Introduction Or Expansion Of Religious Practices Which Disrupt Social Balance Not Protected U/Art 25, 26: Allahabad HC

The Allahabad High Court has observed that the introduction or expansion of a religious use or practice not previously prevalent, particularly where it disturbs the existing social balance, is not protected under Articles 25 and 26.

The bench added that the State is not required to wait for an actual disruption and may take reasonable preventive measures where such activity is likely to affect public life.

With these observations, a bench of Justice Saral Srivastava and Justice Garima Prashad dismissed a writ petition filed by one Aseen, who had sought a direction to the authorities to provide security and permission to offer Namaz on a piece of land in a Village of District Sambhal.

The petitioner claimed ownership of the private property based on a June 2023 gift deed and argued that the respondent authorities were restraining such prayers, thereby violating his fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

The State, on the other hand, claimed that the land in question is recorded as Abadi land, which is land meant for public use and that the petitioner has no ownership rights over the same.

Importantly, the bench was apprised that Namaz has traditionally been offered at the said location only on the occasion of Eid, and that no restriction has been imposed on this established practice.

However, it was further submitted that the petitioner was attempting to introduce regular large-scale congregational prayers by inviting persons from within and outside the village.

The state categorically argued that while religious practices are to be respected, no new traditions or non-traditional activities can be permitted, and that established practices must be adhered to in order to maintain public order.

In its order, the bench noted that while the Constitution protects the right to practice religion, it also makes it clear that this right is subject to public order, morality and health.

The bench stressed that the right to practice religion is not an unlimited right and must be exercised in a way that does not affect others or disrupt the normal functioning of public life.

Importantly, the bench opined that existing lawful religious practices and long-regulated arrangements or permissions granted for limited or specific purposes may stand on their own footing, but no new or unilateral claim can be founded merely on religion or personal preference.

The bench clarified that the State is constitutionally entitled, and in appropriate cases duty-bound, to prevent the use of public land without lawful authority.

Regarding private religious activities on private land, the Court observed that private prayers, family worship, and other limited devotional activities ordinarily fall within the protected domain of religious freedoms under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

However, it clarified that this protection is confined to activity that is truly private, occasional, and non-disruptive and it does not extend to transforming any private premises into a de facto public religious venue.

The bench underscored that where a religious activity extends beyond the private sphere and begins to affect the public domain, lawful regulation will follow.

Further, the Court clarified that the law does not require the authorities to wait for an actual disturbance to occur and where an activity is likely to affect public order, the State is entitled to act in advance.

"The test is not the religious nature of the activity, but its public consequences. This approach is consistent with the constitutional principle of secularism, which requires equal treatment of all religions and equal application of law. While the State must permit private worship, it is equally bound to regulate activities that affect public order, whether on public land or on private premises. Maintaining this balance is essential to the working of Articles 25 and 26 in a constitutional system," the bench remarked.

On the merits of the case, the bench noted that the land in question is recorded as public land and the claim of ownership is based only on vague boundary descriptions.

Even otherwise, the Court said, if the land is assumed to be private, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief as he is introducing a new religious practice.

"The record shows that he is not protecting an existing practice, but seeking to introduce regular congregational gatherings, including persons from within and outside the village. It is admitted that Namaz was earlier offered only on specific occasions such as Eid. This expansion beyond a limited private sphere falls outside the protected domain and is subject to regulation", the Court noted.

In these circumstances, finding that no enforceable legal right was made out, the bench dismissed the writ petition.