Dhavan: Chandrachud J took the view that excluding women was a form of untouchability under Article 17 which was not agreed to by the majority (Misra CJ, Khanwilkar, Nariman JJ) and negated by Indu Malhotra J on the ground that places of worship were excluded from Article 17 by the Constituent Assembly.

A seemingly new test on essential practice was whether denying a practice constitutional recognition would alter the religion-its a too narrow test

Chandrachud J. took the view that balancing religious practice against the public interest could be a question of proportionality for compelling reasons in favour of anti-exclusion outright, so as to make the Court free from examining the tenets and belief of religion. The other majority judges concentrated on denying constitutional protection to the exclusion as an essential practice which was Chandrachud J’s alternative argument.

Nariman J referred to Ayyangar J’s judgment in Sardar Syedna, which interpreted Article 25(2)(a)(b) so that ‘such welfare and reform was not intended to ‘reform a religion out of existence or its identify’. However, although relevant, he ‘felt that this view could be tested in some future case’

Entire discussion over the last 4 days is decoding article 25 and 26 but I belief Article 27 and 28 is also important.

Refers to Article 25(1)- when we say freedom of conscience, we are raising a very big issue. I have a freedom of conscience to challenge anything-State, religion. This right is a very expansive right-it is a right given to all of us to question anything but respectfully and in a bonafide manner.

On I come to the term freely-a person belongs to a particular faith, he is a decident. Hinduism shows there is a plethora of people to freely take a distance from the main religion. They will say freely means my right to follow a religion or not follow a religion or there is something wrong with your religion- [cites Kaushal Kishore's parameters on hate speech].

@rdhavan