When Tribunals Forget Their Limits: NCLT's Personal Summons And Boundaries Of Statutory Power

The National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, recently passed an order in Bank of India v B.E. Billimoria & Co. Ltd. (15 October 2025) directing the Chairman of a nationalised bank to appear in person and file a personal affidavit. The summons was issued in the course of a delay condonation application, where the Tribunal described the Chairman's conduct regarding the custody and handling of money as “unsatisfactory and unbecoming”.

The order cites no statutory provision empowering such a direction. It records no disobedience of any earlier Tribunal order. Although the NCLT is vested with contempt powers under section 425 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Tribunal did not invoke that jurisdiction. The order contains no allegation of wilful disobedience, no identification of any breached direction, and therefore no initiation of contempt proceedings.

In short, the NCLT has exercised a power that the statutory scheme does not authorise in the circumstances of the case. It bears emphasis that the Bench was acting as the Adjudicating Authority under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, where its powers are confined strictly to those conferred by the Code. The IBC does not permit inherent, supervisory, coercive or contempt authority beyond the statute, and certainly does not permit personal summons in the absence of a recorded disobedience or invocation of contempt jurisdiction.

This episode provides an important opportunity to revisit a foundational principle of Indian administrative law: a tribunal is a creature of statute. It can only do what the statute permits. It cannot borrow, expand, or improvise jurisdiction.

A Tribunal Is Not a Court of Plenary Jurisdiction

Unlike the High Courts and the Supreme Court, which are constitutional courts possessing wide-ranging inherent powers, tribunals such as the NCLT are established by legislation and derive all authority solely from statute.

The NCLT's jurisdiction over insolvency matters flows from the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the Companies Act, 2013. Neither statute confers on the Tribunal any form of inherent, supervisory, writ-like, or constitutional jurisdiction. Nor does the Tribunal, while acting as Adjudicating Authority under the Code, possess criminal contempt or civil contempt powers; these remain vested exclusively in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

When the Tribunal issues a direction compelling the personal presence of the Chairman of a public sector bank, it must be able to point to the provision of law that authorises such coercive action. The order does not identify any.

The only references to statutory provisions in the case on hand are to section 7 and section 60(5) of the IBC. Neither provision confers a power to summon public officers at the Adjudicating Authority's discretion. Section 60(5), often invoked as a residuary clause, cannot serve as a gateway to powers that the legislature has not granted. A residuary jurisdiction cannot be a substitute for constitutional authority.

The Supreme Court's Repeated Warnings Against Casual Summons

In State of Bihar and others v Ghanshyam Prasad Singh, a Bench of Justice B. R. Gavai (as he then was) and Justice J. B. Pardiwala held unequivocally that summoning senior officers cannot be a routine practice and should be resorted to only where there is patent disobedience. The Court cautioned that their presence in court wastes precious time and that such directions, rather than upholding the majesty of the Court, undermine it.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v Dr Manoj Kumar Sharma, the Supreme Court went further. It condemned the practice of calling officers at “the drop of a hat”, observing that such directions exert pressure on officials performing executive duties. The Court reminded the judiciary that it must not “behave like emperors”, and that the separation of powers requires officers to be permitted to discharge their public functions without unwarranted judicial intervention.

The same principle appears in earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. In R. S. Singh v U.P. Malaria Nirikshak Sangh (2011) 4 SCC 281 and in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v Jasvir Singh and others (2011) 4 SCC 288, the Court held that merely because a court does not accept a stand, it cannot summon senior officials repeatedly or issue threatening show cause notices. In Steel Authority of India Ltd. v Deby Lal Mahato [2008 INSC 382] and Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC 683, the Court reiterated the need for judicial modesty and constitutional discipline. Likewise, in State of Gujarat v Turabali Gulamhussain Hirani (2007) 14 SCC 94, the Court stated that frequent or casual summoning of high officials cannot be appreciated, and should occur only in rare and exceptional cases involving compelling circumstances.

If even constitutional courts, which possess inherent and contempt powers, are warned not to summon officers unnecessarily, the position of a statutory tribunal must be even more restrained.

Absence of Findings, Absence of Jurisdiction

A striking feature of the Adjudicating Authority's order is what it does not contain.

• It does not record that any order of the Adjudicating Authority has been disobeyed.
• It does not identify any statutory provision empowering personal summons.
• It does not articulate the factual basis for the allegation of “unsatisfactory and unbecoming” conduct.
• It does not explain why a General Manager or authorised officer of the Bank could not furnish clarifications.
• It does not establish how the Chairman's presence would assist the adjudication of a delay condonation application.

It must also be recognised that the Chairman of a public sector bank occupies a position of high responsibility, and his time is not a resource to be diverted for such mundane purposes without compelling legal justification.

Without statutory foundation or recorded reasons, a direction compelling personal appearance becomes unsustainable as a matter of administrative law. A tribunal cannot rely on undefined notions of supervisory or inherent authority. Nor can it issue coercive orders simply because it considers a party's explanation inadequate. Impatience or frustration, howsoever strongly felt, does not confer jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has emphasised that the power of the pen, not the threat of personal presence, is the true instrument of judicial authority. A tribunal must decide on the basis of law and evidence, not by summoning senior officials.

The Broader Consequences of Overreach

When tribunals exceed their statutory mandate, the impact is felt far beyond the immediate case.

• It creates uncertainty in the functioning of public institutions.
• It burdens senior officials whose time is required for governance and financial stability.
• It risks creating precedents that blur the boundary between statutory tribunals and constitutional courts.
• It encourages a culture where judicial indignation substitutes for reasoned adjudication.

Once such overreach is normalised, it cannot be confined to a single office or circumstance. Taken to its logical end, this reasoning would justify the Tribunal summoning even the Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, if it were displeased with the particulars of an application filed by the Union of India. That result, self-evidently untenable, illustrates why the discipline of jurisdiction must never be diluted.

Such patterns can also invite corrective intervention from appellate courts, leading to avoidable litigation and judicial resources being spent on rectifying procedural excesses instead of deciding substantive issues.

A Reminder of First Principles

Tribunals like the NCLT were established to provide specialised, efficient, and principled adjudication in economic and insolvency matters. Their legitimacy depends on adhering strictly to statutory limits and upholding the rule of law.

A tribunal has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has given it. When it compels the personal presence of the Chairman of a public sector bank without statutory authorisation, it exceeds that jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has said repeatedly: judicial authority is best exercised with restraint. That principle applies with even greater force to tribunals that do not possess the wide constitutional powers of the High Courts.

In the end, the strength of any adjudicatory institution lies not in the breadth of the powers it asserts, but in the discipline with which it abides by the limits Parliament has set. A tribunal that honours those limits enhances its own dignity; a tribunal that exceeds them places its own authority at risk. The Supreme Court has spent nearly two decades reminding judicial bodies that overreach is not a mark of vigour, but of abuse. It is a reminder worth repeating. As Shakespeare said in Measure for Measure, “O, it is excellent to have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant.”

The strongest judgments are those that persuade through reasoning, not those that command through summons. In the present case, impatience cannot be a source of power. The true majesty of adjudication lies not in what it can compel, but in what it chooses to forbear.

Rajasekhar V.K., Former Member (Judicial), National Company Law Tribunal. He continues to engage with insolvency and institutional reforms through writing, research, and advisory work too. Views are personal