The Allahabad High Court has held that the exclusion of Shiksha Mitras from the Special Teacher Eligibility Test notified for in-service teachers does not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

It held that teachers already in service when the Teacher Eligibility Test was made mandatory form a distinct class, and that the Special TET is a transitional measure enabling that class to acquire a qualification imposed on them after they entered service.

The Government Order dated 2.9.2026 directed the Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission, Prayagraj to hold a Special TET, and the Commission's notification dated 3.9.2026 scheduled it to commence from 3.11.2026. Eligibility was confined to specified categories of serving teachers, including special teachers engaged for Children with Special Needs on contract or daily wages. Shiksha Mitras were left out.

Justice Manju Rani Chauhan held,

“The impugned Government Order is not a measure regulating a fresh recruitment process, nor does it create a preferential avenue of appointment or promotion in favour of one class of aspirants. Its object is confined to provide an opportunity to teachers already in service to fulfil the qualification which the Supreme Court in view of notification of the NCTE has held to be mandatory for their continuation in service. The petitioners, admittedly not occupying the status of in-service teachers, cannot therefore claim parity with a class to which they do not belong.”

The 221 petitioners, Shiksha Mitras serving in different districts of Uttar Pradesh, said they had been teaching in primary and upper-primary schools run by the Board of Basic Education for roughly 26 years. They sought quashing of the Government Order and the advertisement to the extent that these shut them out of the examination.

Their counsel argued that no intelligible differentia separated them from the categories permitted to appear, and that the exclusion bore no rational nexus with the object of the examination. Reliance was placed on Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar and D.S. Nakara v. Union of India on classification under Article 14, and on Amita v. Union of India for the proposition that Article 16 protects the stages preceding appointment, including participation in a prescribed eligibility examination.

Counsel added that Shiksha Mitras prepare lesson plans, maintain attendance, canvass enrolment, assist with mid-day meals and perform census and election duties, and relied on an office order of the Block Education Officer, Jasra, Prayagraj, jointly rostering them with Assistant Teachers for a five-day Foundation Literacy and Numeracy training under the NIPUN Bharat Mission.

Counsel for the Commission submitted that the Government Order merely implemented the Supreme Court's order dated 29.05.2026 in review, which extended the period under Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 up to 31.08.2028, and that the petitioners, though eligible, had not sat the regular TET held in July 2026.

The Court held that the mode, source and legal framework of engagement of Shiksha Mitras differed fundamentally from those governing Assistant Teachers appointed against regular substantive posts before the NCTE notification dated 23.08.2010 made TET essential. For that earlier class, TET operated as a post-entry statutory requirement rather than a condition of original appointment, it held.

Referring to State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, the Court held that the distinguishing circumstance was existing service coupled with the judicially declared obligation to acquire TET within the period fixed by the Supreme Court, and that the object was to secure compliance without disrupting the teaching establishment and the elementary education of children.

“The principle is succinctly stated, the Constitution guarantees equality before law, not uniformity irrespective of relevant differences, it requires equals to be treated equally and permits unequals, where rationally distinguished, to be treated differently.”

Since the Government Order implemented the binding directions of the Supreme Court in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust, the Court held that it could not be assailed on the premise that those directions were legally erroneous, a writ court being unable to sit in appeal over a judgment of the Supreme Court.

On Article 16, the Court held that the Special TET creates no post and confers no right of appointment, leaving the petitioners free to compete in any recruitment on the qualifications lawfully prescribed.

“The distinction between qualification and appointment is decisive. Clearing the Special TET merely satisfies an eligibility requirement, it does not translate into appointment. No post is reserved, no recruitment avenue is created, and no preferential right to future appointment or promotion is conferred upon the persons permitted to appear therein.”

Rejecting the claim of parity, the Court observed

“The question is consequently not whether the petitioners and in-service teachers are both capable of taking TET, but whether they occupy the same legal position for the purpose of the special examination. In simple words the answer is in negative.”

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.