Ticking POSH Boxes Won't Stop Harassment. Here's The Real Fix

From Compliance to Culture: Why Procedural Adherence Alone Will Not Change Indian Workplaces

On August 12, 2025, the Supreme Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa directed all States and Union Territories to conduct district-wise surveys to verify whether organisations had constituted Internal Complaints Committees (ICCs) as required under Section 4 of the POSH Act. The order was notable not because it introduced something new, but because it was still necessary. More than a decade after the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 came into force, the country's highest court had to ensure that even the most basic structural requirement of the law, the existence of a committee, was being followed.

In the same year, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs notified the Companies (Accounts) Second Amendment Rules, 2025. These rules require companies to disclose in their Board Reports the number of sexual harassment complaints received, resolved, and pending beyond ninety days. Earlier, a simple statement confirming the constitution of an ICC was considered sufficient. This shift from a basic declaration to detailed disclosure reflects a deeper issue. It recognises that compliance has largely been treated as a formality.

A 2024 report by the Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University, examined disclosures from 300 NSE-listed companies over eleven years. It found that out of 1,160 complaints reported in FY 2022–23, most came from just 81 companies. This means that 219 companies reported zero cases. Such under-reporting does not indicate safer workplaces. It points to weak reporting mechanisms. When these findings are read alongside the Supreme Court's 2025 direction, one conclusion becomes clear. The POSH framework exists structurally, but its functioning remains compromised.

India does not need a completely new law. What it needs are two focused statutory amendments and three administrative reforms. These administrative changes do not even require fresh legislation. They require only the willingness to act using powers that already exist. This article outlines all five.

I. Mandate Functional Independence of Internal Committees Through External Oversight

The most structurally weak element of the POSH Act is the ICC itself. Section 4(2)(c) requires one external member from an NGO or association committed to women's causes. In practice, this member is often appointed by the same employer whose actions the ICC is meant to examine. There is no system of rotation, no public database of approved external members, and no mechanism to address conflicts of interest.

A practical solution can be implemented at two levels. At the State level, Labor Departments should maintain publicly accessible panels of verified external ICC members, organised by district and sector. Employers should be required to select external members from these panels through a rotational or randomised system, rather than making direct appointments. At the Central level, the Ministry of Women and Child Development should introduce Model Rules to standardise this system across States. These panels should be integrated with the SHe-Box portal, which is already being used for compliance monitoring following the Supreme Court's 2025 directive. External members should also be required to submit annual declarations confirming their independence, which should be publicly available.

II. Extend the Complaint Window and Strengthen Limitation Jurisprudence

Section 9 of the POSH Act requires complaints to be filed within three months of the incident, extendable to six months in certain cases. In Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti (2025), the Supreme Court held that complaints must be filed within this period from the date of the last incident. The Court refused to treat a later administrative action as a fresh cause of action. As a result, the complaint was rejected as time-barred.

This highlights a structural problem. Victims often delay reporting due to fear, workplace power dynamics, and the time needed to process the experience. The current time limit does not account for these realities.

A 2024 Private Member's Bill proposed extending this period to twelve months, with flexibility to allow further delays. This proposal should be reintroduced as a Government Bill. In addition, ICCs should be required to record clear reasons when rejecting requests for delay condonation. These decisions should be open to appeal before the employer and then the District Officer. Labour Department inspections should also review how such decisions are handled.

III. Enact Statutory Protections against Retaliation

Section 19(e) of the POSH Act requires employers to prevent retaliation. However, this obligation is vague and lack enforcement mechanisms. There is no clear process for reporting retaliation, no fixed timeline for addressing it, and no consequences if employers fail to act. As a result, retaliation often occurs in subtle ways such as role changes, exclusion, or negative appraisals.

This gap requires a legislative amendment. The law should introduce three specific provisions. First, any adverse action taken against a complainant within twelve months should be presumed to be retaliatory unless the employer proves otherwise. Second, ICCs should be given clear authority to examine retaliation complaints. Third, proven retaliation should attract the same consequences as harassment, including disciplinary action and compensation.

The framework of the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 offers a useful model. This reform is limited in scope and can be introduced as a focused amendment.

IV. Strengthen Local Complaints Committees for the Unorganised Sector

For workplaces with fewer than ten employees or where the respondent is not an employee, the POSH Act relies on Local Complaints Committees (LCCs) at the district level. In theory, these bodies are essential for protecting workers in the unorganised sector. In practice, they are largely ineffective.

Many workers are unaware of LCCs. In several districts, these committees are either not properly constituted or lack visibility. Even where they exist, information about their functioning is limited.

The Supreme Court's 2025 survey order applies to LCCs as well. State authorities should publish details of all LCCs on the SHe-Box portal, including their composition and case statistics. District administrations should conduct regular awareness campaigns through local institutions such as Self-Help Groups and Panchayati Raj bodies. These measures do not require new laws. They require coordination and administrative effort.

V. Introduce Third-Party Audits and Integrate POSH into ESG Frameworks

The 2025 amendment to the Companies Rules has already improved disclosure requirements. The next step is independent verification. Self-reported data is often incomplete or understated.

SEBI's Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) framework already requires ESG disclosures from top listed companies. POSH compliance should be included within this framework as a measurable and verifiable parameter. This can include complaint ratios, resolution timelines, committee independence, and retaliation data. SEBI can implement this within its existing powers.

In addition, District Officers should conduct surprise audits of ICC functioning. These audits should go beyond checking whether committees exist and examine the quality and timeliness of inquiries. Karnataka's 2025 circular provides a useful model. A similar national approach would strengthen accountability.

The Tools Exist. The Question Is Whether They Will Be Used

The journey from Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) to the POSH Act, 2013, and then to the Supreme Court's 2025 directions reflects gradual progress in addressing workplace harassment. The law itself is not weak. The issue lies in its implementation.

Key systems already exist. SHe-Box is operational but underutilised. LCCs are mandated but not accessible. External members are required but not truly independent. The complaint window exists but is too restrictive.

Three of the five reforms outlined here require no legislative change. They can be implemented through administrative action. The remaining two require limited statutory amendments.

The path forward is clear. SEBI, the Ministry of Women and Child Development, and State authorities already have the power to act. What is needed is not new law, but the will to use existing mechanisms effectively.

The author is an Advocate based in Rajasthan. Views are personal.