Shared Liability- Missing Link In New Shanti Bill, 2025

As of India's transition to clean energy ambitions, the Parliament passed the SHANTI Bill- Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill, 2025. The country plans to use nuclear energy, which has low carbon emissions, to reach its target of 100 GW of energy by 2047. Although the development of nuclear energy will be boosted by the private companies' participation as introduced by the bill yet, by eliminating the right of action against the suppliers, it is unlikely to be beneficial.

The earlier framework on suppliers' liability as provided under section 17(b) of Civil Liability On Nuclear Damage Act , 2010 (“CLNDA”) acted as a critical incentive for enhanced nuclear safety and security safeguards as the suppliers were aware that they were financially accountable for any defects in nuclear power plants It is anticipated that in the absence of recourse to suppliers' liability under the new SHANTI Bill ,2026 suppliers are unlikely to face any consequences in the event of defective or unsafe engineering components beings used. As per section 16 of SHANTI Bill the suppliers liability is explicitly limited to terms of the contract and wilful misconduct thereby as a whole removing the right to recourse from suppliers in other circumstances .

It is evidenced from the past nuclear catastrophes that failures often originate in reactor designs, safety systems or quality control processes -areas that essentially fall within the liability of the suppliers rather the nuclear power plants operators. Moreover, if suppliers are immune from the liability they will tend to compromise on the nuclear safety. The effects of nuclear accidents are long-term and irreversible, which span over generations. Due to the lingering impacts of these incidents, which lead to numerous compensation claims, operators are unable to bear the financial burden of long-term compensation on their own.

By confining the liability to operators alone the extent and length of the damage caused by nuclear accident will not be appropriately addressed. Further the Bill's liability framework does not guarantee victims' compensation justice, despite the fact that it aims to enhance and broaden the clean energy program. The Bill fails to provide long-term or sufficient compensation capacity by limiting liability primarily to operators and excluding suppliers' liability, a result that can only be practically attained through a more comprehensive liability structure that includes suppliers. Additionally, while Bill requires operators to get nuclear liability insurance or furnish equivalent financial security, the concentration of significant compensation liability on operators alone poses several practical challenges. Due to the scope and unpredictability of nuclear accidents the effectiveness of the insurance requirement is limited since insurers are frequently reluctant to sufficiently pool such risks. Perhaps it could be stated that the New Shanti Bill would have been more effective if it had apportioned the liability among the operators, suppliers and the State. Such a shared liability model would have reinforced the compensation process by ensuring sufficient financial capacity to address the large scale and long-term consequences of nuclear accidents. The Bill, therefore, is unlikely to accomplish its stated goals of sufficient victim compensation and efficient risk allocation since it undermines this framework by doing away with supplier responsibility.

Author is an Assistant Professor at JECRC University Jaipur, Rajasthan. Views are personal.