The Allahabad High Court has held that a police officer cannot be dismissed from service under Rule 8(2)(a) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 merely because he stands convicted on a criminal charge, unless the disciplinary authority has first considered the conduct which led to that conviction.

It held that such consideration is a condition precedent to the authority acquiring jurisdiction to impose the punishment of dismissal.

Rule 8(2) of the Rules of 1991 bars the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a police officer except after proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings. Clause (a) of the proviso to Rule 8(2) takes out of that requirement cases where the officer is dealt with on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. The Court noted that the provision is pari materia with the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

The bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Indrajeet Shukla held,

“Such consideration was a condition precedent to the competent authority acquiring jurisdiction to impose the punishment of dismissal. The order impugned in the writ petition, however, is conspicuously silent on this aspect and nowhere reflects any application of mind to the respondent's conduct underlying his conviction. Before passing the order of dismissal, the disciplinary authority was required to weigh such conduct and only thereafter settle upon the appropriate punishment.”

Respondent, a Constable, was convicted in Sessions Trial under Sections 304-B, 201 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the maximum term awarded being ten years rigorous imprisonment. On that ground, the disciplinary authority dismissed him from service by order dated 25^th July 2006, passed in exercise of power under Rule 8(2)(a) of the Rules of 1991.

He approached the High Court by writ petition about seven years later, filing it immediately upon his release from prison. The petition was allowed on 3^rd October 2013, condoning the delay on the ground that the petitioner had remained continuously incarcerated and was thereby kept from coming to Court earlier. The dismissal order was set aside, reinstatement with consequential benefits directed, and liberty granted to the State to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.

The Single Judge proceeded on the principle that an order of dismissal, removal or termination founded on conduct which has led to a criminal conviction cannot stand where the disciplinary authority has not itself considered that conduct.

Challenging that judgment in special appeal, the State urged that Criminal Appeal against the conviction was still pending and the conviction recorded by the trial court therefore subsisted. It was further urged that the writ petition, instituted about seven years after the dismissal order, was barred by laches.

On delay, the Court held that what falls for examination is the sufficiency of the cause, not the length of the delay.

“Delay of a few days cannot be condoned if sufficient cause is not disclosed explaining it, but even a massive delay may be condoned if reasons pass the muster of sufficiency of cause.”

It noted that in HD Bora v. State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court condoned a delay of 30 years, holding that technical pleas such as laches cannot be used to defeat substantive rights. In Mool Chandra v. Union of India, the cause of delay rather than its period was emphasised.

Since imprisonment had kept the respondent from the Court, a reason beyond his control, the Court held that sufficient cause stood made out.

“It is the duty of Constitutional Courts to remove injustice and overlook delay and laches where they are not attributable to a lack of bona fides or gross negligence on the part of the litigant.”

The Court held that the disciplinary authority was bound to first weigh the conduct that had led to the conviction in the Sessions trial. Observing that the dismissal order was silent on that aspect, the Court held that the order could not be sustained.

Noting that the Rules of 1991 make three major penalties available: removal from service, dismissal from service, and reduction in rank, including reduction to a lower scale, the Court held

“Where more than one major penalty is available, conduct that has led to conviction on a criminal charge, even where terminal in character, requires scrutiny by the disciplinary authority in order to reasonably and fairly choose between the penalties available, having regard to considerations of proportionality.”

The Court further held that the powers of a Single Judge and those of a Bench hearing an intra-court appeal are co-extensive. It held that only errors of principle fall for examination in its corrective jurisdiction.

“Thus, in the intra-Court appellate jurisdiction interference is only warranted where the judgment or order under challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity. Such jurisdiction ought not be invoked merely because another view is possible on the same set of facts, particularly, when the view adopted by the Single Judge is a plausible and reasonable one.”

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the special appeal. It held that the consequential benefits payable to the respondent shall abide by the fresh decision to be taken by the disciplinary authority upon due consideration of the conduct which led to his conviction.

Case Title: State of U.P. and 3 Ors. vs. Raj Narain Yadav Constable 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 540

Case Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 540

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