Fiction Of Party Intention: Rethinking Seat And Venue Conflict In Arbitration
Dr Nuvita Kalra
19 Nov 2026 8:00 PM IST

The dispute resolution mechanism of Arbitration enjoys several advantages over court proceedings despite involving adjudication of the dispute, the most prominent being party autonomy which is expressed through the arbitration agreement between the parties. An arbitration agreement, apart from other things, is expected to describe something which is fairly simple such as if a dispute arises, where will the arbitration legally belong? However, even though the question may seem simple and straightforward but it has led to a long line of litigation in India. When vaguely drafted clauses come before a court, it is expected to examine the intention of the parties and determine the seat of arbitration as the jurisdiction of the court itself in dependent on the private agreement between the parties. This inquiry undertaken by the courts appear to respect party autonomy but a more difficult question lies beneath this familiar exercise that what if the parties never formed a clear and consistent intention regarding the seat in the first place?
The Supreme Court recently dealt with this issue again in the case of Arcis Clean Energy Pvt. Ltd. v. Parshva Innovation - 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1042, and the decision of the Court brings this difficulty into sharp focus. The dispute arose from a franchise agreement which contained a detailed arbitration clause under Clause 32.4 stating that the “precise location of the arbitration shall be within Delhi”. However, immediately thereafter under Clause 32.5 of the agreement, it was provided that the “arbitration proceedings will be held in Goa”. Clause 38 which dealt with the Governing Law and Jurisdiction provided for interpretation of the agreement according to the Indian law and the parties submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent courts in Goa.
The Supreme Court reached to the conclusion that Delhi was a mere venue whereas Goa was the juridical seat by reading the arbitration clause alongside the exclusive jurisdiction clause and according to the Court, viewing the agreement in its entirety, the intention of the parties does point towards treating Goa as the seat as compared to Delhi.
The conclusion may be legally plausible and perhaps even the most workable interpretation of a badly drafted agreement, yet, the case raises a question that if one clause of an agreement points to Delhi and another points to Goa, can it truly be said that the parties had reached a common intention on the juridical seat? Or does the court, faced with an agreement that cannot answer the question for it, construct the answer that best preserves its coherence and then describe that answer as the intention of the parties?
Party Autonomy and the Problem of Unclear Consent
Arbitration derives its legitimacy from the mutual consent of the parties wherein the parties agree to remove their dispute from the ordinary judicial process and submit it to a private adjudicatory mechanism of their choice. This idea of party autonomy is important because arbitration would lose much of its distinctive character if these choices were imposed entirely by the State and could end up suffering the same fate as the judicial proceedings.
The juridical seat is one of the most important of these choices as firstly, it connects the arbitration to a legal system and secondly, it ordinarily identifies the courts that may exercise jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings, entertain challenges to the award and exercise other powers enumerated under the arbitration law. The seat is therefore a legal home, while the venue may only be the place where a particular procedural event occurs.
The difficulty begins when an agreement does not maintain this distinction as commercial contracts are not always drafted with the conceptual precision that the arbitration law later demands from them. The words seat, venue, place, location and jurisdiction may be used vaguely or interchangeably. This may happen as the parties may focus more on the consideration at the time of drafting while giving little attention to the dispute resolution clause. It is only after a dispute arises that each word acquires a significance that neither party may have considered when the contract was signed. In such cases, it becomes difficult to speak of consent in its ordinary sense as consent suggests that a choice was understood and made. Where the agreement contains two competing geographical indications, there may be no single intention waiting to be uncovered and there may instead be uncertainty, incomplete thinking or a drafting error. A court must still resolve the jurisdictional question but the necessity of reaching an answer should not lead us to assume that the answer always existed clearly in the minds of the parties.
It is therefore useful to distinguish between three kinds of contractual intention. The first is express intention, where the agreement directly identifies the juridical seat; the second is inferred intention, where the correct technical expression is absent but the contract consistently points towards one place and the third is constructed intention, where different provisions point towards different places and the court must decide which indication should prevail. While the first two categories can fairly be described as exercises in interpretation, the third requires the court to do something more wherein it must complete a choice that the parties did not express coherently.
BALCO: Giving the Seat Its Juridical Meaning
The modern discussion must begin with Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012), commonly known as the BALCO case. The Constitution Bench in this case had explained that the seat is the juridical centre of arbitration and distinguished it from the places where individual hearings may be conducted for convenience under Section 20 of the 1996 Act.
This distinction brought the much needed conceptual clarity but it also increased the consequences attached to the parties' choice of words. What may appear in the contract as a short geographical reference can therefore decide the seat.
This is where the philosophical difficulties begin as the law attaches a complex set of jurisdictional consequences to the choice of a seat but commercial parties do not always make that choice with a full appreciation of those consequences. A court may nevertheless infer an intention to select the seat from words that were possibly used only to identify a convenient location for proceedings. The law must do so because jurisdiction cannot remain uncertain.
Enercon: Intention Gathered from the Agreement as a Whole
The decision in Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH (2014), demonstrated that the label assigned to a place cannot always determine the seat. The decision in Enercon is an important representation of the contextual interpretation as the Court did not allow the use of the word venue or the identification of London in the agreement to control the inquiry in isolation, rather it considered whether the broader structure of the agreement showed that the parties intended the arbitration to be legally anchored in India.
This form of interpretation can still be understood as a search for intention because the various parts of the agreement, read together, supported a reasonably consistent conclusion yet it also established a principle that would become important in later cases i.e. the juridical significance of a place does not depend entirely upon the word placed before it. Thus, the courts must look beyond the label and decide what function the named place performs within the contractual scheme.
Indus Mobile: When an Inferred Choice Excludes Every Other Court
In the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017), the Supreme Court treated Mumbai as the seat and held that the courts located there possessed exclusive supervisory jurisdiction, even though no part of the underlying cause of action had arisen in Mumbai.
It shows how the language that does not expressly use the word seat may still be assigned all the jurisdictional consequences of a juridical seat through judicial interpretation. This provides an early example of the movement from express intention towards legally attributed intention.
From Hardy Exploration to BGS SGS Soma: The Emergence of a Presumption
The tension between a venue and a seat became particularly visible in the case of Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (2020) in which Kuala Lumpur was found to be merely the venue and that the tribunal had not expressly determined the seat, it nevertheless held that Indian courts could entertain the challenge under Section 34. This approach was distinct from that adopted in the BALCO case as it refused to convert a geographical reference into a legal seat without a clearer indication of intention, it demanded for concomitant factors which could easily establish such additional intention.
The Supreme Court adopted a different approach in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd. -2019 LiveLaw (SC) 929, drawing upon the English decision in Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma - [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm), and held that where a venue is expressly designated, the arbitral proceedings are anchored to that place and there are no significant contrary indications, the named venue may be treated as the juridical seat.
Thus, the courts are no longer asking only whether the parties actually expressed a choice of seat but whether the contractual circumstances satisfy the conditions under which the law will attribute such a choice to them.
BBR (India): Intention, Conduct and the Need for Stability
The question becomes more complicated when the proceedings themselves move from one place to another as was observed in the case of BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt. Ltd. - 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 493, wherein the Supreme Court held that the subsequent movement of hearings does not automatically change the juridical seat and once the seat has been fixed, conducting proceedings at a different place for convenience does not transfer supervisory jurisdiction to the courts of that place.
Thus, in such a situation, party autonomy has to give way to judicial convenience. This adds another dimension to the broader argument since the Courts invoke party autonomy when identifying the seat but they also restrict the ability to infer a change in that seat from later conduct. The intention matters, but at the same time, it operates within rules designed to preserve jurisdictional stability.
Mahanadi Coalfields: A Venue Cannot Be Created by Convenience Alone
The 2026 decision of the Supreme Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. GSCO Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. - 2026 INSC 1038, provides an important limit to the venue as seat presumption. In the absence of a juridical seat, jurisdiction over the Section 34 challenge was determined under Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act and the contractual jurisdiction clauses, both of which pointed to the District Court at Sundargarh. This is what makes Mahanadi Coalfields particularly interesting. It shows that though every arbitration does have a legal framework, but a court need not retrospectively invent a contractual seat merely because the hearings happened at one particular place.
The decisions in Mahanadi Coalfields and Arcis Clean Energy, read together, show the two sides of the modern doctrine. In Mahanadi Coalfields, conduct without a contractual designation was insufficient to create a seat and in Arcis, conflicting contractual designations were resolved by assigning greater weight to some provisions than to others. The first case refuses to construct intention from convenience, while the second necessarily constructs intention from contradiction.
The Case for Legislative Clarity
The continuing uncertainty is also connected to the language used in Section 20 of the 1996 Act, which uses the expression place of arbitration. Although the courts have interpreted Section 20(1) and 20(2) as referring to the seat and 20(3) as referring to a venue, the statutory language itself does not use that distinction.
The 246th Report of the Law Commission of India had recognised the problem and recommended replacing the word place with the expressions seat and venue, thereby giving legislative form to the distinction developed through judicial decisions. However, that recommendation was not incorporated into the 2015 or any subsequent amendment.
The Draft Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2024 has proposed two alternative formulations. The first would replace the term place with seat in sub-sections (1) and (2), while using venue in sub-section (3). The second option, however, would go considerably further by fixing the seat of a domestic arbitration at the place where the contract was executed or the cause of action arose. While this may reduce the need to infer a seat, it does so by limiting the parties' ability to choose a neutral juridical home and also restricting the principle of party autonomy within arbitration.
Moreover, legal advisers as well as arbitral institutions must also accept part of the responsibility. A properly drafted clause requires no elaborate judicial test and it is only when the dispute resolution clause is vague or ambiguous that the courts have to intervene to interpret and give effect to the intention of the parties.
The Indian arbitration law, thus, should acknowledge this judicial role more openly. Party autonomy should govern where the parties have made a discernible choice and where they have not, the law may justifiably supply one but it should call that exercise what it is which is not the discovery of intention but the construction of certainty.
Author is an Assistant Professor at School of Law, MIT World Peace University, Pune. Views are personal.

