The proposed Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill, 2025, marks one of the most ambitious attempts to restructure India's higher education regulatory architecture since Independence. By proposing to replace multiple statutory regulators with a unified institutional framework, the Bill seeks to establish administrative efficiency, uniformity, and streamlined governance. While these objectives may appear commendable, the constitutional implications of the proposed legislation demand far greater scrutiny. The Bill raises some fundamental questions about the future of cooperative federalism, institutional autonomy, democratic participation, and the constitutional distribution of powers between the Union and the States.

The constitution does not conceive India as a unitary State. Rather, it establishes a federal polity in which legislative and administrative powers are distributed between the Union and the States. Although education was moved to the Concurrent List by the Forty-second Constitutional Amendment, the constitutional design did not envisage the virtual displacement of the States from educational governance. The Concurrent List is intended to facilitate cooperation, but not unilateral domination. The spirit of Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule requires a constitutional balance in which both levels of government meaningfully collaborate and participate in shaping educational policy.

But, the proposed Bill appears to disturb this balance by concentrating regulatory authority within a centrally constituted institutional framework. Such centralisation may fall within Parliament's legislative competence, particularly in matters concerning standards of higher education under Entry 66 of List I. However, legislative competence alone does not settle the constitutional question. The exercise of constitutional power must also respect the broader constitutional principles that animate the federal structure. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held in several judgments that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Legislation that substantially amounts to weaken the role of the States in a domain where they have long exercised substantial responsibility deserves a careful constitutional examination.

The most significant constitutional concern lies in the institutional design of the proposed regulatory framework. A single national authority exercising extensive powers over regulation, standards, accreditation, governance, and compliance inevitably alters the relationship between the Union and State governments. State universities, established through State legislation, funded substantially by State resources, and accountable to State legislatures, may increasingly become subject to regulatory decisions over which the States exercise only limited influence. This creates a constitutional asymmetry: responsibility remains with the States, while effective regulatory authority shifts to the Centre.

Such an arrangement raises concerns regarding the principle of cooperative federalism. The Supreme Court has consistently recognised cooperative federalism as a defining feature of constitutional governance. Cooperative federalism requires consultation, shared decision-making, and institutional participation by both the Union and the States. A regulatory architecture that places overwhelming decision-making authority in central institutions, while confining State participation to a marginal role, might lead to transforming cooperation into administrative subordination.

The constitutional concern becomes even more significant when viewed against India's extraordinary diversity. Educational governance cannot be divorced from linguistic, cultural, social, and economic realities. The educational priorities of Tamil Nadu differ fundamentally from those of Nagaland, Kerala, Rajasthan, or Uttarakhand. State governments possess a deeper understanding of regional educational needs, local labour markets, linguistic aspirations, and socio-economic challenges. A highly centralised governance model may inadvertently privilege uniformity over contextual responsiveness. Constitutional federalism exists precisely to accommodate such diversity within a unified national framework.

Another area which requires a careful scrutiny is democratic accountability. Universities do not exist merely as administrative units; they are public institutions serving regional communities. Their governance has historically involved State legislatures, State governments, academic bodies, teachers, and local stakeholders. Excessive centralisation risks weakening these democratic channels of accountability. If crucial decisions affecting State universities are made predominantly by centrally appointed authorities, citizens may find it increasingly difficult to influence educational policy through their elected State representatives. Such an outcome would weaken democratic participation in one of the Constitution's most vital public functions.

The proposed framework also raises important questions regarding institutional autonomy. Higher education flourishes through intellectual diversity, academic freedom, and decentralised innovation. Universities have historically developed distinctive academic traditions reflecting regional histories, local knowledge systems, and linguistic identities. Excessive regulatory concentration may encourage uniformity at the expense of experimentation and academic independence. Constitutional democracy benefits from a plurality of academic voices rather than administrative homogenisation.

It is equally important to distinguish between the constitutional objective of maintaining national standards and the constitutional necessity of preserving federal balance. Entry 66 of List I undoubtedly empowers Parliament to coordinate and determine standards in institutions of higher education. However, coordination is not synonymous with complete centralisation. Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognised that the Union's authority to prescribe standards does not extinguish the legitimate constitutional role of the States in administering, establishing, funding, and developing their universities. A regulatory framework that effectively absorbs every significant aspect of higher educational governance into one central authority risks expanding the idea of "coordination" beyond its constitutional limits.

Supporters of the Bill argue that multiple regulatory bodies have created duplication, inconsistency, and bureaucratic inefficiency. There is undeniable merit in the need for regulatory reform. However, constitutional reform cannot be measured solely by administrative convenience. Constitutional governance requires institutional checks, balanced distribution of authority, and meaningful participation by all constitutional stakeholders. Efficiency cannot become a substitute for federal legitimacy.

A more constitutionally balanced model would preserve national academic standards while strengthening institutional mechanisms for State participation. The governing body of the proposed regulatory authority should include substantial representation from State governments and State universities. Appointment processes should minimise executive dominance through an independent and representative selection mechanism. Regulations affecting State universities should be preceded by mandatory consultation with State governments. An independent appellate mechanism, rather than executive review, would further strengthen institutional accountability and public confidence.

The constitutional debate surrounding the proposed Bill is therefore not a contest between reform and resistance. Rather, it concerns the manner in which reform is pursued. India's constitutional framework permits national coordination but rejects unnecessary concentration of power. The Constitution recognises diversity as a strength, not an administrative inconvenience. Higher education, perhaps more than any other public institution, must reflect the aspirations, histories, and priorities of the communities it serves.

The proposed legislation undoubtedly represents an important opportunity to modernise India's higher education system. Yet constitutional democracies are judged not only by the reforms they enact but also by the constitutional values they preserve while enacting them. If the Bill is to command enduring constitutional legitimacy, it must embody the principles of cooperative federalism, democratic accountability, institutional autonomy, and meaningful State participation. Reform that diminishes these constitutional commitments risks weakening the very foundations upon which India's higher education system has evolved. Parliament should therefore revisit the institutional design of the Bill to ensure that the pursuit of administrative efficiency does not come at the cost of India's constitutional balance.

Author is a Professor at Graphic Era Hill University, Dehradun. Views are personal.