicial Restraint in a New Republic

The story begins in 1952, in the early years of independent India. In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, the Bombay High Court confronted the question of whether personal laws could be tested against the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative. Personal law, it held, was not “law” within the meaning of Article 13. Consequently, it could not be invalidated on the ground that it violated fundamental rights.

This reasoning reflected a cautious judicial philosophy. In a newly independent nation negotiating religious diversity and social reform, the Court envisioned the legislature, rather than the judiciary, as the appropriate forum for transforming personal law. Constitutional adjudication, at this stage, was marked by restraint rather than intervention.

The Echo of Continuity

Nearly three decades later, the Supreme Court appeared to reinforce this position. In Sri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir (1979), the Court held that Part III of the Constitution did not directly affect personal law. Judges, it emphasised, were bound to apply personal law as derived from traditional and authoritative sources unless it was altered by custom or legislation.

This reaffirmation strengthened what came to be known as the Narasu doctrine - a constitutional understanding that insulated uncodified personal law from fundamental rights scrutiny. For a time, the judicial approach appeared settled. Courts would interpret personal law, but they would not fundamentally transform it.

The First Constitutional Tension

Yet constitutional stories rarely unfold in straight lines. In 1985, the Supreme Court's decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, introduced a subtle but significant shift. The Court held that Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a secular welfare provision ensuring maintenance to destitute spouses, applied irrespective of religious identity.

While the Court did not invalidate Muslim personal law, it effectively allowed a secular statutory remedy to operate even where personal law appeared to suggest otherwise. The decision demonstrated a new judicial willingness to prioritise social welfare and constitutional values without directly striking down religious norms. The constitutional equilibrium between faith and rights had begun to change.

Equality Enters the Narrative

By the early twenty-first century, however, equality jurisprudence had begun to reshape the constitutional landscape. In John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003), the Supreme Court struck down Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which imposed discriminatory restrictions on Christians making charitable bequests.

Importantly, the Court did not invalidate personal law as such. Instead, it reviewed a statutory provision that created religion-based inequality. The case nonetheless marked a growing judicial willingness to subject religion-linked legislation to constitutional scrutiny.

A Turning Point: Triple Talaq

The constitutional debate reached a decisive moment in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017). The Supreme Court invalidated the practice of talaq-e-biddat, or instant triple talaq. It was reasoned that the practice had statutory recognition through the Shariat Act, 1937 and could therefore be tested against fundamental rights.

The decision was a classic plurality ruling. A five-judge bench reached a 3–2 majority result striking down the practice, but the judges in the majority did not agree on the same reasoning. This meant that the case implicitly illustrated a deeper principle of precedent theory: a single judgment may contain multiple ratios when judges agree on the outcome but differ on the legal basis.

Justices Rohinton Nariman and U.U. Lalit treated triple talaq as unconstitutional because it was “manifestly arbitrary” and therefore violated Article 14. They reasoned that the instant and irrevocable nature of the practice destroyed any possibility of reconciliation and allowed the marital bond to be dissolved capriciously. Since the

Shariat Act, 1937 recognised the practice, it could be tested against fundamental rights and struck down.

Justice Kurian Joseph, however, reached the same conclusion through a different route. In his view, triple talaq was invalid because it was not sanctioned by the Quran and therefore could not be considered part of Islamic law itself.

The significance of Shayara Bano thus lay not only in its outcome but also in its method. It showed that constitutional adjudication may produce layered precedents.

Constitutional Morality and Religious Practice

The following year, the Court's decision in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2018) (the Sabarimala case) carried the constitutional conversation even further. The majority held that the exclusion of women of menstruating age from temple entry violated principles of equality and dignity. Religious practices, the Court declared, must conform to constitutional morality and cannot justify discrimination.

At the same time, a powerful dissent cautioned against excessive judicial intrusion into matters of faith. Justice Indu Malhotra warned that courts should not ordinarily interfere with sincerely held religious beliefs.

The Question Returns

Today, as the Supreme Court once again considers whether aspects of Muslim inheritance law can be constitutionally reviewed, this long doctrinal journey assumes renewed significance. The judiciary stands at a crossroads shaped by decades of evolving jurisprudence.

On one path lies the legacy of Narasu i.e., a tradition of deference to personal law and legislative primacy in social reform. On the other lies a more assertive constitutional vision, reflected in decisions such as Shayara Bano and Sabarimala, where courts have intervened to protect equality and dignity.

The ultimate resolution of the present dispute may not provide a final answer to the question of judicial review of personal law. Constitutional law, like the society it governs, evolves through contestation and dialogue.

The return of the question is a part of a larger constitutional narrative, one that began in the early years of the Republic and remains unfinished. Whether the future lies in judicial intervention, legislative reform, or a complex interplay of both is a question that will shape the trajectory of personal law in India for years to come.