The Allahabad High Court has observed that conversion to another religion, by itself, does not automatically end a person's Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.

The Court said that whether a person continues to remain a member of a ST is a question of fact, to be determined by examining the essential attributes of tribal identity, including customary practices, social organization, community life and acceptance by the concerned tribal community

A bench of Justice Arun Kumar made the observation while relying extensively on Supreme Court's 2026 judgment in Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others.

In this case, the Top Court had held that the determination of Scheduled Tribe status must turn upon whether the claimant "continues to possess" the tribal identity.

Case in brief

Nanhki @ Naimunnisha, who claimed to be from the Bhuiyan ST community, challenged 3 separate orders passed by the Deputy Collector, Duddhi, Sonbhadra, declaring 3 land transfers in her favour as void.

The transfers were found to be in violation of provisions of Section 157-B of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950/Section 99 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Consequently, it was directed that the land vest in the State Government.

For context, Section 157-B of the 1950 Act and Section 99 of the 2006 Code restrict the transfer of land belonging to a Scheduled Tribe to a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe.

The petitioner, however, claimed that she was born into the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe (ST) and had a valid ST certificate issued by the Tehsildar.

She also argued that the vendors of the disputed land belonged to the Gour Scheduled Tribe and, therefore, the transactions were between members of Scheduled Tribes and hence valid.

The State, on the other hand, disputed whether she continued to hold her tribal status.

It relied on material showing that the petitioner had married a Muslim man according to Islamic rites, subsequently came to be known as Naimunnisha, lived with him for several decades and had 2 children bearing Muslim names. The family register also recorded her religion as Muslim.

In essence, it was the State's case that her ST status had ceased to be available to her by the relevant date in view of her subsequent religious and social identity.

In response, the petitioner argued that she continued to belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe and had not abandoned her original religion or tribal identity despite marrying a Muslim.

It was her categorical submission that she continued to live in her village and follow the customs of the Scheduled Tribe, and that there was no reliable evidence demonstrating her severance from the Bhuiyan community.

High Court's observations

At the outset, the High Court stated that there can be no broad proposition of law that a person ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe merely by reason of change of religion.

The bench added that, even after conversion, a person can continue to be a member of the tribe, and that this is essentially a question of fact to be determined with reference to tribal traits, customs, traditions, and a continuing connection with the tribal community. In this regard, the bench extensively relied upon Top Court's Chinthada Anand ruling and observed thus:

"…the Supreme Court has clarified that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not prescribe any religion-based exclusion and that the determination of Scheduled Tribe status must turn upon whether the claimant continues to possess and is recognised for the essential attributes of tribal identity, including customary practices, social organisation, community life and acceptance by the concerned tribal community".

Applying this principle to the present case, the Court considered the circumstances over several decades, her marriage, subsequent name, family life, names of her children, the family-register entry and other inquiry material.

It found that the petitioner had not produced convincing evidence that she remained connected with the Bhuiyan community.

"What is of particular importance is the absence of convincing evidence from the petitioner showing continuity of her connection with the Bhuiyan community. Upon consideration of the material placed before the competent authority and the material brought on record before this Court, the Court finds that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established continuity of her connection with the Bhuiyan community by producing credible material demonstrating that, notwithstanding those circumstances, she continued to follow the customs and traditions of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, continued to participate in its social and community life and continued to be recognised and accepted by that community", the bench remarked.

Importantly, the Court said it was not applying a rigid test. It clarified that a person cannot be required to prove that she observed every custom of the community throughout her life. Similarly, a single document describing a person as Muslim cannot by itself determine Scheduled Tribe status.

However, in the present case, the Court's conclusion was based on the "cumulative effect of the circumstances" and, importantly, on the absence of evidence establishing continuity of tribal life.

The Court also considered the petitioner's Scheduled Tribe certificate. It said that the certificate was "undoubtedly a relevant piece of evidence", but its existence did not prevent the authorities from examining whether she continued to possess the requisite ST status when later material bearing on that status came before them.

Ultimately, the High Court found that the petitioner had failed to establish that she continued to hold Bhuiyan ST status on the dates the disputed sale deeds were executed.

"…the material relied upon by the respondents indicates that, for several decades, she lived under a different name and within a different religious and social setting", it said.

The Court made it clear that its conclusion was not based merely on her marriage, the allegation of conversion, or the isolated entry showing her religion as Muslim.

Rather, it was based on the prolonged circumstances brought on record and the absence of convincing material showing continued adherence to Bhuiyan customs, participation in community life and acceptance by the Bhuiyan community.

Therefore, the Court held that the transactions were subject to the statutory prohibition applicable to transfers in favor of persons who did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe.

The writ petitions were accordingly dismissed and the orders of the revenue authority were affirmed.

Case title - Nanhki @ Naimunnisha vs. State of U.P. and 3 others along with connected petitions 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 705

Case Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 705

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