Conversion As Cure? A Re-look At The Loss Of Scheduled Caste Status

The Supreme Court (the SC) in Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh reiterated the legal position that conversion to religions other than Hinduism, Jainism, or Sikhism results in the loss of Scheduled Caste status.^[1] The petitioner had challenged an order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashing the FIR against the respondents. The respondents had allegedly beaten and hurled casteist slurs against the petitioner, a member of the Hindu-Madiga community (categorised as Scheduled Caste). The petitioner had, however, converted to Christianity. The HC, inter alia, held that offences registered under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, (the SC/ST Act) could not have been made out, since the victim was not a member of the Scheduled Castes following their conversion. The SC upheld this view.

From a purely legal standpoint, the decision is straightforward. Relying primarily on the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order, 1950 (CO),^[2] along with long-standing precedents, the SC held that a person professing any religion other than Hinduism, Buddhism, or Sikhism cannot, in law, assert membership of a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of securing statutory benefits. While the judgment is legally sound, the legal position itself raises two interesting points of discussion.

First, the legal benefits that are provided to the Scheduled Caste (or, in fact, any other backwards group) are driven to undo historical wrongs with enduring impact against specific segments of society. Thus, the law attempts to rectify not only the wrongs presently being faced by these groups, but also those wrongs that have been committed against them in the past. The law on conversion accounts only for the former of the two, and therefore conflicts with the SC's own understanding of backwardness.

Second, the law in rescinding the Scheduled Caste status on conversion takes a formalistic approach, where backwardness hinges on a mere title rather than on the lived experiences of individuals. Interestingly, the jurisprudence on inter-caste adoptions and marriages has rejected this mechanistic approach, in contrast to the jurisprudence on conversion.

Understood in the backdrop of these two points, the legal position revoking the status of the Scheduled Caste on conversions to certain religions appears to be mired in constitutional conflicts, and therefore demands recalibration. It is important to note, at this stage, that this piece does not examine whether caste discrimination exists amongst members of other faiths or not. Rather, it analyses whether conversion, ipso facto, should lead to a loss of Scheduled Caste status, given that the effects of past discrimination often persist. It is also important to note that the constitutional validity of clause 3 of CO has been challenged before the SC, but, as of now, the petition is pending.^[3]

Clause 3 of the CO

Clause 3 of the CO provides that 'no person who professes a religion different from Hinduism, Buddhism, or Sikhism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste'. This provision entails two consequences. First, no caste or group whose members do not profess Hinduism, Buddhism, or Sikhism can be notified or considered as a Scheduled Caste. Secondly, it annuls the Scheduled Caste status of individuals who, although previously professing the above religions, have now ceased to profess them. The former consequence is based on the perception that untouchability was only suffered by castes who were within the fold of Hinduism. This position, of course, has been challenged, even by commissions set up under governmental sanction. I, however, wish to focus on the latter consequence, which is premised on the assumption that conversion eradicates all disabilities associated with membership in a backward caste.

What does the Scheduled Caste Status entail?

Whenever the law recognises an individual as a member of any caste listed as the Scheduled Caste, it bestows upon them 'constitutional identity',^[4] which carries the presumption that the individual so recognised has suffered certain social obstacles that entitle them to certain statutory and constitutional benefits as a remedy.

These remedies counter not merely the ongoing discriminatory practices, but also seek to correct 'continuing evil effects' suffered due to prior discrimination.^[5] As a corollary, it would be a fair contention that whenever the law disentitles a person from the constitutional benefits that were given to them based on their being a member of the Scheduled Caste, it ought to be working on the assumption or knowledge that the individual will not only not face discrimination, but also that the detrimental effects of prior discrimination have ceased to hinder them. For if this is not the case, then the person should still be entitled to statutory benefits to remedy the social harms suffered by them.

The Legal Approach to Conversion

Unfortunately, neither the CO nor the Supreme Court adopts this approach. Both proceed on the assumption that disadvantages dissipate upon conversion. In doing so, backwardness is framed narrowly in terms of continuing discriminatory practices.

For instance, in C.M. Arumugam v. S Rajagopal, the SC said, “[o]nce such a person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, the social and economic disabilities arising because of the Hindu religion cease, and hence it is no longer necessary to give him protection, and for this reason he is deemed not to belong to a scheduled caste….”^[6] The statement has been reproduced in Chinthada Anand. In Chinthada, the SC further quoted the bible to drive home the point that there is no caste-based discrimination in the Christian faith. It emphasised that conversion usually results in expulsion from one's caste, and legal benefits based on that caste identity become infructuous. This approach is anchored in the assumption, as is visible in the SC's statement in Arumugam, that conversion cures all the effects arising from caste-backwardness, but does not consider the disadvantages stemming from past injustices. Sardar Vallabhai Patel once wrote to Dr Ambedkar that converting to other religions to escape untouchability was like a surgeon chopping off a patient's head in order to cure his stomach disease. The CO, as well as the SC, finds this to be an apt medication.

This becomes perturbing on two grounds. First, the jurisprudence entirely fails to consider the obstacles that an individual may have encountered previously that continue to impede them. The SC itself in previous cases has recognised this. Thus, even if we assume that the person expelled from their Caste, and suddenly transplanted into a society with no discrimination, the past injustices suffered by them would still act as a shackle. Instead of accounting for these, the law here adopts a formalistic approach, where backwardness is associated with a mere title and not with lived realities that actually hinder individual growth.

Secondly, it is in direct contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution.^[7] Whenever the Scheduled Caste status of an individual is revoked, the law appears to be declaring that although the individual was backwards at some point, they are not so anymore. If the person is yet to overcome their disadvantages borne out of caste discrimination, withdrawal of the Scheduled Caste status would be tantamount to a violation of Article 14, as similarly placed people (either from the converted individual's own caste or others notified as Scheduled Caste) would continue to receive benefits as a remedy. This would be discrimination without an intelligible differentia.^[8]

This, curiously, also raises a fascinating question over the removal of Castes from the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Other Backwards Classes (OBC) list. Since both situations require answering whether the individual or the group, once backwards, has now overcome the disadvantage that rendered them so. Given that there has been no political will to initiate discussion of the issue, it has largely been left unaddressed. Should the question ever be taken up, it would likely necessitate consideration of factors such as whether the caste continues to face practices akin to untouchability (assuming it did so historically) and whether it has attained a reasonable level of social and economic advancement, rendering special protections no longer warranted. In my view, grounds along these lines should be considered when, if ever, the question of removal of a Caste from the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or OBC list is deliberated. In revoking the Scheduled Caste status on conversion, principles akin to the aforementioned conditions ought to be applied.

Interestingly, the judiciary itself has rejected a formalistic outlook in cases of adoption and marriage. In Mrs Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University and Others,^[9] the SC held that when someone from a non-backwards caste, by way of adoption or marriage, is 'transplanted' into the Dalits, Tribes or OBCs, they must have undergone the same handicaps, disabilities, disadvantages, indignities or sufferings that members of such groups are subjected to to avail the facility of reservation. It emphasised that a candidate who, being born in a forward caste, has had an advantageous start in their life, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation on being transplanted in the backward caste by adoption, marriage or conversion. In Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of Gujarat and others,^[10] the SC said that while determining the caste of a child from an inter-caste marriage, questions such as whether the child faced the same disadvantages and stigmas associated with the caste claimed as theirs ought to be considered.

The Bombay High Court, in Rajendra Shrivastava v. State of Maharashtra,^[11] held that when a person from a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe marries a person belonging to a forward caste, her caste by birth does not change by virtue of the marriage. It decided '[a] person born as a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe has to suffer from disadvantages, disabilities and indignities only by virtue of belonging to the particular caste which he or she acquires involuntarily on birth. The suffering of such a person by virtue of caste is not wiped out by a marriage with a person belonging to a forward caste.' A similar view was taken by the Kerala High Court in Bhimappa Jantakal and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.^[12]

Here, the judiciary has preferred a more purposive interpretation in these cases. It has not tied the backwardness, caused by historical discrimination on account of caste, to a simple title. Rather, it has sought to conceive it as sustained and enduring obstacles that result from previous or present discrimination, impacting an individual's capacity to compete on par with others. This is what is absent in jurisprudence relating to conversion.

A sophist argument could be that, in cases of adoption and marriage, the individual has not left the sphere of Hinduism. This is wholly immaterial. In both religious conversion and 'transplanting' from backwards to a non-backwards Caste, the experiences before these changes remain substantially the same. As the 'disadvantages, disabilities, and indignities are only by virtue of belonging to the caste which he or she acquires involuntarily on birth' are not wiped out by marriage to a person from a forward caste, it is unfair to assume that disabilities arising because of the Hindu religion cease on conversion. Thus, even here, differential treatment would amount to a violation of Article 14, as similarly situated individuals are being treated differently, without an intelligible differentia.

The existing legal position on the loss of Scheduled Caste status upon conversion rests on a sweeping assumption– that conversion eradicates the effects of caste-based disadvantage. This assumption is constitutionally untenable. Firstly, it overlooks the reality that the benefits afforded to Scheduled Castes are designed not only to address present discrimination but also to remedy the enduring consequences of historical injustice. Secondly, it sits uneasily with the judiciary's own approach in cases of adoption and inter-caste marriage, where lived experiences and accumulated disadvantage determine status. This inconsistency reveals a deeper flaw. While the law recognises caste as a source of enduring harm in some contexts, it treats it as a mere formal identity in others. So long as this contradiction persists, the mechanical revocation of Scheduled Caste status upon conversion remains constitutionally suspect and calls for serious reconsideration.

1. 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288. ↑

2. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, C.O. 19. ↑

3. Centre Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No.180 of 2004. ↑

4. State of Punjab & Ors v. Davinder Singh & Ors, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538. ↑

5. Indira Sawhney & Ors v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 930 of 1990. ↑

6. Civil Appeal No. 1171 of 1973. ↑

7. Constitution of India, art. 14. ↑

8. The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar Habib Mohamed, Civil Revision Petition Case No. 922 and 1113 of 1951. ↑

9. Civil Appeal Nos.3163-64 of 1995. ↑

10. Civil Appeal No.654 of 2012. ↑

11. Criminal Application No.2347 OF 2009. ↑

12. Criminal Petition No.101825 of 2019. ↑

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