A bench of Justice Salil Kumar Rai and Justice Dr Ajay Kumar-II issued the directive after taking exception to a case where both the investigating officer and the trial Court judge treated a homicidal death under Section 304-B alone, completely ignoring the contents of the dying declaration, which clearly alleged murder.

The Court, however, set aside the conviction and life sentence of a man in connection with a 1988 case of the death of his wife. The bench found that the prosecution had failed to prove any specific instance of cruelty or a “proximate and live link” to dowry harassment soon before the wife's death.

Case in brief

The first informant (father of the deceased woman) lodged an FIR on March 1, 1988, against the appellant-accused Chandra Bhan (Husband of the deceased) and three others, alleging that his daughter was physically tortured and burnt to death by them over an unfulfilled dowry demand for a scooter or ₹10,000.

Though the FIR was lodged under Section 302 IPC, a chargesheet was submitted under Sections 304-B, 498-A IPC, and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, upon which the trial court took cognizance. Charges were subsequently framed only under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC.

Ultimately, on October 4, 1989, the trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants Chandra Bhan and Jairam to life terms in jail under Section 304-B IPC.

However, during the pendency of the appeal, co-accused Jairam passed away, and therefore, the proceedings continued solely for the surviving appellant-husband (Chandra Bhan).

In his appeal, the Appellant-accused contended that there was no evidence of cruelty due to non-fulfilment of the additional demand of dowry soon before death, and the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.

High Court's observations

Dealing with the appeal, the High Court perused a letter written by the deceased to her father in November 1987, which completely belied the prosecution's dowry theory.

The letter revealed that the deceased was highly distressed because her husband was frequently staying at the residence of his widowed sister-in-law. The Court noted that the actual bone of contention was the deceased's apprehension of an illicit relationship, not a demand for dowry.

The High Court thoroughly analysed the testimonies of the parents (PW-1 and PW-2) and observed that their allegations regarding the dowry demand were general and vague without giving any specific details of any instance of cruelty or harassment meted out to the deceased.

The bench noted that it is one thing to make a demand for dowry, but entirely another to inflict cruelty for dowry. Relying on the Supreme Court judgments in Karan Singh vs. State of Haryana 2025, the bench observed thus:

"Even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death by the accused. Unless the said burden is discharged by the prosecution, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked".

The bench observed that even if it is presumed that there was any demand of dowry, even then the prosecution has also miserably failed to prove that the aforesaid demand of dowry was ever made soon before the death of the deceased.

The Court found that the last alleged instance of friction occurred in October 1987, while the death took place at the end of February 1988. This time gap snapped the required "proximate and live link," making the allegations stale.

"…there is no proximate and live link between death of the deceased and cruelty or harassment made for demand of dowry by the appellants…we are therefore, of the opinion that the alleged harassment, if any, was not having any proximate and live link between death of the deceased and her harassment for alleged dowry demand as she died on 1.3.1988", the bench noted.

The High Court further noted that the dying declaration of the deceased, which claimed her husband and in-laws poured kerosene on her, stood highly compromised by surrounding circumstances, rendering it "not free from doubts".

The bench took into account the medical records, which showed that the husband himself sustained 15% thermal burn injuries on his hands and face.

The bench said that there was a greater possibility of appellant, accused Chandra Bhan, trying to save his wife on seeing her burning.

Furthermore, the husband did not flee; he personally brought the deceased to the Hospital and was present when the informant arrived.

Importantly, the High Court observed that though the dying declaration pointed toward a homicide, the appellant could not be straightaway convicted under Section 302 IPC by the appellate court.

"The appellant- accused were not tried under Section 302 IPC. Even no question has been put to the appellant accused regarding commission of murder of the deceased by pouring kerosene oil on her and thereafter burning her in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC", the bench noted.

The Court referred to the Apex Court's judgment in the case of Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka 2001, to note that Section 302 IPC is a distinct and graver offence, not a cognate or "minor offence" to Section 304-B under Section 222 CrPC.

However, it stressed that since no charge had been framed under Section 302 IPC and incident pertains to the year 1988, therefore, it was not appropriate to remand the matter back to the learned trial Court for retrial of the appellant after framing appropriate charges.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the surviving appellant was acquitted of all charges.

However, taking a strict view of the procedural lapses, the Court issued the following clear directions for the Judicial Officers in the state:

• Trial Courts must meticulously evaluate both direct and circumstantial evidence collected during investigations before framing charges.
• If there is prima facie material indicating a homicidal death inside the matrimonial home, the trial court is duty-bound to frame the main charge under Section 302 IPC and an alternative charge under Section 304-B IPC.
• While the addition of Section 302 should not be mechanical, it must be the primary focus whenever a distinct case of homicide is established.

The High Court directed that a copy of this judgment be circulated to all Judicial Officers across the State of Uttar Pradesh through the Registrar (Compliance) to prevent future miscarriages of justice.

Also read: Mechanical Addition Of S. 302 IPC 'Unsustainable': Allahabad HC Explains When Trial Courts Can Add Murder Charge In Dowry Death Cases