On and off the parliamentary tables in Delhi, Delimitation is around the corner, yet again. While the time and guise of introducing it has piqued the interest of many a few, the analysis of it has been lost, somewhere within the caustic mingling of the right, left and the centre. Time is neither lost nor is Delimitation a stranger to Indian Politics, in 1976, under the Constitutional Amendment Act, the Parliament temporarily blocked the periodic inter-state reapportionment under Article 82, fixing the Lok Sabha seat shares according to the 1971 Census. With this, the Legislature attempted to extend the already thinning rope of representation to the high-fertility States to control and stabilize their population.

But even with the deadline in sight, the Parliament through the 84^th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2001(read with the 87^th Amendment Act, 2003), reenacted and extended the seat freeze until the census could be conducted again after the year 2026. 10 to 20 years onwards, the population across the high-fertility northern belt continues to be anything but stable. Data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5) published by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in 2021, projected a sharp drop in the Total Fertility Rates of southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, well below the Replacement Level of 2.1. On the other hand, densely populated Northern states have seen an increased population growth. Now, a purely demographic reapportionment after 2026 would dramatically shift power northwards. Research by Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hinston (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), show the Northern belt gain an addition of 40-50 extra Lok Sabha seats, while on the same lines, the Southern representation keeps sinking.

Ever since, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973), the Basic Structure Doctrine prevented the Parliament from making any law under Article 368, that went against the very essence and spirit of the Constitution. In the S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) , Supreme Court held that 'Federalism is an essential feature of this Basic Structure.' Federalism in its rawest sense, respects every unit within a federal structure to share power equally, but when any unit is marginalized ironically because of demographic control, federalism is no longer the elephant in the room. It is the case of pretentious federalism because when we redistribute seats mainly on census figures, progressive and demographically stable states bear the brunt, while high-fertility and demographically unstable states are rewarded with greater legislative control.

Talk about finances, under the 15^th Finance Commission (2021-2026), horizontal tax devolution allowed 45% weightage to Low Per-Capita Income States and 15% to Population (2011 Census), while allocating only 12.5% to Demographic Performance. Highly Industrialized and Progressive States like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala account for the largest share of national direct tax and GST collections. However, the principle of horizontal devolution allocates only 4.08% of the share to Tamil Nadu, 3.65% of the share to Karnataka and 1.93% of the share to Kerala in the central divisible pool. States with significantly lesser progress in population control, education and economic growth like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar contribute significantly lesser shares to the central divisible pool but receive disproportionately large devolution shares in the form of 17.93% and 10.06% respectively. These stark figures also account for the pitous state, Indian Federalism has been reduced to.

International, Federal Democracies across the world rarely allow population instabilities to dictate the composition of their legislative bodies. Under the Article 14(2) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), representation in the European Parliament is governed by the principle of Degressive Proportionality, where, in terms of population, larger member states hold more total seats but smaller member states hold more seats per capita.

Article 1, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution is a milestone on equality in reapportionment. It guarantees every state at least 1 representative irrespective of population size. The Apportionment Act of 1929(46 Stat. 21) capped House membership at 435 seats. A similar model could be inspired in India as well.

But what if the seat share is not determined by population growth alone, but on a variety of other factors brought together in different proportions. In case, we allocate 50% of seats based on Population, 30% based on the Demographic Performance Index, the rest 20% for Human Development Index (HDI) growth and Fiscal Contribution of the respective state, the state can not only elevate development but also induce states to develop their sectors of education, fiscal management and health care. Political voice will not be restricted to demography but all round development as well.

Seat Share = 50%(Population) + 30% (Demographic Performance) + 20% (HDI & Revenue)

*The Formula*

These ideas are an expansion to the 15^th Finance Commission Report (2020), which allocated 12.5% weightage specifically to 'Demographic Performance' to protect the interests of the high performing states.

Coming back to the Parliament, the Lok Sabha with its demographic nature offers no protection and promise to the south. In case, the Rajya Sabha could be federally transformed, the country can avoid a demographic majority in the Lok Sabha from solely determining the policies. The Parliament can amend Article 80 of the Constitution, by bringing in fixed or equal representation in the Rajya Sabha, similar to the system of representation in the U.S Congress. Here, every state can be ensured of equal representation irrespective of their population size. The Rajya Sabha must also be granted powers of a Federal Veto in furtherance of this policy, that strengthens its hold over legislations affecting very significant matters such as state boundary changes, federal fiscal transfers or subjects under the Concurrent List.

Tomorrow, Delimitation may or may not happen. That decision lies with the elected representatives of the people. However, Delimitation cannot and should not be unfairly reduced or associated solely with raw headcounts and arithmetic exercises. Delimitation should not resist Federalism but imbibe it. The regional and national unity that India holds today is not because of the demographic dominance of one state or geographic belt, but due to the continuous pledging and contributions of all federating units to becoming a part of the union that the constitution had envisioned. Protecting the legislative voice of the Southern States is not a demand for strengthening regional autonomy but only a plea in furtherance of the doctrine of Federalism.