Romeo-Juliet Clause And POCSO

When the State Treats Young Love as a Sexual Crime What is a Romeo and Juliet Clause?

A Romeo and Juliet provision is a narrowly tailored statutory exception in sexual offence laws that protects consensual romantic or sexual relationships between adolescents who are close in age from criminal prosecution. It does not dilute the offence of sexual exploitation, abuse, or coercion. Instead, it draws a principled distinction between sexual predation and age-proximate adolescent intimacy, ensuring that criminal law targets harm rather than normal human development.

The legislative intent behind POCSO is the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and not to criminalise consensual adolescent intimacy.

In many cases, parents approach the police not because their child has been exploited, but because they disapprove of a consensual relationship the adolescent has chosen. What begins as a family conflict is thus converted into a serious criminal prosecution, exposing young people to arrest, stigma, and prolonged legal processes. When the coercive power of the State is used to resolve parental anxiety rather than actual harm, the protective purpose of the POCSO Act is fundamentally distorted.

This distinction, well recognised across jurisdictions, is one that Indian law currently refuses to acknowledge. The Romeo and Juliet clause will bring in the scrutiny of the automatic arrest and detention.

The Constitutional Paradox of POCSO

India's child protection framework today faces a constitutional paradox. A statute enacted to shield children from sexual exploitation is increasingly invoked to prosecute adolescents involved in consensual romantic relationships. The Supreme

Court's observations in State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh and Another, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 decided on 9 January 2026) reflect a long overdue judicial recognition of this structural problem and a clear invitation for legislative correction.

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 proceeds on an uncompromising assumption that any sexual activity involving a person below eighteen years is inherently exploitative. Consent is rendered legally irrelevant. Context, proximity of age, and the nature of the relationship are excluded from consideration.

POCSO prosecutions are initiated by parents to enforce caste, social or moral preferences. Hence, it also indirectly becomes state prosecution driven by private morality and hence arbitrary and unconstitutional in nature.

In practice, this absolutism has produced deeply troubling outcomes. Adolescents in voluntary relationships are arrested, charged with serious offences, subjected to prolonged pretrial incarceration, and exposed to lasting social stigma. These consequences arise not because of abuse, but because the law refuses to recognise adolescent reality. At that point, criminal law ceases to be protective and becomes punitive social regulation.

When the adolescent's consensual relationships are treated at par with the aggravated sexual offences. It fails the proportionality test.

Selective suspension of consent of adolescents tries to ignore the lived realities, where in adolescent relationships are common and natural.

Judicial Warnings on Misuse of POCSO

High Courts have repeatedly cautioned against this misuse.

In Sabari v. Inspector of Police, 2019 SCC, the Madras High Court noted that POCSO was being invoked to criminalise romantic relationships between adolescents, producing devastating consequences. In Vijayalakshmi v. State, 2021 SCC Mad 317, the Court again warned that youthful relationships were being converted into criminal prosecutions due to rigid statutory interpretation. Similarly, the Delhi High Court in Ajay Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3705, decided on 20-10-2022, also observed that the intention of POCSO was to protect children under the age of 18 years from sexual exploitation. It was never meant to criminalise consensual romantic relationships between young adults.

Supreme Court's Observations in State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh and Another, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29,

These concerns have now been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. In State of Uttar Pradesh v Anurudh and Another, 2026 , a Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N Kotiswar Singh took judicial notice of the recurring misuse of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships.

While setting aside directions of the Allahabad High Court mandating medical age determination in all POCSO bail matters, the Court observed that genuine adolescent relationships were being unnecessarily drawn into the criminal justice system due to the rigid statutory framework. The Court noted the absence of any legislative mechanism to distinguish between exploitative conduct and consensual age- proximate relationships and suggested that the Union Government consider introducing a Romeo and Juliet clause to prevent such outcomes.

Romeo Juliet Clause in Comparative Statutory Practice

A Romeo and Juliet clause is not a novel or experimental concept. It is a well- recognised statutory device across jurisdictions, designed to separate consensual adolescent intimacy from sexual crime while retaining strict punishment for exploitation and abuse.

United States

In the United States, several states recognise close-in-age exemptions. Section 22.011 of the Texas Penal Code provides that consensual sexual conduct does not constitute an offence where the accused is not more than three years older than the minor, the minor has attained the age of fourteen years, and the accused is not a person in a position of authority or trust.

In State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005), the Kansas Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Kansas' “Romeo and Juliet” statute, which reduced penalties for consensual sexual conduct between adolescents close in age. The Court struck down the discriminatory application of the statute, holding that consensual sexual conduct between teenagers close in age cannot be subjected to disproportionate criminal sanctions merely due to the nature of the relationship. The decision reaffirmed that close-in-age exemptions serve a legitimate constitutional purpose by preventing arbitrary and excessive punishment of adolescent relationships.

In Canada, Section 150.1 of the Criminal Code adopts a graded consent framework. It permits consensual sexual activity where the complainant is fourteen or fifteen years of age, and the accused is less than five years older, provided the relationship is not exploitative. The statute expressly excludes relationships involving trust, authority, dependency, or exploitation, thereby shifting the focus from age alone to harm and power imbalance.

The Supreme Court of Canada has addressed adolescent sexuality through the lens of capacity and consent, rather than a judge-made Romeo–Juliet doctrine. In R v G.F., 2021 SCC 20 , the Court clarified that capacity to consent is a precondition to sexual consent and depends on understanding the sexual nature of the act and the freedom to choose. This reasoning operates alongside Parliament's close-in-age exemptions in s.150.1 of the Criminal Code, balancing child protection with recognition of adolescent autonomy.

Germany follows a hard-based approach. Section 182 of the German Penal Code does not criminalise consensual adolescent sexual activity per se. Criminal liability arises only where the offender exploits the minor's lack of capacity for sexual self- determination. The emphasis is on exploitation and abuse of vulnerability rather than rigid age thresholds.

Several Australian states similarly incorporate close in age defences, exempting consensual adolescent relationships while maintaining strict exclusions for coercion and abuse of authority.

Against this backdrop, India's absolutist framework under POCSO stands as an exception rather than the norm.

Integrating a Romeo and Juliet Clause into Indian Law

A narrowly crafted Romeo and Juliet clause can be incorporated into Indian law without diluting child protection. Such a provision could exempt consensual Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles

1. Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by
2. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or
3. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person

incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine.

1. A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty.
2. A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by
3. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or
4. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person,

and thereby exploits the victim's lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine.

1. The attempt is punishable.
2. In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention.
3. In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.

Relationships where the younger person has attained the age of sixteen years, the age difference does not exceed three years, and the relationship is not exploitative, coercive, or abusive.

The exception must categorically exclude relationships involving trust, authority, supervision, dominance, trafficking, pornography, or aggravated sexual offences. Proper safeguards would ensure that the core objective of POCSO remains intact.

Constitutional Implications

Treating a consensual relationship between a seventeen-year-old and an eighteen- year-old on par with sexual assault collapses meaningful distinctions and results in manifest arbitrariness under Article 14. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration of young persons in consensual relationships violates personal liberty, dignity, and decisional autonomy under Article 21, converting process into punishment.

The Supreme Court's observations in 2026 INSC 47 must be read as a constitutional caution/admonition. Courts cannot indefinitely compensate for legislative rigidity through case-by-case relief while young lives are irreversibly damaged.

Child protection does not require criminalising adolescence. A narrowly tailored Romeo Juliet clause, informed by comparative statutory practice and constitutional principle, would restore proportionality, protect fundamental rights, and preserve the legitimacy of the POCSO Act. It treats the adolescents as rights-bearing individuals and not just objects that need to be protected.

Parliament must act. Delay is no longer neutral. It is harmful. A child-protection law that punishes consensual adolescence ceases to protect and begins to control.

The Authors Are Rajesh G. Inamdar, Advocate At Supreme Court of India, And; Ms. Arpita Arun Chipkar A Law Student Chipkar KLE Law College, Bengaluru.

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