Is Definition Of 'Appropriate Government' Under OSH Code, Appropriate?

India's labour-law regime, built over decades through a framework of over 40 Central and 100+ State laws^[2], had become complex, fragmented, and often inconsistent with respect to definitions, enforcement, and jurisdiction. The multitude of statutes created overlapping compliance burdens and, among other issues, persistent confusion about which authority was competent in particular situations. To resolve this, the Second National Commission on Labour (NCL) was constituted in 1999^[3] with a clear mandate: simplify, consolidate, and modernize labour laws for a changing economy.

One of its key recommendations was that there should be a uniform, single definition of 'appropriate government' across all labour legislations to avoid ambiguity and litigation. There is no need for different definitions of the term 'appropriate government'. There must be a single definition of the term, applicable to all labour laws.^[4]Acting on these recommendations, Parliament enacted four unified Labour Codes^[5].

Their objective was to bring uniformity and streamline enforcement. However, in a surprising departure, the OSH Code, 2020^[6] deviates from the consistent drafting structure of the other three Codes by omitting a clear residuary clause in its definition of “appropriate Government.”.

A comparative reading of the definition of “Appropriate Government” provided under four Labour Codes reveals similar drafting patterns in three statutes with respect to the authority of State Government: Industrial Relations Code, 2020^[7], Code on Wages, 2019^[8], and Code on Social Security, 2020^[9], but a conspicuous departure in the OSH Code i.e. Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 ^[10].

This article examines whether the definition of “appropriate Government” in the OSH Code is, in fact, appropriate, particularly in light of the absence of a clear residuary clause in clause (ii).

Definition of Appropriate Government as per OSH Code

"appropriate Government"^[11] means (i) in relation to, establishments [other than those specified in sub-clause (ii)] carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government or the establishment of railways including metro railways, mines, oil field, major ports, air transport service or telecommunication service, banking company or any insurance company (by whatever name called) established by a Central Act or a corporation or other authority established by a Central Act or a Central public sector undertaking or subsidiary companies set up by the Central public sector undertakings or autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, including establishment of contractors for the purposes of such establishment, corporation or other authority, Central public sector undertakings, subsidiary companies or autonomous bodies, as the case may be, the Central Government:

Provided that in the case of Central Public Sector Undertakings the appropriate Government shall continue to be the Central Government even if the holding of the Central Government reduces to less than fifty per cent. equity of the Central Government in that Public Sector Undertakings after the commencement of this Code; and

(ii) in relation to a factory, motor transport undertaking, plantation, newspaper establishment and establishment relating to beedi and cigar including the establishments not specified in clause (i), the concerned State Government where it is situated.

Explanation. —For the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that State Government shall be the appropriate Government in respect of occupational safety, health and working conditions in a factory situated in that State;

Issue of Interpretation

A reader unfamiliar with statutory drafting may get baffled by having the following two possible understanding of clause (ii):

1. That all establishments not covered by clause (i) automatically fall under the State Government, or
2. That only establishments relating to beedi and cigar, including those which are not specified in clause (i), fall under the State Government.

However, upon a closer grammatical and structural reading of clause (ii), the first construction collapses entirely. The statutory language in fact supports only the second interpretation, owing to the placement of the phrase “including the establishments not specified in clause (i)” immediately after “beedi and cigar,” and the absence of any comma or separate residuary clause. As per the Rule of Last Antecedent, qualifying words ordinarily relate only to the immediately preceding subject unless a contrary intention clearly appears.

In this clause:

• The last antecedent is “establishment relating to beedi and cigar”.
• The qualifying phrase is “including the establishments not specified in clause (i)”.
• The absence of a comma after “beedi and cigar” supports a narrow attachment, not a general residuary function.

Had the legislature intended a broader interpretation, it could have employed several clarity-ensuring drafting devices. The strongest of these would have been the creation of a separate sub-clause expressly allocating establishments not covered under clause (i) to the State Government. Alternatively, Parliament could have inserted the phrase “or any other establishment not specified in clause (i)”, replaced “including” with “as well as”, or isolated the phrase within brackets. Even the simple insertion of a comma before “including” would have indicated that the phrase applies to the entire preceding list rather than only to beedi and cigar establishments. The omission of all these drafting tools reinforces the interpretation that the inclusive phrase is confined to beedi and cigar establishments alone, instead of functioning as a general residuary clause.

Practical Effect of the Narrow Reading of Clause (ii)

A narrow reading of clause (ii) produces significant practical consequences. A wide range of modern commercial sectors, including IT, ITeS, SaaS firms, start-ups, BPOs, KPOs, consulting firms and law practices, would fall outside both clause (i) and the limited categories enumerated in clause (ii). The same exclusion applies to private hospitals and clinics, private educational institutions, warehousing and cold-storage facilities, construction and project-management offices, retail establishments and shopping malls, as well as digital-only media entities. Minor ports, private insurance companies for OSH purposes, NBFCs, financial intermediaries and non-factory units operating within SEZs and IT parks also remain uncovered. For all these private establishments, neither the Central Government nor the State Government can be considered as the “appropriate Government” under the OSH Code. This results in a regulatory vacuum for large parts of India's service-sector economy.

What Remains Clearly Covered

Despite the ambiguity in clause (ii), certain categories of establishments remain clearly within the statutory framework. Under clause (i), establishments such as railways, including metro rail operations, mines, oil fields, major ports, air transport services, telecommunication services, banking companies, insurance companies established by a Central Act, Central Public Sector Undertakings and their subsidiaries, as well as contractors engaged by these entities, continue to fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. Under clause (ii), the State Government remains the appropriate authority for factories, motor transport undertakings, plantations, newspaper establishments and establishments relating to beedi and cigar. These sectors therefore remain unaffected by the drafting ambiguity that impacts many modern service-based industries.

Interpretive and Legislative Tools for Resolving the Clause (ii) Defect

The ambiguity arising from clause (ii) of the OSH Code, raises the question of how this legislative gap might be resolved. Section 132 of the OSH Code^[12] allows the Central Government to step in when any difficulty arises in implementing the provisions of the Code. It permits the Government to issue an order in the Official Gazette to remove such difficulties, so long as the order does not contradict the text of the Code, and only within a two-year window from the date the Code comes into force. However, this mechanism cannot be used to cure the structural defect in clause (ii). Any executive attempt to expand the scope of “including the establishments not specified in clause (i)” so as to convert it into a general residuary clause would necessarily alter the meaning of the provision and thereby become inconsistent with the text of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) itself. Such an expansion would cross the permissible boundary of administrative clarification and enter the domain of judicial construction or legislative amendment. Therefore, Section 132^[13] cannot be invoked to rewrite or widen a definition clause whose restrictive syntax and punctuation are central to its meaning. The phrase “unless the context otherwise requires,” which appears at the beginning of the definition clause in Section 2(1) of the OSH Code^[14], does offer interpretive flexibility but even courts may face difficulty to resort to doctrines such as Harmonious Construction (to align clause (ii) with the other three Labour Codes), or Purposive Interpretation (to avoid jurisdictional vacuum and further the Code's objectives), and other rules of interpretation to give wide interpretation because legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process^[15].

The definition of “appropriate Government”^[16] under the OSH Code omits a clear residuary clause that would otherwise bring all non-central, non-specified establishments within the jurisdiction of the State Government. The syntactic placement of the phrase “including the establishments not specified in clause (i)” immediately after “beedi and cigar” bolsters the narrow construction that this phrase modifies only beedi and cigar establishments, rather than acting as a general residuary limb.

The implication is significant: numerous categories of establishments that are neither listed under clause (i) nor explicitly enumerated under clause (ii) are left in a jurisdictional vacuum and are effectively excluded from both Central and State jurisdiction under the OSH Code. Neither Section 132 nor judicial interpretation can cure this gap, as doing so would require rewriting the definition rather than interpreting it. In light of these issues, the central question remains: Is the definition of “appropriate Government” truly appropriate under the OSH Code?