The Allahabad High Court has held that an offence under Section 467 IPC, which does not prescribe a minimum sentence of 7 years, cannot be classified as a "heinous offence" for the purposes of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act).

A bench of Justice Jai Prakash Tiwari held that the offence falls within the category of "serious offences" under the JJ Act.

Hence, it added, the Juvenile Justice Board could not transfer such a case to the Children's Court for a possible adult trial by invoking the statutory provisions applicable to heinous offences.

The Court thus allowed a criminal revision filed by a juvenile accused in a forgery case. It quashed the orders of the Juvenile Justice Board, Bulandshahr, and the Children's Court, which had upheld the transfer of the case for trial as an adult.

"The offence under Section 467 IPC charged against the revisionist cannot be categorized as 'heinous offence' under Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015", the Court held.

The matter was remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board, which was directed to conduct the inquiry in accordance with the procedure applicable to serious offences, “without subjecting the revisionist to any adult trial”.

Case In Brief

An FIR was lodged on June 30, 2016, by one Haji Rafeeq, against unknown persons in connection with alleged fraud and cheating involving Rs. 40 lakh.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against multiple accused, including the present revisionist, under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC.

The revisionist subsequently claimed that he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged incident.

The Juvenile Justice Board declared him a juvenile after it assessed his age at the time of the alleged offence as 16 years, 9 months and 7 days.

The Board further conducted a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the JJ Act and, by an order dated May 18, 2022, formed an opinion that the juvenile should be tried as an adult. It accordingly transferred the case to the Children's Court under Section 18(3) of the Act.

In July 2023, however, the Board held that the offence fell within the category of serious offences rather than heinous offences.

It subsequently rejected the juvenile's application seeking an inquiry before the Board, observing that the earlier transfer order remained valid and was beyond its power to review. The Children's Court upheld that decision on July 16, 2026.

Now, challenging the board's order as well as the order upholding it, the revisionist moved the HC wherein the Court framed the fundamental issue as:

"Whether an offence punishable under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which prescribes a punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and fine, but does not prescribe a minimum period of imprisonment of seven years, can be categorized as a 'heinous offence' within the ambit of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015".

For context, the issue was significant because the classification of an offence as 'heinous' or 'serious' under the JJ Act determines whether a child in conflict with law can be considered for transfer to the Children's Court for trial as an adult.

Under Section 15 of the JJ Act, the Board may conduct a preliminary assessment in cases involving heinous offences committed by children aged 16 years or above.

The assessment pertains to the child's mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, the ability to understand its consequences and also, the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed.

Section 18(3) empowers the Board to transfer the case to the Children's Court for trial as an adult if, following such assessment, it considers that there is a need for such a trial. The same thing happened in this case.

Furthermore, Section 2(33) of the JJ Act defines "heinous offences" as offences for which the minimum punishment under the IPC or any other law in force is imprisonment for 7 years or more.

Section 2(54), meanwhile, defines "serious offences" as offences for which the punishment under the IPC or any other law in force is imprisonment between 3 and 7 years.

The bench noted that Section 467 IPC, which concerns forgery of valuable security, a will or other specified documents, prescribes imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term that may extend to 10 years, along with a fine.

However, it does not prescribe a mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years.

Therefore, the bench referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2020 to observe that offences carrying a maximum sentence exceeding 7 years, including life imprisonment, but for which no minimum sentence of seven years or more is prescribed, cannot be treated as "heinous offences" under the Act.

In Shilpa Mittal, the Supreme Court held that such offences must be treated as "serious offences" until Parliament addresses the statutory gap.

Applying that principle to the present case, the High Court held that the offence under Section 467 IPC fell within the category of serious offences under Section 2(54) of the JJ Act.

The High Court also considered whether the Board could continue to send the matter to the Children's Court merely because it lacked the power to review or recall its earlier transfer order.

The Court held that the Board's inability to review its earlier order could not justify continuing proceedings before the Children's Court when the statutory requirements for transferring the case for an adult trial were not satisfied.

"Statutory jurisdiction can neither be created nor abdicated on the pretext of procedural constraints or an inability to recall an order. An order passed by a court or board lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void ab initio", the Court observed.

It further held that since the offence was serious and not heinous, the Board had no statutory authority to invoke Sections 15 and 18(3) of the JJ Act. It found that the Children's Court had consequently erred in affirming its jurisdiction over the case.

Allowing the revision, the High Court quashed the Juvenile Justice Board's order and the Children's Court's order upholding it. The revision plea was allowed.